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ABSTRACT
This study examines the legal bases for the protection of 
human rights in the constitutional development of Zambia, and 
indicates how they have operated in practice. The approach adopted 
in discussing this subject is comparative in that the Zambian 
experiences and events are related to those that have taken place in 
other Commonwealth African countries, or indeed in any common law 
jurisdiction.
The work is divided into four parts and consists of ten 
chapters.
The idea that there must be some limits to the power of the state 
to interfere with man’s rights is not new. Chapter One in Part I 
therefore traces the evolution of the idea of human rights as rooted 
in the theories of "natural law" and "natural rights". It also 
examines the influence and impact of international law on the 
development and spread of human rights throughout the world, not least 
in Africa.
The doctrine of "inalienable" human rights was borrowed by Africa 
from Europe and from America. Chapter Two discusses this theme and 
unfolds the avenues through which this doctrine found its way into 
the many independence constitutions of Africa. Chapter Three, on the 
other hand, examines the legal mechanisms through which human rights 
were protected and invaded during the colonial era before independence. 
The decision finally to incorporate a bill of rights in the self- 
government of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) was, as elsewhere in 
Africa, precipitated by certain active political, economic and social 
issues. Chapter Four discusses these.
Part II opens with Chapter Five which examines the content 
and salient features of the Zambian Bill of Rights. Chapter Six 
examines the role played by the courts in the enforcement of the 
guaranteed rights. The nature of the conflict between the over­
riding needs of socio-economic development in an emergent state and 
the protection of property rights are analysed in Chapter Seven.
In Part III, the question whether a one-party state constitutes 
a threat to human rights, and to democracy and to constitutionalism 
is discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine.
Part IV concludes the work with Chapter Ten appraising the 
problems affecting the constitutional protection of human rights in 
Africa, and suggests some alternative modes for their protection.
 ^
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PART I
AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The topic of the constitutional protection of human rights 
in this inquiry is primarily discussed in the light of the 
experiences derived from Zambia.
The Republic of Zambia (formerly the British Protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia) came into existence in 1964, when independence 
was granted to the territory by Britain. Zambia was the first 
country in the Commonwealth to attain a republican status at 
independence. The country lies in the interior of Central Africa, 
and shares borders to the north with Zaire and Tanzania, to the 
east with Malawi and Mozambique, to the south with Rhodesia and 
Namibia (South-West Africa), and to the west with Angola. It lies 
between latitude 8° and 18° south of the Equator and longitude 22° 
and 34° east.
According to the 1976 estimates,* 5,138,000 people occupy 
some 290,586 square miles. Seventy per cent of these live in 
rural areas where they pursue a traditional mode of agricultural 
cultivation, and the remaining one-third live in urban centres 
along tha line,of rail. Zambia is a multi-racial society, with 
around 50,000 Europeans and 13,000 Asians. These form the main 
minority groups. All these minorities live overwhelmingly in 
town exercising a considerable, albeit declining influence in 
business, commerce, and the civil service.
Lusaka, with a total population of 401,000, is the capital.
The other principal towns include Kitwe, Ndola, Chingola, Mufulira, 
Luanshya, Kabwe and Livingstone.
18
Also, as a result of prolonged missionary activity, most
Africans and whites are Christians. Asians are mostly Hindus or
Muslims. The main Christian denominations include Anglicans,
Roman Catholics, Seventh Day Adventists, Salvation Army,
2Methodists Episcopal, and the controversial Watch Tower Jehovah1s 
Witnesses and the Lenshinas (followers of the Lumpa Church led by 
"prophetess" Alice Lenshina).
The African community in Zambia, like most African communities 
elsewhere in Africa south of the Sahara, is not homogeneous, being 
made up of a number of ethnic groupings - popularly known as "tribes". 
Up to seventy-two of such groupings are distinguishable - with about 
an equivalent number of "dialectics". Even so, English is the 
official language for administrative and business purposes. There 
are at least four main local languages, viz., Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga 
and Lozi.
In terms of the constitutional history of Zambia, a bill of rights 
was first written in the country’s self-government constitution of 1963. 
The Independence Constitution of 1964 retained the bill of rights, 
and so did the current One-Party Constitution (effective on 
13th December 1973). The bill of rights which was first introduced 
in Zambia in 1963 was copied from the Nigerian Bill of Rights of 1960, 
which in turn traced its origins directly to the European Convention 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 1950. The European Convention 
was itself inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
But the origins of human rights go much further in European history 
than is sometimes imagined.
Human Rights in World History
If there is any demonstrably valid truth about the concept
of "human rights", it is that in order to understand its present-
day characteristics and its justification from the constitutional
theory point of view, one should, perhaps, have recourse to its
history in order to show how the concept has persistently
developed under different social and political conditions, and how
these have determined its content and pattern of development.
Unlike many legal concepts in the common law sphere, the idea of
"human rights", known as "natural rights" in its historical times,
has its ancestry stretching far back to the ancient regimes of the
West, and has developed as an aspect of Western political
philosophies. To this end the notion of "human rights", even in
its present-day manifestation, owes much of its background to
3
"the Judeo-Greco-Roman-Christian traditions" which have also 
undoubtedly shaped various facets of the European model of 
constitutionalism. In this chapter what we have tried to do is to 
present a bare outline of the early development of the idea of 
human rights in Western Europe and America up until the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations 
in 1948, and also moving from there to the proclamation of the 
European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (and its 
five protocols) in 1950. We discuss the impact which the Universal 
Declaration made in arousing the human rights consciousness among 
the peoples of the Third World, in the Indian sub-continent and in 
Africa, and how this fact alone constituted a driving force in 
forging the movements of nationalism in the Third World areas. In 
the second place we indicate the role played by the European
20
Convention in the spread of human rights in many of the 
Commonwealth African independence constitutions in the later 
part of the 1950’s and in the early 1960's.
It will thus be noted that these two documents are of 
special relevance to any discussion of human rights within the 
context of any African Commonwealth country with a bill of rights, 
or which has had one. The relevance of the documents lies in the 
fact that it is from these that the rights and freedoms enshrined 
in the constitutions of newly independent states were derived.
But, as will be shown in due course, the rights and freedoms which 
found their way into the Universal Declaration, and later on into 
the European Convention, were themselves a restatement of the 
classical natural rights which had been achieved in England, America 
and France, and which had already been apparent in the early Greek 
city-states, and in the Roman and medieval Christian times - 
confirming our point here that the concept of human rights displays 
a characteristic continuity in its development from times of 
antiquity.
i) The substance of the concept of "natural rights"
Both in its historical manifestation and in its present- 
day implications, the idea of ’’natural rights" or human 
rights concerns itself with the problem of defining the 
relationship between the individual and the community. It 
concerns itself with the notion that the individual in the 
total scheme of the political community must be guarded 
against the arbitrary or oppressive conduct of those 
exercising power, or against the abuses of power. Professor 
Lauterpacht who notes, as asserted above, that the content of
21
human rights both in its historical and present perspective 
has always remained essentially the same, neatly summarizes 
the definition of the concept:
"The substance of natural rights has been the denial of 
the absoluteness of the State and of its unconditional 
claim to obedience; the assertion of the value and 
of the freedom of the individual as against the State; 
the view that the power of the State and of its rulers 
is derived ultimately from the assent of those who 
compose the political community; and the insistence 
that there are limits to the power of the State to 
interfere with man's rights to do what he conceives 
to be his duty".^
But although this is an accurate definition of "natural
rights", a distinction can be drawn between the nature of
the restrictions imposed upon those in power in ancient
regimes and those in power in modern governments. In ancient
times the restrictions thrown upon rulers meant, at most, only
moral prohibitions, and were therefore in no way "legally"
enforceable individual rights of the subjects."* It is only
in the course of historical times, more specifically after the
victory of the theory of "legal positivism", that those
rights were transformed into statutory law.
One further preliminary point ought to be stated here, 
and this is that the theory of "natural rights" of man directly 
developed from the doctrine of natural law - or, as Sir Norman 
Anderson put it, that "it was the doctrine of natural law which 
was the direct progenitor of the concept of human rights". 
According to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who is considered to be 
the founder of the modern theory of natural law, the doctrine of 
a Law of Nature could still be "viable and convincing^ even if 
there were no God, or if the affairs of men were no concern to 
him".^ As a result of the popularization of this view by those
22
who followed Grotius, the whole concept of natural law 
underwent a change from an emphasis on natural 
insistence on natural rights; that is, "from an appeal to 
a divine law which man, as a rational creature, ’.could in 
part discern and apply to a proclamation of the inherent and
g
sacred rights of man". And "human rights" is but the present- 
day name for what has traditionally been known as "natural 
rights".
There is also a further important difference between the 
contemporary movements for human rights and the earlier 
tradition of the "natural and inalienable rights of man".
The earlier tradition of natural rights was primarily a system 
of protection of individual citizens against the tyranny of 
an absolute monarch or a despot. On the other hand, the 
contemporary scheme of human rights is a system of protection 
^^"^the majority who happen to rule and who therefore wield the 
executive and legislative power of the state.
What then are the major evolutionary phases of the idea of 
natural rights? A useful starting point in our survey of the 
evolution of the twin ideas of "natural law" and "natural 
rights" is with the early ideologies of the Greek city-state, 
the polis, noting from there how the natural law traditions 
survived through early Roman times into early Christian times, 
and finally how the concept was received in feudal Europe 
(especially in England and France), and how the newly founded 
colonies of America benefited politically from the natural 
rights theories. It is at this point in time that natural 
rights were transformed into statutory law and later became to
23
be accepted as norms of international law with the solemn
United Nations1 Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
ii) The role of Ancient Greece
Early Greek law and religion recognized two types of
laws, viz., the law of "God" and the law of the "State".
The early Greeks believed in the existence of a series of
gods exercising authority in many facets of the citizens1
life. They also believed that the commands emanating from
these gods stood above those exercised by secular rulers.
From this a distinction was made between the "higher norms of
the divine power", that is the rules making up what we call
"natural law", and the commands of the State which, if they
are found at variance with the former, need not be observed
because they are of a type inferior or subordinate to the
9
"unwritten laws of heaven". In this sense the Greek theory 
of natural law restricted the area of secular authority and 
activity by requiring conformity to a norm postulated to 
exist at a higher level. This in a sense could be looked upon 
as an early manifestation of the concept of "constitutionalism" 
since in essence it claimed limitation of arbitrariness of 
state power as against individuals or the citizenry at large.^
In the second place it is a well known fact in political 
philosophy and jurisprudence that democracy first developed and 
was practised by the Ancient Greeks. The notions of "equality" 
and "justice" also trace their ancestry from the early Greeks.
In the early Greek city-state or polis citizens enjoyed political 
and civil freedoms and rights - hence Greek isotimia or 
equal respect for all. They were also protected against
3 4
tyranny by respect for the law and other legal restraint on 
government - hence Greek isonomia or equality before the law 
as contrasted to arbitrary rule. Greeks also enjoyed freedom 
of speech - hence the Greek isogoria or equal freedom of 
speech.* *
But of course when discussing the early Greeks1 practice 
of natural rights, one has to bear in mind that the "nation" was 
narrowly conceived and was a mere reflection of those societies' 
prevailing social and political circumstances. For example, 
women, resident aliens and slaves were excluded from enjoying 
many civil and political rights. Moreover, Greek democracy, 
and therefore citizens' rights, operated in a small city-state, 
and for this reason cannot be a practical model for a large 
modem industrial state, with its complex governmental 
institutions. However, in spite of this, the point posited above 
remains valid, that the Greeks laid down the foundations of the 
essential elements of the idea of "human rights" by constructing 
a political scheme which tended to place limitations on 
governmental power in order to safeguard individual rights and 
freedoms. ^
iii). The role of the Roman legal theories
When the Greek city-states collapsed, the natural law 
tradition was taken up by a number of Roman philosophers known 
as the "Sophists". The starting point in Stoa philosophical 
conception was to reject the Greek ideal of justice by 
contending that "there should not be a different city-state 
each with its own peculiar system of justice". Instead the
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the Sophists placed the concept of "nature" in "the centre
of their philosophical system". "Nature" in Stoa language
meant "the ruling principle of the whole universe", which
was identified with God. In the second place, these
philosophers taught that man being a rational being was
attributed with the capacity to know about the law of nature
13through "the dictates of reason". From a combination of 
these two propositions arose the Stoa.ideal of a world-state 
"founded on the equality of all men and the universality of 
natural law". Cicero (106-43 BC) , a great Roman lawyer and 
statesman, summarised the substance of Stoa philosophy thus:
" And there will not be different laws at Rome
and at Athens, or different laws n w and in the 
future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will 
be valid for all nations and for all times, and 
there will be one master and one ruler, that is,
God, over us all, for He is the author of this law, 
its promulgator, and its enforcing judge".14
What contribution, then, did the Stoa philosophy make towards
the evolution of "natural rights" within the context of
Roman political set-up? In the first place, like the early
Greeks, from which much of this philosophy drew upon, state
legislative activity could only be valid if it passed the
tests provided by the "cosmic, natural order". In the second
place, it will be seen from the expositions of Stoa
philosophy thereabove that the Stoic version of natural law
also emphasized the principle of "equality". Thus:
"The Stoic philosophers were convinced that men were 
essentially equal and that discriminations between 
them on account of sex, class, race, or nationality 
were unjust and contrary to the law of nature".^
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Essentially because of the impact made by Stoic philosophy 
the idea of human equality constituted an essential feature
in the political philosophy of the Roman Empire, and further
16gave growth to the humanitarian and egalitarian ideas.
But what, in fact, was the reality of the Roman ideal 
of equality? Paradoxically, the objectives pursued by the 
Stoa was never put into practice. Thus differences between 
the legal status of free citizens and slaves, or between 
natives and foreigners were, as in the Greek polis, never 
eliminated. The reason for this in the Roman Empire might 
have been due to the appeals made by other new doctrines.
Thus the classical Roman jurist Gaius, in his book the 
"Institutes'1 (AD 161), made a distinction between two species 
of laws: the jus civile and the jus gentium. The former
was a law applicable to Roman citizens only. The latter was 
that body of rules which were applied in controversies 
involving non-citizens of Rome. To this dichotomy was added 
the third body of law, the jus naturale, i.e., the law of 
nature. From this categorization of legal institutions, it 
was now claimed that the institution of slavery and the 
treatment of aliens in a discriminatory manner was justified 
on the ground that it was part of the jus gentium, that is, 
the law applicable to non-citizens of Rome. Thus exclaimed 
the jurist Florentinus, "slavery is an institution of the jus 
gentium by which, contrary to nature, one man is made the 
property of another".^ And in Ulpian is found this, that: 
"So far as the civil law is concerned, slaves are not
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considered persons; but this is not the case according to
18natural law, because natural law regards all men as equal".
From the statements above it is evident that although
slavery and other forms of discrimination were practised
during this time, there nevertheless developed this other
doctrine which questioned the validity of these practices in
view of the overriding dictates of natural law which was
19asserting that "all men were originally bom free". It is, 
fundamentally, in this respect that the Roman theory of 
natural law contributed to the development of the concept of 
"natural rights". And as Bodenheimer has concluded on this 
subject:
"The Stoic concept of a world-state with a common 
citizenship and a common law, based on natural reason, 
acquired a very real and non-utopian meaning under 
these circumstances. With the granting of citizenship 
rights to most of the Roman provincial subjects in 
212 AD, the idea of a community *civilized mankind 
(Civitus Maxima), as opposed to the parochialism of 
the small city-states of earlier periods, had found 
an approximate reality. It was no wonder that under 
these conditions the philosophical concepts of 
Stoicism, which found additional support in the rise 
and spreading of Christian ideas, had a significant 
impact on the political and legal development of the 
Roman Empire".20
iv) The role of early Christian doctrines
Again during the Roman Empire, the Roman tradition of 
natural law underwent a further twist, largely due to the 
influence of the philosophy of Christianity of this period. 
Early Christianity of the Middle Ages made use of the Stoic 
ideas of a world-state embracing the whole man - but they 
interpreted the Stoic concept of "world-state" to mean 
"divine empire" - hence the "Holy Roman Empire". In this 
system of thought a distinction was sharply made as between
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two authorities, viz., the "State" as an earthly institution 
and the "Church" as the representative of the higher-ranking 
divine world. Further, according to this theory, the church 
claimed to be the guardian of the eternal law of God (lex 
aetema) and since this was a higher order than that professed 
by the state, the church claimed an automatic supremacy over 
the state.
From the above expositions as put forward by the medieval 
Christianf philosophers, arose this new dimension of natural 
law that man, being a citizen of the divine empire, possesses 
innate human dignity to which all external influences are 
subject. This "inalienable and unchangeable value" was 
inherently provided for in the eternal law of God of lex 
aeterna and, if the worldly law, or , contains
provisions contrary to it, these provisions were of no force 
and should be disregarded. Among the fathers of the church 
who are associated with the teachings of the medieval 
catholistic natural law were St. Augustine (354-430 AD), whose 
main thesis was the subordination of the world order, or the 
civitas terrena, to that of the divine order, or the civitas dei. 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274 AD) also stressed the point that 
natural law was a law higher than positive law, and therefore 
ought to be obeyed by all rulers of the world.
Paradoxically, as in early Greece, and the Stoa Roman 
Empire, medieval Christian traditions accepted the institution 
of slavery. But Christian tradition was more considerate by 
making some appeals to masters to treat slaves with 
consideration and kindness. The attitude of the fathers of
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the church, including St. Paul, to slavery has been amply 
summarized by the Rev. Professor Dean Sydney Evans, as 
follows:
"Paul is more concerned with a man finding interior 
freedom than exterior freedom. He is more concerned 
to help slaves to come to terms with their condition 
than to change that condition. To be a slave or 
freeman, he says, makes no difference to God. Both 
are equally capable of knowing God and of living as
children of God.....  In relation to Christ it is
a matter of indifference whether a man is a slave or 
a free man. But by this same token Christian masters 
must treat their slaves with fairness, for the master 
is no dearer to God than is the slave".21
Thus, as the Rev. Sydney Evans now concludes:
"It could be argued that in this instance Christianity 
was an influence retarding the development of human 
rights thinking by accepting the institution of 
slavery while teaching the slave that he was no less 
in the eyes of God than his master".22
Nevertheless, taking into account the circumstances of these
times, it is evident that Christian doctrines contained
sufficiently aggressive ideas about humanity, and the entire
nature of scriptural teachings was aimed at formulating
some concrete norms in order to enhance the quality of human
social co-existence in dignity.
Although the set of ideas professed by Stoa and early
Christendom no doubt meant a step forward on the historical
path of attaining an "independent human personality", neither
Stoa norf-Christian philosophy provided ground to recognize
human rights through a positive legal means. In other words,
these teachings amounted to no more than stressing the fact
that state activity towards individuals was to be limited
not by legal, but by moral, religious or other ethical
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considerations. This is, however, not to say that this was 
not an efficient machinery for individual rights protection 
given the social structure of these ancient states. But 
the next stage in the evolutionary history of human rights 
was decisive in the sense that for the first time signs of 
positivity in the contents of human rights were becoming 
evident,
v) Impact of feudalism
When the Roman Empire finally collapsed a number of 
tiny feudal kingdoms in much of Europe came into existence. 
Characteristic of this type of politico-social organizations 
was the increasing political power concentrated in the hands 
of the feudal monarchs. Invariably the rule provided by these 
monarchs was despotic and tyrannical. At the same time during 
these periods there was evolving rapidly - especially in 
England - a body of law designated as "common law" which, 
as well as being "common" throughout the kingdom "commonly" 
applied to the monarch and his vassals. Thus, in the ensuing 
conflicts between the monarch and his vassals, resort was 
made to "common law" in the settlement of the conflict of 
interests. Most of these conflicts arose in protest against 
the arbitrary and tyrannical pretensions of the monarchical 
rule. But the most significant aspect of the conflict- 
resolution arrangement was that the nobles succeeded on many 
occasions in having their demands to rights recognized in 
charters, documents, etc., issued by the monarch and binding 
on him. The most celebrated of these charters is, of course,
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the Magna Carta of England (1215). Under Chapter 39 of the
Magna Carta the "freeman" was protected against unlawful
arrest, detention, expulsion and other restrictions upon
personal liberty. Although, no doubt, the Magna Carta
was an important (probably the first) "veritable symbol" in
the legal protection of liberties in England, it seems not
to have extended to cover the protection of liberties of
the whole population. At most it was confined to the legal
relationship between the nobles, barons of the realm on the
one hand, and the crown on the other. The same remarks could tm.
made of the English Bill of Rights which followed 474 years
later (1689). The English Bill of Rights, like the Magna
Carta, was an attempt to demarcate the powers of the king
vis-a-vis Parliament and was a prompt reaction against the
despotic rule of the Stuart kings. The preamble to the Bill
of Rights, for example, is explicit on this point when it
stipulates that "the late King James the Second by the
assistance of diverse evil councillors, judges, and ministers
employed by him did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the
Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of this 
23kingdom". Thus when James II was forced to abdicate and 
William and Mary ascended the throne, the opportunity 
presented itself for Parliament to define and circumscribe 
the new rulers’ powers, requiring them to govern within the 
limits defined by a statute - i.e. the Bill of Rights. This 
provided for the supremacy of the law, by denying the royal
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power to suspend it, and for equality before the law; 
prohibited establishment of special courts and the levying 
of money without the consent of Parliament; provided for
freedom of election; freedom of speech, and provided
, 24against excessive bail.
These then, were the agreed basis and conditions upon 
which the new monarch was to rule. As will become evident, 
most features of the English Bill of Rights are to be found 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and it 
was therefore an important landmark in the future development 
of human rights, and inspired the more sophisticated 
developments in other countries, most noticeably in the 
United States one hundred years later,
vi) The !>Social Contract Doctrine"
It will have become apparent from our discussion on 
the English Bill of Rights above, that this manifested 
itself in a form of a "contract" entered into between the 
monarch and the people as represented by Parliament. The 
contractual nature of this relationship impressed upon the 
political philosophers of the day, who now saw in this 
phenomenon a real pivot of political life, and who seized 
upon it in order to interpret the existence and limitation 
of the power of the state. During this era in Europe, 
national states were emerging which were invariably governed 
by absolute rulers with claims to freedom of political 
action. Consequently, the real issue in the political 
philosophy of the day was to find some rational means
whereby the doctrine of raison d’etat, which sought to 
subordinate the individual citizen to the needs of the 
state, could be tempered by the claims of the "natural 
rights" doctrine, which had traditionally favoured the 
preservation of the rights of man as inviolable and 
inalienable.^
An English political philosopher, John Locke (1632-1704)
saw the solution to the "State/individual" conflict of
interests to lie in the doctrine of "social contract".
Locke hypothesized that rights which were due to all
individuals could best be upheld only by the doctrine of
"the social contract". Under this theory, by entering into
such a contract men agree, upon establishing a political
community (factum unionis), to subject themselves voluntarily
to the power of the community (factum subiectionis). In
Hobbes’ theory of social contract of an earlier period,
(1588-1679)i only the factum subiectionis, the agreement of
submission of all natural rights of the subjects to the
sovereign was ever discussed. But it was Locke who gave the
institution of natural rights extra force, namely that men
in establishing a political authority retain those natural
rights of life, liberty and property - which he seems to
26group together under the single concept of property.
Locke further asserted that the government, being a party
to the contract, could be resisted if it failed to fulfil its
part of the bargain, which was the preservation of the 
27liberties of men.
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Locke’s ideas about civil governments were exceedingly 
| revolutionary and were to have an everlasting impact on the
t
1 future evolution of the western constitutional theories of
t
government. Its immediate impact was seen in the American 
revolution. The "natural rights" doctrine now travelled 
from England to America!
vii) From England to America
By far the greater part of the population of the 
American colonies who waged the war of "national" 
liberation, were English by descent, who ipso facto, were 
brought up in the English political culture. It is not, 
therefore, surprising that the war of liberation was justified 
on the claim of restoring those rights and liberties which 
had been attained by the citizens of England a century before.
When the war was finally won, the founding fathers of the 
American nation had no problem in resorting to Locke’s theory 
of government as guiding principle upon which to base their 
form of government. The Lockian theory of natural rights, 
together with his doctrine of justified resistance against 
governmental oppression, indeed formed the philosophical 
background to the American Declaration of Independence. The 
Declaration, which was adopted on July 4, 1770, followed 
closely, indeed sometimes verbatim, Locke’s line of views 
about "natural rights", as thus:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
creator with certain inalienable rights, that among 
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
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"That to secure these rights governments are 
instituted among men deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed; 
that whenever any form of government become 
destructive of these ends, it is the right 
of the people to alter or abolish it and
institute new g o v e r n m e n t ".28
Suffice it at this point to note one feature characteristic
in this manner of conceiving the place of natural rights in
the total frame of government - and this is that the
American variety of natural rights implied that the state is
not the creator of individual rights, but only recognizes and
protects them. Further, following Locke1s theory, the state
is created for the purpose of protecting these rights. It is
this feature of the Western notion of natural rights that is
in direct variance with the socialist or communist theory
of rights, since the latter conceive the state as the creator
29and giver of individual rights. However, at this point 
in time of history this is not an important issue, but with 
the growth of international community as exemplified by 
the United Nations, we shall see that this constitutes an 
area of confusion and misunderstanding about the nature of 
individual rights.^
However, coming back to the discussion on the philosophy 
of natural rights in the United States, it is important 
perhaps to observe that the philosophical basis of the 
American system of government was greatly influenced, not only 
by Locke’s theory of natural law as explained above, but also 
by the philosophical teachings of a French nobleman by the 
name of Charles Louis de Montesquieu (1689-1755). Montesquieu’s 
concept of legal philosophy was, in fact, a necessary
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complement to that offered earlier on by John Locke.
Montesquieu agreed with Locke that human liberty was the
highest goal that a nation can achieve, but he went further
than Locke by attempting to devise a system of government
under which liberty could be secured in the most practicable
and efficient way. According to Montesquieu, a political
system which would most effectively safeguard liberty is to
be found in his theory of the "separation of powers".
"Constant experiences shows us", he said, "that every man
invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his
31authority as far as it will go". Therefore, to prevent 
such abuses Montesquieu argued that it is necessary that 
power should be checked by power. In Montesquieu*s scheme, 
that form of government in which the legislative, the executive, 
and the adjudicative are separated, that is, made independent 
of each other and entrusted to different persons or groups 
of persons, offers the best prospects for the preservation 
of liberty. Furthermore, these three institutions of
government must be so constituted as to hold each other in
32 . . .check. In his view, this kind of government structure would
operate to prevent an undue extension and arbitrary use of 
governmental authority.
Montesquieu1s political theory of the "separation of 
powers" was seized upon by the founding fathers of the American 
nation. In America, the constitutional division of government 
into three independent branches, accompanied by an intricate 
system of checks and balances to forestall supremacy of any 
one of these branches, owes its inspiration, no doubt, to
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Montesquieu. Furthermore, such aspects of the US
Constitution as the granting veto power to the Chief
Executive, the vesting in the legislature of the power to
impeach and try high officials, may be traced to Montesquieu’s 
33renowned treatise.
On the other hand, the Lockian theory of natural rights,
especially his doctrine of justified resistance against
governmental oppression, formed the philosophical background
of the American Declaration of Independence. It has also
been shown by Grant that the Lockian theory of natural rights
has, in fact, influenced the interpretation of certain clauses
of the Bill of Rights, especially the due-process clause, by
34the US Supreme Court. The language of the Supreme Court
35 .in the case of Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka, .is 
cited to illustrate the theme advanced above. Here the 
Court said that:
"There are rights in every free government beyond
the control of the State. A government which 
recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the 
liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at 
all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited 
control of even the most undemocratic depository of
power, is after all but a despotism..... There are
limitations on such power which grow out of the 
essential nature of all free governments, implied 
reservations of individual rights, without which 
the social compact could not exist, and which are 
respected by all governments entitled to the name".
And quite obviously Locke’s theory of natural rights was
relied upon by the framers of the Constitution of the State
of Virginia of June 12, 1776, which enacted that:
".... men are by nature equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights of which, when they 
enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any 
compact, deprive or divest their posterity: namely,
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"the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means 
of acquiring and possessing property, pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety".
But although, as we have seen above, the founding fathers
through the Declaration of Independence of July 1770, based
their case against the mother country on the rights of man
as justifying their revolution, in the draft constitution
of 1787 no attempt was ever made to enshrine these rights in
the form of a bill of rights. A bill of rights in the USA
came when Congress in 1791 passed ten amendments to the
Constitution, which came to be regarded as forming part of
the Constitution. The Bill of Rights provides that Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech or the press or the right of people peacefully
to assembly, and to petition the government for redress of 
36grievances. The right of the people to keep and bear arms
37 . .shall not be infringed, and no soldier shall m  time of
peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the
38owner, not in time of war, but in a manner prescribed by law.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
39not be violated, and subject to certain stated exceptions, 
no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise 
infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury, nor shall any person be subjected to double 
jeopardy with respect to the same offence. No person shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty or
39
property without due process of law, and his property shall
40not be compulsorily acquired without just compensation.
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his
behalf, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
41 . . . . .defence. There shall be the right to jury trial in civil
42suits involving more than twenty dollars. Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor shall .excessive fines be imposed.
Similarly, cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
43 . . .  . .inflicted. Finally, it is provided that the constitutional
enumeration of certain individual rights shall not be
• • 44construed to deny or disparage others not yet mentioned.
But although this was, not doubt, a thorough document 
on the protection of civil liberties, it had two initial 
drawbacks. Firstly, the enjoyment of these rights did not 
extend to negroes, and secondly the Bill of Rights was limited 
to the Federal Constitution, as it only bound the Federal 
Government but not those of the states. However, at the end 
of the Civil War, Amendments 13-15, or the so-called Civil War 
Amendments, were adopted specifically to extend civil 
liberties to the now freed negores, and to enforce the Bill 
of Rights against the states. Thus the 13th Amendment 
forbids slavery and involuntary servitude; the 14th, inter 
alia, broadens the base of American citizenship by providing 
that all persons bom or naturalized in the United States 
are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
40
they reside. And furthermore, no state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor deny to .any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The 15th Amendment provides that the rights of citizens
of the United States shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any state on the grounds of race, colour or
previous conditions of servitude; and in 1920 it was provided
that this right shall not be abridged or denied on account of 
45sex.
Here we shall not concern ourselves with how the United 
States1 Bill of Rights has worked in practice, and the kind 
of interpretations that the Supreme Court has placed on the
various phrases used therein. There is now a mass of
. . . 46 . . .literature on this subject. Suffice to mention the point
here that in the United States the Courts, and especially the 
Supreme Court, have assumed guardianship over the Bill of 
Rights (and the whole Constitution, for that matter), and 
that the practical operation of the Bill there depends much 
upon the interpretation which the Supreme Court places on it.
Perhaps before we note the influences which the American 
experience had on the future development of human rights, we 
should also note the French experience, because these two 
experiences were singularly eventful in influencing the 
development of human rights in the international arena.
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viii) The role of the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man arid of the Citizen, 1789
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen, 1789, is eventful in the timing of the
development of the concept of human rights in that this
document contained perhaps the more important rights which
were later to be adopted in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948; and also because the French Declaration
has undoubtedly been a source of inspiration to many
constitutions of the parliamentary type of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries in Europe, Latin America and the Francophone
countries of Africa.
From the contents and formulation of the rights proclaimed
in the Declaration, it is clear that it was in part inspired by
the English and American experiences discussed earlier on, and
was also heavily loaded with the political philosophy of the
eighteenth century, but specifically with that of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau (1712-1778). After its general affirmation of faith,
the full text of the Declaration contained a list of seventeen
articles proclaiming a number of the "natural and imprescriptible
rights of man", clothed in a political philosophy that "the
aim of all political associations is the protection of the
natural and imprescriptible rights of man: liberty, property,
security and resistance to oppression", and that "the law is
47the expression of the general will", as opposed to one
individual's will. The Declaration then lists a number of
48these rights - equality before the law, freedom from arrest
49except m  conformity with the law, protection against 
retroactivity of the law,"*^  the presumption of innocence,
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freedom of opinion, freedom of religion, freedom of
54 55expression, the right to property, the right to
representation in public institutions like Parliament,
and the right of control over public expenditure."^
One should point out, however, that the French approach
to the protection of the rights of man is distinguished from
the American one in at least two respects. Firstly, the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man uses the preamble as
the place where the rights are guaranteed; secondly, the
French Declaration proclaims the rights "in a general,
absolute and dogmatic manner, the natural inalienable,
imprescriptible and sacred rights of man, not of the man
living in a country at a particular time, but of man in the
58abstract of all countries and of all agesV. The American 
approach has been to state the rights in the body of the 
Constitution in "relative and accurate" manner, obviously 
because they are intended to be the subject of judicial 
interpretation. The French formula of utilizing the preamble 
not only as a mere recitation of rights, but also as a means 
of guaranteeing them, was used both in the Fourth and Fifth 
Republics of France, and it is this libertarian tradition which 
France has handed down to many of its former dependencies in 
Africa.
However, the important point about the American and 
French incidents in the historical development of human rights, 
is that for the first time ever this concept, especially in 
the American model, was raised to the level of a
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"constitutional institution", and also became a special 
constitutional law concept in that, being part of the 
supreme law of the land, all other legal norms in the legal 
system were subject to and derived their validity from it.
And with this, the first stage of the historical development 
of human rights came to an end, the American and French 
experiences serving as models and examples which were to be 
followed in the process of constitutional evolution not only 
in Europe, but, with the rapid growth of an international 
consciousness of brotherwood, the human rights idea was 
steadily becoming a problem to be dealt with on a universal 
basis.
C. Human Rights and International Law
It will have become self-evident from our discussion above 
that well before the First World War the doctrine of human rights 
had already been firmly entrenched in the political systems of at 
least three leading Western countries, viz., England, America and 
France. Indeed the idea of human rights or natural rights of 
man occupied a real pivot of democratic life in the Western 
countries. It must, at the same time, be appreciated that the 
many emerging international customs, norms, conventions, etc., 
were being devised largely at the initiative of Western statesmen, 
scholars, organizations, etc. It is not, therefore, surprising, 
as we shall shortly see, that the idea of human rights was given 
a prominent role in the emerging international order, and attained 
that status because of the corresponding status which natural 
rights had won themselves in most of the Western countries. In 
fact, it will become clear that it was the principles underlying
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"natural rights" which were restated into the international
documents concerned under the new name of "human rights". It is
significant, perhaps, to point out here that the expression
"human rights" was adopted instead of "natural rights"
simultaneously with the international campaign for the declaration
of an international bill of rights. In what follows, we survey
briefly the methods by which human rights became to be regarded as
a matter of international concern and the extent to which the
resultant international bill of rights and its offshots reflected
the contents of the old classical natural rights. The subject of
the development of international protection or regulation of human
rights can be studied from both before and after the Second War-.
Though our central commitment is with regard to the post-World War II
period, the period before the War also provides an interesting, and
perhaps an indispensable account of this subject.
i) International protection of human rights before World War II
Even before the first World War, concern for the
protection of human rights on an international plane had
steadily come to the fore and manifested itself in at least
three basic ways, viz., through the doctrine of "intervention 
60d’humanite", international measures for the abolition of 
61slavery, and finally through the doctrine of state
62responsibility for injury to aliens.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention was derived
63from the very author of the Law of Nations,, Grotius,
who stated that other states would be justified in intervening
in another state for the jvu-t-posas of protecting the
inhabitants of this state from oppressive or arbitrary 
treatment by the domestic regime. Such an action would be 
justified on humanitarian grounds. This doctrine, as would 
be expected, has been severely criticized as being contrary 
to the sovereignty of other states, and as affording a
pretext for an interference in the domestic affairs of the
. , 64other states in the name of human rights.
In the second place, early international concern for
human rights was caused by the need for a concerted
international front to suppress the evils of slavery and
slave trade, more especially in Africa and on the high seas.
To this end, various international conventions on the question
of suppressing slavery and for "the safeguard of human
65personality" were generally signed. The eventual success 
induced by this international effort directed at the 
suppression of slavery and servitude was later to be seen by 
the recognition of the "freedom from slavery or servitude, 
and freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment", which received protection by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This right also found
its way into practically all Commonwealth African bills of
• 66 rights.
In the third place, early signs of an international
concern for the protection of human rights manifested itself
through the doctrine of state responsibility for injury to 
67aliens. According to this doctrine, a principle was 
emerging in international law that State A could be rendered 
responsible for an injury caused to a citizen of State B.
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According to Dr. Garcia Amador:
"The State is under a duty to ensure to aliens the 
enjoyment of the same civil rights, and make 
available to them the same individual guarantees 
as are enjoyed by its own nationals. These rights 
and guarantees shall not, however, in any case be 
less than the ’fundamental human rights' recognized 
and defined the contemporary international
instruments".68
This rule is of respectable antiquity which addressed itself
to respect for the rights of anindividual living in a foreign
land and to his proper treatment. The rule, however, proved
to be persistently ineffective because at this stage in the
development of international law an individual possessed no
subjectivity of his own in the eyes of international law,
and therefore could not claim redress against the state which
had allegedly violated his rights. Claim for redress under
this rule had to be channelled through the intermediary of
the state of which he was a citizen.
The point discussed above with respect to the standing
of an individual under international law of the pre-First
World War, merits a little further pursuance, because it was
precisely this that retarded the development of human rights
as a practical concept. The source from which the view that
a private individual in international law (or the "law of
nations", as this branch of law was popularly known), does
not constitute a "legal entity", and therefore devoid of
rights and obligations thereunder, was derived from the
prevailing traditional positivist doctrine. Probably
Oppenheim presents a concise, but clear formulation of the
. 6 9chief tenets of the "traditional positivist doctrine", 
as thus:
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"Since the Law of Nations is based on the common 
consent of individual States, and not of individual 
human beings, States solely and exclusively are the 
subject of International Law. This means that the 
Law of Nations is a law for the international
conduct of States, and not of their citizens...
An individual human being is never directly
a subject of International L a w " . 70
The retarding effect of this doctrine on the development of
the concept of human rights lay in the fact that the idea
remained a theoretical value which an individual could not
rely upon to secure redress for any of its alleged
violations in any international tribunal. It was only after
the Second World War, that this hurdle was overcome, with
the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights CI950)
when for the first time an individual had access to
international machinery for the actual enforcement of the
guaranteed rights under the Convention.
Ii) The Impact of the First World War and its aftermath
It could be asserted in general terms that the idea 
of international safeguards of human rights came to be gaining 
some concrete grounds after the First World War, more 
specifically when the scheme of the League of Nations was 
being constructed. The occasion which gave rise to the 
problem of an international concern for the protection of 
human rights was the need to devise some arrangements for 
the protection of minorities after the 1914-18 War. At the 
Peace Treaty of Versailles, the victors of the War contrived 
to reward themselves and their allies by means of territorial 
acquisitions. This plan involved the redrawing of national 
boundaries of the states in the eastern region of Central
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Europe. This form of territorial rearrangement produced
the inevitable result of leaving a large number of the
indigeneous populations of the states concerned as minority
groups subjected to the domination of states formed by
other nationalities. The problem of minority protection thus
became the central issue at the Peace Treaty Conference of
Versailles because of the expressed fear that if it was not
properly handled it could erupt into something that could
” disturb the peace of the world”.^ Consequently, a
system of minority protection was introduced by the Covenant
of the League of Nations with the primary object of providing
for safeguards for the minorities, coupled with a machinery
for checking against any arbitrary actions that would be
72meted out against them.
The method by which the "minority protection scheme” was 
implemented was through concluding a series of conventions or 
treaties between the states whose territories were extended, 
and the principal allied and associated powers. In other 
instances, there were declarations which were required to be 
made by certain states before the Council of the League of
73Nations, in which these undertook to respect minority rights.
f
These sets of agreements granted to all inhabitants, 
aliens:- (i) the right to life and freedom; (ii) the right 
of the free exercise of religion; (iii) equality of all 
citizens before the laws, and equality in the enjoyment of 
civic and political rights; (iv) entitlement of minorities 
to their specific racial, denominational, or lingual freedoms -
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like freedoms of the use of their own language, the right 
to keep schools or educational institutions, the right to 
use the minority language in public instructions, the support 
of the minorities from budgetary appropriations for
. . 74educational or denominational purposes, or for chanties.
These obligations for the protection of minorities constituted 
"international commitments" under the supervision of the 
League of Nations.^ And any disputes arising from the 
minority agreements in general were to be referred to the 
Permanent Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction was binding, 
and the decision of the Court was final in the sense that 
no appeal was allowed.^
However, "the minority system" under the League of 
Nations did not prove to be an effective means for an 
international protection of human rights, because, for one 
thing, the League itself, as an international institution for 
maintaining world peace and security, failed to command the 
confidence of some big powers; and, in any case, - and maybe 
for that reason - the League collapsed together with the rights 
of the minorities under its system. But in spite of this, 
it could be said that the minoiryt scheme constituted an 
efficacious antecedent upon which an international protection 
of human rights was later to develop. This was now to be 
manifested in the United Nations1 Bill of Rights consequent 
upon the cease-fire of the Second World War.
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iii) International protection of human rights after World War II
Opportunity for the establishment of a comprehensive 
system for the regulation of human rights on an international 
plane presented itself only after the Second World War . It 
is also from this sytem that most of the rights and freedoms 
as found in the many bills of rights of the Commonwealth 
countries, are ultimately derived.
After the Second World War, many world statesmen and all 
those concerned with the restoration of international peace 
vowed never to allow any chance to arise for the future 
occurrence of any such costly disaster as the Second World War. 
To do this they first had to detect the major factor which 
caused the outbreak of the War, and then to seek to remove it 
as a way of paving the way to any future peace prospects. The 
War was, in fact, seen to have come about because of the 
increasing fascist activities in some European countries, 
notably in Germany and Italy, with the result that there were 
constant aggressions directed at the sovereignty of other 
states: and in their general internal performance these
regimes displayed utter disrespect to the personal liberties 
of both their own citizens and aliens. The solution for 
the guarantee of future peace and security in the world was 
therefore seen to lie in "the enthronement of the rights of 
man”, to which every government on the planet should be made 
to pay due respect. This interrelation between the protection 
of human rights and the safeguard of international peace and 
security, became the cardinal idea of the political settlement 
after the Second World War. When world statesmen and their
si
advisers were working out some kind of ’’rational scheme of 
world order" to guard against the threats to peace and 
security, the concept for an international protection of 
human rights was seen as one of the most important means 
for the realization of that end. When the "scheme for the 
world order" was finally worked out, it proved to be in the 
nature of the arrangements under the United Nations. And 
since it was to this organization that a major part in the 
promotion of international peace and security fell, it also 
happened that the problems associated with the protection 
of human rights on an international level equally fell to 
that organization for their solution. It is for this reason 
that we find that the promotion of the respect for human 
rights was made one of the fundamental objectives of the 
Charter, and it is within this context that the spirit 
behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
implemented. But before we come to consider the Universal 
Declaration and its influence on the regional and national 
imitations for the guarantee of human rights, it is worthwhile 
to pause and examine the significance of the provisions of 
the UN Charter on the later development of the concept of 
human right,
iv) The role of the United Nations’ Charter
Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, the United 
Nation’s Charter contains the idea of the international 
safeguard of human rights, which is mentioned at seven 
different places within the Charter.
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According to the Preamble of the Charter, member 
states of the United Nations pledge themselves "to affirms 
faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women". And one of the purposes of the United Nations1 
Organization is "to achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of economic, social, cultural, 
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion".^ The task of promoting these ends falls to
the General Assembly which shall initiate studies and make 
recommendations "for the purpose of assisting in the
78realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms".
Further in the area of international economic and social
co-operation, the Charter provides that the United Nations
79would promote the universal respect for these rights. As
a result of this, the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations was called to life specifically to deal with the
promotion of international co-operation, among whose functions
is to put forward recommendations "for the purpose of promoting
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
80freedoms for all". And of course the competence of this
Council extends to the formation of commissions for the
81promotion of human rights, as it did with regard to the 
International Human Rights Commission. Finally, in Chapter XII 
on the International Trusteeship system, the Charter declares
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that one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system 
was also to encourage respect for human rights for all
82without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
It is beyond doubt in the light of the aforegoing
provisions in the Charter of the United Nations, that one of
the objectives of the Organization is to promote and further
the aims of human rights, and that specific organs of the
Organization are specifically defined in relation to their
functions in the safeguarding of human rights. The importance
of this element of the Charter for our purposes is that for
the first time in the annals of the history of human rights,
the "society of nations" gave formal recognition to the
principles of human rights. Further the Charter declares that
it is the aim of the United Nations "to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle
83of equal rights and self-determination of peoples", and in 
terms of Article 56 of the Charter, member states pledge 
themselves "to .take joint and separate action in co-operation 
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55". These provisions complete laying down 
what we may refer to as the basis or pre-conditions for the 
effective safeguard of human rights, by calling upon nations 
to a genuine commitment in the advancement of these ideals.
One feature of the Charter, in so far as provisions for 
human rights are concerned, calls for mention, and this is that 
there are no special provisions in the Charter for the protection 
of minorities as such, but only sanctions general protection of 
human rights to the exclusion of any discrimination. It might
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be considered, as Green does, that by preventing
discrimination emphatically, the Charter was also aiming
at condemning any form of discrimination, the basis of
84which may be "race, sex, language, or religion".
Of much significance, the UN Charter implied within 
itself some inherently revolutionary doctrines, such as 
the doctrine of equal rights and that of self-determination.
The revolutionary nature of these doctrines soon came to 
manifest themselves in relation to the political status of 
the colonial peoples, especially those of the Indian 
subcontinent and of Africa. We have already indicated that 
the new world order within which everybody now wanted to 
live, was to be based on the sanctity of, and respect for
human rights "for all men " Under the provisions of the
Charter, the attainment of the equality of rights and self- 
determination of all men was made the duty of all member 
states, including all those states which had overseas colonies. 
Soon the Charter was seized upon to provide justification for 
demands of political freedom for the colonial peoples, and the 
United Nations, with its relevant organs, became the forum 
at which the demands for national independence of the hitherto 
dependent peoples were voiced. One effect of the Charter, 
therefore, was that it helped to generate nationalistic 
feelings in the colonial territories, and it is within this 
context that one can understand the proposition that when 
independence was granted to these territories, the idea of 
human rights upon which the struggle for national independence
was justified, featured prominently in the accompanying 
constitutional settlements. On the other hand, the 
proposition can claim only a half-truth for although a 
"human rights climate" had undoubtedly been achieved in 
the 1950’s, there was another factor which stood in the way 
of the constitutional basis of human rights: this was the
influence of the English constitutional practice with 
respect to the protection of personal liberty. We discuss 
this subject at an appropriate point later in this inquiry,
v) The role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
The incorporation of the idea of an international 
guarantee of human rights in the United Nations1 Charter, was 
no doubt eventful in the history of human rights. The Charter 
being like the "Constitution" of the UN, the references to 
human rights that we have dealt with were laid down in very 
broad terms, and left the task of elaborating upon them to 
the United Nations itself, or to its organs concerned with 
human rights. This can be confirmed by the fact that the 
Charter does not embody any catalogue of human rights: 
therefore, the next logical stage in the development of human 
rights was the need to define in some precise way the nature 
and substance of the rights to be protected, and to devise 
some means, if possible, for their practical implementation.
The work in this direction was initiated by one of the 
United Nations’ principal organs concerned with human rights, 
the Economic and Social Council, when it resolved on the 21st 
June 1946, in favour of an international bill of rights. The _ 
Council declared that:
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"The mission of the United Nations for the promotion 
and protection of human rights as laid down in the 
Charter cannot be fulfilled unless measures are 
taken for the problem of human rights and an g,.
international charter of human rights is drawn up". '
In consequence of this declaration, the Commission on Human
Rights, one of the functional commissions of the Economic and
Social Council (set up by the latter in 1946 in terms of
Article 63 of the Charter), announced that an international
86bill of Human Rights would be drafted. This proposal was
quickly approved by the General Assembly of the UN. The
actual draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was adopted on the 10th December 1948, in the form of a
87resolution of the General Assembly,
vi) The nature of the rights guaranteed by the Universal Declaration 
The nature of the specific rights and freedoms which the 
Universal Declaration embodied, was in no significant way 
different from the traditional natural rights which had already 
been achieved in England, America and France. But, on the 
other hand, the Declaration also constituted a radical 
reaction against the traditional conception of human rights by 
virtue of the fact that it deals not only with basic political 
and legal rights, but also with the economic, social and 
cultural rights. We discuss the subject of the substance of 
the international bill of rights with reference to two 
propositions:
a) The Declaration as a restatement of traditional 
"natural rights0
It is abundantly clear, even from a mere introduction 
to the language of the Declaration without considering in 
detail the substance of most of its items, that the
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document draws heavily from such earlier documents
inspired by ’’natural rights" thinking as the English
Bill of Rights, 1688; the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizens, 1789; and the American
Bill of Rights, 1791. In this respect it is worth
noting that twenty-one out of the thirty articles of
the Declaration deal exclusively with the traditional
civil and political rights which invariably occur in
all of the earlier documents mentioned above. Article 1,
for example, following the French Declaration, reads
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights " The remaining first twenty guaranteed
civil and political rights were also familiar ideas
developed from natural law. These include the rights to
88life, liberty and the security of person; freedom from
slavery or servitude and the prohibition of slavery and 
89the slave trade; freedom from torture or cruel,
. 9 0inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the
. . 91right to recognition as a person before the law;
92
equality before the law and equal protection of the law;
the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
'93tribunals; the right to be presumed innocent until
q /
proved guilty; freedom of movement and to leave any
• i , - 9 5country including his own, and to return to it;
96the right to seek and enjoy asylum; the right to
97 . 98nationality; the right to property; freedom of
99thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion
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and expression; the right to peaceful assembly
and association;*^ ** the right to take part in the
102government of one's own country; the right of
. f . 103access to public service in one's country;
104freedom from arbitrary arrest, or detention; 
freedom from interference with a person's privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, and protection against 
attack upon his honour and reputation;*^ "* etc.
However, the claim that is asserted here in 
relation to the above mentioned rights and freedoms, 
is not that each and every one of these rights in the 
Declaration necessarily takes the same form and shape as 
the parallel provisions found in the earlier 
proclamations based on natural law, but rather that as 
the Declaration was thus not an original document 
with regard to the contents it enshrined. But the 
Declaration merits positive acclamation, especially 
because it improved upon the formulations of these 
rights, and also because it is a comparatively modem 
document, it certainly reflects fairly well on the 
problems of modem governments in relation to an 
individual.
b) The Declaration as a reaction against the traditional 
conception of human rights
We have already mentioned that the Declaration did 
not stop at only enunciating the civil and political 
rights discussed above, but also went further to embrace 
the provisions on economic, social and cultural rights
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which are contained in the Articles from 22 to 28.
These are the Articles which provide that everyone
has a right to social security, to work under just
and favourable conditions, and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests; the right to
rest and leisure, the right to an adequate standard
of living, the right to education, to participation
in the life of the community, to enjoyment of arts
and to a share in scientific advancement and its
benefits. These rights are not of the same character
as the classical "natural rights" that we have all
along been discussing. On the contrary, the social,
economic, and cultural rights derive their philosophical
content from the socialist understanding of the role of
the "State” and "law" in society. The foundations of
the socialist theory of rights and duties are contained
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m  the works of Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, as 
elaborated upon and further evolved in Lenin1s doctrine 
on the socialist state and constitution. Briefly, these 
theoretical conclusions concern on the one hand the 
criticism of the bourgeois concepts of rights and duties, 
revealing the underlying reasons of the 
constitutional and other legal regulations; and on the 
other hand stress the position of the working-class in 
relation to the "citizens1 rights and duties" which, as 
institutions, are translated into a legal reality in a
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socialist state. Further, it is characgeristic of 
socialist constitutions that they are not limited to 
legal or constitutional, issues'; they regulate not only 
the form of the given socialist state, the structure 
of its government, etc., but also provide for the social 
and economic programmes of the state. In fact, quite a. 
vast space in a socialist constitution of an eastern type 
is devoted to the economic, social and political structure 
of the socialist society.
The Constitution of the Soviet Union provides perhaps
a vivid example of what is asserted above. The Soviet
108Union has a constitution of 174 articles, with basic
Chapters, inter alia, on "the Political system","the
Economic system",11^ the "Social Development and Culture"V^
and on "the Basic Rights, Freedoms and Duties of Citizens
of the USSR". 112 The Constitution also contains a variety
of provisions about the institutional structure of the
State, as well as procedures for the exercise of government
powers - "indeed a full paraphernalia of a seemingly
113regularized system of restraint". Yet, as has been
observed, "all this seems to be nothing but a facade", 
since, "the Constitution reads more like a political 
manifesto than a legal charter, and may indeed have been
intended by its framers to have no more than a political
»i 114 existence .
The truth of the observation stated above about the 
Soviet Constitution, is confirmed by the fact that 
individual rights therein are purported to be guaranteed
8JL
under two different formulae: in the case of the
social and economic rights, by stating that "citizens
of the USSR have a right to them", and by describing the
means by which the right is ensured, e.g., "the right to
work is ensured by the socialist organization of the
national economy, the steady growth of the productive
forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the
possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of 
115unemployment". No doubt "rights" of this nature are
not justiciable legal rights. The other formula 
declares certain rights as either "an indefensible law",
] 1 fte.g., equality of rights of citizens, or as 
"guaranteed or protected by law", e.g., freedom of 
speech, press and assembly;11^  the inviolability of
118the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence.
Even these types of rights are not justiciable rights which 
the Constitution envisages that an individual may assert 
against the State. In any case, under the Soviet 
Constitution, no procedure for the enforcement of these 
rights either by the ordinary court or otherwise is 
available. Thus, "the so-called guarantee of the rights 
in the Constitution of the USSR means no more than a 
declaration of objectives, a statement of what the State 
will, hopefully, do for its citizens".^
The socialist approach to the protection of human 
rights, therefore, differs in some fundamental way from 
that of the "bourgeois" states. The constitutions of the
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latter do not contain statements on the social, 
economic and cultural rights as such, but cover only 
legal issues, and are therefore strictly documents of 
a legal nature. Herein lies the problem which the 
authors of the Universal Declaration faced - namely, how
urortc!
to reconcile and accommodate the two ' ideological
approaches to the question of human rights: that is, the
socialist and Western concepts of human rights. It is 
therefore not surprising to see that the Universal 
Declaration, apart from incorporating the "traditional 
civil liberties" which developed from the West, also 
incorporates the so-called social and economic rights which 
the socialist countries regard as equally important.
In concluding our discussion on the nature of the rights 
under the Universal Declaration, a remark ought to be made 
here that, for all the significance attributed to this 
document, it had from the very beginning one serious defect, 
which was that no machinery for the actual enforcement of the 
guaranteed rights was ever established. As could be deduced 
from the broad nature of its provisions, plus the inclusion 
of the social, economic and cultural rights, the Declaration - 
or rather the rights under it - were not meant to be enforced 
through some established institution. On the contrary, as 
the Preamble to the Declaration proclaims, the Universal
Declaration was meant to be " a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations " This
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inadequacy of the Declaration was overcome two years later 
after its proclamation by the adoption of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in 1950 by European states. The
Convention applies only to European states who are
signatories to it, and therefore the majority of the 
states still remain without some kind of international 
machinery for the enforcement of human rights. However, the 
fact is that the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
constituted an important step, in as much as the future 
development of human rights was concerned. The period after
the Second World War up to the present date has been
characterized by seeking means for effective protection of 
human rights, either by states in a particular region, or 
by states which have achieved sovereign status after the 
Second World War, by requiring that a bill of rights be 
written into their respective constitutions. The question, 
however, is how, and to what extent, did the Universal 
Declaration influence the spread of human rights in Africa?
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CHAPTER 2
RECEPTION OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA
There is no doubt that since its adoption in 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights has had remarkable impact on many countries
of the world, not least on those of Africa.* The amount of influence
which the Universal Declaration has had on the many national
constitutions and municipal legislations throughout the world was given
public recognition by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
U Thant, at the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran in
1968 - the United Nations’ "Human Rights Year". The Secretary-General
reckoned that there were no fewer than forty-three constitutions adopted
in recent years which were clearly inspired by the Universal Declaration,
and that examples of legislation expressly quoting or reproducing
2provisions of the Declaration could be found in all continents. The 
Universal Declaration has also exercised a powerful influence in the 
production of many international treaties and conventions, declarations, 
etc., of a world-wide character or of a regional character alike whose aim
has been the promotion and implementation of certain of the rights stated
3 . . . .m  that document. In what follows we discuss this theme in relation
to Africa, noting the avenues through which the concept of human rights 
and respect for human rights found their way into the many independence 
constitutions of Africa. In this respect it may be noted that in 
relation to this subject there are two ways through which the idea of 
human rights came to be diffused into the African political imagination 
both before and after independence. Even before independence in many 
African states there was a clear acceptance of the idea of respect for 
human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration. This is clearly 
detectable from an examination of the role played by Africans in the
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international protection of human rights as seen from the activities 
of the various African organizations and conferences. In the second 
place, human rights found their way into Africa through their inclusion 
in the independence constitutions, which, in the case of most of the 
Anglophone African independence constitutions, contained bills of rights 
patterned on the European Convention (1950) which was itself based on 
the Universal Declaration.
A. Acceptance of Human Rights as enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration by African States generally
It is significant that the ’ I ' which were taking place
in the field of human rights, engendered by the Universal 
Declaration, coincided with the rise of African nationalism after 
the Second World War, and, in the 1960fs, with the emergence on the 
world political scene of newly independent African states. In these 
circumstances, the adoption of the United Nations’ Charter with its 
human rights provisions, e.g., the right to self-determination and 
equality of all peoples, coupled with the eventual elaborations of 
these rights and freedoms in the Universal Declaration, provided . 
the colonial peoples with a legitimate means of challenging their 
colonial masters and denouncing colonialism generally as being 
contrary to the UN Charter and therefore a violation of human rights.
So, even in the pre-independence period, many African nationalist 
leaders had already become acquainted with the ideology of human 
rights and of its value in government as an indispensable attribute 
of democracy. A good example of this was the "Declaration of 
Fundamental Human Rights", of October 1960, by Zambia’s dominant 
nationalist party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP).
The ydatt 1960 was four years ..before the attainment o-f;’independence 
by Zambia but UNIP’s declaration of human rights was part of the
/
nationalist strategy to encourage the struggle for the achievement 
of national independence by creating confidence in all those concerned 
that the independence "Constitution would contain fundamental safe­
guards guaranteeing the freedom of the individual and providing 
against abuses of power by the Executive", and that the concession 
to include a bill of rights in the independence constitution was 
"ai expression of UNIPfs belief in the dignity and freedom of the 
individual, and in the principles of justice and charity to all".'* 
There were fourteen of the principles of human rights which 
UNIP promised to entrench in the constitution, and practically all 
of these were to be found in the Universal Declaration - although 
differently framed. These included the right to life, liberty and 
security of person; equality of all citizens before the law; 
prohibition of arbitrary arrest, detention, etc., save in accordance 
to law; freedom from interference with onefs privacy, home or 
correspondence; freedom of peaceful assembly and association, 
including the right to form political parties and trade unions; 
freedom of opinion and expression, provided publication of indecent, 
seditious or blasphemous matter were to be punished in accordance 
with law; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; right to 
adequate standard of living, including good health for oneself and 
one's family; duty on the part of the new state to safeguard the 
economic interest of the weaker members of the community, etc.; 
right to own property; freedom from discrimination on grounds of race, 
colour or sex; right to education; no person was to be tried on 
any criminal changes save in due course of law and before an 
ordinary court, and no special courts or tribunals for the trial of 
criminal offences may be established.
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The African readiness to support and defend the ideals 
proclaimed in the United NationsT Charter and the Universal 
Declaration was becoming apparent, judging from their attitudes 
to th§ international protection of human rights and their role 
in its implementationi
The African movement which culminated in the establishment 
of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 sprang from a series 
of conferences organized by the only few African independent 
states during this time, but also attended by delegates from the 
new political parties which had developed in various African 
territories. The first of such conferences was held at Accra 
in April 1958, and from Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda (now the President 
of Zambia) represented the newly-founded nationalist party - the 
Zambia African National Congress which changed its name to "United 
National Independence Party" in 1960, and which was the party that 
succeeded in bringing about political independence to the territory 
of Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia was then called). However, the 
Declaration which emerged from this gathering proclaimed the
"unswerving loyalty to the Charter of the United Nations and
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights",^ and also mentions 
the resolved "recognition of the equality of all races and of the
g
equality of all nations, large and small " In the Accra
Declaration the African leaders urged immediate steps ter be taken 
by the "Administering Powers" of colonial Africa "to implement the 
provisions of the Charter and the political aspirationd' of the 
colonial peoples. The African delegates castigated, as against 
the objectives of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration, the
practice of racial discrimination " in South Africa, the Central
African Federation, Kenya and other parts of Africa".^
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The Second Conference of Independent African States and 
their allies held at Addis Ababa in 1960 was equally emphatic 
on the human rights exaltation. The Declaration w ich emerged 
from this conference reaffirmed "that the subjugation of peoples 
to alien domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of
fundamental rights contrary to the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights " At
this conference too the suppression of national liberation movements, 
coupled with indiscriminate detention and restriction of nationalist 
leaders, was condemned as unjustifiable in the context of the 
standards defined by the Universal Declaration.
When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was finally 
established in May 1963, the preamble to its Charter declared that
the founders of the Organization were " persuaded that the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provide a solid foundation for peaceful and
positive co-operation among states".*^ * Article II of the OAU Charter 
sets out as one of its aims: "to promote international co-operation,
having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights".**
The OAU acted as an instrument through which African states 
concerted their actions to influence the United Nations in the field 
of the international protection of human rights. Increased African 
(and Asian) pressure forced the United Nations1 General Assembly, 
for example, to produce the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which was adopted
12 . . .in 1965. This was the first international instrument on human
rights directly adopted by the United Nations attempting to .
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implement on a world-wide basis "the idea of the equality of
races" and containing a strict international machinery of 
13implementation. This achievement in the field of human rights
at the instigation of the Afro-Asian bloc was akin to the one which
the same group virtually forced into action as early as 1960. In
that year the United Nations' General Assembly produced a
"Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
14and Peoples". In its preamble the Declaration referred to the
"determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in 
the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small and to promote social ^
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".
The General Assembly then called on serious commitment to the
principle of "Self-determination" "which counsels that all peoples
anywhere on earth have the right freely to determine their political
status and freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
16development". Henceforth arguments based on the inadequacy of
political, economic, social or educational preparedness among the
dependent peoples should not serve "as a pretext" for delaying
independence.^ Finally, immediate steps were to be taken in Tr^st
and Non-self-governing Territories or all other territories which
had not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the
peoples of those territories unconditionally and without any 
18reservations. Significantly, the Declaration introduced the
concept that "all states shall observe faithfully and strictly the
provisions of the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of 
19Human Rights...."
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The duty to "observe faithfully and strictly" the provisions
of the Universal Declaration was clarified in 1968 to mean that
"the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order
20and become a part of customary international law". Further,
at the Teheran Conference, already referred to above, the
Secretary-General of the UN emphasized the point that the Universal
Declaration constitutes "an obligation for the members of the
international community".
Coming back to the African scene, developments in the area of
human rights went a further step when in 1961 the International
Commission of Jurists sponsored an African Conference on the Rule
of Law, held in the Nigerian capital city of Lagos. What was
significant about this gathering was that it was held before the
independence of the majority of African states, but was nevertheless
attended by African lawyers, not only from the Anglophone but
21also from the Francophone territories. The conference analysed
many aspects of the concept of human rights and its relationship 
to African socio-economic conditions. The Resolution of the 
Conference, known as the "Law of Lagos", urged that:
"in order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, this Conference invites the African 
Governments r» study the possibility of adopting an African 
Convention of Human Rights in such a manner that the 
conclusion of this Conference will be safeguarded by the 
creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that 
recourse thereto be made available for all persons under 
the jurisdiction of the signatory states".22
Unfortunately, in spite of the United Nations1 encouragement to
implement this resolution by the African governments, nothing has
ever been effected in that regard.
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However, what we have said above, with regard to the 
attitudes and responses of Africans towards the international 
and regional implementation of human rights as enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration, shows that even prior to the entrenchment 
of bills of rights in the constitutions of African independent 
states, respect for human rights had already been accepted by 
africans. Logically, therefore, when bills of rights were 
proposed for inclusion in the independent constitutions granted 
during the peak period of British decolonization in the 1960s, 
African leaders predictably responded favourably - and indeed in 
some cases the constitutional incorporation of fundamental rights 
and freedoms was at the nationalists* own request, as for example, 
in Nigeria and Zambia.
Having discussed the impact of the Universal Declaration on 
African attitudes towards respect for human rights, and its 
generation of a favourable human rights climate and enthusiasm 
in a predominantly pre-independent Africa, we should now examine 
the pertinent question of how the same directly or indirectly 
affected constitution-making in the emerging independent Africa - 
that is the question of the source of bills of rights in 
Commonwealth Africa.
B. The Universal Declaration as a Direct and Indirect Source of 
Bills of Rights in Commonwealth Africa
It is convenient to note briefly how the Universal 
Declaration influenced the constitutional protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the Francophone African states. The normal 
practice in these states is that they list a number of fundamental
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rights in their constitutions, and also incorporate by reference 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789). The 
Constitution of the Republic of Chad, for example, proclaims in 
its preamble that:
"The people of Chad solemnly proclaims its attachment to 
the principles of democracy as defined by the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789, by the 
Universal Declaration of 1948, and as guaranteed by the
present constitution".23
In fact, with respect to the Francophone states, it could be said 
that the rights of man in their constitutions have as their source 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 
1789, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Of 
course, the mode of protection is remarkably different from that 
adopted in Commonwealth African constitutions. In the ex-French 
dependencies the preambles to their respective constitutions are 
used not merely to recite the rights, but also to guarantee them - 
obviously an imitation of the practice of the mother country (France) 
which, in its constitutions of both the Fourth and Fifth Republics, 
adopted that method.
An interesting example within Commonwealth Africa of the 
incorporation of the principles of the Universal Declaration is 
found in the current Republican Constitution of Malawi (1966).
The former British Protectorate of Nyasaland attained independence 
(under the new name of Malawi) within the Commonwealth in 1963 with 
a constitution which included a bill of rights, like most other 
British territories. When the country opted for a republican status 
under a single-party system of government in 1966, the bill of 
rights was rejected and in its place the Constitution declared, 
inter alia, that:
s a
"The Government and People of Malawi shall continue 
to recognize the sanctity of the personal liberties 
enshrined in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration ^  
of Human Rights, and the adherence to the Law of Nations".
The legal effect of this and other similar provisions in the
Constitution of Malawi will be fully discussed later; here it
suffices to note that this form of constitutional guarantee looks
like a declaration of intent or objective which the government
strives to achieve in relation to individuals. In fact, this
was all that the Universal Declaration expected of those states
who adhered to it.
But in Commonwealth Africa, bills of rights were not adopted
with the Declaration in view, rather the fundamental rights and
freedoms in these countries were borrowed from the European
Convention on Human Rights which, as indicated elsewhere, was
itself inspired by the Universal Declaration. For the purposes of
the ensuing discussion we should perhaps say something about the
Convention, the relevant areas of difference between it and the
Universal Declaration, and the extent to which bills of rights in
Commonwealth Africa reflect its style of protection.
C. The European Convention on Human Rights
In relation to the adoption of the Universal Declaration, it 
has been indicated that its effect in generating both international 
and regional efforts in the promotion of human rights was profound. 
In the area of regional attempts to establish machinery for the 
implementation of some of the provisions in the Universal 
Declaration, there is no doubt that the adoption of the European
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Convention of Human Rights in 1950 constituted the single most 
important event. The Convention was concluded by the members 
of the Council of Europe whose specific aim was the induction of 
"greater unity between its members". The conclusion of the 
Convention on human rights was thus seen as an essential component 
of the Council's general programme towards European unity, 
understandably against communist threat.
The European Convention had from its establishment, many 
advantages over the Universal Declaration, and it is precisely for 
this reason that the former has proved more successful in the 
implementational and operative sense than has been the case in 
relation to the Universal Declaration. Firstly, as Robertson has 
observed, the European Convention was classically a system of regional 
approach to the protection of human rights, and this approach has 
the advantage that it is easier for a group of like-minded countries 
in a particular region to agree on a common standard and accept a
common system of control than it would be for a community of the
25 . . .world. This proposition is also confirmed by the preamble to
the Convention, which says that:
"... the governments of European countries which are like-
minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, 
ideals, freedom and the rule of law take the first steps 
for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights 
stated in the Universal Declaration...
The second advantage which the Convention had over the Universal
Declaration is implicit in the above statements in its preamble.
It has been shown elsewhere in this part of our inquiry that the
European conception of human rights embraces only the "traditional
natural rights" of a political and civic nature. It is true that the
four Protocols which were later signed by the High Contracting .
8f?
Parties as "complementary" documents to the Convention, and
more significantly, the signing of the European Social Charter 
27of 1961, social and economic rights are now recognized. But, as
the Social Charter of 1961 expressly provides, the High Contracting
Parties have only accepted these "as the aim of their policy, to
28be pursued by all appropriate means " The social and
economic rights provided therein are therefore not susceptible to 
enforcement by the European Commission as are the civil and 
political rights which we have just discussed above.
The rights and freedoms in the European Convention, therefore, 
are really an assemblage of those values which have been identified 
as fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual as they were 
presented by the European political culture. On the other hand, 
the Declaration was an attempt to accommodate the two dominant 
world ideologies about the relationship of man and his political 
society, that is, between the socialist/communist ideology and the 
Western capitalist ideology. Thus, unlike the Declaration, the 
rights and freedoms in the European Convention are couched in an 
individualistic rather than in a collectivist ideology, e.g., 
"Everyone has the right to liberty", or "No one shall be held in 
slavery or servitude".
The above stated proposition is significant, because it 
explains why bills of rights in Commonwealth Africa, which were 
more or less an importation of the European Convention, failed to 
deal with the social and economic rights in the African 
constitutions, rather the rights therein reflected their orientation 
in the individualistic ideology. Such an approach to the protection
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of human rights, which did not take into account the differing 
stages of social and economic conditions of poor nations, was 
bound to be opposed by the governments of those countries. This 
explains, at least in part, why bills of rights became unpopular 
in emergent Africa after independence. We discuss this subject 
in a later chapter on the impact of socio-economic factors on 
human rights in an emergent African state, taking Zambia as a case 
in point.
The rights and freedoms which are set out in Section I of
the Convention are as follows:
29
1) The right to life.
2) Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment or 
punishment.^
313) Freedom from slavery or servitude.
324) The right to liberty and security of person.
335) The right to a fair trial.
6) Protection against retroactivity of the criminal law.34
7) The right to respect for one’s private and family life,
35one’s home and one’s correspondence.
368) Freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
379) Freedom of expression.
3810) Freedom of assembly and association.
3911) The right to marry and found a family.
12) The right to an effective remedy if one’s rights 
are violated.^
13) Freedom from discrimination in the enjoyment of the
41rights and freedoms set forth m  the Propocol.
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i
. . .  4214) The right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
43! 15) The right to education.
4416) The right to free election.
Practically all these rights and freedoms guaranteed by the system of 
protection under the European Convention are taken from the Universal 
Declaration (in fact 12 of the 13 rights and freedoms guaranteed in 
the Convention are taken from the Universal Declaration), 
although not copied holus-bolus. The improvement of the European 
Convention on the Universal Declaration in the protection of human 
rights lies in the fact that unlike the latter, the Convention was 
drafted with a view to attributing legal content to the rights 
guaranteed and with creating the necessary machinery for their 
supervision and enforcement. This meant that, unlike the Universal 
Declaration again, the signatory states to the Convention were put 
under legal obligation to abide by the Convention. Because of the 
legally enforceable nature of the provisions in the Convention, in 
the sense that they were intended to be enforced through a judicial 
process, the rights and freedoms under the Convention are stated 
in a more specific and precise manner characterized by qualifications 
specifying grounds on which the guaranteed rights and freedoms may 
be derogated from. Articles 8-11 and Article 1 of the Protobol 
allow derogation from the guaranteed rights and freedoms if the 
derogating measures are undertaken in accordance with law, and are 
necessary in a democratic society and in the interests of public 
good. Further, measures derogating from the fundamental rights 
and freedoms are allowed in time of war or other public emergency
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threatening the life of the signatory state, provided that
these measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation. But certain rights and freedoms cannot be derogated
45from even during a public emergency: these are the right to
life - save in the exceptional cases stated: freedom from
torture or inhuman or degrading punishment; freedom from slavery 
or servitude; freedom from punishment for acts or omissions 
made criminal by retroactive legislation.
The scheme under the European Convention has been highly
46successful as an instrument for the protection of human rights, 
and many cases have been dealt with by the European Convention
Commission and the Court of Human Rights - the machinery set up
. . . 4 7for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention.
The principles of human rights set out under the European ••
Convention found their way into Africa in two ways; viz., before
independence by some of the African dependants through the extension
48of the Convention as prescribed m  the Convention, and through 
the adoption of a bill of rights based on the Convention in the 
independence constitutions of many ex-British colonies acceding to 
independence. These are discussed below.
D. Extension of the Convention to Non-Metropolitan Territories
i) Extension of the Convention during colonial rule
It is said that:
"in the minds of the promoters of the Convention, 
the collective guarantees of the fundamental 
rights of man were to have effect not only in 
the metropolitan territory of the member states 
of the Council of Europe, but also in their 
overseas territories and their colonial 
possessions".49
8 6
The evidence for this is the existence of Article 63(1) 
of the Convention - otherwise called the "Colonial Clause". 
According to this clause, any state may at any time declare 
that the Convention shall extend to all or any of the 
territories for whose international relations it is 
responsible. And by Clause 3 of the same Article, upon the 
declaration of the extension to any territory, "the 
provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such
territories with due regard to local requirements". This
in effect means that the content of the application of the 
Convention to any territory is the matter to be determined by 
the state making that application, and may use this provision 
to exclude from its undertaking some rights defined in the 
Convention and in the Protocol. Admittedly, given the 
political and social realities of any colonial situation, a 
number of rights and freedoms stated in the Convention could 
not be made to apply without some serious modifications, since 
the Convention itself was . “ ' and made to apply within the
context of the political, social and cultural situations of 
the European countries. Such rights guaranteed under the 
Convention, as the right to holding free elections at 
reasonable intervals under conditions giving rise to the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature; or the right to education and of respect of the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical
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convictions; or freedom of expression; freedom from 
discrimination on grounds of race, colour, political or 
other opinions, cannot be executed fully within the context 
of colonial rule.
However, the Extension Clause in the Convention was used 
by the United Kingdom on October 23, 1953, to extend the 
application of the Convention and Protocol to forty-two of 
its overseas territories, including Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 
Interestingly enough, the ex-British colony of Southern 
Rhodesia was missing from the list of those British overseas 
territories to which the Convention was made to apply. The 
territory of Southern Rhodesia (now know as "Rhodesia" only) 
achieved the status of a self-governing colony in 1923, and 
in consequence of that secured to itself a considerable amount 
of internal autonomy. Vasak thinks that the omission of 
Southern Rhodesia from the list could be explained by the fact 
that being self-governing, the territory’s government "ought 
to be, if it has not been, consulted before any extension of 
the Convention". *
But one would be entitled to ask the pertinent question - 
What effects, in fact, was the Convention expected to produce 
in the territories to which its application was extended? Did 
the gesture of extension mean, for example, that colonial 
persons could also invoke the judicial process established 
under the Convention to enforce any of the rights guaranteed 
thereunder in the event of any allegation of violation? Or 
did the extension simply mean that the state extending was 
required to take into account the provisions of the Convention
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in their dealings with the colonial peoples, and further 
that if a breach of the Convention ever occurred* they could be 
called upon to account for it at the international level in 
terms prescribed by the Convention?
With respect to the first question posed above, two
responses seem apt. In the first place, it is reasonable
to say that in the political, social and educational conditions
of the colonial peoples at the beginning of the 1950s, the
practical value for which the Convention stood could not be
made use of by them, and indeed it would not be out of place
to say that even its existence was not known amopg the colonial
subjects during this period, except by a handful who happened
to be politically enlightened. This was one of the practical
limitations of the Convention in its application to the
colonial territories. The second limitation obviously related
to the technical difficulties under the Convention regarding
the rule of of locus standi governing the lodging of complaints.
Under the Convention only two sets of entities could set in
motion the judicial investigation for the alleged violation
with the European Commission of Human Rights, viz., by any of
the contracting states petitioning against another state - or
the so-called "inter-state petition", and secondly, by an
individual claiming to be the victim of a violation of the
Convention who lodges a petition against the state to whom the
violation is attributed, or the so-called "individual 
52petition". With respect to the "individual petition", 'the 
High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been
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I lodged has [to] recognize the competence of the
53S Commission to receive such petitions", and as the UK had
|
| not recognized this neither a British subject
proper nor a colonial subject in the territory to which the
Convention had been extended could have access to the
Commission. Access via the "inter-state petition" offered
but a circuitous means of access to the Commission by a colonial
subject. He could do this by approaching any of the Contracting
Parties (of course, other than the state against which the
complaint was directed) requesting it to lodge an application
on his behalf against the allegedly infringing state. It is
reported that this once happened against the United Kingdom
" in February I960", when " two African politicians
of the African National Congress [of Nyasaland] went to
Iceland in order to ask the Icelandic Government to bring
before the European Commission of Human Rights the detention,
deemed to be contrary to the Convention, of Dr. Banda, leader
54of the Nyasaland Independence movement". However, not much 
transpired from this "behind the door" technique of challenging 
the executive action of the UK servant in executing the detention 
order in a colonial territory, because when the Icelandic 
Government "was on the verge of lodging with the Commission 
against the UK", Dr. Banda had been released from detention, 
and this put an end to pursuance of this matter. However, 
this experience does register the fact that perhaps a colonial 
subject might use this method successfully to enforce certain 
provisions of the Convention if it has been extended to the 
territory in which he resides. But the legal issue might have
been brought out as to whether the Icelandic Government 
had sufficient interest in the matter surrounding the 
detention of Dr. Banda to justify.it lodging and pursuing 
the petition on his behalf. Since the UK has recognized 
the "inter-state petition", the Icelandic Government, being 
a party to the Convention, had the capacity to cause another 
party to account for the breach of the Convention in its 
colonial territories, to which it had extended the application 
of the Convention.
However, the potency of the Convention in its application 
to the dependent territories lay in the fact that the United 
Kingdom has been observing its provisions whenever it undertook 
measures manifestly derogating from its obligations under 
the Convention. Article 15(1) and (3) of the European 
Convention, for example, provides that:
"(i) In time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating 
from its obligation under this Convention to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation, provided that such measures 
are not inconsistent with its other obligations 
under international law,
(Lii) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this 
right of derogation shall keep the Secretary- 
General of the Council of Europe fully informed 
of the measures which it has taken and the reasons 
therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary- 
General of the Council of Europea when such
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions
of the Convention are again fully executed".
Pursuant to these provisions of the Convention reproduced 
above, the Acting United Kingdom Representative to the Council
of Europe in Strasbourg, sent to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe a note of information that in the Protectorate
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of Northern Rhodesia, "in or about September 1956 a public 
emergency within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the 
Convention a r os e " a n d  in consequence of this:
"Certain emergency powers were brought into operation 
in the Western Province of the Protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia on 11th September, in order to 
preserve the peace and prevent outbreaks of violence, 
loss of life and damage to property; for these 
purposes the Governor of the Protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia, to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation, exercised powers to 
detain persons which may involve derogations in certain 
respects from the obligations imposed by the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. However, there are at the present time no ^  
persons under the detention pursuant to these power".
It is true that at the time when this information was being
furnished to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe,
no detentions were executed pursuant to the emergency
regulations; however, soon after, a number of detentions were
made pursuant therewith.
Article 15(3), as we have seen, also required that in the
event of the withdrawal of measures derogating from the
obligations under the Convention, this fact too must be
communicated to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe*
Pursuant to this requirement when the declaration of emergency
was terminated in Northern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom
Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe comnunicated
to the Secretary-General giving an account of the amount of
damage done to persons and property occasioned during the
emergency, and the nature of measures taken by the Governor and
his senior administrative officers, and of the police. The
note then ended by a reference to the question of compliance
via the Convention in the following terms:
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| "As a result of the improvement in the situation in
i Northern Rhodesia, the Governor was able to revoke
| several of the Preservation of Public Security
| Regulations  Accordingly, the UK has the honour
: to state that the provisions of the Convention are
again being fully executed in the Protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia".57
In view of what has been recounted above regarding some
aspects of what the Convention in its application to colonial 
58territories entailed, it is clear that the Convention
exercised some practical influence in enhancing the content
of political responsibility on the part of the UK Government
towards dependent peoples. But of more significance for our
present purpose is that the Convention was made applicable to
dependent territories well before many of these territories
had assumed the status of independent sovereign states. The
next question was, upon assumption of that status by any or
all of these colonial countries, Britain was to cease to be
responsible for their international relations, and therefore
the Convention would have ceased to apply to them at least
through they way it did. In other words, the question was
how best to retain the Convention in the constitutional system
of the new independent states. It is important to stress the
point that the provisions of the European Convention had
their origin in the dependent territories during the colonial
era, and that that era having gone in the 1960s, the question
was merely one of adaptation to the situation created by the
fact of independence.
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11) The Nigerian case
a) Origin 1
The incorporation of a full set of fundamental rights--and' 
freedoms in the Nigerian Constitution of 1959 was a
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event in the constitutional practice of the British 
Commonwealth in the sense that the old attitudes against 
the constitutional protection of human rights were now being 
abandoned. As a result of this, practically all of the 
former British African territories which acceded to 
independence after the Nigerian experience took the example 
of including a bill of rights in the independence instrument. 
This fresh approach stood in sharp contrast to the pre-1959 
one whereby the independence constitutions of, say, Ghana (1957) 
and Ceylon (1947), contained only a limited range of personal 
liberties and freedoms; the reason being that these 
constitutions were granted at the height of strong Anglo-Saxon 
pessimism towards constitutional guarantees of personal 
liberties.
The story of the origins of the decision to incorporate
fundamental rights and freedoms in the Constitution of Nigeria
60has now been told in full. However, suffice it to state here 
that the decision arose from the problems engendered by the 
federal nature of the territory1s government, coupled with the 
tribalistic approach^to politics by all the three major political 
parties in the country. Since 1914, when the Union of Nigeria was 
founded, and up to and beyond 1959, Nigeria had been divided 
into three regions. These included the Western Region, the 
Eastern Region, and the Northern Region. In terms of ethnic 
composition, each of these three Regions displayed the same 
outlook, which was that in each case there was a tribal group - 
Yoruba in the Western Region, Ibo in the Eastern Region, and 
Hausa-Fulani in the Northern Region; and around each of these
main tribes in each of these three Regions there was a cluster of 
minority tribes. More significantly, each of the tribal groups 
in their respective Regions controlled the political party in 
power. For example, the Yoruba in the Western Region controlled 
the Action Group; the Ibos in the East controlled the National 
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, and the Hausas and the Fulanis
in the North controlled the Northern Peoples1 Congress. The
practical result of this structural arrangement of the country
was to create a situation whereby the minority groups had no
say or meaningful participation in the country’s politics.
Not surprisingly, tension quickly developed between the
minority tribes and majority groups - the former making
"allegations of discrimination, oppression, neglect and
general maladministration" against the majority tribe-dominated
61regional governments" in the country. And certainly 
"discrimination in the distribution of social and economic 
amenities was evidently practised in varying degrees in all 
the regions".^
In these circumstances two issues dominated Nigerian 
politics during the period before and during the Constitutional 
Conference of 1957, namely, devising some means of allaying 
minority fears of dominance and oppression by the dominant 
tribal groups, and secondly, the question of the creation of 
more regions in order to enfeeble certain regions which were 
grossly over-sized “ like the Northern Region. At the 
Constitutional Conference held in London in May and June of 
1957, where the above-mentioned issues were raised the
delegates were in favour of a proposal for the appointment 
of a Commission of Enquiry by the British Government. The 
Commission, fittingly called the Minorities1 Commission, was 
appointed in 1958 under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink, 
"to ascertain the facts about the fears of the minorities in 
any part of Nigeria, and to propose means of allaying those 
fears whether well or ill-founded". The Commission, which 
reported in the following year, proposed that one means by 
which minority grievances could be solved was to include in 
the proposed Nigerian Constitution, provisions guaranteeing 
certain fundamental rights. In its often quoted words, the 
Commission argued that:
"Provisions of this kind in the Constitution are 
difficult to enforce and sometimes difficult to 
interpret. Nevertheless, we think that they 
should be inserted. Their presence defines beliefs 
widespread among democratic countries and provides 
a standard to which appeal may be made by those 
whose rights are infringed. A government determined 
to abandon democratic courses will find ways of 
violating them but they are of great value in 
preventing a steady deterioration in standards of 
freedom and the unobstructive encroachment of a 
government on individual rights. We have therefore 
considered what provisions might suitably be inserted 
in the Constitution and have given particular attention 
to the Convention on Human Rights to which, we 
understand, Her Majesty's Government has adhered on 
behalf of the Nigerian Government...."
These recommendations of the Minority Commission, together
with other checks against the abuse of majority power, were
accepted by the British Government and were used to form the
basis of the draft constitution for Nigeria which was presented
to the resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference of September
63and October 1958 in London. Although the original purpose
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of this latter constitutional conference was to prepare a text 
constituting the Independecnce Constitution, the chapter
relating to the human rights was promulgated even before
64 .independence on October 24, 1959 - that is to say, in time
for the federal elections taking place on December 18, 1959.
The reason for this was that the adoption of a bill of rights
in the country was seen to be instrumental for a free conduct
of electioneering campaigns by the political parties within
Nigeria. Thus the human rights provisions were published as
the Sixth Schedule to the Constitutional Order of 1954, but
in the Independence Constitution of Nigeria, which came into
65force on October 1, 1960, the provisions on fundamental 
rights and freedoms occupied one of the early portions in the 
Constitution, i.e., Chapter III of the Second Part of the 
Federal Constitution of Nigeria,
b) Content
One of the most notable features of the rights and freedoms 
which were written into the Nigerian Constitution was that 
invariably all of them were individualistic in formulation - 
quite naturally reflecting the European approach of confining 
only to the protection of what are often referred to as the 
"traditional civil liberties". It is here that the point must 
be made to the effect that what the Nigerian bill of rights did 
was to import into Africa the Western conception of human 
rights. The evidence for this is easy to adduce. The 
Nigerian Constitutional guarantees of rights were for the most 
part detailed on the precedent of the European Convention - 
indeed all except one or two provisions were taken almost
word-for-word from the Convention.
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Thus in examining the provisions of human rights set
out in the Nigerian bill of rights of 1960, it is necessary
also to indicate the source of each specific right in the
European Convention, as specified in the footnotes. The
rights guaranteed included:
the right to life:^ the right to protection against
torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or 
67treatment; the right to liberty and security of
person;^ the right to a proper administration of 
69justice; the right to respect for private and
family life, home and correspondence;^ the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;^
. 7 2the right to freedom of expression; the right to
73freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
74the freedom of movement; the right to protection 
against discrimination;^^ and the right to 
compensation in the event of expropriation.^
c) Form of guarantees
The Nigerian bill of rights did not only end at copying 
the substance of the European Convention, but also went still 
further to abstract the principles concerning the ways in 
which the guaranteed rights and freedoms could be derogated 
from. The bill of rights followed closely (albeit with minor 
differences in phraseology) the European Convention in 
specifying circumstances in which it was permissible for the 
State to pass laws deviating from the guaranteed rights.
f
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C. Nature of Formulation
The European Convention through the Nigerian bill of rights
has also played a significant role in influencing the manner in which
bills of rights in Commonwealth Africa have been formulated. It is
the Convention, for example, which supplied certain principles upon
which the guaranteed rights and freedoms could be derogated from
in the African bills of rights. Under the Convention, certain of
the rights protected may have restrictions placed upon them by the
authorities, but any measures of this sort must be as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
welfare of the member state concerned, for the prevention of
disorder or of crime, for the protection of health and morals and
the rights and freedoms of others.^
The principle stated above upon which some of the guaranteed
rights and freedoms under the Convention, could be lawfully derogated
from by the signatory authorities, was reproduced in the Nigerian
bill of rights though differently put in terms of phraseology.
Under the Nigerian bill of rights certain of the guaranteed rights
and freedoms were also made to operate subject to curtailment by
laws that were reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in
the interests of defence, morality, public order, etc. The rights
qualified in this manner were those relating to private and family
life, freedom of conscience, of expression, assembly, association 
78and movement. The evident differing standards set by the 
Convention and the Nigerian bill of rights in respect of the grounds 
for permissible restrictions, has been best summarized by De Smith 
as follows:
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"Under the European Convention the standard for laws 
restricting the guaranteed rights and freedoms is more
exacting: they must be such as are ’necessary in a
democratic society’. What is necessary and what is 
reasonably justifiable may be fundamentally different 
in a given situation, and it is obvious that the scope 
of judicial review envisaged by the Constitution is 
narrower than under the European Convention".^
Thus, the concept of "reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society" which was present in most of the neo-Nigerian bills of
rights in Africa, traces its origins from the Convention, but its
content, as De Smith asserts, imports that the African governments
were given more scope in passing laws that may deviate from the
sanctions imposed by the bill of rights. However, this principle
has been the subject of active judicial scrutiny by the Zambian
courts which have striven to find some criteria as towhat is
80reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The determination
of this principle in the Constitution has often posed " the
greatest difficulty " to the Courts, because " there are
countries of greatly differing ideological character, all of whom
81claim that they are democracies". This topic is reserved for more 
intensive discussion in a later chapter on "Judicial Response", but 
suffice on this occasion to make the point that the bill of rights 
ought perhaps to have defined the intended meaning of such an 
' imprecise term.
The other aspect of the formulation of rights which found 
their way from the Convention into African bills of rights, were 
the provisions relating to the proclamation of public emergencies.
We have already referred to Article 15 of the Convention which 
provided for these. We have seen that under it, if a situation 
of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
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arises, the state concerned would be justified taking measures
which may involve derogation from certain of the obligations
under the Convention ,fto the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation...." But even in this situation, the
authorities are not allowed to make derogatory measures with
respect to certain rights and freedoms; the rights and freedoms
excepted in this way are the right to life (but not in respect
of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war); freedom from torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from
slavery or servitude; and freedom from retroactive penal 
82legislation. Similar provisions were adopted in the Nigerian
bill of rights, except that under the bill emergency measures
authorized by Parliament must be reasonably justifiable for the
83purpose of dealing with the emergency. Moreover, derogations 
under the Nigerian Constitution were allowed only in respect of a 
few rights, namely, the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person; the right to a fair trial and to protection against 
discrimination. The declaration of a state of emergency was 
itself raised beyond judicial review the latter was limited to 
determining whether the procedures laid down in the Constitution 
for the declaration have been followed or not, and whether actions
taken under emergency laws are reasonably justifiable to deal with
84 . . . .the situation. Emergency provisions of a kind contained m  the
Nigerian bill of rights were also to be found in practically all of
85 . . .
the neo-Nigerian bills of rights, although differences m  drafting
techniques and in other minor cases could be found. In Zambia, for 
example, it was the President who was to declare a public emergency,
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or a declaration that a situation exists which, if it is allowed
86to continue, may lead to a state of public emergency. The role
of Parliament was one of approving the presidential declaration
within a specif ied time, depending on whether it was sitting or not.
Perhaps, of the Commonwealth African countries, Zambia offers a
unique experience of the way the law relating to public emergencies
have operated and their impact on personal liberties has been >
profound. This again will be the subject of a substantive chapter
at a later stage. In their place of origin, especially in the UK,
invocation of emergency laws has been almost unknown, and even when
invoked it has been in indisputably grave situations, such as those
created by war. The reason for this infrequent use of emergency
powers in the developed democracies is obviously attributable to
their political maturity and the fact of their long history of
nationhood. Once transplanted in emergent societies with numerous
areas of deep-seated divisions between the component groups,
emergency laws have been seized upon by unscrupulous politicians
to advance not always the purposes for which these laws were intended,
87but in order to achieve their own political ends. The result has 
been the frequent incidence of emergencies in new nations - and as 
for Zambia, the country has been under a public emergency since 
independence in 1964. And on January 28, 1976, President Kaunda 
invoked "the full powers of the State of Emergency" following civil 
war in the neighbouring country of Angola in which Zambia was 
involved in some way. As the President explained, consequent upon 
the invocation, "the police and other wings of the security forces 
will with immediate effect apply in full all the powers under the
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relevant laws relating to Emergency", and that "the full application 
of the State of Emergency means that fundamental rights and freedoms 
of individuals under Part III of the Constitution of Zambia will be 
affected".^
D. Enforcement of the Guaranteed Rights
On this subject it could be said that the provisions relating 
to the enforcement of the protective provisions in the Nigerian 
Constitution and those that were patterned on it were original, 
at least in the sense that the European Convention did not provide 
any precedent in that regard. The Convention was in the nature of 
an international treaty rather than a national "bill of rights", and 
so it has its own set of institutions to enforce its provisions.
It is quite obvious that the notion underlying the enforcement 
procedure in the Nigerian Constitution was drawn from the Western 
conception that the Courts are the traditional sanctioning 
institutions of justifiable controversies between individuals inter 
se, and those whereby the state is also a party. In particular, 
the Courts in the English and American constitutional systems are 
the established venues through which individual grievances relating 
to infractions of personal liberties have been ventilated. This 
classical role of the Courts as the guardian of the Constitution as 
a whole and individual freedoms in particular, was written into the
Nigerian Constitution which provided that any person alleging
. . .  . .89contravention of the protective provisions in relation to him
in any territory of the Federation of Nigeria could apply to the 
High Court for redress. These provisions were also reproduced in 
all of the African neo-Nigerian bills of rights, though with some
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90substantial improvements in the technique of drafting. In
the Zambian Constitution, for example, the enforcement of
protective provisions also contains a clause to the effect that if
in any proceedings in any subordinate court any question arises
as to the contravention of the guaranteed rights, that question
91would be referred to the High Court for its determination.
And this procedure was utilized once in Zambia in the famous case
92of Patel v. Attorney-General for Zambia. The applicant in this 
case was being prosecuted for the criminal offence under the penal 
code and under the Exchange Control Regulations 1965, for an 
unauthorized act of exporting Zambian currency outside the country.
The parcels suspected of containing currency had been opened, 
examined, and seized from the post office by the Customs officer 
who believed that the parcels contained money going outside Zambia 
in violation of the Exchange Control Regulations. While proceedings 
were going on in the Senior Resident Magistrate’s Court, counsel for 
applicant challenged the act of the Customs officer in searching the 
applicant1 s correspondence and in seizing his property as being contrary to 
certain of the fundamental rights of the individual which were 
guaranteed by the Constitution. The Senior Resident Magistrate, 
pursuant to the Constitution, referred the matter to the High Court.
The question can again be asked here as to why, as we shall 
see later, the Courts in the African states have, in fact, failed 
to uphold and assert their constitutionally assigned duty to be 
’’the sentinels” of fundamental rights and freedoms. The effect 
of the enforcement provisions in the constitutions was to empower the 
judiciary to interpret the constitution, and to strike down 
legislation or executive decrees which conflict with its provisions.
104
In spite of the fact that there were more bills of rights in 
the African continent than anywhere else, only one instance is 
reported whereby a court of a Commonwealth African state struck
down a relevant portion of the legislation found to be repugnant
92Tto some constitutional right.' In Zambia, for example, in spite of
the fact that the Courts have been presented with more than
thirty-two occasions to review certain executive and adm nistrative
acts as to their constitutionality, in only about three of these
. . 94instances have the Courts pronounced against the authorities.
A survey of the fundamental rights and decisions in Zambia and in
some Commonwealth African jurisdictions in the latter part of this
work shows the unwillingness of the Courts to intervene in the
defence of the rights of individuals as against government actions.
What is the explanation for what one commentator on one of the
outstanding Zambian fundamental rights decision described as an
illustration of "judicial self-imposed restraint or judicial 
95passivism?" The pertinancy of this question lies in the fact that 
unlike African judiciaries, those in the developed democracies of 
Britain and the USA, and also the Supreme Court of India, have 
shown a characteristic intransigency in asserting themselves as 
"the sentinels" of personal liberty. No doubt the authors of 
African independence constitutions had their minds fixed on the 
fact that the same amount of performance in relations to the 
enforcement of rights would be attained by the African judiciaries.
On the contrary, the tendency in the post-independence constitutional 
practice has been the initiation of deliberate measures by the 
governments to remove whatever constitutional fetters exist in
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their way through constitutional amendments, or through the
adoption of one-party states. A combination of these factors
has affected the outlook and role of the judiciaries in the total
. 9 6scheme of the governments of new nations. The Zambian experience 
is apt to illustrate the points raised above. In Zambia the 
provisions relating to detention and restrictions under the 
independence constitution contained very "noble" procedural safe­
guards intended to guard against the arbitrary use of security
97laws by the government. As we shall see, this area of the bill
of rights was the most affected by the many (twenty in all since 
98independence) of constitutional amendments so far passed. And 
the clear trend of these amendments has been in the direction of 
attributing more power to the executive in the administration of
99security legislations. This was quickly followed by an amendment 
which swept away altogether the requirement that a special procedure 
should be invoked when amending the entrenched sections in the 
constitution, which included, inter alia, a bill of rights and the 
independence of the judiciary. The actual implementations of these 
amendments had1, of course, far-reaching effects on the fundamental 
rights and freedoms - but the most affected area was the right to 
property. The government had a virtually free hand to acquire 
compulsorily private property on terms of compensation determined 
no longer by the Courts, but by the National Assembly.The 
| process of weakening the content of the bill of rights was further
! carried to another end by the introduction of a one-party state in
I 1973. This important constitutional event had the effect of
| introducing novel concepts relating to the political relationships
j
i
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of state institutions in a manner that was deliberately intended 
to promote omnipotency of the ruling party and to erect the 
institution of presidency as the repository of almost all state 
functions. This has, in actual practice, meant "partyrization" 
of Parliament, trade unions, student unions, parastatal 
organizations - including institutions of higher learning, the 
civil service, the public service commission, the judicial service 
commission, and even the Courts themselves.
The position elsewhere in the Commonwealth African countries 
shows more signs of constitutional instability than otherwise. Of 
course, the manifestations of these instabilities vary from country 
to country, for others have experienced military takeovers, e.g., 
Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria; and others which have opted for a one- 
party government have not included bills of rights in their 
constitutions, like Tanzania and Malawi. Even in those countries 
where bills of rights have survived, the evidence shows that either 
they no longer command the authority of sacrosanctity in the 
constitutions, or in their practical administration, or they have 
been substantially modified as to affect their traditional character 
and potency as instruments of "constitutionalism". Similarly, the 
problematic orientation of African politics has rendered judicialism,
"the practical instrument [of] constitutionalism and the
best guarantee of the rule of law and therefore liberty"^ to 
operate, but on its lowest level.
In conclusion it could be said that these first two chapters 
introducing the concept of human rights and tracing its source,
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development and the way it found its access in African independence 
constitutions, clearly lend a great deal of light about the nature 
of problems which have, and are, operating against an effective 
enforcement of human rights in new nations. We have endeavoured to 
show that the source of human rights lies in the political-philosophical 
traditions of the West and in- the laissez-faire conception of the 
individual in society. We have further shown that the concept of human 
rights which underlined the bills of rights in African independence 
constitutions was that of European origin. The various independence 
constitutions of Anglophone Africa could, in fact, be considered as 
"packages" of the various instruments of democratic liberalism with 
institutions based on the Westminster model. The authors of these 
constitutions perceived that the institutions which had worked so well 
in Western democracies would also operate likewise in independent Africa. 
Thus, they reproduced such features of the Westminster-type of 
institutions as democratic methods of governance through the creation of 
parliaments chosen through competitive elections, parliamentary 
supremacy, cabinet government, multi-party system, free elections held 
at fixed periodic intervals, politically neutral zones like an independent 
civil service and an independent judiciary, a controlled executive; and 
in the case of the majority of African states, a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights.
It must be added here that independence constitutions were like 
negotiated treaties, and hence more of a product of ad hoc bargaining 
in London, which never, save in a few cases, reflected popular demands 
and manifestations of indigenous political culture. These constitutions 
were quickly accepted by the nationalist leaders, not because they
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entirely agreed with their provisions, but in order to hasten the 
attainment of national sovereignty and the entrenchment of their own 
power. Once in power, the nationalist governments knew they could 
change the constitution to suit their likings and to suit local needs 
and also to tighten their control over the political system. As 
already indicated, most of these constitutions did not last long. The 
parliamentary system has since been discarded in some countries, or in 
others made subordinate to the executive or the only party in power, 
strong systems of central control have been developed, political 
opponents have been subjected to detention and restriction ordeals; 
there has been deliberate discouragement of judicial review; the civil 
service, trade unions, chiefly authority, student unions, and other 
private organizations have since been co-opted under the umbrella of 
government control, and most governments now control all major channels-of 
information - newspapers, television, radio, cinemas, etc. These, 
together with many other manifestations of constitutional problems that 
we shall discuss, constitute the political climate in most of Africa 
south of the Sahara. In other words, what has happened in Africa is 
that the very apparatus which ought to support the enjoyment of individual 
rights and freedoms has been destroyed. Added to these human-induced 
factors are the problems peculiarly inherent in the socio-political 
organizations of African societies - ethical diversity of African 
communities impose the threat of national disunity to a newly created 
"national" state, existence of local antagonistic religious groups to the 
authority of the governments, the problem of minorities, and in the case 
of Zambia, its geo-political position in southern Africa, has had a direct
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impact on the operation of certain personal liberties. Further, all 
of the countries with which this investigation is concerned, have 
experienced colonial rule for many years - 70 years in the case of 
Zambia. The colonial experience in the area of the protection of the 
civic and political rights has not been of any help to the independent 
governments, and in fact has handed over to new governments a tradition
Qrb!tn»-ln
of in administering the ex-colony and its
dealings with the indigenous people.
In short, what this investigation purports to do in the chapters 
that follow is to analyze how the various political, economic, social, 
cultural, ideological, historical, etc., forces in Africa have operated 
to affect an effective protection of human rights in Commonwealth 
Africa, using Zambia as a specially referent case study.
lift
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER COLONIAL RULE
The relevance of the study of the colonial constitutional 
system and practice in relation to human rights'in post-independence 
Zambia can easily be appreciated. At independence in 1964, although 
the handing over of the reins of government by the colonial regime 
to the nationalist government involved the withdrawal of most of the 
colonial officials, the institutions of government, administrative 
practices and procedures nevertheless remained substantially the same.
For example, all the extensive powers of the Governor under the 
colonial constitution devolved on the President at independence; all 
the laws passed during the colonial time continued in force after 
independence until repealed by Parliament;^ the National Assembly 
established at independence merely succeeded the Legislative Council 
of the colonial period, and inherited its procedures; the cabinet 
instituted at independence exercised the functions which were performed 
in the colonial period by the Executive Council. In these circumstances, 
the traditions left by the colonial regime of how to run the government 
and its administrative practices were inevitably of some immediate 
importance to the nationalist leaders who took over responsibility 
for the government of the territory. The colonial government^ 
attitudes and practices in relation to the protection of personal 
liberties, the freedom of expression, of association and assembly, 
freedom of movement, freedom against discrimination, etc., was vital 
to the nationalists because these were the attitudes and practices which 
were most likely going to be adopted, by the African leaders. A study 
of the extent to which individual rights and freedoms were protected 
during the colonial period would serve to inform us of the background
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against which the post-independence task of effectively protecting 
fundamental rights and freedoms can best be appraised and understood.
2A. Some Historical Antecedents
Like other former colonial territories in Africa, the 
geographical unit now called Zambia was created by the European 
partition of Africa in the late nineteenth century. Although 
there are records to indicate that the Portuguese explorers and 
traders were the first Europeans to enter present-day Zambia, the 
country1s real contact with the western world was brought about 
by the pioneering work of the Scottish missionary, Dr. David 
Livingstone. Between 1851 and 1872, this intrepid explorer had 
travelled through many parts of Central Africa, especially 
through Zambia where he subsequently died in 1873 at Chitambo 
village in the central province of the country. The town of 
Livingstone, near the Victoria Falls, was named after him and 
the Falls were named by him in honour of the reigning British 
Queen•
Livingstone’s experiences led him to believe that Europe, and 
especially Britain, could play a big role in changing the backward 
circumstances of Central Africa and in improving the social 
conditions of its peoples. His initial task in securing Britain’s 
intervention in Central Africa was one of supplying scientific 
information about that area with a view to generating enthusiasm 
among British politicians, fellow missionaries and missionary 
organizations, and commercial interests. The idea was one of 
inducing certain categories of Europeans to come to the area to 
improve its social and economic outlook. It is important to
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emphasize that Dr. Livingstone was "a spokesman both of 
Christianity and of the Industrial Revolution11.
Livingstone’s work in Central Africa and his appeal for 
intervention in the name both of the Christian gospel and of 
modern commerce, came at the right time. Europe was at the 
height of its industrial advance as expressed through the 
Industrial Revolution. For this revolution to succeed, Europe 
needed a variety of raw materials such as cotton, rubber, 
minerals, etc., to feed its industries, and these materials were 
needed in larger quantities than was the case before.
The changed pattern of economic life in Europe engendered 
by the Industrial Revolution soon produced rivalries among 
European powers as to what overseas areas each power needed for 
the purpose of extracting raw materials. European powers soon 
started to lay their hands on Africa with claims and counter­
claims for territorial possessions. It was precisely for this 
reason that in 1884 Bismarck, the German Chancellor, arranged a 
conference of European powers to try and reach a basic understanding 
about what was later to be called "the scramble for Africa". The 
Berlin Conference which took place in 1885, concentrated its efforts 
on drawing boundaries within which the European powers concerned 
were to be allowed to operate.
At the Berlin Conference, Britain displayed a uncharacteristic 
indifference to the acquisitions of any more territories in Africa, 
principally because of the recognition by the House of Commons that 
any such further territorial ambitions would involve financial
burdens on the Treasury in administering new colonies. But at 
the same time Britain realized full well the advantages to be 
derived from maintaining her influence over certain areas in 
Africa for the purpose of supporting industries at home. Seen 
in the wider context, all European countries in fact tended to 
take active steps to protect the interests of their own traders 
and manufacturers against those of rival countries. This in 
practice meant that each of the interested European powers had, 
in effect, to control those areas where its own trade and industry 
were most involved. Britain could not therefore have afforded to 
stay aloof in the face of these prevailing economic realities in 
Europe.
In the meantime, by the turn of the nineteenth century, British 
commercial traders had already settled in the southern part of 
Africa, in what is now called South Africa and Rhodesia, and had
3their eyes focused on the territories north of the Zambezi River, 
that is, the territories of Zambia and Katanga of the Congo. As a 
result of these developments, Britain was compelled to come to the 
aid of her traders and to protect them in some tangible way, which 
in effect meant extending her sphere of influence over the areas 
concerned. The most attractively economic way for Britain to 
run overseas territories and at the same time ensure her economic 
interests in these areas, was by granting Charters of Incorporation 
to trading companies with administrative provisions by which the 
traders themselves would assume the administrative responsibilities, 
with the financial responsibilities which this would entail. This 
is the approach which Britain adopted in extending her influence 
over various regions in West and East Africa and earlier on in
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India. Indeed, British India originated in the enterprise of 
the East India Company, just as imperial expansionism in East 
Africa was facilitated by the activities of the British East 
Africa Company.
Similarly, in Central Africa, British influence, and 
finally the establishment of imperial rule, were the result of 
the enterprise of the British South Africa Company (the BSA 
Company).
The driving force behind the founding of the BSA Company 
was Cecil John Rhodes, from whom the name "Rhodesia" (i.e. Northern 
Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia) was derived. Cecil Rhodes, at the 
time with which we are dealing, was already an established figure 
on the Kimberley diamond fields of South Africa; and he exercised 
a tremendous influence in the politico-commercial circles of the 
emerging community of traders and businessmen in South Africa and 
in Rhodesia.
Rhodes* political and commercial doctrine was that the future 
of British South Africa lay in the acquisition of territories north 
of the Limpopo River. Behind this idea of "northward expansionism" 
was the belief that there was an enormous mineral wealth of gold, 
diamonds and copper which could be placed under the control of the 
BSA Company. But at the same time, Rhodes was fully aware that 
his ambition to extend control over the mineral wealth of the North 
could not be realized without the protection of the British 
Government.
The only way in which Rhodes imagined implementing his 
"northward" policy was to initiate a programme whereby, through 
his agents and in the name of the British South Africa Company, he
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could conclude some agreements with the most powerful African
chiefs so that permission could be granted to undertake commercial
activities in the areas concerned. In the event, Rhodes sent
emissaries to seek concessions from African chiefs. The first of
such concessions was achieved in 1888, when King Lobengula of the
Ndebale granted to C.D. Rudd (Rhodes1 partner in the diamond
business), a concession conveying the monopoly of the mineral rights
4throughout his territory to the BSA Company. The Rudd Concession, 
as it was known, became the first real basis of the British South 
Africa Company.
i) The British South Africa Company
Having secured this concession, Rhodes, in partnership 
with other traders, proceeded now to approach the Crown for 
the Charter of Incorporation for a company to acquire and 
work these concessions. The only reaction from the British 
Government was its insistence on ensuring that the 
incorporation must clearly place the company under British 
control instead of leaving it on its own. A letter of May 16, 
1889, written by direction of Lord Knutsford, then Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, shows the British Government*s 
mind on the question of the company’s incorporation. The 
Secretary of State commented thus:
" I am to observe that, in consenting to consider
this scheme in more detail, Lord Knutsford has been 
influenced by the consideration that if such a company 
is incorporated by the Royal Charter its constitution, 
objects, and operations will become more directly 
subject to control by Her Majesty’s Government than if 
it were left to these gentleman to incorporate them­
selves under the Joint Stock Companies Act, as they
122
are entitled to do. In the latter case, Her Majesty’s 
Government would not be able effectually to prevent 
the company from taking its own line of policy, which 
might possibly result in complications with Native 
Chiefs and others 5
The British Government’s position having been clarified with
respect to the character and kind of company it was willing
to support, the South African commercial businessmen under
the leadership of Cecil Rhodes, not having objected to the
British Government's views, submitted a formal petition on
13th July 1889, for the Charter to the Imperial Government.
The petition expressed these gentlemen’s ideas and intentions
behind the request for the incorporation of a company. For
example, the petition set forth:
"That the existence of a powerful British Company,
controlled by those of Your Majesty's subjects...
would be advantageous to the commercial and other 
interests of Your Majesty's subjects in the United 
Kingdom and in Your Majesty’s colonies".
Further:
"That Your Majesty's Petitioners desire to carry 
into effect divers concessions and agreements which 
have been made by certain of the Chiefs and tribes
inhabiting the said region, with the view of
promoting trade, commerce, civilization, and good 
government in these territories...."
And more significantly, the petition concluded with these
remarks:
"That Your Majesty’s Petitioners believe that if the 
said concessions, agreements, grants, and treaties 
can be carried into effect, the conditions of the 
natives inhabiting the said territories will be 
materially improved and their civilization advanced, 
and an organization established which would tend to 
the suppression of the slave trade in the said 
territories being opened to the immigration of 
Europeans, and to the lawful trade and commerce 
[with] other nations".6
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It would thus be seen that the petitioners based their 
\ argument for the incorporation of the company substantially
| on the ground that once formed such an establishment would
advance the material welfare of the natives, and would help 
create conditions conducive to the securing of their basic 
"freedoms'’ of a social and economic character. It was in 
this context that the British Government replied with an 
unequivocal "yes" to the request of the petitioners, with 
the announcement that the Crown, "being satisfied that the 
intentions of the petitioners are praiseworthy and deserve 
encouragement, and that the enterprise in the petition 
described may be productive of the benefits set forth 
therein", constituted and incorporated the British South 
Africa Company.^ And when the company was finally 
incorporated, the Preamble to its Charter recited the 
intentions of the petitioners - namely (i) to establish 
British ascendancy in South Central Africa; (ii) to develop 
potential wealth in that part of Africa, and (iii) to raise
g
the lot of its native inhabitants.
In incorporating the BSA Company, the Imperial Government
was in no doubt influenced by "the example of the Imperial
East African Company", which showed "that such a body may to
some considerable extent relieve Her Majesty's Government
9from diplomatic difficulties and heavy expenditure". And 
Dougal Malcolm, Director of the BSA Company since 1913 and 
its President since 1937, wrote that "avowedly Her Majesty's 
Government granted it (i.e. the Charter) because by this 
means it was thought that the British influence could best be
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extended over the regions of Africa concerned with the 
minimum of risk, responsibility, and expense to the 
Crown”.* ^
The original Charter of the British South Africa
Company of 1889 did not include the regions north of the
Zambezi, which were the target of Cecil Rhodes and his
partners. The principal areas of operations contemplated in
the original Charter were "the region of South Africa laying
immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the
north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west
of the Portuguese dominion".** This meant that the territory
which was to become Northern Rhodesia and which formed a major
portion of the territories north of the Zambezi, fell outside
the jurisdiction of the company. The anomaly was rectified in
February 1891, by a supplementary agreement secured by the
Company extending its field of operations to the north of the 
. 12Zambezi. Increasingly under the supplementary agreement 
Nyasaland was expressly excluded from the "field of operations".
By Article 3 of the Royal Charter, the BSA Company was
" authorized and empowered to acquire by any concession,
agreement, grant, or treaty " any territories, lands, or
property in Africa for its own commercial purposes or ends.
Armed with this legal authority, and assured of British 
protection, Rhodes now embarked on a more enterprising programme 
of obtaining agreements or treaties from the Chiefs of the 
northern territories so as to ensure the commercial monopoly 
of his company in those territories. In 1890 he despatched 
a number of emissaries to obtain concessions from all the
125
principal Chiefs of the northern territories as far as
Katanga. Alfred Sharpe and Joseph Thompson covered the areas
of Blantyre, south of Lake Nyasa and along the borders of the
Congo Free State. A number of treaties resulted from this
expedition from various Chiefs and headmen of these regions.
Joseph Thompson, for example, collected treaties from the
13Chiefs of Bisa, Aushi, Lamba, Lenje and Lala tribes. The
combined work of Sharpe, Thompson and Lochner in obtaining
concessions from the African Chiefs on behalf of the Company,
which concessions were formally accepted by the Crown in terms
of the Royal Charter, "broadly defined the limits of the present
14territory of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)". Of much importance 
to the present study was the work of F.E. Lochner, who was 
sent to Barotseland to conclude a treaty with King Lewanika of 
the Lozi tribe,
ii) The Lochner concessions of 1890
The treaty which was signed between Lochner on behalf of 
the British South African Company, and King Lewanika in 1890, 
was "by far the most important treaty^ with Africans concluded 
by the company in Northern Rhodesia", and it is this treaty 
that subsequently became the basis of the Company’s claim to 
the mineral wealth of Zambia for a period of about seventy 
years.
By the terms of the treaty, the BSA Company obtained 
"the sole absolute and exclusive perpetual rights and power" 
to carry on certain commercial activities, and more important, 
to work out diamond, gold, coal, oil and all other precious 
stones, minerals or substances in the territory of Barotseland.^
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The Company was also given administrative rights to deal 
with and adjudicate upon all cases between white men and 
between white men and natives, except that cases between 
natives were left to the King to deal with and dispose of.^
In return for these concessions, the Company undertook to 
protect King Lewanika and his nation from outside interference. 
In the second place, the Company further agreed to aid and 
assist in the education and civilization of the native subjects 
of Lewanika by the establishment and maintenance of schools and 
other institutions. The King was also to receive an annual 
royalty of £2,000 which was reduced to £850 in 1900 when the 
land and mineral concessions were ratified. King Lewanika was 
also obligated to assist the Company in its endeavours to 
suppress slavery and witchcraft.
It will be noticed that the contents of the treaty and 
matters thereby dealt with, have as their basis the Charter of 
the Company. In fact, it was provided in this agreements that:
"this concession shall not be deemed to confer upon 
the British South Africa Company any rights inconsistent 
with the provisions of the North-Western Rhodesia
Barotseland Order in Council or with the Charter
of the British South Africa Company or with any 
supplemental Charter which has been or may hereafter 
be granted to the company".^
Further, none of the privileges which were conferred on the
Company could be alienated by the Company without the prior
consent of the British Government. The only condition excepted
from this was that the Company could alienate the rights to
search for, digging and working out minerals to third persons.
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These provisions purport to tie the agreement to the Charter 
of the British South Africa Company so that if anything in the 
agreement was found inconsistent with the Charter, it was to 
be treated as null and void. Further, the administration of 
the agreement by the Company was made subject to imperial 
control as a means of checking the activities of the company 
in relation to the native chiefs and native subjects.
But did the agreement constitute a treaty under the 
principles of international law, and in any case, how valid 
were "treaties" of this character? A treaty under international 
law can only be reached between or among subjects of that law.
In the Lawanika-BSA Company relationship, it could be seen 
that Lewanika, being an African Chief, was recognized as a 
competent local sovereign to sign treaties. But as for the 
ompany, it was clear that it was not competent to conclude a 
treaty by itself, because it lacked subjectivity under inter­
national law. Under the United Kingdom Law (i.e., through 
the Charter of Incorporation itself), it is true that the 
Company had power to negotiate for concessions. But the 
Company’s power in this respect was subject to the 
signification of the UK Government. This means that the 
Agreement could become a binding treaty in international law 
only if ratified by the United Kingdom as a sovereign state; 
the parties to it would then not be King Lewanika and the BSA 
Company, but Lewanika and the UK Government (although in 
practice it would really be the Company as an agent of Her 
Majesty’s Government, which would be involved in the 
administration of the treaty). The C.ompany itself had no
locus standi in international law. As to the questions on 
the validity of the Agreement as the basis for giving away 
the entire natural resources of the country to the Company, 
this will be discussed appropriately in a later chapter (on 
human rights and economic development Zambia), especially in 
the light of the fact that the Agreement was of great 
significance at and even after the independence of Zambia: 
for any property rights already created under the Agreement and 
still existing at the time of independence were entrenched in 
the independence constitution, 
iii) The company government
For a period of about J25' years, the government of 
Northern Rhodesia was placed in the hands of the British 
South Africa Company. The Company*s power of direct 
administration became operative on June 30th, 1895. However, 
by this time British jurisdiction over the territory was not 
fully acquired under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, 
until Orders in Council were promulgated in 1899 and 1900 , 
called the North Western Rhodesia Order in Council and the 
North Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, respectively. These 
Orders in Council provided specifically for the exercise of 
"Her Majesty’s jurisdiction in Northern Rhodesia for the 
administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and 
generally for the peace, order and good government of all 
persons therein". It could thus be said that from 1899 to 
1924 frhen the Imperial Government took over the administration
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of Northern Rhodesia) there were three legal instruments 
which formed the constitution of the ompany administration. 
The first was obviously the Company’s instrument of 
incorporation, that is the Charter itself from which the 
powers of the Company were derived. Secondly, the two 
Orders in Council extending imperial authority to the 
territory in 1899 and 1900 constituted a second constitutional 
basis for the Company’s administration because in the words 
of the North Eastern Order in Council, ’’the powers conferred 
upon the Company by this Order are in augmentation of the 
powers conferred upon it by the Charter”. In 1911, there 
were some constitutional changes in that the two separate 
regions, i.e., North Eastern Rhodesia and North Western 
Rhodesia, which had been administered separately, were merged 
into one territory with one government. The legislation which 
provided for the amalgamation of the two regions into a single 
protectorate was the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council 1911, 
which also made provision for the appointment of the 
administrator who was administratively responsible to the 
High Commissioner of the Union of South Africa.
B. Safeguards against the Abuse of Power under
the Company’s Constitution
Thus, from the beginning the Imperial Government intended the
BSA Company to run its affairs under supervision from Whitehall.
The Imperial Government considered the Company to be its principal
instrument in the colonization of the regions of Central Africa,
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and therefore the Company was expected to be bound by the 
authority of its ’’principal”, that is His Majesty’s Government.
In the colonial territories it had acquired before and during 
this time, Britain was principally concerned with the interests 
of natives and how best to safeguard these in some definite legal 
manner. Therefore, when the legal framework for the Company’s 
administration was being devised, the question of the preservation 
of native interests and ways of checking arbitrariness and abuse 
of power by the Company administrators loomed high in the mind of 
the Imperial Government.
In the event, two mechanisms were included in the Company’s
principal legal instruments by which to check arbitrary administration
and ensure the prevalence of the interests of natives. Firstly, a
a wide range of the Company’s legislative and administrative powers
were made exercisable subject to the ultimate supervision of the
Secretary of State for the Colonies acting on behalf of Her Majesty’s
Government. Secondly, within the Company’s Charter and in both the
the North Western Rhodesia and North Eastern Rhodesia Orders in
Council, and in the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council after 1911,
certain built-in safeguards were included which prohibited the
Company from acting arbitrarily with regard to the traditional ways
20of life of the indigenous people, 
i) Protective provision under the Charter”
The Charter, being an enabling instrument of the Company,
conferred on the Company the power for the general administration
of the territory, that is the "powers necessary for the purposes
21
of good government and the preservation of public order”,
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provided that the exercises of these powers were "in
accordance with the terms of the Charter and the
22provisions of the Orders in Council'1. In any case,
practically all of these general powers of administration
conferred on the Company were made exercisable subject
to the approval of the Secretary of State for the
Colonies. Thus all concessions or agreements entered
into between the Company and any African chief were to be
examined and approved by the Secretary of State, who could
. . 23also vary their conditions. He was also made the arbiter 
in any differences arising between any native chief and
the Company, and the latter was to be bound by his
. . .  24decision in the matter. Any dealings of the Company with
any foreign powers were subject to the approval of the
25Secretary of State. The Secretary of State was also
given the right to object or dissent from any system of the
Company relative to the peoples of the territory in respect
of slavery or religion, or the administration of justice.
In that event, the Secretary was to make know his objection
or dissent, and his directions on the matter were to be
26obeyed by the Company.
But perhaps the most important weapon of imperial
control was the reserved power of the Crown to review
the Charter after 25 years from its inception, and at the
end of every succeeding period of 10 years. By virtue of
this right, the government could "add to, alter, or repeal
27any of the provisions" in the Charter. The "reservation"
13 2
provision should also be read together with the
provision conferring on the Crown the right to terminate
the Charter in the event of the Company not fulfilling 
28its engagements. By this provision, if the Crown
was satisfied that uthe Company has substantially failed
to observe and conform to the provisions of [the] Charter,
or that the Company is not exercising its powers under
the concessions, agreements, etc....,11 it was lawful
for it to terminate the existence of the Company.
The most notable way of imposing restrictions on
the power of the Company administrators was through the
express entrenchment of certain individual rights and
freedoms in the Companyfs constitutional instruments.
The Company’s Charter, for example, expressly prohibited
29
the slave trade and slavery; it guaranteed freedom
of religious worship by natives, except as may be
30necessary in the interest of humanity; and natives
31were free to apply their local laws and customs.
But the Orders in Council went further than the 
Charter in seeking to provide against any possible abuse 
of power by the Company administration,
iii) Protective provisions under the Orders in Council
We have already indicated that Northern Rhodesia 
was initially partitioned into two regions for the 
purposes of its administration by the chartered company. 
The two regions were the North Western Rhodesia 
(i.e., Barotseland) and the North Eastern Rhodesia, and
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these regions were governed by separate Orders in Council 
which were not necessarily identical in content. In 
many respects the style of administration adopted in each 
| of these regions was different, and the degree and extent
I *$ . . .I imperial control in each region assumed a different level*
|
i  The main reason for the difference, however, was
that in North Western Rhodesia a fairly strong African 
State of Barotseland under King Lewanika was already in 
existence, and its recognized position vis-a-vis the 
| Company was explicitly sanctioned by the treaty rights
i
| already reffered to. The Land and Minerals Treaty of 1900,
[ for example, entered into between King Lewanika and the
[ BSA Company provided that the latter was "not to interfere
i
in any matter concerning the Kingfs power and authority
32over any of his own subjects”. The effect of this was
obviously to leave the Lozi traditional government
intact, free from any large measure of interference by
the Company or by the imperial government. Because of the
existence of an efficiently organized system of government
in Barotseland, the suppression of slavery proved effective
and also because it was one of the obligations put on
King Lewanika in the treaty between him and the Company
that he was to assist the Company in the suppression of 
33slavery.
Perhaps for these reasons the North Western Rhodesia 
Order in Council was quite short (19 articles only) 
compared with the North Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council 
(with 51 articles).
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Unlike the political circumstances prevailing in
North Western Rhodesia when the Company assumed the
reins of government, there was never an efficient system
of tribal administration in existence in North Eastern
Rhodesia, and conditions there were politically chaotic.
The slave trade between stronger tribes and the Arabs
from the eastern coast of Africa were frequent. The
Company and the Crown government perceived that what
was required in these circumstances was a strong
government under the Company, ultimately controlled by
the Imperial Government. In the second place, the
Imperial Government wanted to see North Eastern Rhodesia
develop as a protectorate alongside Nyasaland. In fact,
North Eastern Rhodesia was formally linked with Nyasaland
in that the High Commissioner of Nyasaland was
simultaneously the legislative authority of North Eastern 
34Rhodesia. On the other hand, North Western Rhodesia
was attached to South Africa since the High Commissioner
of South Africa was also the legislative authority of
. 35North Western Rhodesia. The High Commissioner for
South Africa could make proclamation to provide for the
administration of justice, for the raising of revenue,
and generally for the peace, order, and good government,
and for the prohibition and punishment of acts tending
36to disturb the public peace in North Western. Rhodesia. And 
in the exercise of his legislative authority, the High 
Commissioner was to "respect any native laws or customs 
by which the civil relations of any native chiefs, tribes,
13 5
37or the protected persons are governed”. However,
the Imperial Government retained its checking power
38of disallowance through the Colonial Secretary.
The North Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council was
far more elaborate on the protective provisions shielding
natives from the Company's possible maladministrative
practices. In the first place, the North Eastern Order
in Council established thorough administrative organs.
The administration was to be conducted by an
administrator appointed by the Company and approved by
39the Secretary of State. The administrator was to be
assisted by an Executive Council. The administrator,
with the concurrence of the Council, was vested with
power to legislate for the administration of justice,
raising revenue, and generally for peace, order and
40good government. A police force was established, and
a High Court of North Eastern Rhodesia created with full
............. . . 41
jursidiction in civil and criminal matters.
In such civil and criminal matters the law to be
applied was English law, and the procedure and practice
to be observed were those obtaining before Courts of
42Justice and Justices of the Peace m  England. Even 
at the earliest stage, judicial security of tenure was 
given express recognition. Thus every judge of the 
High Court was to be appointed by the Secretary of State 
on the nomination of the Company, and:
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"Shall hold office during good behaviour, 
and shall only be removed by a Secretary 
of State. The salaries of the judges... 
shall not be increased or diminished 
without his [the Secretary of State's]
approval".43
Appeal from the High Court lay with the Privy 
44Council in London. The hierarchy of the judiciary 
was completed by the fact that lower courts, below
45the level of the High Court, were also established.
Rut more strikingly important were the substantive 
protective provisions under this Order in Council, which 
were spelled out in very clear terms. All of these 
resemble very nearly the present-day principles under­
lying the concept of human rights. In the first place 
the Order in Council provided against discrimination by 
enacting that no conditions, disabilities or restrictions 
were to be imposed upon natives save in respect of fire­
arms, ammunition, liquor or any matter authorized by the
46Secretary of State alone. And the Company was
obligated to assign to the natives of the region "land
sufficient for their occupation and suitable for
their agricultural and pastoral requirements, including
 a fair and equitable proportion of springs or
47permanent water". Further, a native had the right to 
acquire, hold, encumber and dispose of land on the same 
conditions as a person who was not a native; but in 
order to guard natives against others who might have 
capitalized on their ignorance of the commercial nature
of land transactions, the Order in Council provided that
^ 9
whenyer there was a contract to be executed for encumbering
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or alienating land by a native no such control was
to be valid unless it was made in the presence of
a magistrate who was to attest it, and who was then
required to issue a certificate signed by him stating
that the consideration for the contract was fair and
reasonable and further, that the native understood the 
48transaction. Yet though the Order in Council 
entrenched land rights in favour of natives, and 
prohibited the arbitrary acquisition of natives' land 
by "any person", the enjoyment of this right was, 
however, curtailed in one significant way, namely by the 
Order in Council providing that "the Company shall retain 
the mineral rights in all land assigned to natives".
In effect, this meant that if the Company required any 
such land "for the purpose of mineral development", or 
even for sites for townships, railways or other public 
works associated with the mining of any mineral discovered, 
natives could be ordered to leave such lands. The only 
condition contingent upon such a forced removal of 
natives was that such natives were to be assigned "just 
and liberal compensation in kind" elsewhere sufficient
and suitable fo sustain their agricultural and pastoral
49 .requirements. Otherwise, the Order m  Council
explicitly prohibited the removed of natives from any
land assigned to them, and also from their kraal^ and
made it an offence, punishable with imprisonment for any
period not exceeding two years upon conviction by the
High Court.
The machinery created under the North Eastern
Rhodesia Order in Council for the effective protection
of native interests whenever their infringement was
threatened, was not spelled out in any definite and
specific manner. Under the Order in Council any
allegation as to the infraction of any of the protective
provisions under it was not to be the subject of
judicial enquiry, but was rather left to be decided upon
by the appointed Company administrators. Thus all
questions, for example, relating to the land rights of
natives, were to be dealt with and decided upon by the
administrator, whose decisions on all such matters were
to be reported to, and subject to review by, the High 
52Commissioner. The Commissioner's reviewal powers
were further subjected to imperial scrutiny, as he was
required to transmit a report upon every case relating
to natives dealt with by him to the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State was vested with power to reverse
or modify any decision given by the High Commissioner,
and would give his directions in the matter as he thought
53fit; such direction was to be obeyed by all persons,
But at the stage when the matter relative to a 
native's rights was before the High Commissioner, judicial 
opinion could be sought if the Commissioner wished the 
case to be referred to a judge of the High Court. The 
relevant provision was as follows:
*90
"The Commissioner may, if he thinks fit, 
refer any question relating to natives 
for report to any judge of the High Court, 
and the judge shall thereupon make such 
inquiry as he thinks fit, and shall report 
to the Commissioner the result of such 
inquiry. The Commissioner may act with 
reference to any such report as he thinks 
fit".54
Quite evidently, therefore, the High Commissioner had a 
wide discretion to deal with any conflict arising between 
a native or natives and any Company officer, and the role 
of a judge of the High Court, if asked at all to render 
his opinion, was merely advisory and, therefore, not 
binding on the Commissioner. This is quite underr 
standable from the constitutional position of the
High Commissioner, since he was the one who was
responsible and accountable to the Imperial Government.
But there was also the practical aspect of administering
justice by bureaucrats at this early stage, since "the
British Courts, composed of BSA Company officers, were
55undermanned and ill-equipped from the outset". In any 
case, the Courts at this stage could hardly be suitable 
instruments for the civilizing of natives or for 
harmonizing some of the contradictory traditional norms 
of natives with those of the Western social, political, 
and legal concepts.
It is clear also that from the outset the administrative 
policy of both the Company and the Imperial Government was 
to leave natives free to pursue their own style of life 
according to their customs. This was given effect by the 
Order in Council when it enacted that all marriages
contracted by natives according to their native law 
or custom were to be recognized as valid by any Court. 
This also meant that polygamous marriages were accepted 
by the colonial regime. But the application of customary 
law as a whole was also limited to instances where it was 
not "repugnant to natural justice or morality". The 
Order in Council provided that:
"In civil cases between natives the High Court 
and the Magistrates* Courts shall be guided by 
native law so far as that law is not repugnant 
to natural justice or morality, or to any Order 
made by Her Majesty in Council, or to any 
Regulation made under this Order. In any such 
case the Court may obtain the assistance of one 
or two native assessors, to advise the Court 
upon native law and customs, but the decision 
of the Court shall be given by the judge or 
magistrate alone. In all other respects the 
Court shall follow, as far as possible, the ^  
procedure observed in similar cases in England".
From this time and throughout the history of Northern
Rhodesia the clause, otherwise known as the "repugnancy
clause", remained on the statute book, and has been
retained even after independence. The Local Courts Act
passed in 1966, that is, two years after Zambia*s
independence, provided that a Local Court shall
administer African customary law applicable to any matter
before it "in so far as any such law is not repugnant to
natural justice or morality or incompatible with the
provisions of any written law...
The obvious import of the "repugnancy provision" is
to limit the scope for the application of native law and
customs by implying that such laws and customs can only
operate if they pass the criterion supplied by English 
58law, because as Lord Summer said, the effect of the
movement of white settlement in the Company territories
supported by the Crown was that the aboriginal system
gave place to another prescribed by the Order in 
. 59Council. There have also been a few cases recorded
in Northern Rhodesia or Zambia invoking the repugnancy
60clause. In R. v. Mubanga and Sakani, a direct clash 
between a Bemba tribal law and the dictates of Christian 
religion came out into the open. The appellants were 
charged with contempt of Bemba traditional law under the 
Native Authority Ordinance because they had refused to 
abide by the Chief’s orders that, in accordance to the 
Bemba customary law they, together with other tribesmen, 
were required to contribute millet for the purpose of 
worshipping the tribal spirits. The appellants1 refusal 
to follow this customary practice was based on the fact 
that they, being Christians, would be doing something 
which their Christian teaching did not approve of it, and 
was indeed against it. In the High Court of Northern 
Rhodesia it was found that, in fact, the so-called custom 
of offering millet was never established among the Bemba 
tribe; but the Court went on to make the important point 
that even if it was established, it would still have been 
inconsistent with other laws in force in the territory and 
"repugnant to justice", and that "native customary law 
cannot be sustained where it is in conflict with thfer 
Common Law".
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A Tanganyikan case presented to the High Court
of Tanganyika the interesting question as to whose
conception of "natural justice and morality" should be
applied in terms of the Tanganyika Order in Council (1920)
which also contained the repugnancy clause in exactly the
same wording. The Court supplied a clear answer in the
following words:
"To what standard, then, does the Order in Council 
refer - the African standard of justice and 
morality or the British standard? I have no 
doubt whatever that the only standard of justice 
and morality which a British court in Africa can 
apply is it own British standard".
There is also no doubt that the expression "morality" in
the repugnancy clause represents morality as interwoven
in the Christian religion so that if any mode of tribal
worship was found to exist inconsistently with Christianity
62it would, for that reason, be declared unlawful. This
is, in fact, what was implied in the Zambian case of
Mubanga and Sakeni referred to thereabove.
63In another Northern Rhodesian case, the High 
Court reversed an order of the highest Native Court in 
Barotseland purporting to expel the appellant from his 
home village and requiring him to be removed to another 
district he had never lived in. The only reason why he 
was to be expelled was that his conduct was becoming 
offensive to the local induna (a kind of councillor to 
the chief responsible for the area). Reversing the order 
the High Court ruled that the action of expelling a native 
from his home was repugnant to natural justice and 
morality. Patterson, C.J., then gave a noteworthy
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observation about the repugnancy clause in the 
following terms:
"Nevertheless, in deciding whether an order is 
repugnant to natural justice or morality, I 
must apply the somewhat stricter standards 
that a judge of the High Court should observe.
I consider that it is the duty of the High 
Court in deciding cases relating to the 
liberty of the subject to set as high a 
standard of human conduct as is consistent 
with the due maintenance of law and order and 
the rights of other individual persons".64
Further, Patterson considered that before a native court
could make an order expelling a man from his home, the
court would have to be satisfied that there was no lesser
remedy which would be sufficiently effective for the
purpose of maintaining security, peace, and good order
in village. Meanwhile, earlier on he had observed:
"I consider that it is the duty of the High Court 
in deciding cases relating to the liberty of the 
subject to set a high standard of human conduct 
and is consistent with the due maintenance of law 
and order and the rights of other individual 
persons".
The importance of this decision to the instant investigation 
isthat it immediately shows that there was a mutual 
relationship between between the "repugnancy clause" and 
the ends of human rights. No doubt the repugnancy clause 
was, at least not in a small measure, intended to 
discourage certain tribal practices and customs which were 
inherently incompatible with certain principles of 
humanity as expressed through the concept of human rights.
It might therefore have helped to bring down servitude and 
inhuman treatment practised in some tribal societies, and
144
at the same time harmonizing the less offensive ones
to the introduced scheme of law. This view seems to be
65
fortified by the case of In re Southern Rhodesia, where 
the Privy Council said:
"Some tribes are so low in the scale of social 
organization that their usages and conception 
of rights and duties are not to be reconciled 
with the institutions or legal ideas of 
civilized society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged... 
On the other hand, there are indigenous peoples 
whose legal conceptions, though differently 
developed, are hardly less precise than our own.
When once they have been studied and understood 
they are no less enforceable than rights arising 
under English law".
In the midst of such tribal practices as slavery, the
slaughtering of certain commoners to accompany the burial
of a chief, amputation of hands of those found guilty of
theft, and certain aspects of witchcraft, the operation
and annulling effect of the repugnancy clause was
66naturally called for.
C. Unification of North Western and North Eastern Rhodesia 
under the first Constitution, 1911
Hitherto we have been discussing the government of Northern 
Rhodesia under the Company and the protective provisions therein 
before 1911. On May 4, 1911, the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council 
of 1911, revoking the North Eastern and Barotseland-North Western 
Orders in Council and merging the two territories into one 
jurisdiction, was promulgated; its provisions were brought into 
operation by the Northern Rhodesia Proclamation, Number 1, of 
August 17, 1911. This, in effect, meant that the two former 
territories of North Western and North Eastern Rhodesias merged into 
a single territory to be known as Northern Rhodesia under the 
government of the BSA Company.
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The Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, followed closely
the pattern of the North Eastern Order in Council, and was in all
essentials a replica of the latter Order. Naturally, there were
certain changes in the administrative structure necessitated by
a change in the constitutional status of the territory. But with
respect to the provisions incorporating safeguards for natives,
the 1911 Order in Council reproduced, verbatim, all such provisions
67as they existed in the North Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council.
Also incorporated in the new scheme was the concept of imperial
control over the company’s legislative and administrative activities
through the power of disallowance conferred on the Secretary of 
68State; and throught the requirement that the appointments of 
principal officers by the Company be approved by the Secretary of
State. By virtue of this power, Proclamation No. 9 of 1912, which
. . .  • 6(provided for collective punishment in the territory, was disallowed.
There was also one vital area in which the legislative exercise of 
power in the territory was limited under this Order. The High 
Commissioner for South Africa was the constituted authority vested 
with the power to make legislation by proclamations in the territory. 
Proclamations issued were, however, subordinate legislation, as the 
High Commissioner’s powers depended upon the Order in Council or 
Letters Patent appointing him to the office. Moreover, all such 
legislation was sugject to the overriding authority of the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act, 1965, which reads that:
"Any colonial law which is or should be in any respect 
repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament 
extending to the Colony to which such laws may relate, 
or repugnant to any Order or Regulation made under the
authority or such Act of Parliament, shall be read
subject to such Act, Order, or Regulation, and shall, 
to the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, 
be and remain absolutely void and inoperative".70
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Apart from these few remarks, the position of the Company1s 
authority over Northern Rhodesia remained essentially the same 
until 1924 when the British Government assumed direct responsibility 
for the administration of the territory.
D. Crown Administration and Constitutional Safeguards 1924-1962 
By the early 1920’s, the Company was experiencing grave 
administrative and financial problems in running the territory, and 
its officials were satisfied that the problems could no longer be 
contained. The Crown was also satisfied that the BSA Company 
administration could be improved upon. Thus, by the Devonshire 
Agreement of September 1923, Company rule was ended. On February 
20th, 1924, the Crown assumed responsibility for the administration 
of the territory. The 1911 Order in Council was revoked and replaced 
by the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924. Henceforth Northern 
Rhodesia became a Protectorate with a constitution of the usual 
"Crown Colony" type.
i) The meaning and legal nature of a "protectorate"
Wight says that " legally, a protectorate is a
dependency that has not been annexed: it is not part of the
dominions of the Crown, and its inhabitants are not British 
subjects".^ Because a protectorate is not part of the 
Crown’s dominions it is, therefore, technically a foreign
72country. In the Northern Rhodesian case of Ex Parte Mwenya, 
which involved impugnment of the Governor’s detention order in 
an English court, the Secretary of State in his affidavit swore 
that Northern Rhodesia is "a foreign country within which Her 
Majesty has power and jurisdiction by treaty, grant, usage,
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sufferance and other lawful means within the meaning of the
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, but not recognized by Her
73Majesty as part of the Dominions". Herein lies the
distinguishing mark between a protectorate and a colony.
A colony is part of the Crown dominions, and its inhabitants
are British subjects for "the settlers who established settled
colonies took with them all the rights of the British
subjects " But in actual fact, the institutions of
government established in protectorates and colonies, and
the modes of administration in both sets of territories were
74the same. As Kennedy, L.J., in sekgome^ case, commented,
the powers exercisable in a protectorate are "usually so
complete that they are indistinguishable from those enjoyed
in a territory which is part of the Her Majesty’s dominion,"
hence the designation "colonial protectorates".^ Another
element of a protectorate is brought out by Sir Henry Jenkyns.
A protectorate is a territory:
" which is not within the British Dominions, but as
regards its foreign relations it is under the exclusive 
control of the King so that its government cannot hold 
direct communication with any foreign power, nor a 
foreign power with that government".76
The relevance of unfolding the legal nature of a protectorate
in this inquiry will be appreciated when we discuss the extent
to which an English court could intervene in the legal
controversies of a protectorate in defence of personal liberties.
ii) The constitutional arrangements in the Northern
Rhodesia Protectorate 1924-1963
There were really three basic instruments which provided
the constitution of the Northern Rhodesia Protectorate from 1924
to 1963 - the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, the
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Northern Rhodesia (Legislative Council) Order in Council 1924,
and the Instructions passed under the Royal Sign Manual and
Signet to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief.
a) Institutions of Government created by the Northern 
Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924
The most important institutions constituted by the
1924 Order in Council were the Office of the Governor,
the Legislative Council, the Executive Council: and the
High Court, Magistrates' Courts, and Native Commissioners'
Courts were retained as they existed under the 1911 Order
in Council - but with slight changes in their organizations.
In place of the Administrator under the 1911 Order
in Council, the 1924 Order made provision for the appointment
of a Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the territory.^
The Governor was designated as the principal imperial
officer and was therefore vested with extraordinarily
wide powers, the exercise of which was made subject
" to the tenor of any Orders in Council relating
to the territory and according to such
instructions as may from time to time be given to 
him "
78by Her Majesty's Secretary of State. The entire
executive authority in the territory was vested in the
Governor and, although provision was made for the creation
of an Executive Council for the purpose of advising the 
79Governor, the latter could in fact act contrary to the 
advice so rendered. In this event he was required to 
report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies his
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reasons for disagreeing with the Executive Council,
and the members of the Council (formerly composed
80entirely of officials) were entitled to have their
views placed on record. This was presumably intended
to be a deterrent to arbitrary action by the Governor,
since the requirement of reporting to the Secretary of
State the circumstances in which he failed to act in
concurrence with the Council, and the requirement that
the views of the Council be placed on record, had a
restraining effect on the GovernorTs decision and of
its rational content.
Also established by the 1924 Order in Council was
the Legislative Council. The establishment of the
Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia was a direct
response to pressure from the white settlers who, between
the period 1911 to 1923, were agitating for an effective
share in the government of the territory.
The Buxton Committee, which was appointed on 7th
March 1921, by the Secretary of State to advise on a
number of matters raised in the white settlers1 petition
about the constitutional future of the territory, came
out (in its five-page report of 25th April 1921), with
the view that the settlers* claims to an effective
participation in the governmental affairs of the territory
81"were reasonable". It therefore recommended that the 
BSA Company should consider the establishment of a
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Legislative Council. But since the question of the
termination of Company government was also under active
consideration, the issue of establishing a Legislative
Council during the Company1s rule was postponed until
this issue was resolved.
Thus, when the issue referred to above was resolved
and the territory placed under direct imperial rule, the
Legislative Council was one of the most significant
institutions which emerged from the first constitution of
82the Northern Rhodesia Protectorate. The Council was
effectively constituted by the Northern Rhodesia
(Legislative Council) 1924, which was proclaimed on the 
838th May 1924. The first Governor of Northern Rhodesia,
Sir Henry Stanley, clarified the nature of the Legislative
Council when it first met. He said:
"It is hardly necessary for me to emphasize that 
a council such as ours is not a parliament in 
the generally accepted sense of that term. It 
is constituted on a different basis, which 
obviously places the government in a position to 
exercise effective c o n t r o l " .84
The Legislative Council was to consist of the Governor
as President, ex-officio members, officials nominated by
85the Governor, and elected unofficial members. A Nova 
Scotian (Canada) case decided that the tenure of office 
of the members of the Legislative Council was during the 
pleasure of the Crown, or for life as they were appointed 
during pleasure.^
The Legislative Council had "full power and 
authority" to make ordinances "as may be necessary for the
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administration of justice, the raising of revenue
and generally for the peace and good government of
Northern Rhodesia". But the Governor was elevated
above it since he could veto the making and passage 
87of all such laws. This provision was significant 
considering that the Governor was very much a 
component of the Council and, indeed, its president.
In the end, all ordinances which were made for the 
territories were "enacted by the Governor with
88
the advice and consent of the Legislative Council...
In effect, the Governor was indeed the legislature by 
88himself. It is clear from what we have said
respecting the Governors role in the colonial 
administration, that his office combined the two main
<a.TiC-ie_u+-i
state powers of and legislative all
effectively under his authority. The concentration of 
such power in the Governor meant that the legislature 
was subordinated to the executive, which was 
responsible only to Secretary of State. This form
 ^Q+Cs tn Cl (
of . *. regime has therefore been called
89"autocratic". But perhaps, before describing the 
system of government as autocratic, it is necessary 
to look at the kind of protective provisions or 
control mechanisms which were erected by the 
constitution to guard against the abuse of power by 
the Governor.
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E. Protective Provisions and Control Mechanisms under 
the First Constitution of the Protectorate, 1924
There were a number of weaknesses in the constitutional 
arrangements of Northern Rhodesia (1924), and the Northern Rhodesia 
Order in Council 1924 was designed to control the actions of the 
colonial officers, especially the Governor and his principal officers. 
It would appear that the Imperial Government was far more strict 
in the control of the Company’s administration than it was in the 
colonial regime after 1924. This is clear from the range of almost 
uncontrolled powers given to the colonial regime under the 
territory’s constitution of 1924, as compared with the same powers 
meted out to the Company's government in the preceding period.
However, the same principles which underlined the mechanics of 
control during the Company’s administration were retained under the 
new colonial administration: these were, the express incorporation
of protective provisions in the basic documents of government, and 
the subordination of the colonial government to the Imperial 
Government.
The Northern Rhodesia Order in Council (1924) followed closely 
the pattern of the 1911 Order in Council, which in turn was, as 
already indicated, erected upon the North Eastern Rhodesia Order in 
Council, 1900. But there were vast changes as regards the type of 
government institutions established, their relationships inter se, 
and their relationship with the Imperial Government - which were 
necessitated by the territory's assumption of a different character 
of constitutional status. The point, however, is that the connection 
of the Protectorate’s new constitution with its predecessors turned 
out to be that those safeguards which were designed to preserve the
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9° . . ,
interests of natives in the previous constitutions were retained
under the new constitutional order. Thus such safeguards as
. . . . . . . .  . 9 1restrictive regulations against discrimination as regards natives,
92 . . .protection of rights of land by natives, prohibition of removal
93of natives from kraal or land, authorization of native law and
. 9 4custom to be applied m  civil cases between natives, freedom of
95natives to marry under native law and custom - were all given
effect and continued by the Order in Council. In addition, the 
native rights reserved under the Lewanika concessions were now 
given express effect by the Order in Council in the following 
terms:
"It shall not be lawful for any purpose whatever to 
alienate from the Chief and people of Barotse, the 
territory reserved from prospecting by virtue of 
the concessions from Lewanika to the BSA Company, 
dated 7th day of October, 1900, and the 11th day 
of August, 1909".96
But it was in the area of the control of the Governor and the
Legislative Council by Whitehall that the Order in Council
introduced novel ideas. The imperial government on its part was
aware that in a colonial situation where the legislature was
powerless to control the actions of the executive, or where no
reliability could be placed on the control by the electorate, or by
any effective judicial control, an ideal situation for despotic
behaviour was potentially facilitated. It therefore armed itself
with power to check against arbitrary tendencies by the colonial
regime. The imperial government^ approach to this problem assumed
the "positive" and "negative" dimensions. The positive aspect was
manifested in its desire to charge the Governor, as an instrument
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of implementing imperial policy in the territory, with the 
responsibility of seeing to it that the general welfare of natives 
was given prominence. The imperial government regarded itself as 
the trustee to the natives until such a time that they were able 
to take over the reins of power in the territory - and this 
attitude of the imperial government was given reality with the 
publication of the Secretary of Stated Memorandum on Native Policy 
in East Africa in 1930. In this paper Lord Passfield, then 
Secretary of the State for the Colonies, affirmed that "the main 
responsibility of Great Britain in East Africa was a trustee for 
the native peoples hot yet able to stand on their own feet™, and 
that "this would necessitate the retention of final control by His
Majesty1 s Government " of the colonial administration in Kenya.
Most significantly, the paper emphasized that:
"the.interests of African natives must be paramount, and 
that if, and when, those interests and the interests of 
the immigrant races should conflict, the former should
prevail".97
The publication of this memorandum provoked a storm of intense 
protests by the white settlers of Northern Rhodesia, and made the 
Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir James Maxwell, act by summoning 
and meeting the unofficial members of the Legislative Council to 
elucidate upon the meaning and implications of the paper. In this 
connection he said:
"There is nothing whatsoever in [the] White Paper which
means any change of policy on the part of the Government,
and there is nothing in it which in my opinion is
detrimental to the interests of white settlers or to other 
people of European origin who have come to, and are working 
in this country. Paramountcy of native interests did not
155
"mean racial discrimination. Where you have a group of 
Europeans conflicting with the interests of a group of 
natives it does not mean that the interest: of that 
group of natives is to prevail simply because they are 
natives, but in my opinion it does mean that if you 
have some question arising in which the interests of 
the natives as a whole are at variance with the 
interests either of the Europeans as a whole or of a 
group of Europeans, that the interests of the majority^ 
of the population, that is the natives, must prevail".
The imperial government’s conception of their relationship to the
natives as trustee for their "material, physical and moral
advancement" was reflected in the provisions of the protectorate’s
principal instruments of government. By Section 22 of the Northern
Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, all ordinances to be passed by the
Legislative Council were to respect:
"Any native laws or customs by which the civil relations 
of any native chiefs, tribes or populations under His 
Majesty’s protection are regulated "
And Section 23 reserves to the Crown government, through the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the right to disallow any
ordinance passed by the Governor in Council. Also reserves to itself
was the power of the Crown government to make such laws or ordinances
as may appear to be necessary for the peace, order and good
99government of the territory. Moreover, certain categories of
bills were removed from the power of the Governor for assent; there 
were four types of such billsj but only one type seems relevant to be 
mentioned in connection with the present discussion. The Governor 
was not to give assent to:
"Any bill whereby natives may be subjected or made
liable to any conditions, disabilities or restrictions 
to which persons of European descent are not also 
subjected or made liable".100
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Further, in making and establishing bills and ordinances, 
the Governor and the Legislative Council were obligated to conform 
to and to observe not only the directions contained in the Order 
in Council, but also "any instructions under His Majesty’s Sign 
Manual and Simultaneously with the promulgation of the
1924 Order in Council, the Royal Instructions of 26th February 
1924, were also passed defining, among other things, the duties of 
the Governor. One of the principal duties directed at the Governor 
in relation to native inhabitants was that:
"The Governor is, to the utmost of his power, to promote 
religion and education among the native inhabitants of 
the Territory, and he is especially to take care to 
protect them in their persons and in the free enjoyment 
of their possessions, and by all lawful means to prevent 
and restrain all violence and injustice which may in any 
manner be practised or attempted against them".101
102i) The decision in R. v. He Jager
The provisions requiring the Governor in Council to 
conform with Royal Instructions and the imposition by the 
latter of a duty on the Governor (inter alia) to promote religion 
among the native inhabitants, and safeguard them in the free 
enjoyment of their possessions, was relied upon in the De Jager’s 
case to impugn the validity of a proclamation passed by the 
Governor in Council as restricting the freedom of conscience 
and as an infringement of, or a non-compliance with, the terms 
of the Royal Instructions. The case was decided by the High 
Court of Northern Rhodesia in 1935.
The applicant was a representative of the "Watchtower 
Bible and Tract Society" and was convicted by the Acting 
Resident Magistrate of Ndola District of two offences under
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the Penal Code of the territory. The evidence was that he was 
found in possession of certain books, to wit 4 books named 
"Deliverance" and one book named "Jehovah". The importation 
into the territory of these categories of literature was 
prohibited by Proclamation No.9 of 1935, passed by the 
Governor in Council pursuant to the power conferred by the 
Penal Code. In the High Court the appellant set himself to 
test the validity of the action of the Governor in Council in 
issuing the proclamation, inter alia, on two ground. First, the 
appellant argued that "The Proclamation is repugnant to a basic 
principle embodied in the Law of England which in its 
recognition of freedom of conscience applies in Northern 
Rhodesia". Secondly, he argued that the proclamation was 
invalid because "any act in deprivation of the use of these 
books by the Natives of this Territory is an infringement of, 
or at least a non-compliance with, the terms of the Royal 
Instructions, which impose on the Governor a duty to promote 
religion among the Native inhabitants". We shall respectively 
denote the two grounds of appeal as the issue of validity of 
the proclamation because of its inconsistency with some 
principles of English law, and secondly, the issue of the 
invalidity of the proclamation because of its inconsistency 
with the Royal Instructions:
a) Proclamation versus some principles of English law
On the first issue of the claim of invalidity of the 
proclamation because it was inconsistent with the principles 
of English law recognizing the freedom of conscience and
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religion which applied to Northern Rhodesia,
Francis, J., first admitted that English law was made
applicable to the territory by virtue of the provisions
103m  the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924,
and also by the operation of Section 11 of the High Court
ordinance, 1933, where the application of English law
was more specifically dealt with. But, he argued, the
application of English law to a colonial territory does
not render the power invested in the local legislature
to legislate for the peace, order and good government of
the territory restrictive in any way; and since what may
be suitable in the law of England may not always be
expedient in an African colonial dependency, it was
perfectly permissible for the local legislature to pass
certain laws which may not always be in harmony with some
principles of English law. In support of this proposition
104the Court cited the case of Rex v. Crewe ex parte Sekgome 
where Farwell, L.J., propounded the principle that in a 
local enactment there may be repugnancy to the law of 
England, and that that enactment would not be treated as 
invalid except in so far as such repugnancy is not to some 
principle of natural justice, the violation of which would 
induce a Court not to give effect to it, or is not to some 
imperial statute. This then was the limitation which was 
placed on the applications of English law to a colonial 
situation.
After exposing the above stated principles, the Court 
then came directly to resolve the issue by making the point
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that religious matters were subject to the control of 
the legislature if in its view such matters needed some 
control. But, while conceding the fact that certain 
matters were so fundamental to freedom of worship, like 
the Holy Scriptures, etc., the judge held that there 
were certain matters which did not go to the roots of 
the act of worship, and their curtailment would not 
diminish the enjoyment of the freedom of worship. The 
Court concluded:
"When, however, the case involves books containing 
politico-religious teachings of a kind noticeable 
in those under review, the matter assumes a 
different complexion. Politico-religious 
discussion among the educated invariably excites 
controversy, and its propaganda among primitive 
people may lead quite feasibly to misconception. 
Consequently, I am not prepared to say that the 
deprivation of literature of this order is an 
interference with any principle of natural 
justice".
Further, the Court drew attention to the question 
raised by the applicant regarding the alleged repugnancy 
of the proclamation to an English law establishing 
freedom of conscience in religious matters, and commented 
that the argument failed because the applicant did not 
identify or particularize which English statute law, or 
which common law principle he was referring to as having 
been infringed.
b) Issue of alleged invalidity of proclamation because 
of its inconsistency with the Royal Instructions
It will be recalled that the proclamation was alleged
to offend against Royal Instructions given to the Governor
requiring him to promote religion among the natives. The
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applicant argued that prohibiting the importation of 
religious literature into the territory, which is an 
essential component of religious activity, constituted an 
act against law which the Royal Instructions expected the 
government to strive for, namely, the promotion of 
religion among the natives. Worshipping or any form of 
religious activity is also fulfilled through the use of 
of books and literature, wherein are contained religious 
doctrines. But here the Court made a distinction between
two categories of religious literature, viz., " Holy
Scriptures, the Koran, or books of a liturgical or
devotional nature " of any creed and said that
prohibition of such literature would certainly amount to a 
contravention of the freedom of conscience in religious 
worship; but this was not true of the prohibition of 
a second category of books, containing "politico-religious 
teaching" which may not be in line with the needs of 
peace, order and security of the territory. Thus the 
Court said, "it would seem that the Government considered 
certain of the Society1s publications appearing in this 
Territory, to have a subversive influence on the Natives..." 
The Court then concluded:
"Now directly if such a contingency arose, it would 
appear to me that there is a duty imposed upon the
Governor to act, as and when he thought fit....
if his view of the facts was a reasonable view for 
him to take - it appears to me to be impossible to 
deny that, so far as it relates to the two books 
in question, this proclamation was a valid 
proclamation, not ultra vires, but within the 
scope of the power and duties entrusted to the 
Governor".
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On the whole the effect and tenor of the decision in 
De JagerTs case was that there could be a substantial area 
of English law which, though it incorporated important 
principles of personal liberties, could not apply in 
a dependent territory. The Court asserted this fact when
it observed that "It is not uncommon to find among
the laws of the British Dominions and possessions 
generally, instances where principles of English law, 
important or otherwise, have been abrogated or modified to 
meet local conditions". The claim that personal rights 
and freedoms were better protected in England than in the 
colonial territories may have been justifiable proposition 
in respect of those areas of freedoms with close affinity 
to political matters, that is political and civic rights 
like freedom of association and assembly, freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press and publication, etc. We 
shall notice this aspect of colonial constitutional 
practice at a later stage. For the moment it is intended 
to take up the subject of the protection of the right to 
personal liberty during the colonial period, and to discuss 
this subject against the background of one of the most 
celebrated personal liberty decisions by an English court 
in the Northern Rhodesian case of Ex parte Mwenya.*^
ii) Ex parte Mwenya: Protection of personal liberties 
during the colonial period
The case of Ex parte Mwenya decided by the English Court of
Appeal on behalf of a native of Northern Rhodesia, is important
not only because it overruled previously obtaining authorities
162
that English courts cannot issue the writ of habeas corpus 
in respect of a person detained or restricted in a protectorate, 
but also because it decided that that most important instrument 
for the protection of personal liberty in England, the writ of 
habeas corpus, could be used by "British protected persons" to 
challenge the abuse of power by the colonial regime in the area 
of individual liberties. The case is also important to this 
present investigation, because it shows exactly the extent to 
which the Secretary of State could control the actions of the 
Governor as prescribed by the constitution of the Protectorate 
which we have discussed.
The facts of the case were strightforward and can be 
recounted briefly here. The applicant was a native of the 
Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, and was the subject of two 
restriction orders made by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia 
pursuant to powers conferred on him by the Emergency Regulations, 
1956, of Northern Rhodesia requiring the applicant to remain in 
the district of Mporakoso. The applicant applied for a writ 
of habeas corpus to the English Divisional Court directed to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Governor of Northern 
Rhodesia, and the District Commissioner of Mporakoso District 
on the ground that he was unlawfully detained and asking to be 
set free. Under the Constitution of the Protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia, the Secretary of State, as we have seen, had 
extensive powers to control the legislative and executive powers 
of the Governor, or the Governor in Council, but under the 
specific emergency legislation under which this restriction
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order was effected, his approval or consent to the restriction 
orders was not required, and he took no part in the detention.
The Court was asked to resolve two issues, namely:
(i) whether an English court had jurisdiction to issue the 
writ of habeas corpus to persons, like the Governor and 
District Commissioners, in a protectorate; and (ii) whether 
the Secretary of State, by reason of his constitutional 
position, possessed sufficient custody of the applicant to be 
amenable to the writ.
a) Whether English courts were competent to issue 
the writ of habeas corpus to a protectorate
On this issue the applicant submitted that there 
was a duty on the part of the Crown to safeguard the 
liberty of all subjects within the realm, and that in 
principle the writ should go wherever there has been an 
unlawful act by a servant of the Crown, "for if Her Majesty 
may not enquire why someone entitled to her protection is 
unlawfully detained, then that protection is endangered".
In reply the Attorney-General, who had all the 
previous authorities in his favour establishing that the 
writ cannot issue to a protectorate, argued that Northern 
Rhodesia, being a protectorate, and not a colony, was no 
part of Her Majesty’s dominions in the territorial sense and, 
according to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, it was 
a foreign territory in which Her Majesty exercised power 
and jurisdiction by treaty, grant, usage, etc. In fact, 
the writ of habeas corpus had never before issued to a
164
territory not forming part of Her Majesty’s dominions.
106Iii Ex Parte Anderson, decided in 1861, an English 
court issued the writ to the County of York in Canada 
which was part of the Queen’s dominions. In a more 
or less similar case which arose from Bechnuanaland,
Ex Parte Sekgome, an English court considered the 
issue whether writ could issue to a protectorate 
(Bechuanaland), but the majority of the judges there 
thought that the writ applied "only to the territorial 
dominions of the Crown", and "that the protectorate
108formed no part of His Majesty’s dominions of the Crown", 
and therefore the application was turned down. In the 
case of Ex Parte Mwenya (as in Ex Parte Sekgome) it was 
further argued that there were courts of law established 
by the protectorate’s constitution which had jurisdiction 
to deal with the question of the legality of the detention, 
and that by Section 1 of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1862, the 
writ ought therefore not to issue.
On this first issue the decision of the Divisional 
Court, delivered by Lord Parker, C.J., in effect acknowledged 
previous authorities, but was based on the concept of 
sovereignity and its implications. The Court observed 
that the writ of habeas corpus was a prerogative writ, and 
therefore a manifestation of the sovereignty of the Crown 
as an instrument by which that sovereignty is exercised. 
Therefore, the power to issue this writ was co-extensive 
with such sovereignty. Since the Crown possesses complete
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sovereignty only in respect of its dominions, and not in 
protectorates where there is present some other 
"competing sovereignty", the writ cannot issue. But 
surely there was no competing power in a protectorate 
like Northern Rhodesia, and the control of the imperial 
government through the colonial regime was, in fact, 
complete.
b) Whether the Secretary of State by virtue of his 
constitutional position had sufficient custody 
so as to be amenable to the writ
The submission, of the applicant on this issue was 
that the Secretary of State, by virtue of his constitutional 
position in the protectorate, could control the exercise of 
power of the Governor vis-a-vis the colonial inhabitants.
It will be recalled that when we were discussing the 
Orders in Council and the Royal Instructions, or the 
constitution of the protectorate, the Secretary of State 
quite clearly had some power, and de facto control, over 
many activities of the Governor. According to his 
affidavit in this case, the Secretary of State swore that 
his constitutional position in the protectorate was only 
to advise Her Majesty with regard to the exercise of her 
power and jurisdiction in the territory. He then denied 
that he possessed any power to order the Governor to revoke 
the restriction order. In reply Parker, C.J., ruled 
that the constitutional powers vested in the Secretary of 
State by the protectorate’s constitution does not give the 
Secretary custody of the body of the applicant.
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The applicant appealed before the Court of Appeal, 
and Lord Evershed, M.R., reversing the decision of the 
Divisional Court, ruled as follows:
"But, as it seems to me, if upon a proper 
investigation of the facts, it appears that 
the internal governance of Northern Rhodesia 
is in legal effect indistinguishable from 
that of a British colony or a country 
acquired by conquest, then in conformity with
the nature of the writ I see for my part no
reason for denying jurisdiction to the Court...
If the fact is that the power and jurisdiction
of the Crown vis-a-vis Northern Rhodesia is no
whit different from that exercised in a "colony" 
or "dominion" then in my view, there is nothing, 
historically or logically, which bars the making 
of an order of habeas corpus."1Q9
The decision in this case confirms the view that in the
area of the protection of personal liberties, citizens
of colonial territories (including those of protectorates)
were secured roughly to the same degree as those in
England - since the former had also the benefit of
entitlement to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
from English courts. It is unfortunate that this case came
up for decision rather late (i.e., in 1959) when the
British colonial era in Africa was coming to an end (five
years before Zambia attained independence). But can it be
said of the same in respect of other types of fundamental
rights and freedoms that the citizens of colonial territories
were secured in the enjoyment of, say, the freedom of
assembly and association, of expression, of movement, etc.,
as those in Britain?
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F. Protection of Civil arid Political Freedoms arid the Colonial Rule
When discussing a topic of this nature and for the purposes 
of understanding the underlying factors behind the colonial regime’s 
reaction to certain activities of the colonial peoples, it is 
important to appreciate the initial point that the principal 
preoccupation of the colonial government was with the preservation 
of public order and security, and that it was always apprehensive 
of any kind of challenge to its authority. It was therefore readily 
disposed to subordinate the rights of an individual to public 
security whenever both should happen to be in conflict.
This is exactly what happened in the events after March 11, 1959, 
in Northern Rhodesia when the Governor of the territory invoked his 
powers under the Emergency Powers Ordinance. This declaration of 
emergency (actually a ’’semi-emergency")* *  ^ followed the announcement 
by the Government that a general election for the territory's 
Legislative Council would be taking place at some future date. To 
this the African nationalist movement was divided in that the newly- 
formed party - the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) under the 
leadership of Kenneth Kaunda - indicated that it was going to boycott 
the election and that it would use any means in order to induce or 
compel Africans to refrain from voting or from standing as candidates 
for the election. This arose out of the dissatisfaction with certain 
aspects of the country’s new constitution of 1958, which did not meet 
the Africans’ expectations for internal self-government. On the 
other hand, the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress, under 
Harry Nkumbula, though not accepting all the features of the new 
constitution, decided not to support a boycott of the election, but 
to encourage members to vote. In the event, ZANC embarked on a
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regime of intimidation, force, violence and restraint against
Africans in order to induce them, or compel them to refrain from
112voting or standing as candidates m  the election. ZANC also
systematically planned to obstruct voters at the polling stations
113or on their way thereto during the election.
In these circumstances, and pursuant to the Emergency Powers
Ordinances, the Governor made the Safeguard of Elections And Public
114Safety Regulations, 1959. Under these regulations, the Governor
or any of his Provincial Commissioners was given powers to restrict 
anybody upon satisfaction that that person or group of persons were 
preparing or participating in actions likely to frustrate the conduct 
of elections or which would lead to a situation endangering the public 
safety.Further, a "competent authority" (that is, the Governor 
and his Provincial Commissioners), or a District Commissioner or 
police officer not below the rank of Assistant Superintendent was 
empowered to prohibit the holding in any area of a public meeting 
or procession (organized by any association, society or other 
organization) upon satisfaction that this would lead to a breach of
116the peace or order, and would also affect the conduct of elections. 
Further, the police officers and other administrative officers were 
empowered to arrest without warrant any person guilty of or 
reasonably suspected of being guilty of an offence against the 
regulations.^^ Powers of search were also granted to the police.
Finally, the Zambia African National Congress was declared an 
unlawful organization, and seme, of its top leaders were deported and 
restricted to various parts of the country. And those leaders of 
ZANC who had attempted to make statements considered to promote ill- 
will or hostility among members of the community, or who made
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statements against the government, were taken to Courts to 
answer charges of criminal sedition.
To start with, in spite of the wide powers conceded to the
government by the regulations to restrict anybody, power to make
restriction orders, to vary or amend them was given exclusively in
the hands of the competent authority who the Safeguard of Elections
and Public Safety Regulations defined as the Governor or any
Provincial Commissioner. This power, unlike the other powers under
the regulations which we have discussed above, did not extend to a
District Commissioner or police or administrative officers. Thus in 
119Ex Parte Makasa the applicant was served with a restriction order 
made by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia under Regulation 3 of the 
Safeguard of Elections and Public Security Regulations, 1959, the 
effect of which was to restrict the applicant to the Solwezi .
District of Northern Rhodesia. An application was made to the High 
Court for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus addressed to the 
District Commissioner of Solwezi District. The applicant argued that 
the restriction order was invalid because while in Solwezi he was 
under the custody and control of the District Commissioner who also 
imposed some restraints on his movement whilst there. In other words, 
the allegation was that the District Commissioner administered the 
'order* in a manner outside its terms, and that this therefore amounted 
to a variation of the order which it was outside the powers of the 
District Commissioner to do so in the light of the provisions contained 
in the Safeguards of Elections and Public Safety Regulations.
Patterson, C.J., expressed the view that, under-'the Safeguard of 
Elections and Public Safety Regulations, "it is apparent that a 
Restriction Order can only be made by a competent authority who is
defined in Regulation 2 as the Governor or any Provincial 
120Commissioner". In this particular case there was no evidence
that the District Commissioner was acting at any time on behalf
of a competent authority in his capacity as such - otherwise the
restriction order would have been declared invalid.
However, the declaration of emergency and the making of the
regulations under the Emergency Powers Ordinance to deal with the
situation, explained thereabove, prompted a wave of protests and
resentment by Africans, especially in view of the harsh manner in
121which the emergency was handled.. Africans now became more and
more vocal in their expression of hostility to the colonial
government. To this the government resorted to invoking the law
relating to criminal sedition as an attempt to quieten nationalists,
and it should perhaps be stated here that freedom of expression
among the colonial peoples was often flouted through the application
of the law of sedition. It is also here that one clearly sees that
there were limitations on the freedom of speech in the colonies as
compared with the United Kingdom.
122In R. v. Chona, for example, the accused was the National 
Secretary of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and in 
that capacity issued a document' described as a "press statement". 
The press statement purported to describe the evils of colonial 
rule by alleging inter alia, that there was no justice whatever 
under colonial rule anywhere in the world. The circular went on to 
state that:
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"Those of you who have attended the courts while 
trying your political colleagues must have got the 
same impression as myself, i.e., that the courts 
are here to rubber stamp oppression and to administer 
mock justice. As for the native courts, all of you 
must have got the impression that they have been 
reorganized to jail any African that the Government 
Administrative Officials want to be jailed, whether 
he has committed an offence or not. I have witnessed 
trials myself from the beginning to the end. If I had 
tears, I would shed them".
The accused was charged with publishing a seditious publication
123contrary to Section 53 of the Penal Code. His defence was that 
the above words were not seditious, and that there was no 
"seditious intention" as defined in the Penal Code. On the contrary, 
the accused argued, the words were published to point out errors 
or defects in the government or constitution of the territory as 
by law established, or in the administration of justice, and to 
try and persuade inhabitants of the territory to procure by lawful 
means the alteration of the matters he complained of. The High 
Court of Northern Rhodesia started off by saying that it was entitled 
to take judicial notice of what was taking place in the country, and 
that it was against this background that the "intention" associated 
with the publication of the accused's "press statement" would be 
abstracted from. The Court found as a fact that it was common 
knowledge that since 1959 to 1961 there was an outbreak of violence 
in the territory designed to bring pressure to bear on the government 
in connection with negotiations, then taking place with regard to the 
constitution of the territory. Many members of UNIP were then 
convicted by the courts of violence, arson and destruction of public 
property. Against this background the Court ruled that "when the 
statement was written it was a seditious publication because it
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intended to bring into hatred or contempt, and to excite
disaffection against the administration of justice in the Territory,
for the purposes of propagating the policy of UNIP". But compare
125this case with an English case of R. v. Burns and Others. The
accused in this case were members of the Social Democratic
Federation and were charged with uttering seditious words by
denouncing the House of Commons
"as composed of capitalists who had fattened upon the 
labour of the working men....to hang these would be 
to waste good rope, and as no good to the people was 
to be expected from these representatives there must 
be revolution to alter the present state of things".
The English law on criminal sedition as found in Stephen’s Digest
126On the Criminal Law, is much the same as that found in the then 
Northern Rhodesian Penal Code. But although in R. v. Burns and 
Others, it was conceded by the jury that the words uttered were 
"highly inflammatory", the accused were, nevertheless, acquitted of 
the charge. Yet in this case there seems to be a strong case for 
arguing that the natural effect of the words uttered by the accused 
was to excite disaffection or to bring hatred on members of the House 
of Commons, and certainly not to point out errors or defects in the 
system of government or in the administrative procedure of a 
government institution. The accused also advocated "revolution" as 
a means of altering the then present state of affairs, which in 
effect meant use of violence. In R. v. Chona, on the other hand, 
no violence was ever advocated, and the accused was more concerned 
with the defects in the administration of justice which he condemned 
as politically oriented. But the same cannot be said of another
Northern Rhodesian case of Chakulya v. R. In this case, which
also arose from within the same political climate as that of
R. v. Chona, the appellant was charged with uttering seditious words
contrary to the Penal Code. Mr. Chakulya, a UNIP District Chairman,
told a public meeting of 200 Africans that:
"(i) If you see anything white with 2 legs, 2 eyes and
a mouth as I am, hate it. It is your enemy. You should
spit on it'"
and
"(ii) ’The European is a robber', ’The European should be hated', 
'We must hate the white man’, 'The white man is a liar',
'The white man is a thief'".
Quite clearly these words were uttered irresponsibly to promote
feelings of ill-will and hostility among different classes of the
community - and it could never be doubted, as the Court said, that
the intention behind their utterances was to bring hatred and
excite disaffection between the Africans and Europeans. Northern
Rhodesia, as we shall see in the next chapter, was a home of many
races and to that extent was a multi-racial society. Whites had
come to Northern Rhodesia in numbers to run the country's copper
mines, the railway, schools, hospitals, the civil service, and
generally the country's growing economy. In these circumstances,
propaganda based on promoting tension and hatred among the racial
groups posed a danger to public order and safety. And freedom of
speech is abused if the effect of its exercise is to induce
consequences prejudicial to the interests of public safety, public
^  128 order, etc.
The Chakulya v. R. case should be contrasted with yet another
129Northern Rhodesian case of Buchanan v. R. Here again, the
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appellant was convicted of publishing a seditious publication in 
contravention of the Penal Code. She had published a sheet called 
"Gothic Review". The front of the sheet had the phrases "Anti­
communist" and "Pro-Christian", and contained an article entitled 
"Emergency Regulations - For Whom?". The theme of this article 
was that the Government of Northern Rhodesia was mistaken in using 
regulations, that these regulations had the effect of silencing 
criticism of what was wrong in the territory. There were other 
subjects on which the article touched, but which are not of immediate 
relevance here. Did that publication amount to a "seditious 
publication" having a "seditious intention"? It is in this case
that the Federal Supreme Court in Salisbury affirmed the rule laid
130down m  Wallace Johnson v. The King, that although the elements
of a "seditious intention" under the Northern Rhodesian penal code
131corresponded closely to the intention of Common Law, "it is in
the Criminal Code [of Northern Rhodesia]  and not in English or
Scottish cases that the law of sedition for the colony is to be found". 
Although the appeal was allowed because of the existence of a procedural 
defect, one would maintain that even on a substantive issue the case 
could have been decided in favour of the appellant. We have seen that 
to succeed on a charge of sedition, the prosecution must establish 
a "seditious intention" as being behind the publication concerned.
Now the Penal Code provided that an act, speech or publication is 
not seditious by reason only that it intends:
a) to show that Her Majesty has been misled or mistaken 
in any of her measures; or
b) to point out errors or defects in the government or 
constitution of the territory as by law established
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or in legislation or in the administration of justice 
with a view to the remedying of such errors or 
defects;
c) to persuade Her Majesty1s subjects or inhabitants of 
the territory to attempt to procure by lawful means 
the alteration of any matter in the territory as by 
law established; or
d) to point out, with a view to their removal, any matters 
which are producing or have a tendency to produce 
feelings of ill-will and enmity between "different classes 
of the population of the territory".
Quite clearly what the appellant in this case tried to do 
through her publication amounted to no more than indicating the fact 
that the government erred in promulgating an Emergency, and that the 
use of the Emergency regulations had the effect of suppressing the 
freedoms of individuals such as the freedom of free speech, of 
movement, assembly and association, and also the right to personal 
liberty. In other words, she was simply showing that Her Majesty 
had been misled or mistaken in taking the measures she did through 
her government in Northern Rhodesia, and that it was because of 
the brutal way in which the Emergency regulations had been implemented 
which constituted a source of discontent and dissatisfaction among 
the people, thereby forcing them to look upon the colonial regime 
as an oppressive government. According to the Penal Code these 
circumstances do not establish seditious intention, and therefore 
the crime of sedition could not possibly be established in relation 
to the accused in this case. This case has some parallels with 
that of R. v. Chona, which we have discussed thereabove. In
R. v. Chona, too, the accused was merely pointing out defects in 
the system of the administration of justice, and criticising 
colonialism as heing inherently inconsistent with justice. Surely 
this is allowed by the Penal Code as stated above in Clause (b).
We must now conclude our chapter on human rights under the 
colonial rule. The evidence that we have been able to adduce shows 
that although the colonial administrative officers had wide powers 
these were, to a substantial degree, controlled through the 
mechanisms that we have discussed. However, i,n practice it would 
appear that the British Government, which was supposed to be the 
guardian of African interests vis-a-vis the colonial regime, was 
thousands of miles away and therefore could not possibly detect 
how, in practice, the colonial administrators operated the government. 
Secondly, under the colonial constitutional system there was no 
code of fundamental freedoms but, as in England, these were largely 
protected by the ordinary law. However, it is true to say that in 
the area of the protection of political and civil rights in relation 
to the indigenous peoples there is evidence to suggest that the 
colonial regime displayed some signs of authoritarianism. In this 
context there is no doubt that citizens of colonial territories were 
not more secure in the enjoyment of such freedoms as the freedom of 
expression, of assembly and association, of movement, protection from 
discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language or religion than 
those of England. In fact, the constitutional incorporation of a 
bill of rights in the Northern Rhodesian Constitution of 1963, 
originated from the fact that during the Federal rule (i.e., from 
1953-63), racial discrimination was practised on a wide scale to the
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disadvantage of Africans, and it is this which constituted their
132basic grievance and hatred towards the Federation. In order
to help "to allay the fears of domination " which disturbed
Africans, and to give them greater confidence in the future, a
bill of rights was suggested to be included in the constitution of
the Federation, and in the three territorial constitutions of
133Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. This epoch 
in the constitutoonal history of Zambia, especially with regard to 
the evolution of the Zambian Bill of Rights, is of immense 
importance to this inquiry, and therefore deserves a separate chapter. 
It is to this that we should now turn.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE ZAMBIAN BILL OE RIGHTS
It is notable that the bill of rights was first introduced in
Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia was then called) with the adoption of
the constitution which established self-government in 1963.* The
bill of rights occupied the first chapter of that constitution. A
year later, in 1964, when the leaders of the nationalist parties of
Northern Rhodesia and the representatives of the British Government
were engaged in negotiations for provisions to be included in the
Independence Constitution of Zambia, it wss agreed that "the provisions
of the Independence Constitution relating to human rights should be in
the same form as those in Chapter I of the present constitution (i.e.
2 'the self-government constitution" - although, of course, some few
modifications were suggested and made. In 1973 too, when Zambia
introduced a one-party state, President Kaunda had specifically
directed the National Commission charged with the task of working out
the One-party Constitution that in this constitution "the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual shall be protected as...provided
3under Chapter III of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia"
Thus, unlike in many African states, a bill of rights in Zambia has 
been a permanent feature of its Constitution(s) since 1963.
The purpose of this Chapter is to explain the political situation 
obtaining in Central Africa before 1963 which prompted the constitutional 
protection of human rights in Zambia as a solution to the then current 
problems.
A. Origins
The immediate political factor in Northern Rhodesia, and 
Central Africa as a whole for that matter, which gave rise to 
demands for constitutional safeguards as a means of allaying fears 
of domination of one race by another, was the creation of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, and the fact that 
the Federation was operated by whites of mostly Southern Rhodesia 
on racial lines.
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had total population 
of some 8,009,000 people. The great majority of these were Africans 
numbering about 7,000,000 against a white population of 297,000. 
Most of these whites had their homes in the Federation and formed 
a permanent community. There were also some 25,000 Asians and 
13,500 members of the coloured community.'*
When, in 1953, the British Government brought about the 
federation of its three Central African territories - Southern 
Rhodesia (now Rhodesia), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and 
Nyasaland (now Malawi) - it wrote into the new constitution a 
promise that the emergent nation would:
"....conduce to the security*advancement and welfare of all... 
inhabitants, and in particular would foster partnership and 
co-operation between (the) inhabitants...."6
Yet when the federal rule was established, it produced exactly the
opposite to this ideal. The federal government was dominated and
controlled almost exclusively by whites, especially those in
Salisbury. This naturally aroused fears in the Africans, who now
came to regard the federal scheme as a machinery designed to
subordinate their interests to those of the whites and to put a
brake on their (the Africans1) political advancement.
*87
The British Government's agreement to incorporate some form 
of constitutional guarantees, such as a bill of rights and other 
institutional safeguards, in the Federal and the three Territorial 
Constitutions of the Federation after 1960, was a means of trying 
to solve the political problems of a multi-racial Central Africa 
and, more specifically, a'means of "allaying the years of domination" 
of the Africans by the whites.^
Therefore, before discussing how the Zambian bill of rights 
emerged from this situation, it is pertinent to note the 
dimensions of federal politics and its impact on the movement of 
African agitations whic eventually ripened into demands for 
a constitutional entrenchment of human rights to protect the 
"weaker communities".
i) Background to the creation of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
The question of "closer association" between the 
three Central African territories of Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was already a live issue 
among the white settlers in Southern and Northern Rhodesia
g
by the 1930's. While the two northern territories of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were both protectorates 
ruled directly by His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom through the Colonial Office, Southern Rhodesia had 
already attained the status of a self-governing colony.
By Letters Patent of the 1st September 1923, Southern 
Rhodesia was provided with a responsible government
9constitution, which came into force on the 1st October 1923.
This constitution formally bestowed internal self-rule 
on Southern Rhodesia - in effect self-rule for the whites 
in whose hands the government of the country was exclusively 
placed. The 1923 Constitution for Southern Rhodesia also 
provided for a typical "Westminster export model" 
legislature, which consisted of a Legislative Assembly 
composed of thirty members representing white electoral . 
districts. Africans under this arrangement did not qualify 
to be members of the Legislative Assembly, neither were 
they eligible to vote. There was to be a cabinet whose 
members were selected from the Legislative Assembly and 
headed by a Prime Minister. The Governor remained for 
the most part as the King's representative, and as such 
was an imperial officer. Though the whites of Southern 
Rhodesia had gained a considerable autonomy in the 
administration of internal matters, Britain still controlled 
the colony, especially through the powers of disallowance 
of certain legislation passed by the colony's Legislative 
Assembly. External affairs- of the colony were also 
controlled by Whitehall. However, on the whole, the whites 
of Southern Rhodesia were in effective control of the 
colony and it was their longstanding ambition to extend 
their area of influence to the northern territories, 
especially to Northern Rhodesia,
Thus the campaign for "closer association" was mostly 
waged and agitated by the white settlers of Southern 
Rhodesia (though the white community of Northern Rhodesia
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was also equally active) who saw obvious economic and 
political advantages from an enlarged Central African 
territorial unit. The most publicized reasons to 
justify closer association were mainly economic, and 
with this was the desire by the white settlers in 
Southern Rhodesia to see the mineral riches of Northern 
Rhodesia come under their control from Salisbury. Closer 
association was, for example, urged on the ground that 
once implemented it would yield an economic independence 
of the three territories, whose economies were seen to be 
"complementary", and that by unifying the economic policies 
of the three territories, it would be easier to secure 
maximum economic development of the area as a whole in the 
interests of all the people. Such a unified entity would 
also, it was contended, be stronger in defence. It was 
also envisaged that such public utilities as rail, trunk 
roads and air communications would be improved if they were 
planned on a broader basis, other advantages of closer 
association envisaged included the view that this would 
promote the most efficient use of the capital of the whole 
region in finance, raw materials, power, labour and technical 
skill. Such an expanding economy would quickly promote the 
social advancement of Africans too.^
In the light of the white settlers' agitations for 
closer association, the British Government appointed a 
Royal Commission in 1938 under the chairmanship of Lord 
Bledisloe,
" to enquire and report whether any, and if so
what form of closer co-operation or association 
between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland is desirable and feasible with due 
regard to the interests of all the inhabitants, 
irrespective of race, or of the territories 
concerned and to the special responsibilities of 
our Government in the United Kingdom.... for the 
interests of the native inhabitants".11
The Commission reporting in the following year, took the
view that the time was not yet ripe for amalgamation or
federation (although it did not consider the federal
solution in detail). The main reasons for the Commission's
conclusions were the differences in native policy between
Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories, their
different stages of political and social development, and
12the financial weaknesses of the northern territories.
However, the Commission instead recommended the establishment 
of consultative machinery, in the form of the Central African 
Council, with the function of co-ordinating policy and 
action between the three governments in all matters of
13common interest. The Council was established m  1945.
In the eyes of white settlers, the creation of purely 
consultative machinery in the form of the Central African 
Council was not enough, and the limitations inherent in 
its functions engendered the revival of the idea of closer 
association.
On 8th November 1950, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, the Rt. Hon. James Griffiths, stated in the House 
of Commons, the imperial government's decision for a fresh 
examination of the problems of closer association for the
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14three Central African territories. In 1951, a
conference of officials of the three Central African
governments, His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom, and the Central African Council, was convened
by the Secretary of State. The officials' report argued
in favour of closer association and, at the same time,
recognized the African opposition to the idea in the
northern territories. However, the conference thought
that African opinion would turn out to be more favourable,
provided the proposed scheme of closer association
"contained adequate provision for African representation
and adequate protection for African interests",*** and
provided that "the services more intimately affecting the
daily life of Africans were outside the scope of the Central 
16Government". It was also at this conference that the 
idea of "amalgamation" of the three territories was dropped 
in favour of a less ambitious scheme of "federation", which 
the British Government would more readily be persuaded to 
consider.
The officials' conference in London was followed in 
September 1951, by the Ministerial Conference at Victoria 
Falls, which was attended by the officials of the Colonial 
and Commonwealth Offices of the United Kingdom, the Prime 
Minister of Southern Rhodesia, and by the Governors of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. African representatives 
from the two northern territories made it clear that they 
were unable to accept any scheme in which Southern Rhodesia
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was closely associated with Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. However, they pointed out that Africans 
would be willing to consider the question of federation 
on the basis of the Report of the Conference of Officials 
"after the policy of partnership in Northern Rhodesia had 
been defined and, as so defined, been put into progressive 
action".^
To meet the apprehensions felt by Africans in the two 
northern territories, that federation might impair their 
position and prospects, the Victoria Falls conference 
unanimously agreed that:
"in any future consideration of proposals for 
federation, land and land settlement questions 
as well as the political advancement of the 
peoples of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
both in local and in territorial government, 
must remain as at present (subject to the 
ultimate authority of His Majesty’s Government 
in the United Kingdom) the responsibility of 
the territorial government and legislature in jg 
each territory and not of any federal authority".
It was further agreed that the protectorate status of the
northern territories was to be accepted and preserved, and
that this meant that the question of amalgamation of the
rCentral African territories would never arise at any time. 
And, most importantly, it was at this conference that the 
principle of partnership between Europeans and Africans 
was given prominence in the following words:
" that economic and political partnership between
Europeans and Africans is the only policy under which 
federation could be brought about in the conditions of 
Central Africa, and....that any scheme of closer 
association would have to give full effect to that 
principle".20
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It was from this background that the London conference 
of April-May 1952, was convened to work out the draft 
to establish what came to be known as the 
"Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland". The final details 
of the Federal Constitution were completed at the London 
conference which met in January 1953. The proposed federal 
scheme embodied provisions implementing the Victoria Falls 
assurances on African interests pointed out above. The 
Federal Scheme became the Constitution of the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which itself became operative 
on 3rd September 1953. Thus from that date federation came 
into existence.
ii) The main institutions of government established 
under the Federal Constitution
The institution of government which the Federal 
Constitution established followed the traditional rule of 
dividing state functions into three, namely the legislative, 
executive, and the adjudicative.
The legislative power in the Federation was vested in
the Federal Legislative which consisted of Her Majesty and
21the Federal Assembly. The Federal Assembly consisted 
of a Speaker and a number of members whose total of thirty- 
five in the first Federal Parliament elected in December 
1953, was subsequently increased by the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1957, to fifty-nine as follows:
a) forty-four "elected members", of whom twenty-four 
are returned in Southern Rhodesia, fourteen in 
Northern Rhodesia, and six in Nyasaland^
b) eight "elected African members" (four from 
Southern Rhodesia, and two each from Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland);
c) four "specially elected African members" (two 
each from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) ; 
and
d) three European members "charged with special 
responsibilities for African interests", of 
whom one was elected in Southern Rhodesia, and 
the other two appointed, one each by the ^  
Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
The distribution of power in the Federation was
> S  \ex+«-i ►-£
such that the Federal was vested with a
wide area of action as compared to the Territorial 
Legislatures. This state of affairs posed a politically 
serious threat to Africans since the Federal Legislature 
was a European-dominated institution. The Constitution 
gave the Federal Legislature power to make laws in 
respect of any power included in the Second Schedule 
and any matter incidental thereto. The Second Schedule 
contains two parts, the first dealing with the Federal 
Legislative list and the second part with the concurrent 
legislative list. Part one, that is the Federal Legislative 
List ("being, in relation to any Territory, matters with 
respect to which the Federal Legislature has, and the
not-
Legislature of the Territory has , power to make laws"), 
contained forty-four matters, which included such vital 
areas as external affairs, defence, immigration, 
citizenship of the Federation, aviation, banking, 
transport, primary and secondary education of persons 
other than Africans, taxes on income and profits on 
some saleable goods, currency, exchange control, imports
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and exports, etc. The Concurrent Legislative List
(i.e. "Matters with respect to which both the Federal
Legislature and the Legislature of the territory have
power to make laws") had only thirty-one matters - and
these included subjects like deportation, naturalization,
land banks, hire purchase, electricity, scientific and
24industrial research, road-rail crossing, etc.
The executive powers of the Federation lay in
Her Majesty’s purview, and was exercised on her behalf by
25the Governor-General. Federal executive authority was
naturally limited only to the execution of the laws
passed by the Federal Legislature within its competence.
The Governor-General appointed Prime Minister and other
Ministers of the Federal Government, and assigned
26functions to those Ministers. The Prime Minister and 
the rest of the Federal Ministers were to be members of 
the Federal Assembly. An Executive Council was established 
to advise the Governor-General in the government of the 
Federation, consisting of the Prime Minister of the
Federal Government and other persons who must be
. . .  27Ministers in the Federal Government. The appointment
of Ministers to this Executive Council was made by the 
Governor-General acting on the recommendations of the 
Prime Minister. In effect, the Executive Council consisted 
of all the Ministers of the Federal Government, except 
former Ministers.
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28Finally, the Federal Supreme Court was 
established and was given exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine any dispute between the Federation and a 
Territory or between Territories inter se and to 
determine any question as to the interpretation of 
the Federal Constitution. The Court also had 
jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the 
High Court of any Territory on any question as to the 
interpretation of any provision of the Federal 
Constitution or that of the Territory.
iii) Protective provisions or safeguards under 
the Federal Constitution
One of the most controversial issues at the creation of
the Federation in Central Africa was undoubtedly the problem
of safeguarding African interests in the face of wide
legislative powers conceded to the white-controlled Federal
Legislature. The British Government was aware of this problem,
and accepted its role as a protector of African interests.
Moreover, the British shared the Africans' fear that the
white influence of Southern Rhodesia would slow down the
independence of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and'that in the
Federal Government the power of the Europeans would be
dominant, without any effective check by Her Majesty's
Government in Britain. Consequently, two control mechanisms
on the activities of the Federal Government were established
in.the Federal Constitution; viz., firstly, the traditional
technique of imperial supervision through disallowance and
reservation of Bills, and, secondly, control through the new
"African Affairs Board" as a constitutional organ 
specifically charged with the responsibility of 
protecting the interests of Africans in the federal 
sphere.
a) Imperial supervision of the Federal 
Government1s activities
The first point to note about the Constitution 
of the Federation is that the British Government 
only meant it to be an interim one (and never a 
permanent one) whose continued existence depended 
on whether it was capable of achieving the objects 
stated therein and of its preamble, and of creating 
"a stable and lasting form of association between 
the three territories". This is partly borne out by 
the fact that the Constitution of the Federation was 
annexed to an Order in Council, made under an 
enabling Act of the United Kingdom Parliament - the 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Act, 1953; and 
Article 29(7) of the Constitution saves any power of 
Her Majesty conferred by an Act of the UK Parliament 
to legislate for the Federation: which power could
extend, of course, to revoking the Constitution in 
whole or part. This provision should also be read 
together with the final Article in the Constitution - 
Article 99 - which also confirms that the Constitution 
was meant to be an interim one only. Under this 
Article a conference must be convened "not less 
than seven nor more than nine years" from the date 
on which the Constitution came into force for the
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purpose of reviewing the Constitution. And as
-Macdoaald points out, "there would seem to be no
limit to the field of review, and,....the United
Kingdom Government might feel bound to use its
power of legislation to implement the
29recommendations of the conference".
The assertion that the United Kingdom Government 
retained the power to dissolve the Federation, if it 
failed to achieve any of its set goals for the 
purposes of assessing the imperial governments 
protective role with regard to the African 
inhabitants, was made clear by a commentary from the 
office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
in 1963 on the subject, of the withdrawal of 
Nyasaland. The commentary read as follows:
" It was, of course, the purpose and desire
of Her Majesty's Government in endorsing the 
Federal scheme in 1953 that a stable and lasting 
form 6f association between the three territories 
should be created. This was clearly and publicly 
stated at the time. Her Majesty's Government, 
however, were in no position to give and did not 
give any undertaking of guarantee as to its 
permanency1*. ^
Again, continued the commentary:
"The responsibility of Her Majesty’s Government 
for the inhabitants of Nyasaland as a territory 
under the special protection of Her Majesty 
remained unimpaired (by the establishment of 
the Federation. In the new circumstances that 
have arisen, namely the expressed wish of the 
majority of the inhabitants of the territory to 
withdraw from the Federation, it would in the 
of Her Majesty's Government be a breach of its 
obligations to the people of the Protectorate 
to disregard that wish "3*
In view of this it could be said that the United 
Kingdom Government armed itself with sufficient legal 
power for an effective overall supervision of federal 
activities, and for it to be able to assert its role 
as the ultimate guarantor of the interests and rights 
of Africans in the Federation. Moreover, as the above­
quoted Colonial Office commentary implied the Federation 
was established as an experiment to test whether it could 
achieve any of the goals which were expressed in the 
preamble to its Constitution. The most important of 
these aims is that the Federation would "conduce to 
the security, advancement and welfare of all their 
inhabitants, and in particular would foster partnership 
and co-operation between their inhabitants and enable 
the Federation, when those inhabitants so desire, to go
forward...towards the attainment of full membership of
32the Commonwealth "
b) Retention of Protectorate status by the two 
northern territories as a safeguard
Undoubtedly the retention of the Protectorate status 
of Northern Rhodesia arid Nyasaland at the time of the 
establishment of the Federation constituted an important 
political safeguard to Africans, as later events proved. 
It enabled the two territories to hasten towards self- 
government and eventually to full independence. But how?
It will be recalled that at the Victoria Falls 
Conference of 1951, which examined the best form of 
"close association" likely to meet the requirements of
5*9°
Central Africa, "amalgamation", which had all along 
been advocated as a basis for closer association, 
was rejected in favour of a "federation".
"Southern Rhodesia is a self-governing colony.
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are protectorates.
If the three territories were to be amalgamated, 
they would all become merged in the new self- 
governing state. Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland would thus lose their separate identity 
(which they would, retain in a federation) 
and this would mean that His Majesty's Government 
would have to disregard obligations which, by 
virtue of treaty or otherwise, they have assumed 
towards the two northern territories. This they 
cannot do".33
In the event, the Victoria Falls Conference agreed that 
the Protectorate status of the two northern territories 
should be accepted and preserved, and that this excluded 
any consideration now or in the future of the amalgamation 
of the three Central African territories, unless the 
majority of the inhabitants of the three Territories 
desired it. So with this, the Constitution of the 
Federation was constructed in such a way that its 
preamble gave an express recognition to the fact that 
the Federation's component territories should remain 
separate and distinct political entities, independent of 
the Federation within their respective spheres, and 
continue to be under the special protection of Her Majesty.
The fact that the protectorate status was retained by 
the territories under consideration after the creation of 
the Federation, did not please the white settlers. The 
whites had already set their eyes towards achieving 
dominion status as a federation, and therefore the
granting of self-government to Northern Rhodesia 
Nyasaland was inherently at variance with that 
ambition. To be sure, had the two northern 
territories lost their Protectorate status by 
being amalgamaged with Southern Rhodesia, self- 
government, not to mention full independence, would 
not have been achieved in these territories as 
early as it did come.
In the second place, the fact that Northern 
Rhodesia retained its Protectorate constitution, 
which we have already discussed in the last chapter, 
meant that all those built-in safeguards for Africans 
contained in the Order in Council and the Royal 
Instructions remained untouched and unimpaired. The 
only adverse effect on them was that the creation 
of the Federation and the vesting of an exclusive 
legislative list in its sole competence, stripped 
away a substantial area of controllable legislative 
and executive activities from its territorial 
sphere.
c) Disallowance and Reservation
Ultimate control of federal legislative 
activities by the imperial government was also 
expressed through the constitutional provisions 
in connection with the power of disallowance of 
federal laws and reservation of federal bills.
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Article 25 of the Constitution provided that 
"Her Majesty may through the Secretary of State 
disallow" within twelve months any law of the 
Federal Legislature assented to by the Governor- 
General, and that any law so disallowed shall be 
annulled. This power was never used in the whole 
life of the Federation. The power of disallowance 
also appears in the Federal Constitution in a 
special form in Article 77 in connection with the 
functions of the African Affairs Board which is 
discussed below.
Reservation of certain categories of bills 
passed by the Federal Legislature for the 
signification of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies is provided for under Article 24 of the 
Federal Constitution. Under this Article three 
classes of bills passed by the Federal Legislature 
were mandatorily made subject to imperial final 
decision with regard to their assent. These were 
all bills
i) withjrespect to the election of the members of 
the Federal Assembly, including provisions 
for. the qualifications and disqualifications
for election, qualifications and disqualifications 
for registration as a voter and voting at 
elections, delimitation of electoral districts 
and certain kindred matters;
ii) in respect of which the African Affairs Board 
presents to the Speaker of the Federal Assembly 
a written request that the bill be reserved for 
the signification of Her Majesty1s pleasure on 
the ground that it is a "differentiating 
measure"; and
iii) all bills for the amendment of the Constitution.
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The reserved power under the Constitution was
only invoked with regard to the functions of the
African Affairs Board, and in all cases the
British Government gave assent to bills which
were otherwise labelled as "differentiating
measures" by the Board. This subject should now be
discussed in depth in connection with the
establishment - and protective role - of the African
Affairs Board under the Federal Constitution.
34d) The African Affairs Board
The African Affairs Board was undoubtedly the 
most important and interesting feature of the Federal 
Constitution from the point of view of guarding 
against the passage of legislative measures 
detrimental to the interests of Africans in the 
federal sphere. The idea of devising an institution 
in the nature of the African Affairs Board arose 
out of the recognized need for some form of 
constitutional safeguards intended to safeguard the 
interests of Africans who were, in effect, given 
a politically inferior place in the Federation to 
the whites. It was essentially because of this 
that Africans had consistently opposed the idea of 
federation.
Moreover, as we have indicated in the preceding 
paragraphs, when the Federation was established, a 
considerable amount of legislative power was 
conceded to the Federal Legislature, and considering
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that the Federation was run to satisfy the needs
35and aspirations of whites, it would not be out 
of place to imagine that discriminatory legislation 
and executive actions were to be anticipated. Thus, 
when the Constitution of the Federation was drawn 
up, the African Affairs Board was established as 
a Standing Committee of the Federal Assembly, and 
its specific function was to scrutinize bills 
passed by the Federal Assembly, including statutory 
instruments made by the Federal authorities whose 
effects were disadvantageous to the interests of 
Africans, and if found to be so, the Board was 
empowered to reserve such bills or statutory 
instruments for the signification of the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies in the United Kingdom.
In a sense, therefore, this device for protecting 
Africans in the Federation also depended on the 
ultimate authority of the United Kingdom Government 
to have the final say on the particular bills or 
statutory instruments assailed as discriminatory.
The composition and functions, and other related 
matters, were dealt with in Chapter VI of the Federal 
Constitution. The Board was to be composed of six 
members, and all of these members were to be members 
of the Federal Assembly. It members were the three 
European members whose duties were to look after the 
interests of Africans, and one member from each of
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the three territories who was to be an African 
elected by a majority vote of all the African 
members of the Federal Assembly and the three 
Europeans referred to in the first category of 
membership. Among these six members the Governor- 
General, "at his discretion", appointed a chairman 
and a deputy chairman.
Article 70 defines the first general function 
of the Board, namely, to make representations to 
the Federal Prime Minister, or through him to the 
Executive Founcil, in matters within the legislative 
or executive authority of the Federation as the Board 
may consider to be desirable in the interests of 
Africans. Secondly, if the government of any 
territory so requests, to give that government any 
assistance which the Board may be able to provide 
in relation to the study of matters affecting 
Africans, and in particular assistance in the exchange 
of information relating to any such matter.
Article 71 dealt with the more particular 
functions of the Board with respect to the federal 
legislation. It reads,
"It shall be the particular function of the 
Board to draw attention to any Bill introduced 
in the Federal Assembly and any instrument 
which has the force of law and is made in the 
exercise of power conferred by a law of the 
Federal Legislature if their Bill or instrument 
is in their opinion a differentiating measure".
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Immediately below this provision, the Constitution 
defined the expression "differentiating measure" to 
mean
"Bill or instrument by which Africans are 
subjected or made liable to any conditions, 
restrictions or disabilities disadvantageous 
to them to which Europeans are not subjected 
or made liable, or a Bill or instrument which 
will in its practical application have such 
an effect".
To enable the Board to execute this particular
function, the Constitution, by Article 73, provided
that a copy of every proposed bill was to be sent to
the Board, unless the Governor-General certified
that the bill was urgent or was one which the public
interest dictated should not be published before
introduction to the Assembly. If, at a later stage,
during the passage of any bill through the Federal
Assembly that bill was, in the opinion of the Board,
a differentiating measure, the Board could lay.
before the Assembly a report on the bill stating
their reasons for considering the bill to be such 
36a measure. It was further provided that if at 
any time after such a report as referred to above 
has been laid the Board no longer considered the 
bill to be a differentiating one, they could lay
37before the Assembly a further report to that effect. 
Indeed, the mere laying of the report had no 
constitutional significance, but the following 
Article completes the story. This provides that 
if on the passage of the bill the Board felt that
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the bill was differentiating, it could present to
the Speaker of the Assembly, a request in writing
that the bill shall be reserved for the
signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure, and send
the Board's request to the Secretary of State
38together with the bill. This request was also
to include the reasons in the opinion of the Board
why the bill was a differentiating measure.
Further, if the decision to make the request was
not obtained unanimously by the members of the Board,
this fact was also to be stated in the request. In
two instances the Governor-General might give assent
to the bill notwithstanding the request of the
Board: if he satisfied himself that it was not a
differentiating measure, and that the reasons given
by the Board for considering it as such were of an
irrelevant or frivolous nature, or if he satisfied
himself, upon representations made by the Prime
Minister of the Federation, that it was essential
in the public interest that the bill be brought into
39immediate operation. But if the Governor-General
did assent, to a bill in these circumstances, the
Constitution required him to send forthwith to the
the Secretary of State the bill to which he had
assented, together with the Board's request and a
40statement of his reasons for assenting. The 
Secretary of State could, of course, disallow such
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such a bill even though the Governor-General had 
assented to it. In other words, Article 25 of 
the Constitution, which we have discussed in 
relation to the imperial government's power of 
disallowance, came into operation.
Further, the effect of Article 97 of the 
Constitution was of great importance to the role 
of the Board with regard to amendments of the 
Federal Constitution. This Article in effect 
implemented the imperial government's intention to 
see to it that "Her Majesty's Government and 
Parliament" must "have the last word on
41constitutional amendments" in the federal sphere.
Thus the Article provided for the automatic 
reservation of any bill amending the Constitution, 
and enabled the United Kingdom Parliament to veto 
the bill if objected to by a territorial legislature. 
Similarly, if the Board requested that such an 
amending bill be reserved as a differentiating 
measure, this power of veto came into play.
Article 97 dealt with the functions of the 
Board with respect to subordinate legislation in 
the federal sphere. It provided that if any 
instrument which has the force of law and was made 
in the exercise of a power conferred by a law of 
the Federal Legislature, was in the opinion of the 
Board a differentiating measure, the Board could at 
any time within thirty days after the publication
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of the instrument send to the Prime Minister a 
report in writing to that effect stating the 
reasons why in the opinion of the Board the 
instrument was such a measure. Upon receipt of 
the Board’s report, the Prime Minister was, 
within thirty days, to send the same, with his 
comments, to the Governor-General, who would forward 
the report and the comment to the Secretary of State. 
The Secretary of State again had the last word on 
the fate of the statutory instrument in question, 
and could disapprove of the instrument.
These then were the functions and powers 
conferred by the Federal Constitution on the African 
Affairs Board, and although these were fairly broad 
in scope, the actual operation of the Board within 
its nine years of existence disappointed Africans, 
and subsequently failed to win their confidence as 
an effective check on discriminatory legislation in 
the Federation. The Monckton Commission in its 
report on the Federation in 1960, remarked on its 
declining prestige as follows: that
"The African Affairs Board has in recent years 
lost the confidence of the Africans. The 
Board’s prestige and usefulness were seriously 
injured when it tried unsuccessfully to keep 
the Federal Constitution Amendment Act of 
1957 and the Federal Act of 1958 off the 
Statute Book. In the eyes of many this was 
a convincing proof of the Board’s ineffectiveness 
as a safeguard".
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Even before this time, and indeed as early as 
1955 or before, when the Federation was still in 
its infancy, the African Affairs Board had been 
criticized as inadequate by the Africans themselves. 
In a ’Memorandum on the Representation of Africans
and Other Races in the Federation....", sponsored
by the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress, 
the African Affairs Board was attacked as
" not having been an effective check on
discriminatory legislation in the Federation". The 
Memorandum went on to cite specific instances 
justifying the Board s weaknesses in defence of 
African interests:
"The Income Tax Act which made the Africans of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland liable for 
income tax for the first time without relieving 
them of Territorial Native Tax, and the 
Cadet Corps Act which excluded Africans by ^  
implication from its scope, passed unopposed".
The Board’s prestige was given a final blow 
by the passage of two Federal Bills referred to 
earlier on, namely, the Constitution Amendment 
Bill 1957, and the Electoral Bill of 1958. The 
relevant background to the successful passage of 
these bills in spite of the Board’s intervention 
was this: the European politicians in all the
three territories, as well as at the Federal level, 
were now growing restless in moving towards achieving 
Dominion status for the Federation. In the event, 
the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, took
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the initiative of securing a number of assurances
(in 1957) from the British Government, of which
the most relevant one in the present context was
that at the Federal Review which was due to take
place in 1960, a programme of the Federation's
advance towards independence would be one of the
items on the conference's agenda, and further that
the British Government in the interim would not
exercise its right to legislate for the Federation,
as provided in the Constitution, except at the
44request of the Federal Government. Knowing that
the British Government would not exercise its power
"to legislate" for the Federation, which included
not exercising its power of disallowance, reservation,
or disapproval, the Federal Government then pushed
45m  those two bills referred to above. The 
Constitution Amendment Bill sought to increase the 
size of the Federal Assembly from thirty-five to 
fifty-nine, while the Electoral Bill sought to make 
changes in the methods of elections for Africans in 
such a way that Europeans would have had a greater 
control in the elections of African members, for 
example. The two bills were reserved by the Board 
under Paragraph (3) of Article 97 and Article 10 
respectively for the consideration of the British 
Government on the ground that they were 
"differentiating measures" which, if passed into 
law, would have the effect of undermining the value
212
of African representation in the Federal Assembly.
A lively debate ensued in the House of Commons 
between Labour MPs and the Conservative Government. 
Mr. James Callaghan, himself a longstanding ally of
| African aspirations, cautioned that "if the bill
| [i.e. the Constitutional Amendment Bill] is approved
|
| by the British Parliament, the African Affairs
A6Board is seriously discredited in African eyes...
j
\ The House of Commons* debates on both Bills finally
j  ended with Parliament approving them and thereby
I rejecting the findings of the Board. In view of
the assurances given in favour of the Federal
|
' Government (as mentioned above), this verdrfciwas
| not unexpected. The damaging effect which the
i
| approval of these bills by the United KingdomI
Parliament had on the African Affairs Board, in 
the eyes of all, was vast and was neatly summarized 
by the Rev. Andrew Doig, the European member of 
the Board from Nyasaland, who himself resigned from 
the Board in protest at Britain*s flagrant and 
discrediting behaviour towards the Board. He wrote:
"I think that we have reached a crisis in the 
affairs of the Federation. If the British 
Government are prepared to pass this 
Constitutional Amendment Bill in the face of 
almost complete opposition of the African 
Affairs Board, then they will pass anything in 
the future. It has always been my view that 
the Conservative Government at least would 
never refuse the Federal Government anything, 
and their agreement to the Amendment Bill
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will not only be the end of any faint confidence 
the Africans had in the African Affairs Board, 
but opens the door to complete control in the 
end of all three territories by the Federal 
Government with the certainty of a negligible 
voting power in the hands of Africans".
The Monckton Commission realized that nothing could be
done to revive the reputation of the Board, and although
it did not recommend its total abolition, it expressed
its wish to improve upon the Board and for it to emerge
under a different guise with a different structure and
48functional features. Moreover, that aspect of the 
Board's function which covered review of legislation only 
in relation to the interests of Africans was criticized, 
and a suggestion was popularized whereby the substitute 
institution of the Board should cover legislation 
affecting the interests of all the races.
The most important period in the constitutional 
history of Northern Rhodesia and in particular with 
reference to the constitutional guarantee of human rights, 
followed the publication of the Report of the Monckton 
Commission in 1960. The Report criticized many aspects 
of the Federation's constitution and made radical 
recommendations designed to restore the image of the 
Federation which was so tattered in the eyes of many to 
the extent that the Monckton Commission convincingly 
stated that "it could not be made to succeed in its 
present form". Moreover, it was this Commission's 
Report which brought out the compelling need for some
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"legal and political safeguards" to be included in
49both the future Federal and Territorial Constitutions.
In particular, it recommended a bill of rights to be 
incorporated in both sets of constitutions. The 
Commission1s Report in relation to this relevant subject 
should now be discussed in some detail.
B) Impact of the Monckton Commissions Report on 
the Constitutional incorporation of a bill of 
rights.
We have already referred to Article 99 of the 
Federal Constitution, which provided for the review of 
that Constitution "not less than seven nor more than 
nine years from the date of its coming into force".
The date of the Review Conference was fixed to be in 
1960 - that being the earliest possible time for it 
under the Constitution. In anticipation of this 
Conference, the British Government appointed a Commission 
in 1959, which was chaired by Viscount Monckton, to 
advise on the review of the Constitution of the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
The Commission, reporting the following year, 
disclosed that "the dislike of federation among Africans 
in the two Northern Territories is widespread, sincere, 
and of long standing. It is almost pathological"."^
The Commission attributed the fundamental origin of 
African hatred, of federation to lie in the racial 
discrimination which the white-dominated Federal 
Government helped to promote by its actions. Thus 
the Report remarked:
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"Throughout our tours of the three Territories 
we heard much evidence of racial discrimination.
Such discrimination operates mainly to the 
disadvantage of non-Europeans, particularly 
Africans, and is one of their basic grievances".
Thus one of the formidable problems which the Commission
was confronted with was to advise the British Government
on a solution to the problem of "racial partnership"
in the future constitutional arrangement of the
Federation. The commission in its report confessed
that:
"Many of the witnesses who appeared before us 
insisted that, before federation went forward 
to full membership of the Commonwealth, new or 
more effective safeguards should be provided and 
fundamental human rights guaranteed. We agree 
with this view. We believe that it is essential 
to improve existing safeguards, to devise new 
ones, and to ensure that their effectiveness 
continues".52
In consequence, the Commission recommended two sets of
safeguards, which it described as the "legal" and the
"political" safeguards to be included both in* the Federal
53and Territorial Constitutions. Bills of rights 
represented the legal safeguards, and an improved upon 
variant of the African Affairs Board - now to be known 
as the Council of State - represented the political 
safeguards,
i) Bill of- Rights
In recommending the inclusion of a bill of 
rights in the Constitution of the Federation, the 
Commission argued that this would promote "greater - 
+ security" among all peoples of the Federation, and 
more important, that such a bill would:
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"(a) help to allay the fears of domination which 
disturb the main section of the population, and 
give them greater confidence in the future:
(b) provide a criterion or standard upon which 
institutions, whether political or judicial, 
could base their protection of the people's 
rights; and
(c) guard the liberties of all persons whether 
they were Federal citizens, British citizens,
British protected persons or aliens".54
Paradoxically, the Commission recommended the bill of
rights to be something on the lines of the Canadian
model"^ - although it seems that the Commission cited
this by way of illustration only. Nevertheless, the
recommendation of the Majority Report to base the bill
of rights on the Canadian precedent prompted a sharp
reaction by the two African members of the Commission
(one from Northern Rhodesia and the other from
56Nyasaland) who, in a Minority Report, argued against 
adopting the Canadian Bill of Rights as a model for the 
Federal and Territorial bills of rights on two grounds. 
Firstly, they argued that the Canadian Bill of Rights 
was of limited legal effect in that it provided 
no more than rules of construction with regard to the 
ordinary legislation. Secondly, the Canadian Bill of 
Rights contained a proviso permitting the rights and 
freedoms declared in the Bill to be abrogated by the 
express provisions of a subsequent Act of Parliament.
An alternative suggestion of the type of bill of 
rights appropriate to the circumstances of Central 
Africa, was one of following the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights, which was the 
basis of provisions already included in the 
Constitution of Nigeria, as noted in our first 
chapter. One advantage of a bill of rights based on 
the European Convention or on the Nigerian model was 
that it would operate to invalidate any law on the 
statute book which was inconsistent with its 
provisions. This would have satisfied African 
apprehensions since the white-dominated legislature 
of the Federation would be checked by the judiciary 
if it endeavoured to pass discriminatory legislation.
A recommendation ought also to have been made 
that in the specific conditions of the Federation, 
where the Commission found that discrimination was 
practised in the social, economic and commercial 
fields, a bill of rights ought to have contained 
provision for an express prohibition of racial 
discrimination in those fields,
ii) Councils of State
The commission in urging a constitutional 
incorporation of some political or institutional 
safeguards in addition to a bill of rights, made out 
a very relevant recommendation, taking into account 
the then prevailing political circumstances of Central 
Africa. It asserted:
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"A Bill of Rights, however comprehensive, will 
not by itself provide a completely satisfactory 
safeguard for the inhabitants of the Federation. 
There remains the problem peculiar to a multi­
racial state, that of discrimination on grounds 
of race, colour or religion. This is a matter 
of deep and anxious concern to both Africans 
and Europeans. Discrimination, open or 
disguised, is present in many kinds of human 
activity and may occur in a wide range of laws 
and executive actions. It is often harmful, 
but it may at times be beneficial where it is 
used to protect the interests of weaker classes 
or groups. To distinguish between beneficial 
and harmful discrimination is a difficult and 
delicate task which the Courts cannot 
appropriately be asked to undertake. We 
believe that this is a political problem for 
which a different safeguard is needed. In 
addition to a bill of rights there should be 
established a political body specially charged ,-o 
with the prevention of unfair discrimination...
For this purpose the Commission recommended the
59creation of Councils of States in both the 
federal and territorial constituencies. The 
Councils of State were to be modelled on the lines 
of the Council of State in Kenya which was created 
in 1958 as a means to solve the racial problem 
in that country. The Commission made a number of 
suggestions as to the guiding criteria in making 
appointments to the Councils, and finally concluded 
that appointment to them should be made without 
regard to race - although this approach also had 
its shortcomings. The recommended functions of the 
Councils of State included the duty of reviewing 
proposed legislation with power in their respective
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constitutional spheres to delay its passage 
through the Legislature if it was found to be 
unfairly discriminatory; the Councils of State 
were to be empowered to review existing legislation 
and, for this purpose, to recommend the 
introduction of legislation to remove existing 
unfair discrimination; further, the Councils of 
State were to perform the function of examining 
and reporting on any unfairly discriminatory 
trends that may develop. The Commission would then 
recommend a variety of things connected with the 
functions of the Councils, such as the procedure 
to be adopted in the performance of their functions.
The point ought to be made here that in 
recommending the creation of the Councils, the 
Monckton Commission wanted only to revive the 
African Affairs Board in a different form and with 
some suitable modifications. Thus, unlike the 
African Affairs Board, the Councils were to guard 
against discriminatory tendencies directed not 
only against Africans, but against all races. 
Further, the scheme of Councils, unlike the Board, 
embraced the examination of all proposed and 
existing legislation (including subsidiary 
legislation) both in the territorial and federal 
spheres. The composition of the Councils was to 
consist of persons outside Parliament and not
members of Parliament, #as was the case with 
regard to the membership of the Board. This 
meant that the Councils were to be independent 
of the legislature, but without the power to 
veto proposed legislation by the legislature.
"The provisions relating to the Bill of 
Rights and the Council of State", urged the
60Commission, should "be specially entrenched".
The idea was that amendment of the Constitution 
in respect of the provisions containing the 
safeguards should not be easily obtained, for 
this would place these safeguards at the disposal 
of the legislature. The Commission therefore 
recommended a special procedure for the legislature 
to secure alterations of the protective provisions, 
namely by
"(a) an affirmative vote of not less than 
three-quarters of all members of the 
legislature; and
(b) a referendum in which a majority of 
electors in each of the main racial groups 
 approve the proposed amendment".61
Implementation of the Monckton Report:
The 1963 Northern Rhodesia Constitution
The recommendations of the Monckton Commission 
greatly influenced the British Government’s attitude 
and approach towards the future constitutional development 
of Northern Rhodesia. For one thing, the detailed 
examination of the nature of political problems prevailing 
in the country as part of the Federation enlightened 
the imperial government enabling it to prescribe the
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appropriate constitutional principles to be applied 
in any future constitutional settlement of the 
territory. The Monckton Commission also laid down 
what would be an acceptable constitutional course 
in Northern Rhodesia. In this respect, apart from 
the recommendations for the inclusion of a bill of 
rights and other institutional safeguards in the 
constitution of the territory, the Commission’s next 
important recommendation for Northern Rhodesia was 
that
”there should be an African majority in the 
Legislative Council and an unofficial majority 
in the Executive so constituted as to reflect 
the composition of the Legislative Council"62
It also urged the British Government to take immediate
practical steps, by convening a constitutional conference,
to implement the transition to self-government under an
African government. The British Government, having in
effect accepted the Commission’s Report, in no time
convened a Constitutional Conference in February 1961,
which Iain Macleod, the Colonial Secretary, said was
called "to find an agreed basis for the next constitutional
63advancement in Northern Rhodesia", which "should
provide for a substantial increase in the number of
64Africans in the Legislature".
At the Conference the question of " proposals
for a Bill of Rights and a Council of State which had
-f©rnie*<~d
been put ' in the Monckton Report in the Federal
65context" was easily pressed upon by the Secretary of
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State to form part of the territory's next constitution. 
Perhaps the persuasive argument of the Secretary of 
State (Iain Macleod) which he put to the delegates 
urging a bill of rights, can be repeated here. He said:
"I think the Conference may now turn its
attention to safeguards, both for the individual 
and for minority communities. The latter is 
perhaps of particular importance in a territory 
which is not yet fully developed and a society 
which is not homogeneous. Whereas in a developed 
homogeneous country such as Britain, the protection 
of minority interests is maintained by certain 
recognized and traditional conventions, in under­
developed and mixed communities special provisions 
are needed for this purpose, and it has been usual 
in Commonwealth countries to enact by law safe­
guards  Without such safeguards a mass
electorate, dominated by a single party, might 
control all the organs of government, and minority 
interests could be completely disregarded "66
There is one point which clearly emerged from the above
statement regarding the need for legal protection of
individual rights in Northern Rhodesia - and this is
that the problems which gave rise to the suggestion of
a bill of rights in Northern Rhodesia combined those of
Nigeria and Kenya. Like Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia was
not ethnically homogeneous, nor was it homogeneous in
religious terms. There are seventy-three different
ethnic groups in the country and politics followed the
67appeal to tribal support. Therefore the Zambian 
situation at this time had all the potential of the 
Nigerian problem in 1959-60. Like Kenya too, Northern 
Rhodesia was "the home of many races". Northern 
Rhodesia had attracted a significant number of whites, 
mainly from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, because
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of its association with the Federation but, more 
importantly, because the white personnel were 
indispensable in running the country's gigantic copper 
industry, the jointly-owned Rhodesia railway, 
manufacturing industries, banks, insurance companies, 
schools, the civil service, and many other public and 
private enterprises. Based in a relatively sound national 
economy (by the standards of African states) commercial 
activities, especially in the retail and wholesale 
sectors, had attracted a relatively huge number of Asians 
who completely dominated it. Thus the people of European 
and Asian races constituted the so-called "racial 
minorities" whose personal interests needed special 
protection in the constitutional scheme under consideration.
What was noticeably interesting at the Constitutional
Conference of 1961 was that the Secretary of State's
suggestion for the constitutional entrenchment of rights
was immediately acclaimed by the representatives of the
chiefs who also urged that "there should be safeguards
for minorities, and that for this purpose there should
68be a Bill of Rights in the Constitution". The chiefs 
are the leaders of the various individual ethnic groups 
in the territory, and naturally they were apprehensive 
of a central government composed of people who did not 
belong to their groups. Their concern for their 
existence in a totality of the new political community as 
minorities could therefore be appreciated. However,
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this is not to imply that the other delegates who 
represented the five political parties in the country 
were not in favour of a bill of rights. As in Ghana 
(1957), the vitality and importance of the notion of 
human rights to democracy was already popularized by 
the nationalists themselves, and was an entrenched 
feature in their ideology and propaganda. The human 
rights argument was used in the pre-independence 
period both as a "sword" and as a "shield". It was used 
as a sword by the nationalists in attacking the 
undemocratic foundations of the colonial government 
because of its continued denial of basic civil and 
political rights amd freedoms to the indigenous people. In 
other.words, colonialism was,seen as inherently incompatible
with human rights. It was also used as a shield to 
offset accusations that once in power, the nationalist 
government might either be autocratic in its actions,, 
or might import communism, which knows of no legal rights 
to persons and their property. In order to assure ethnic, 
racial and religious minorities, and to create confidence 
in the international community at the United Nations, 
the nationalist parties promised in advance to adopt 
human rights in the independence constitution. Thus in 
Zambia, the most dominant African nationalist movement, 
the United National Independence Party (which subsequently 
formed the first black government in the country), issued 
what it called the "Declaration of Fundamental Human
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69Rights, I960". The Declaration purported to promise 
that the constitution of the territory under UNIP 
government would safeguard the personal rights and 
liberties of all individuals. The Declaration read:
"The Constitution shall contain fundamental 
safeguards guaranteeing the freedom of the 
individual and providing against abuse of 
power by the Executive. These fundamental 
laws will not alone safeguard the members 
of the country. They are not concessions 
to any one group or community but rather 
an expression of UNIPfs belief in the 
dignity and freedom of the individual, and 
in the principles of justice to all".
The rights and freedoms which the UNIP Declaration
laid down were principally of the traditional civil
liberties-type, plus two or so rights in the realm of
social and economic rights. The Declaration, no doubt,
drew these principles from the United Nations'
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
The rights and freedoms formulated in the UNIP
Declaration included the right to life, liberty and
security of person; equality before the law; freedom
from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile save in
accordance to law; freedom from interference of one's
privacy, family, home, or correspondence; freedom of
peaceful assembly and association, including the right
to form political parties and trade unions; freedom of
expression; freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
right to property; protection from discrimination on
grounds of race, colour or sex; right to vote and
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rights to due process of law. The rights of a social 
and economic nature mentioned in the Declaration 
included the right of everyone to a decent standard of 
living, good health, and the duty of the state to 
safeguard the economic interests of the weaker members 
of the community; right to education, which was to be 
free at least in the elementary stages, and right of 
parents to choose the kind of education they wished for 
their children.
The Declaration did not, of course, have any direct 
bearing on the decision to incorporate a bill of rights 
in the proposed constitution of the territory, but it 
does indicate the kind of favourable climate within 
which the suggestion was made In any case, by 1961, or 
more specifically after the Nigerian experience, the 
policy of the Colonial Office favoured the writing of a 
bill of rights in any orte of the constitutions 
conferring self-government on the dependent territories. 
So the suggestion to include a bill of rights in the 
Zambian self-government of 1963 should also be understood 
within the larger context of Britain's approach to 
constitutional settlement with respect to its colonies.
Self-government came to Northern Rhodesia with 
the adoption of the Northern Rhodesia Constitution, 1963, 
which was a schedule to the Northern Rhodesia 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1963, which came into 
operation on 3rd January 1964. It is this constitution
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which implemented the Monckton Commission's Report 
with regard to the bill of rights and the Council of 
State. The "Protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of the Individual" occupied the first chapter 
in the Constitution, and Chapter Two dealt with the 
"Constitutional Council".^ In the next chapter we 
proceed to take up the subject of the content and manner 
formulation of this bill of rights, which was also 
reproduced in the independence Constitution of Zambia 
of 1964.
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PART II
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER 
THE ZAMBIAN CONSTITUTION (1964-79)
CHAPTER 5
FORM AND CONTENT OF THE ZAMBIAN BILL OF RIGHTS
In the last chapter we noted the origins of the decision to
incorporate a declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual in the Northern Rhodesian Constitution of 1963 which
established self-government in the territory. It was also noted that
the provisions protecting the rights and freedoms in that Constitution
were reproduced, with minor modifications, in the Republican
Constitution (1964) of the Republic of Zambia. This chapter, on the
other hand, concerns itself with the contents of the Zambian Bill of
Rights and the manner of formulation of the guaranteed rights and
freedoms - and in this respect it is to be compared with the corresponding
provisions adopted in other Commonwealth African states.^ It is obvious
that the British gave very serious consideration to the form and content
of the bills of rights in some African countries, especially in Kenya
and Zambia where the political and economic circumstances required
2considered constitutional arrangements.
Generally speaking, all the Commonwealth African bills of rights
followed a common pattern in the range of the rights guaranteed and the
manner of formulating them. In this, they merely reflected their common
source which was in the European Convention (Articles 2-11) and the bill
3of rights m  the Nigerian Constitution. However, later bills of rights 
which followed the Nigerian experience (i.e. the ’Neo-Nigerian bills of 
rights') exhibit some distinctive features which represent improvements 
in the manner of drafting. One of these features is the presence of a 
declaratory or an introductory note which precedes the actual provisions 
guaranteeing the rights and freedoms.
A) The Declaratory Section and its Legal Effects
4The Zambian bill of rights, like that of Kenya,
5 6Nyasaland, and Jamaica, for example, but unlike the
Nigerian bill, contains what is generally referred to as a
declaratory section, as a kind of preamble to the substantive
sections guaranteeing rights and freedoms. It is difficult to
understand the absence of a declaratory note to the Nigerian bill
of rights because even the European Convention on Human Rights is
preceded by a recital in a preambulary form reaffirming faith
in "those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of justice
and peace in the world and best maintained by an effective
political democracy and by a common understanding and
observance of the Human rights " and further that "...
Governments of European countries which are likeminded and have
a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and
the role of law take the first steps for the collective
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal
Declaration " However, the preambles to the Neo-Nigerian
bills of rights took a different form. The Nigerian bill of rights
having failed to incorporate the preambulary recital, it was
COACA-Hpt'
Uganda (1962) where such a . first appeared as a feature of
the constitution.^ The Ugandan example was followed by all 
African constitutions which contained bills of rights. Section 13 
of the Constitution of Zambia sets out this preliminary section:
"Whereas every person in Zambia is entitled to the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say the 
right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, 
colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and for the public interest to each 
and all of the following, namely:-
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a) life, liberty, security of the person and the 
protection of the law;
b) freedom of expression and of assembly and association; 
and
c) protection for the privacy of his home and other 
property and from deprivation of property without 
compensation.
The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the 
purpose of affording protection to those rights and 
freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection 
as are contained in those provisions, being limitations 
designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights 
and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the 
rights and freedoms of others or the public interest."
In the Zambian case of Nkumbula v. The Attorney-General for
g
Zambia, the applicant argued, inter alia, that the government*s
decision to introduce a one-party state would infringe on his
freedom of assembly and association "guaranteed under Ss 13
and 23(i)", and that in any case, the introduction of a one-party
system of government would be "in contravention of the spirit of
the Constitution and in particular Ss J_3, 22 and 25..." He asked
the court to issue such order, write or direction "for the
purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of Ss _1_3, 22 and
25....of the Constitution...." Quite clearly the applicant in this
case was lumping together Section 13, that is the declaratory
section, together with the rest of the other substantive provisions
for human rights in the Constitution and thereby making it appear
as though it also confers enforceable rights or freedom . Chief
Justice Doyle, who decided the case in the High Court did not give
this matter any extended discussion as to the legal effect of S.13,
but merely observed that "Section 13 is merely a general statement
9of the principles embodied in the following sections..."
An example of a direct and thorough judicial examination of 
the legal effect of the declaratory section arose in the Kenyan 
case of Shah Vershi v. Transport Licensing Board.^ The Kenyan
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Constitution, as indicated above, also contained a declaratory
section, i.e. Section 70, in exactly the same terms as Section 13
of the Zambian Constitution. In the case cited above the
applicant, a company owned by Asians, was refused renewal of
some of its transport licences by the Licensing Board. The Board's
decision was obviously influenced by the need "to remove imbalance
between Kenyan citizens". The applicant challenged the decision
of the Board on the ground, inter alia, that it denied the
fundamental rights given to it by the Constitution of Kenya, and
in this respect cited Section 70 (i.e. the declaratory section)
in support of his case. Section 70 prohibited "discriminatory
treatment" to every individual whether a citizen or a foreigner,
yet the ground of refusal to renew the transport licence to the
applicant company was based on its being owned by non-Kenyans.
The High Court of Kenya ruled that Section 70 of the Constitution
created no justiciable rights on its own: Chanan Singh, J.,
explained the proper effect of S.70 as follows; that
" although given a separate number, this section is
quite clearly in the nature of a preamble  [The]
section itself creates no rights: it merely gives a
list of the rights and freedoms which are protected by 
other sections of the chapter".^
The Court also explained that the word "person" as used in the
section includes "any body of persons corporate or unincorporate".
This means that a company as the ontin this case is a "person"
within the meaning of the section and would, ipso facto, be
entitled to all the rights and freedoms given to a natural person
12which it is capable of enjoying.
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. . 13Earlier, m  1967, m  Olivier v. Buttigieg a case in 
Malta, which surprisingly was not referred to in the Kenyan 
case above, the Privy Council gave a neat summary of the true 
legal character of a similar section - Section 5, Part 11, of 
the Maltese Constitution. In its opinion the Privy Council 
declared that:
".... [Section 5] which begins with the word "Whereas"...
is an introduction to and in a sense a prefatory or 
explanatory note in regard to the sections which are to
follow  The Section appears to proceed by way of
explanation of the scheme of the succeeding sections. The 
provisions of Part 11 are to have effect for the purpose 
of protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms, but the 
section proceeds to explain that since those rights and 
freedoms must be subject to the rights and freedoms of 
others and to the public interest it will be found that in 
the particular succeeding sections which give protection 
for the fundamental rights and freedoms there will be 
"such limitations of that protection as are contained in
those provisions".......the succeeding sections show that
the promised scheme was followed. The respective succeeding 
sections proceed in the first place to give protection for
one of the fundamental rights and freedoms .... and then ^
proceed in the second place to set out certain limitations...
The Ugandan case of Shah v. Attorney-General for Uganda*** is
too of immense interest to the present discussion on the legal
effect of what we have, for most of the time, referred to as a
’declaratory section'. The majority opinion in this case was to
the effect that an Act of Parliament could be declared invalid on
the basis of its provisions being inconsistent with the provisions
of the 'declaratory section', even though it was not necessarily
incompatible with any of the substantive or operative provisions
under the bill of rights. In other words, the case decided that
the preamble to the bill of rights possesses legal form independent
of the operative provisions that follow to define the rights and
freedoms.
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The Ugandan Constitution of 8th September 1967, which
followed a coup d'etat by Prime Minister Milton Obote, the
suspension of the 1962 Constitution and the deposition of the
incumbent President of Uganda, the Kabaka of Buganda, contained
a bill of rights closely based on the Nigerian model, as was its
bill of rights under the 1962 Constitution. That bill of rights,
like the Zambian one, had a preamble as a declaratory section
introducing t,he guaranteed rights and freedoms - although the
Ugandan declaratory section was differently worded. The relevant
16provisions to this discussion read as follows:
"8 (2) Every person in Uganda shall enjoy the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, 
the rights to each and all the following, namely,
a)
b)
c) protection for the privacy of his home and other 
property from deprivation of property without 
compensation".
In addition to these provisions protecting, inter alia, property 
rights in the declaratory section, a later article in the 
operative provisions of the bill of rights, namely Article 13, 
dealt specifically with "protection from deprivation of property" 
and specified a number of conditions which have to be satisfied 
before dispossession or acquisition of property could lawfully 
be effected.^
In this case the petitioner had obtained judgment against 
the Government of Uganda in a suit founded upon a contract between 
him and the former Kabaka's Government of Buganda. The Government 
failed to pay the judgment; in fact the Government through its 
official in the Treasury responsible for payment refused to accept
the order of the High Court to pay. The petitioner then applied 
for mandamus on the officials responsible for payment, whereupon 
the Attorney-General applied to dismiss the application relying 
on a section of an Act of Parliament, the Local Administration 
(Amendment) (No.2) Act of 1969, which had been passed after the 
judgment had been given. The Act purported to deprive a person 
of the right to litigate on a contract. There was, of course, 
the argument that the Act did not apply to the petitioner’s 
judgment debt because it dealt only with contracts and that the 
contract upon which the plaintiff's original suit had been founded 
had now been merged in the judgment. The High Court of Uganda 
upheld this view.
Next, the petitioner argued that the relevant provisions of 
the local Administration (Amendment) Act, 1969, was unconstitutional 
because it purported to sanction deprivation of property without 
compensation as provided for under Article 8(2)(c) of the 
Constitution cited thereabove. In other words, he was claiming 
that there was invalidity of the statute in question because it 
offended against Article 8(2)(c) - which was the preambulary 
declaration to Chapter III of the Constitution and not Article 13 
which constituted the substantive basis of the right against the 
deprivation of property without compensation.
Jones, J., and Mead, J., both held that the provisions of 
the impugned Act was ultra vires Article 8 of the Constitution, 
and therefor it, and anything done thereunder, was null and void 
and of no effect.
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Wambuzi, J., who dissented from the judgment of J.Jones 
and Mead, did so substantially on the premise that it was not 
enough for the petitioner merely to show that a particular law 
was in conflict with the declaratory section to the bill of 
rights, but that he must go further to show the actual 
repugnancy with one or any of the operative sections that 
follow. In this connection he said:
"Looking at Chapter III [in the bill of rights] generally... 
it is evident that the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the individual named in Article 8 [i.e. the declaratory 
statementj can be ascertained only by reading the remaining
articles in that chapter...... No provision in Article 8(2)
of the Constitution can be said to have been infringed 
unless it is shown that a corresponding provision defining
! and limiting the right or freedom has been i n f r i n g e d " . 18
I Wambuzi, J., went on to show that the protection of property
| referred to in Article 8(2)(c) was to be found in Article 13
I which dealt with the "protection from deprivation of property".
j
j This, he said, "must be the protection or part of the protection
I
I referred to in Article 8(2)(c) of the Constitution". It therefore
|
followed that for the petitioner to succeed in his claim that the 
impugned law deprived him of his sum of money represented in the 
judgment debt, the conditions laid down under Article 13 (and not 
Article 8) will have to be satisfied. In Wambuzi1s view, however,
"the judgment debt in question which is nothing more than 
a right to recover the amount of the debt is not such 
property as is protected under Article 13 of the 
Constitution. It is not purported under the (impugned)
Act to be taken possession of nor is purported to be 
acquired by the Government. It is purported simply to be 
extinguished by the legislature. In those circumstances, 
the question whether the taking possession or acquisition 
was in the public interest"
19as prescribed by Article 13 does not arise. In other words, 
the judgment of the two other judges which was based on the
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assumption that a declaratory section confers legal rights
and obligations which can be enforced judicially was obviously
wrong. declaratory sections1 as they appear in the Commonwealth
African bills of rights are in the nature of a preamble to the
substantive provisions that follow guaranteeing rights and
freedoms; and it has never been doubted that a preamble, at
least in the English conception, forms no part of the statute
and so cannot create any legal rights or obligations enforceable
through the Courts. It therefore follows that (in the case under
discussion) Justice Wambuzifs line of thought and assumption that
the petitioner, to succeed in his claim, must show that some
right in the substantive portions of the bill of rights, and not
in its declaratory section, has been infringed was correct.
B) Individual Rights and Freedoms specifically protected
The rights and freedoms which were entrenched under the
Zambian Constitution, and indeed under most other Commonwealth
African constitutions, were those in the nature of "the
traditional natural rights", which, as we have seen, trace their
immediate origin from the European Convention - but which in fact
have a long history enmeshed in the Western politico-philosophical 
. . 20traditions. Like the European Convention, these rights are
S - p e 'c ~  ^ c -'^ V
formulated with a great degree of s^ they were meant to
be susceptible to judicial enforceability. However, unlike the
terms of the Convention, Commonwealth African bills of rights "are
more extensive and detailed and include precise definitions
of the exceptions or modifications which are allowed to qualify 
21them". But even within the African type of bills of rights,
there are, not infrequently, differences between states both in
the substantive provisions themselves and in the content of
21the exceptions thereto. This obviously, as has been suggested,
was deliberately intended to "take into account?' the various
local factors, political, economic, social or cultural, of the
country concerned.
There are in all twelve rights and freedoms which are
22protected under the Zambian bill of rights, and these are
23 . 24the right to life; the right to personal liberty; freedom
25from slavery and forced labour; freedom from inhuman 
26treatment; the right to property and freedom from its
27 2deprivation; the right to privacy or home and other property;
29the right to the protection of the law; freedom of conscience
30which includes freedom of thought and of religion, etc.;
31 32freedom of expression; freedom of assembly and association;
33 . . . .freedom of movement; and freedom from discrimination on the
34grounds of race, tribe, colour, etc.
All of these rights are, of course., subject to exceptions
which are carefully detailed in the subsections that in all cases
immediately follow the substantive provisions guaranteeing the
right or freedom concerned. The reason for this is, no doubt,
that it is impossible to provide rights in a constitution in
absolute terms: this has led a leading English constitutional
lawyer to make a cynical remark which has been widely quoted:
"The ideal constitution would contain few or no
declarations of rights, though the ideal system of 
law would define and guarantee many rights. Rights 
cannot be declared in a constitution except in 
absolute and unqualified terms, unless indeed they 
are so qualified as to be m e a n i n g l e s s " .35
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Unlike the position under the European Convention, the
exceptions to the rights and freedoms under the African bills
of rights are so complex in detail and comparatively vast in
range, that one commentator described the earliest of these
bills to be devised (i.e. the Nigerian bill) as "a Bill of
36exceptions, not a Bill of Rights". The freedom of movement
under the Zambian Constitution, for example, has only five
sentences guaranteeing the freedom, but is followed by more
than thirty-seven sentences specifying grounds on which that
37 . .freedom can lawfully be derogated from. The position is even 
worse with regard to freedom from deprivation of property after 
1969, when a Constitution amendment was passed specifically to 
remove the restrictive provisions on the acquisition of property 
which the independence constitution had inposed on the government.' 
In its amended form there are only seven sentences guaranteeing 
the freedom, but these are followed by no less than one-hundred-
and-five sentences defining situations in which the compulsory
. . .  39acquisition of property can lawfully be effected.
The fact, however, is that all of the rights and freedoms 
under the Zambian Constitution are qualified: thus even the
more direct 'God-given* right, that is the right to life, is 
subject to a number of exceptions. The right to.life, for 
example, is not infringed if life is deprived in execution of the 
sentence of a court for a criminal offence of which the person 
concerned has been convicted. The right is also not infringed 
if death results from a lawful act of war or from a lawful use
24 4
of such force as is reasonably justifiable for the defence
of person, and even more interesting, for the defence of
property, or to effect an arrest, or for suppressing riot,
insurrection or mutiny. With regard to an equally important
right of an individual, the right to personal liberty, there
are ten specified classes of case in which its deprivation is 
40authorized by law. Most of these cases are naturally 
intended to enable the State to maintain law and order and 
therefore achieve national security. The right to personal 
liberty is also made to operate subject to the constitutional
provisions relating to detention, or restrictions of persons
 ^ • 41during an emergency.
The provisions to secure non-discrimination on the grounds
of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions were especially
important to Zambia with its experience of a long history of racial
antagonism between Africans and Whites, especially during the
42 . . . .federal period. Because of its economic potential and job
opportunities, especially in its mining industry, Zambia attracted 
a considerable number of whites and people of Asian origin, who 
constituted racial minorities. Zambia too, like many other 
Commonwealth African states, had many small groupings of ethnic 
communities (about seventy) which were surrounded by the three 
dominant tribal groups of Bemba, Lozi and Ngani. The nationalist 
government which took over from the colonial regime was dominated 
by people from those three main tribes. At independence, too, and 
thereafter before the advent of the one-party state, Zambia was a 
typical multi-party state whose opposition parties were active.
Therefore, Zambia, presented an ideal situation where
discrimination against racial and tribal minorities and against
those who belonged to opposition parties, who held different
views about how the government should be run, could be an
established feature of post-independence political practice.
However, in recognition of the existence of large segments of
tribal communities in Zambia, the provision protecting against
discrimination does not apply to any law which makes provision
"for the application in the case of members of a particular race
or tribe of customary law with respect to any matter to the
exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is
A3applicable to the case of other persons". Also it was in
recognition of the peculiar circumstances of Northern Rhodesia,
as Zambia was then known, in the area of race relations between
Africans and Whites during the Federation that the Constitutional
Council was instituted in the self-government Constitution of 1963
with the purpose of examining any new Bills passed by the
Legislative Assembly before submission for the GovernorTs assent,
and for the Council to recommend whether, in its opinion, the Bill
was unfairly discriminatory or otherwise contravened the provisions
44of the ’Declaration of Rights1. This Council was replaced by
the establishment of a Special Tribunal in the Independence 
45Constitution, which inherited most of the functions performed by
the Council. The Special Tribunal has also survived the
46establishment of the One-Party Constitution. The National 
Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party Participatory 
Democracy in Zambia noted that protection from discrimination on
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the grounds of sex was not covered in any of the relevant
47sections of the Independence Constitution. It therefore
38recommended, and government accepted, that protection from 
discrimination on the grounds of sex should also be included in 
all relevant sections of the proposed One-Party Constitution.
In the first instance, the Independence Constitution did have 
a stipulation in the ’declaratory section1 prohibiting 
discrimination, inter alia, on grounds of sex: but as noted
earlier, this method of protecting a right is not enforceable in
49 . . .law. What the Commission inevitably wanted to see was the
actual incorporation of the freedom from discrimination on grounds 
of sex in the appropriate substantive provision in the 
Constitution dealing with freedom from discrimination. However, 
when the One-Party Constitution was finally enacted, the promised 
inclusion of a stipulation to that effect was never, in fact, 
implemented."*^  Again, only in the declaratory section of the One- 
Party Constitution does the stipulation occur.
It seems that the provisions to secure the ’due process of law’ 
under Section 20 of the Constitution are the least qualified and are 
in most parts prohibitive against infractions of the various rights 
guaranteed to the accused persons. However, the right to 
counsel of one’s choice before any court received some narrow 
interpretation by the High Court of Zambia. The relevant 
constitutional provision protecting this right is worded as 
follows:
"Every person who is charged with a criminal offence.... 
shall be permitted to defend himself before the Court in 
person or, at his own expense, by a legal representative 
of his own choice".51
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. 52The Court, m  Patel v. Attorney-General for Zambia,
ruled that the words "legal representative" here means a "legal
representative, entitled to practice in Zambia as an advocate",
and "must be a person who is not disabled under any law in Zambia
from appearing before the Court and actually exercising his right
of audience". The Court in effect was saying that an accused
person cannot argue that his right to a legal representative of
his choice has been infringed if the particular lawyer he engaged^
though entitled to appear before the court, is disabled by law
from entering Zambia and whose presence in the country would
53constitute a criminal offence. This statement was made by way
of obiter dictum in this case. But in the Nigerian case of
54Awolowo v. Federal Minister, Internal Affairs, the Nigerian 
Federal Supreme Court made it clear that the right of an accused 
person to counsel of his own choice which the Constitution provided 
for, may be curtailed for various reasons: for example, the
counsel of a person1s choice may be under lawful detention, or he 
may have been legally prohibited to enter into the country if he is 
a foreigner, and so forth.
As already indicated, there is no doubt that the provisions 
giving protection from deprivation of private property in Zambia 
form "lengthy and complex" clauses. The strong base in Zambia's 
expanding business interests as represented by the mining industries, 
and in other sectors of the economy, required to promote the 
entrenchment of these interests by constitutional means - the 
intention being to make it difficult for the reformist nationalist 
administrators to tamper with those interests and with private 
property generally. The protection of property rights and the
34 8
needs of economic development in an emergent state like Zambia, 
is fully dealt with in another chapter of this work, but suffice 
it to make the point here that the Independence Constitution 
prohibited the compulsory acquisition of property of any 
description, or indeed-any interest therein, except when 
certain specified conditions have been fulfilled; that is to say
"(a) the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary 
or expedient -
i) in the interests of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality, public health, town and 
country planning: or
ii) in order to secure the development or utilization
of that, or other property, for a purpose beneficial 
to the community; and 
(b) provision is made by a law applicable to that taking or 
acquisition -
i) for the prompt payment of adequate compensation; 
and
ii) securing to any person having an interest in or 
right over the property a right of access to a 
court or other authority for the determination 
of his interest or right, the legality of the 
taking of possession or acquisition of the 
property, interest or right, and the amount of 
of any compensation to which he is entitled, and 
for the purpose of obtaining prompt payment of 
that compensation".55
In Kenya, Swaziland and Lesotho, the requirement of "prompt and
adequate compensation" was/is even stricter, in that those
constitutions use the expression "prompt payment of full
. „ 56compensation .
The phrase "prompt and adequate compensation" in the Zambian 
constitution, together with other conditions necessary for a lawful 
acquisition of property, were removed from the constitution by a 
constitutional amendment in 1969.*^  By this change in the 
constitution, the government sought to embark on the policy of
taking over foreign-owned businesses or at least to acquire 
some shares in the mining, industrial and financial businesses 
of the country. The amendment also empowered the government to 
acquire compulsorily any property "under the authority of an Act 
of Parliament which provides for payment of compensation for the
property or interest or right to be taken possession of or
• 58 acquired .
C) Derogations from the guaranteed Rights and Freedoms during 
normal times
It has been noted in the preceding paragraphs that rights and
freedoms cannot be constitutionally guaranteed in absolute terms
because "the entrenchment of human rights in the constitution is
merely an attempt to strike a more or less permanent balance between
59the interests of the individual and those of the State". As the
declaratory section' to the bills of rights asserts, the enjoyment
of these rights by one single individual or a group of individuals
should take into account the rights and freedoms of others and of
60the public interest as a whole - thus, the need and justification 
for the exceptions to the rights guaranteed. Going through the 
specific articles in the constitution, and particularly noting the 
exceptions thereto, it is to be noticed that these exceptions 
fall broadly into two classes. The first class of exceptions are 
those which do not confer authority on the legislature to derogate 
from the guaranteed rights in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality and public health. The 
exceptions belonging to this category are of a hybrid kind in 
that they are not underlined by any identifiable common principle 
upon which the exceptions are based, but instead each provision
250
guaranteeing the rights also defines its own appropriate
exceptions to it. Thus the rights to life, personal liberty,
freedom from inhuman treatment, slavery and forced labour,
freedom from discrimination, and the right to the protection of
law, contain exceptions of this category. In Nigeria (1960),
even the right to adequate compensation for property acquired
compulsorily was not subject to laws passed in the interest of
61defence, public order, etc. With the exception of freedom
from discrimination, and, in the case of Nigeria, with the right
to property, the rights subject ot these kind of exceptions are
concerned primarily with the interest of the individual, and rarely
draw the Courts into the controversial arena of balancing between
the interest of an individual against that of the community as
a whole. The Court would find a determination of the alleged
infraction of any of these rights to be relatively safe than with
62those rights loaded with policy considerations.
The second class of exceptions is that whose main purpose 
is to empower the legislature to carry out measures to promote the 
public good by even retracting from the prohibitions contained in 
the guaranteed rights concerned. Thus the right to privacy of 
home and other property, freedom from deprivation of property, of 
conscience, of expression, of assembly and association, and of 
movement, under the Zambian Constitution, are guaranteed subject 
to curtailment by laws that are "reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society" in the interest of defence, public order, etc. 
In other words, the exceptions to this class of rights authorize 
the government to encroach upon the rights guaranteed to
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individuals in the name of some specified interests, but that 
this encroachment must be shown to be reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society. Grove has neatly summarized what this 
demands of the approach of the Courts when they are engaged in 
the interpretation of these sets of rights; he has written that:
"This phrase [i.e. ’reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
state] brings the courts into the picture, for it is they 
who must balance the rights of the individual against the 
interests of the community in order to determine if the 
restriction if "reasonably justifiable". Clearly cases
in this category involve the courts in questions
of policy. A court must consider the nature of the
individual and community interests which are involved.
It must examine the degree to which the individual’s 
interests undermine those of the community interests which 
are involved...."63
Quite obviously the extent to which the constitutional guarantee
of these rights limits the exercise of governmental authority turns
on the meaning which the Courts have given to the concept of
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society". Quite happily
the Zambian Courts have now exhaustively dealt with this
question, and this, with the Nigerian experience in the background,
has set the standard upon which the limitation of governmental
actions inherent in the expression under reference can go. First
requirement that tl w Lghts must
be "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society".
D) "Reasonably justifiable in a democratic society"
The first fundamental rights case which involved the Zambian 
Courts in the interpretation of the meaning of the expression
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society" was Feliya Kachasu
. 64 .v. The Attorney-General for Zambia. This case is discussed in
detail in a subsequent chapter, and therefore only its relevance
it may be asked
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to the present discussion will be mentioned here. The
constitutional provision alleged to have been infringed was
Section 21, which deals specifically with the protection of the
freedom of conscience. This freedom is one of those which belong
to the second category that we have mentioned above, in that the
provision introducing the right to freedom of conscience, thought
and religion is followed by provisoes allowing the government to
impose restraints by law which satisfies certain requirements,
and when those restraints themselves are reasonably justifiable in
a democratic society. The applicant had been suspended from
school and refused reinstatement because, being a Watchtower
Jehovah’s Witness, she refused to sing the national anthem and
to salute the national flag, as required by Ministerial regulations.
She also indicated that she would not participate in any of these
ceremonies, which she regarded as being contrary to her religious
beliefs. The school headmaster suspended her and excluded her from
school, pursuant to the Education (Primary and Secondary Schools)
Regulations, 1966, which required all pupils formally to sing the
national anthem and to salute the national flag on certain occasions.
These regulations also empowered the headmaster to suspend any pupil
who refused to do any of these things, as had happened in the 
65applicant’s case. She now claimed that the regulations under 
which she was suspended were invalid because they were in conflict 
with Section 21 of the Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of 
conscience, thought and religion. Moreover, she claimed that her 
being suspended under them constituted a hindrance in the enjoyment 
of her freedom of conscience, thought and religion within the
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meaning of the constitutional provisions. In terms of the
Constitution, therefore, for the applicant to succeed in her
claim that her freedom of conscience, thought and religion was
interfered with by the law under attack, she had to establish
the following points, viz.,
i) that the action taken by her school authorities in
coercing her to sing the national anthem and to salute
the national flag contrary to her religious expression,
amounted to a hindrance in the enjoyment of her freedom of
religion within the meaning of the Constitution;
ii) secondly, that this hindrance and the law under which
it came to be exercised went beyond the extent of what
was reasonably required in the interests of defence,
public safety or public order; and
iii) finally that the law authorizing the challenged actions
itself went further than was reasonably justifiable in
a democratic society.
The applicant easily succeeded - proving "hindrance", thus
disposing of requirement (i), as above. With respect to
requirement (ii) , the Court, holding that the burden had
been successfully disposed, ruled that,
"Bearing in mind the compelling consideration, particularly 
at the present time, of national unity and national security, 
without which there can be no certainty of public safety nor 
guarantee of individual rights and freedoms, I think it is
a reasonable requirement that pupils in schools should
king the national anthem and salute the national flag".66
In other words, the Court was saying that the law under which the
applicant came to be suspended, and which was under attack as Jaeing
unconstitutional, was reasonably required in one of the interests
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specified by the Constitution, namely, the interest of national 
safety or security. The crucial question, however, was whether 
that law was further reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society. On this Blagden, C.J., ruled that
"The criteria of what is justifiable in a democratic 
society might vary according to whether that society 
is long-established or newly-emergent. Zambia is a newly- 
emergent.state. It would be unrealistic to apply this 
criterion of a long-es.tablished democratic society. We 
should look to the democratic society that exists in 
Zambia; and having found that these regulations are 
reasonably required in Zambia I have no hesitation in 
finding that they are reasonably justifiable in the 
democratic society that exists here".67
This interpretation of "reasonably justifiable "and of its
equation to "reasonably required" would have the support of De
Smith,who remarked that "one can imagine unjustifiable action
being taken in pursuance of a reasonably required law, but it is
very hard to see how a law can itself be both reasonably required
68and not reasonably justifiable". The difference between De 
Smith's view and that of Chief Justice Blagden is that the former 
was referring to "reasonably required" and "reasonably justifiable" 
and their logical relationship, while the latter was referring to 
"reasonably required" and "reasonably justifiable' in a democratic 
society". The difference between these sets of phrases is self- 
evident. The proposition upon which Blagden based the 
interpretation of "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society" 
in the Kachasu case was, however, not followed, but was indeed 
rejected in the later Zambian case of Jasbhai Patel v. The
69Attorney-General (popularly known as the Patel Currency Case).
In this case, which was also a fundamental rights case, it was 
argued by one of the counsel that "if what is reasonably
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required in Zambia is to be equated with what is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society, the latter part of the 
subsection would be tautologous and completely unnecessary11.
In other words, if the Court could decide that the regulation, 
or what was done under it, was reasonably required in any of the 
specified interests, there would be nothing more for it to decide 
on the issue of whether it was reasonably justifiable.
Magnus, J., who decided the case, thought that "it is 
necessary to adopt the objective test of what is reasonably 
justifiable, not in a particular democratic society, but in any 
democratic society". He, however, conceded to the argument that 
"some distinction should be made between a developed society 
and one which is still developing, but I think one must be able 
to say that there are certain minima which must be found in any 
society, developed or otherwise, below which it cannot go and 
still be entitled to be considered as a democratic society".^
A further observation by Justice Magnus in the same case 
about the difference between "reasonably required" and "reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society" is of some interest. His 
Lordship asserted that a regulation authorizing some public 
officer to do something can be reasonably required in any of the 
specified public interests, but for the purposes of determining 
whether it, or anything done under it, is reasonably justifiable, 
the method used in implementing or attaining the specified object 
authorized by law is of fundamental importance. Thus, even though 
an exchange control regulation can be found to be reasonably required 
for the purpose of guarding against exchange control evasions,
"method is fundamental when one comes to consider " whether
the same regulation is reasonably justifiable: for "here it is
the manner in which the power was exercisable and in fact
exercised which is the question". What the Court was saying, in
other words, is that if parliament were to introduce a measure,
which, say, gave the police or any other official, carte blanche
powers of search at their own discretion, that such a measure would
certainly not he reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
The judicial interpretation of "reasonably justifiable in
a democratic society" in the Nigerian bill of rights also
received some judicial interpretation by the Federal Supreme
Court and many learned commentaries have evolved about the
trend of these decisions.
E) Enforcement of the Brotective Provisions
Unlike the American Bill of Rights, all the "Neo-Nigerian"
bills of rights in Commonwealth Africa include an expressly
entrenched provision for the enforcement of the rights guaranteed.
Under the Zambian Constitution, for example, any person alleging
that a fundamental right has been, is being or is likely to be
contravened "in relation to him" may apply to the High Court for
72redress. The Court is then under a duty to hear and determine 
the justiciable issues involved, and in consequence, may make
such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may
73 . .consider appropriate. However, there is no express or specific
mention of the orders and writs which the Court may issue in the 
Zambian provision - and this is indeed the case under the rest of
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Commonwealth African constitutions, except under the now over­
thrown constitution of Ghana, 1969. Under the 1969 Ghana 
Constitution it was specifically provided that the orders and 
writs which the Court may issue in connection with the enforcement 
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed therein include "writs and
orders in the nature of habeas corpus, ceriorari, mandamus,
74prohibition and quo warranto". Although the constitutional 
provisions make no reference to specific remedies in Zambia and 
the other countries, the Courts have in fact been using those 
very old remedies specified in the Ghanaian constitution - 
especially habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, and the newer 
remedy of a ’declaratory judgment’.
Still on the enforcement provisions, the Zambian Constitution, 
together with the rest of African constitutions, provides further 
that if in any proceedings in a subordinate court any question 
arises as to the convention of the protective provisions, the 
person presiding in that court is under a duty to refer the 
question to the High Court if one of the parties to the proceedings 
so requests, unless he is of the opinion that the raising of the 
question is merely frivolous or vexatious.^ If the constitutional 
point arises in this way, the Zambian Courts have insisted that 
the Magistrate in the subordinate court handling the matter "should 
have the issues framed by the parties and refer such issues to the 
High Court", and that "it is not correct for the magistrate simply 
to adjourn the proceedings and direct that one of the parties 
should apply to the High Court pursuant to Section 28(1) of the
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76Constitution". There have been at least two instances when,
by this procedure, fundamental rights disputes found their way
to the High Court for Zambia.^
In Uganda (1966), Jamaica (1962), Malawi (1964), and Sierra
Leone (1961) there is a proviso in these sections conferring a
special jurisdiction on the Courts for the enforcement of the
guaranteed rights, to the effect that
" the High Court (or Supreme Court) shall not exercise
its powers under this subsection if it is satisfied that 
adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged 
are or have been available to the person concerned under 
any law".78
No such proviso exists in the constituions of Zambia and Kenya. 
Further, in Zambia (but not in Kenya) it is expressly provided 
that no appeal can be from the determination of the High Court
dismissing on application on the ground that it is frivolous or
79vexatious.
In all of the African Commonwealth constitutions the practice 
and procedure to be followed in the determination of the 
fundamental rights cases arising under this special jurisdiction,
is to be prescribed "by the persons or authorities having
power to make rules of court with respect to practice and 
procedure...." (In Kenya the Chief Justice is specifically 
mentioned as the authority to prescribe such matters.) In their 
absence the Zambian High Court, in the first two post-independence 
fundamental rights cases, adopted the general High Court Rules 
which apply to most civil suits, and prescribed that
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"any application made to the Court in respect of
which no special procedure has been provided by any 
law  [shall] be commenced by an originating motion".
But since the Patel Currency Case was decided, the Protection
of Fundamental Rights Rules, 1969, have been made: these now
provide that an application under Section 28 of the Constitution
(that is under the enforcement provision) should be made by
81 82 petition to the High Court. In the Somabhai Patel Case,
the High Court for Zambia ruled that a reference of a
constitutional issue by the subordinate court to the High Court,
as discussed above, "is not an application to 'that Court1 and
the Protection of Fundamental Rights Rules do not apply to such
reference and do not in any way inhibit the Magistrate from
8^3adopting the procedure" specified under Section 28(3) of the 
Constitution.
However, the Courts in Commonwealth African jurisdictions
have refused to allow procedural technicalities to impede the
exercise of their jurisdiction to entertain disputes, touching on
the fundamental freedoms of individuals. Thus in the Nigerian
. 84case of Cheranci v. Cheranci, Bate, J., commented that
" The Constitution Order gives no guidance as to procedure
and no law such as is envisaged by Section 245(4) has as yet 
been passed to regulate procedure. No objection has, however, 
been taken to the procedure adopted by the applicant and 
since the liberty of the subject is involved, I would not 
myself think it proper to raise a procedural objection".
Before the High Court of Zambia, the state in a fundamental rights
case tried to argue that an application for redress under the
Special Jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine allegations
for breach of the protective provisions cannot simultaneously be
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used to impugn a law or administrative act alleged to violate 
other provisions of the Constitution. It was submitted that 
accepting that the petitioner’s application is an application 
to the Court for redress under the special jurisdiction, conferred 
upon by Section 28 of the Constitution, then the Court is strictly 
limited to the jurisdiction so conferred. Section 28 specifically 
preserves the subject’s right to pursue other remedies lawfully 
available to him. It was therefore argued that the Court had no 
jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Constitution to make any 
order where the complaint was simply that a regulation was invalid 
or something done under it was unlawful because of a conflict, not 
with the protective provisions, but with the provisions of some 
Act. While agreeing with this view, the Court nevertheless over­
ruled it because as the Court put it:
" for the purposes of exercising the Special
Jurisdiction it may, and in most cases it will, be 
necessary to determine the validity, effect and application 
of legislation, where the complaint is, as here, that a 
breach of the protective provisions has been brought about 
in part by that legislation or anything done under it”.85
i) Requirement of the Standing of the Plaintiff in the Case 
Under the Zambian Constitution in line with the rest
of the African Commonwealth constitutions, access to the
Courts is guaranteed to anyone who alleges that any of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights "has been, is being or is
likely to be contravened in relation to him".^ This is the
phraseology the judicial interpretation of which has evolved
the principle in Commonwealth Africa (otherwise established
in the US and India) that
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"the party who invokes the power must be able to show 
not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has 
sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, 
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, 
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way 
in common with people generally".8?
The Indian Supreme Court has also pronounced that only a
person whose rights have been affected by a statute may
challenge its constitutional validity, and that that person’s
88
rights must be directly or immediately threatened.
In its African Commonwealth form the principle was firstly
enunciated in the Nigerian case of Olawayin v. Attomey-
89
General of Northern Region. In this case the applicant 
brought proceedings in the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria 
challenging the validity of the Children’s and Young Persons’ 
Law, 1958, of the Northern Region. This law prohibited 
political activities by juveniles, as well as the inducing of 
such activities by adults. The applicant had not induced any 
juveniles to engage in political activities and therefore no 
direct threat of prosecution of him under this law could ever 
be contemplated. Nevertheless, the applicant attacked the law 
as infringing the guarantee of private and family life, 
freedom of conscience, and freedom of expression in the 
Constitution of Nigeria (1954). He rested his case on the 
ground that he was a father of children whom he wished to 
instruct politically, but was unable to do so for fear of 
violating the Statute. The High Court dismissed the case 
because
" no right of the applicant was alleged to have been
infringed and that it would be contrary to principle to 
make a Declaration in vacuo".90
2QJ?
On appeal to the Supreme Court the applicant tried to 
argue that the enactment of legislation which makes an 
offence of something which a person is constitutionally 
entitled to do is sufficient to make him an interested 
party, to seek a declaration from the Court. The Supreme 
Court then considered the Standing of the applicant to 
contest the validity of the Children's and Young Persons'
Law: Unsworth, F.J., speaking for the Court, remarked that:
"The appellant did not in his claim allege any interest 
but his counsel said that the evidence would be that 
the appellant had children whom he wished to educate 
politically. There was no suggestion that the appellant 
. was in imminent danger of coming into conflict with the 
law or that there had been any real or direct inter­
ference with his normal business or other activities.
In my view the appellant failed to show that he had a 
sufficient interest to sustain a claim. It seems to 
me that to hold that there was an interest here would 
amount to saying that a private individual obtains an 
interest by the mere enactment of a law with which he 
may in future come in conflict; and I would not 
support such a proposition".^!
The Nigerian decision did not, however, define what actions of
the applicant would have amounted to his obtaining a locus
standi in the circumstances. For example, the applicant
might have fallen foul of the law in question if, in the course
of his activity as a politician he addressed a political
assembly of juveniles, or solicited their membership of a
92!political party or associated with them politically.
In the Zambian case of Harry Nkumbula v. the Attorney- 
. 93General for Zambia, the concept of locus standi, as expressed 
through the constitutional phraseology "has been, is being or 
is likely to be contravened in relation to him [i.e., the 
applicant") received a detailed consideration by the Court ‘of
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of Appeal. The President of the Court of Appeal for Zambia, 
Baron, J., ruled on behalf of the Court:
"This Section [‘8.28(1)] applies only to executive and 
administrative action (or exceptionally, action by a 
private individual) and that this is so is underlined 
by the existence of the wards "in relation to him".
Thus, if there is on the Statute book an Act of 
Parliament, or subsidiary legislation, which it is 
alleged contravenes the Constitution, it is not open 
to any individual to come to court and ask for a 
declaration to this effect; before the individual has 
locus standi to seek redress there must be an actual 
or threatened action in relation to him. For instance, 
if an individual is arrested under a provision of an 
Act which he alleges is ultra vires the Constitution, 
he may in addition to any other remedy open to him 
proceed under Section 28(1). Again, if the individual 
has good ground for believing that some executive or 
administrative officer will take some action prejudicial 
to him and in contravention of his rights under 
Chapter III of the Constitution, he may proceed under 
this section. Many examples might be given.
"For instance, a parent of a schoolchild might have 
received a letter from the headmaster threatening 
expulsion if the child did not conform to certain rules; 
the parent need not wait for the actual expulsion but 
could invoke Section 28(1) if he alleges that to enforce 
such rules would contravene the provisions of Chapter III. 
Again, a trader might have received an intimation 
from an executive officer indicating that a recommendation 
would be made for the revocation of his trading licence 
if certain conditions were not complied with; the trader 
would have locus standi to proceed under Section 28(1) 
to determine whether the imposition of such conditions 
and the revocation of a licence or failure to comply 
therewith could be in contravention of his constitutional 
rights".?4
Finally, under the Constitution of Zambia no application 
can be made under Section 28(1) in respect of a Bill alleging 
that it would, if enacted into law, infringe any of the 
guaranteed rights: Section 28(5) provides for this situation
as follows:
264
"No application shall be brought under Subsection (1) 
of this section i.e. S.28 on the grounds that the 
provisions of Sections 13 to 26 (inclusive) of this 
Consitution are likely to be contravened by reason 
of proposals contained in any bill which, as the 
date of the application, has not become law".
Thus, in the Nkumbula case, since what the applicant was
contending for was that the government's plan to introduce
legislation in future bringing about a "one-party participatory
democracy" will infringe his rights under the Constitution in
its present form", the Court quickly replied * that:
"the existence of Section 28(5) makes it clear that if
the only step taken by the executive is the
introduction of the bill in question, subsection (1) 
cannot be invoked...."
What is striking about Section 28(5), cited above, of
the Zambian Constitution is that no similar provision under
the 'enforcement of protective provisions' is to be found in
95any of the other Commonwealth African constitutions. The 
reason for this is that in Zambia, and nowhere else in .the 
African states, the Constitution specifically provides the 
machinery for testing whether or not a particular Bill is 
incompatible with a bill of rights, prior to its becoming 
law. This machinery is in the nature of a special tribunal 
appointed by the Chief Justice. This procedure has its roots 
in the constitutional history of Zambia. It is appropriate 
to discuss this unique feature of the Zambian Constitution 
in detail.
ii) The role of a Special Tribunal under Section 27 
of the Constitution
The Special Tribunal established under Section 27 of the
Republican Constitution and continued under the One-Party
Constitution traces its origins to the Constitutional
Council, which was itself established in the Self-
Government Constitution of 1963 as recommended by the
9 6Monckton Commission. The Northern Rhodesia
Independence Conference, 1964, which settled the form
of the independence constitution, agreed that "the
Constitutional Council established by the present
constitution [i.e. the Self-Government Constitution,
1963] would not be reproduced in the "independence
constitution. But a section would be included in the
chapter of the independence constitution dealing with
human rights.... immediately before the section
corresponding to Section 15 of the present constitution
[i.e. the enforcement of protective provisions],
97containing provisions..." to replace the Constitutional 
Council with a Special Tribunal. Thus this is why the 
provisions relating to the Special Tribunal, that is 
Section 27, immediately precedes the provisions relating 
to the enforcement of the rights and freedoms under 
Section 28.
The Tribunal thus established differs from the 
former Council in composition and procedure only, but 
inherits the same basic functions as its predecessor. 
Further, the legislature was now brought into the 
process in that its jurisdiction can be invoked at the 
request of a number of Members of Parliament; this was
9 8not the case with regard to the Constitutional Council.
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The Constitution (1 964) provided that if not less than
seven members of the National Assembly gave written
notice to the Speaker within three days after the final
reading of any bill by the Assembly, the Speaker would
inform the Chief Justice, who would appoint a tribunal
consisting of two persons, each of whom would be either
a serving judge or have held the office of a judge of
the High Court. The tribunal would then consider whether
the bill, if enacted, would be inconsistent with the code
of fundamental rights included in the independence
constitution and make a report on the matter to the
President and the Speaker. The tribunal could refuse
to consider the matter if in its opinion the grounds
put forward for consideration of the bill were merely
99frivolous or vexatious. The Constitution is silent
on the effect of the report of the tribunal that the 
bill appears to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
It is clear that in these circumstances the President may 
choose either to assent to the bill nevertheless, or 
to refuse his assent and to return the bill to the 
Assembly. In this latter case it seems that the 
procedure under Section 71(4)(5)(6) would apply. This 
is to the effect that when the President returns a 
bill to the National Assembly, that bill should not 
again be presented to the President for assent unless 
within six months it received the support of a two- 
thirds majority of all members of the Assembly.
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Where this occurs the President should either
dissolve parliament or give his assent within
twenty-one days of the presentation of the bill.
The effect of dissolving parliament under the
Republican Constitution is that the President is
also required to stand for election.^®
A procedure similar to the one described above
applied in relation to statutory instruments which were
required to be published in the gazettes within fourteen
days of their being made. If the tribunal reported that
the statutory instrument in question appeared to be
inconsistent with the bill of rights, the President
could make an order either affirming it or annulling
it.^ The tribunal was also empowered to perform
the functions which the Constitutional Council performed
in respect of granting legal aid, at the public expense,
to anyone who "intends to bring or is an applicant or
appellant..." in proceedings in which the issue is an
allegation for the infringement of any of the guaranteed
rights in relation to him, but who cannot afford to
102pay for the cost of the application. The Independence
Constitution re-enacted this to read that "Whenever....
the Chief Justice considers it necessary for the
103purpose under Section 28 of this constitution", 
he could appoint the tribunal for this purpose; the 
tribunal may then grant such aid to any person who 
satisfies it that
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" a) he intends to bring or is an applicant in 
proceedings under Section 28(1) or 28(4) 
of this constitution;
b) he has reasonable grounds for bringing the 
application; and
c) he cannot afford to pay for the cost of the 
application".
All these provisions relating to the establishment
and functions of the Special Tribunal were reproduced
in the One-Party Constitution of 1973.*^ However,
106by a Constitutional Amendment, a request for a 
report on a bill or a statutory instrument now 
requires the support of twenty-one members of the 
National Assembly, not, as before, seven.
F) Derogations from Fundamental Rights During an Emergency 
All African states which became independent from 
Britain had provisions in their independence constitutions 
designed to preserve the safety of the new nation from 
either an actual public emergency or from some threatened 
danger which might befall the n a t i o n . I t  is recognized, 
even among the older-established nations with less like­
lihood of being confronted with some serious national 
disaster, that the principle of salus populi est supreme lex 
(that is to say, that the safety of the nation is the 
supreme law) is of cardinal importance. If this is so with 
respect to old nations, how much concern does it generate to 
new nations which, as President Nyerere reckons, "have 
neither the long tradition of nationhood, nor the strong
physical means of national security, which older countries 
„ 108take for granted . This need to safeguard the rights
and freedoms of individuals in the constitution has to be
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reconciled and balanced with the overriding need to
preserve the state. The Attorney-General of Zambia,
making submissions to the Court in one of the human
rights cases, gave an impressive summary of the extent to
which the security of the state can impinge on the
protection of individual rights:
"....the applicant’s undoubted right to enjoy freedom 
of conscience, and all the other rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by Chapter III of the Constitution, depend 
for their very existence and implementation upon the 
continuance of the organized political society - 
that is the ordered society - established by the 
Constitution. The continuance of that society itself 
depends upon national security, for without security 
any society is in danger of collapse or overthrow. 
National security is thus paramount not only in the 
interest of that State but also in the interests of 
each individual member of the State; and measures 
designed to achieve and maintain that security must
come first; and must override, if need be, the
interests of individuals and of minorities with 
which they conflict...."*09
Here we shall concern ourselves with an examination of the
extent of security or emergency powers, both constitutional
add statutory, conceded to the nationalist government at
independence, and how this impinges on human rights. The
question of how far these have been used in Zambia will be
discussed in a subsequent chapter dealing with the protection
of personal liberty.
i) Emergency laws in Zambia
Before 1964, that is before independence, there
were three pieces of legislation in Northern Rhodesia
,  ^ , • • noto deal with full or partial emergency situations; 
these were the Emergency Powers Order in Council 1939—
61 (which also applied to all British dependencies in 
Africa and Asia); The Emergency ordinance, 1948; and
finally, the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance,
1960. Unlike some independent African states, where it
was customary to continue the Emergency Powers Order in
Council 1931, for some time after independence (Ghana
for example), in Zambia the independence constitutional
conference, 1964, agreed that at the independence date
the Emergency Powers Orders in Council would expire,***
and in consequence of this the Zambia Independence Order
1964, accordingly provided for the Order in Council to
112"cease to have effect as part of the law of Zambia".
The Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1948, was also
113discontinued after independence. Both of these
colonial laws were replaced by new legislation, the
114Emergency Powers Act, 1964, which came into operation 
on the eve of Zambia’s independence. On the other hand, 
the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance continued
into force after 1964 (renamed the Preservation of Publi
*  ^ 115 security Act) .
The independence constitution (and One-Party
Constitution) vested the power to proclaim a declaration
that
" a) a state of public emergency exists, or that 
b) a situation exists which, if it is allowed to 
continue, may lead to a state of public 
emergency", ^
in the President of the Republic. A declaration of
situation (a) as above invokes full emergency powers
and is governed by the Emergency Powers Act, mentioned
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above. A declaration of situation (b) relates to 
dealing with threatened or semi-emergency situations, 
and is governed by the Preservation of Public Security 
Act. The President (like his predecessor, the Governor, 
under the Colonial Emergency legislation) has the 
unchallengeable discretion to say whether a situation 
has arisen to justify a declaration of a semi-emergency 
or a full emergency, and thereby to bring into operation 
the wide powers conferred by the Preservation of Public 
Security Act or the Emergency Powers Act, as the case 
may be.
The effect of a Presidential declaration of a semi­
emergency in accordance to the Constitution is, as 
indicated above, to bring into operation the far-reaching 
provisions of the Preservation of Public Security Act. 
Under this Act, the President is empowered, for the 
preservation of public security, to make regulations
which have far-reaching consequences on individual rights 
118and liberties. For example, the President may, by
regulation, make provision for the prohibition of the 
publication and dissemination of any matter which, in 
his opinion, is prejudicial to public security; make 
provisions for the prohibition, restriction and control 
of assemblies; make provision for the restriction, 
prohibition, and control of residence and movement, and 
possession, acquisition or use of property. He may also 
make regulations to provide for the detention of
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persons; and he may "make provision for, and
authorize the doing of, such other things as appear to
him to be strictly required by the exigencies of the
120situation in Zambia". Further, any regulation made
under this Act "shall have effect notwithstanding any­
thing inconsistent therewith contained in any written
law other than the Zambia Independence Order, 1964, or
121the Constitution...."
Since the declaration of "threatened emergency" by
the Governor of Northern Rhodesia prior to the 24th
October 1964 (i.e. before independence), thereby bringing
into effect the provisions of the Preservation of Public
Security Ordinance, there have been a total of nine
122statutory instruments made under this statute to 
regulate various aspects of public security.
A declaration by the President that "a State of 
Emergency exists" pursuant to the constitutional provisions 
already noted immediately applies the Emergency Powers Act 
to deal with the situation so created by the emergency.
The distinguishing mark between the "state of emergency" 
pure, and "semi-emergency is that the former is supposed 
to be a more serious state of affairs than the latter 
and therefore would require greater powers for the 
executive to deal with the calamity that has beset the 
nation. But upon a critical appraisal of the powers 
that accrue to the Executive both under the Preservation
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of Public Security Act, and under the Emergency Powers
Act, there is in fact little difference in the range of
such powers under these Acts respectively.
However, having brought the Emergency Power Act into
effect, the President is empowered thereunder to make
such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or
expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of
the Republic, the maintenance of public order and the
suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot, and for
maintaining supplies and services essential to the life 
. 123of the community. In particular, as in the case of the
Preservation of Public Security Act, the Emergency Powers
Act empowers the President to make regulations to effect
the detention of persons or the restriction of their
movements, and for the deportation and exclusion from the
.124Republic of persons who are not citizens of Zambia,
and for the authorization of the taking of possession or
control of any property - including its acquisition on
. 125
behalf of the Republic. Such regulations can also
authorize the entering and search of any premises.
However, the trial of persons by military courts is
expressly excluded from the rule-making power conferred 
127
on the President; but he can make regulations to
"provide for amending any enactment, for suspending the
operation of any enactment, and for applying any
128
enactment with or without modification". This means 
that even the penal code or the Criminal Procedure Code
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could in effect be suspended or its applications
could be varied, and not least, to induce a particular
desired political end. Further, while the regulations
made under the Preservation of Public Security Act may
not be inconsistent with the Constitution, though with
other written laws, the regulations made under the
Emergency Powers Act may, apparently, be repugnant even
to the Constitutional provisions as there is no
stipulation to the contrary in the appropriate 
129provisions.
ii) Effect of an emergency situation on the Bill of Rights 
The Constitution of Zambia expressly provides for 
derogation from a certain category of fundamental rights 
during an emergency. It is worthwhile to reproduce the 
relevant provision here, it reads as follows:
"S. 26 Nothing shall be held to be inconsistent with 
or in contravention of Articles 15, 18, 19,
21, 22, 23, 24, or 25 to the extent that it 
is shown that the law in question authorizes 
the taking, during any period when the 
Republic is at war or when a declaration 
under Article 30 (i.e. declaration relating to 
emergencies or threatened emergencies is in 
force, of measures for the purpose of dealing 
with any situation existing or arising 
during that period; and nothing done by any 
person under the authority of any such law 
shall be held to be in contravention of any 
of the said provisions unless it is shown 
that the measures taken exceeded anything 
which, having due regard to the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, could reasonably have 
been thought to be required for the purpose 
of dealing with the situation in question".
The constitutional provisions referred to in the above
quotation relate to those which protect, respectively,
the right to personal liberty, freedom from deprivation
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of property, right to privacy of home and other 
property, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, 
and freedom from discrimination. These rights and 
freedoms are then guaranteed subject at all times to 
emergency measures including those taken during the 
semi-emergency period. This, in effect, means that the 
regulations made under the Emergency Powers Act or the 
Preservation of Public Security Act, or anything done 
under their authority, operates to restrict those rights 
and freedoms mentioned above.
On the other hand, not all rights under the bill of 
rights are made subject to measures taken during an 
emergency: the ones missing from the above quotation
are those protected under Articles 14, 16, 17 and 20. 
These relate, respectively, to those provisions securing 
the right to life, freedom from slavery and forced 
labour, freedom from inhuman treatment, and the right 
to the protection of law. These cannot be derogated 
from at any time.
The question of how much of emergency or security 
law has been used in Zambia since independence and how 
the Courts have responded to control some executive 
actions based on that law’s authority will be the 
subject of discussion in the next chapter.
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G) Entrenchment of the Procedure to alter the Bill of Rights
As Ezejiofar has correctly asserted, "constitutional
Bills of Rights do not mean very much if they can be
130destroyed by simple constitutional amendment". True,
if the rights and freedoms which a bill of rights seeks
to protect are to be altered in the same simple way as it
makes or amends ordinary law, then the whole idea which
human rights expresses, namely, to place some limitations
on the exercise of political power by the government, loses
much of its point and meaning. The idea of creating a bill
of rights in a constitution arises out of the need to place
certain fundamental matters to society and to citizens beyond
the reach of the legislative actions of the government and
in this way hope to minimize incidents of arbitrary rule. If no
no such limitations exist, or if these limitations can easily
be removed by the government, then the citizens are clearly
exposed to the whims of the rulers, and such a condition is
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conducive to arbitrary rule. Therefore, the procedure
whereby a bill of rights (together with other vital 
constitutional matters) is altered becomes crucial if the 
objects for which fundamental rights and freedoms were 
included in the constitution are to be fully realized. As 
Professor Anderson has recently said in reference to the 
United States1 Bill of Rights,
"....In America.... the Constitution can only be changed 
by a special procedure which is both difficult and 
labourious: so all Americans can rest assured that
those individual rights included in their Bill of Rights 
and in subsequent Amendments to the Constitution stand 
above ordinary laws and cannot be abrogated or 
attenuated at the whim of a transient majority in a 
single elective chamber...."^2
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In the context of the African political realities,
the problem of having to subject a bill of rights to be
altered by a simple parliamentary majority, of say, two-
thirds or even more, is fraught with an obvious danger.
For even before the advent of one-party states in most
African countries, the nationalist parties which took over
from the colonial regime came into power with an overwhelming
parliamentary support. Where this was not the case, as in
Uganda (1962), the nationalist party in control of government
soon manoeuvred itself through to strengthen its position in 
133parliament. Hence restrictions based solely on a bare
simple parliamentary support had no real significance as a 
limitation on such governments, since the required majorities 
could be obtained easily. Professor Nwabueztt observes that
"The reality of the African political scene compels the 
conclusion that constitutionalism would be better safe­
guarded if the more fundamental provisions of the 
constitution are made subject to amendment by a 
procedure involving more than a parliamentary majority, 
e.g. the participation of some outside body or bodies, 
like the electorate at a referendum or other legislative 
assemblies in a federation".
It is precisely because of these predictable problems 
that the British Government preferred the device of a 
’special entrenchment procedure’ which involved not only 
parliament in the amendments of bills of rights and other 
"fundamental provisions" in the independence constitutions 
of their African ex-colonies. This procedure varied from 
country to country "according to the gravity and importance 
of the provisions in the light of the political circumstances
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of the country concerned". From what we have said about
the politico-economic issues which characterized the
: jjq, #
constitution-making in Kenya and Zambia, the vital
significance of the amendment procedure cannot be over­
emphasized.
[
| In Zambia the procedure arrived at in amending the
i
I constitutional provisions was as follows: for ordinary
amendments, publication of the proposed amendment for thirty
days in the Government Gazette before the first reading was
i
| required, and a two-thirds majority on the second and third
i
readings, were all that was required. But what was to be
published in the Gazette was the full text of the bill and not
just its title or a summary of it. For an amendment of the
| specially entrenched provisions an amending Act "shall not
ii
I come into operation unless the provisions contained in the
l
Act affecting that alteration have been submitted to a
referendum in which all persons who are registered as voters
for the purposes of elections to the National Assembly shall
be entitled to vote and unless those provisions have been
supported by the votes of a majority of all the persons
entitled to vote in the referendum". The specially
entrenched matters to which this procedure applied were the
bill of rights, the judicature, the procedure relating to
the presentation of bills for presidential assent, the making
of statutory instruments, and the amendment procedure
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By a constitutional amendment enacted in 1969, the
referendum procedure was abolished and thereafter the only
requirement for the alteration of all provisions in the
Constitution, including of course a bill of rights, was by
138a parliamentary majority of three-thirds. With the 
introduction of a one-party system in 1973, whereunder 
every Member of Parliament must be a member of the ruling 
Party, it became axiomatic that human rights, though retained 
in the One-Party Constitution, can be amended with ease and, 
indeed, their very existence precariously depends on the will 
of the Party which controls Parliament. Mr. John Mwanakatwe, 
Member of Parliament since Zambia attained independence in 
1964 and at the material time Minister of Finance, complained 
of the ease with which the Constitution was being frequently 
amended: contributing to a parliamentary debate on one of
the occasions when a constitutional amendment was being 
debated in the one-party National Assembly, he made the 
following remarks:
"....it is....fair to assert that we have not had a
stable constitution of Zambia at all......At the time
of our independence we obtained a constitution for 
Zambia which was, at best, a compromise between the 
views of the colonial government and those of our 
leaders who attended the Constitutional Conferences in 
London in 1964. For this reason, I am the first to admit 
that the' necessity for amending the Constitution was 
obvious in the early years of our independence. But 
the point I am making is that the. time must come when 
some caution must be exercised in the urge to amend 
the Constitution from time to time. I am making this 
observation because I feel that few people appreciate 
the sanctity of the Constitution and they think that 
it should be amended from time to time at the whims 
of Parliamentarians','.
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Mr. Mwanakatwe went on to make the important point that,
"On the contrary, the truth is that the extent to 
which social and political stability can be achieved 
in the nation depends upon the sense of security 
citizens can repose in the constitution, the only 
instrument which provides adequate safeguards for 
the protection of fundamental human rights". *39
From the time of independence in 1964 to 1975, Zambia had
1introduced no less than twenty amendments to the constitution 
of which more than half of these in effect amended some 
portions of the bill of rights. This is the highest record 
of constitutional amendments to be reached among the 
Commonwealth African states. Professor Nwabueze surveying the 
uses of the amending power among the presidential regimes in 
Commonwealth Africa, records that including the adoption of 
new constitutions, there have been no less than thirteen 
amendments since independence in Malawi; eleven in Kenya; 
ten in Tanzania; six in Uganda; five in Ghana and four in 
Botswana.
It is true that some of those amendments in Zambia were
passed to enable the government to exercise some control over
the foreign-owned businesses by amending the constitutional
142
provisions entrenching the right to property. Yet still
a number of them were intended to yield more power to the
executive to deal with detained and restricted persons,
143thereby curtailing their rights, and others still were
launched for political ends specifically to enfeeble the
. 1 4 4  opposition parties.
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Moreover, as already observed, the bill of rights
like the rest of the other parts of the constitution, can be
amended (since 1969) by a simple procedure of merely securing
a two-thirds parliamentary majority. This makes the rights
guaranteed under the bill amenable to abridgement by the
legislature at any time and without any difficulties. In
this regard it is interesting to notice some contrasts with
the status of fundamental rights vis-a-vis constitutional
amendment by Parliament in India. In the famous fundamental
145rights case of Golaknath v. State of Punjab the Supreme
Court of India held that the Parliament of India had no power
to amend or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined therein.
The effect of this decision was indeed to make "Fundamental
Rights transcendental, eternal and immutable, beyond the pale
146of change by a sovereign nation and its parliament".
However, the Golaknath judgment led to a raging controversy
among the members of the India Parliament, and this resulted
in the Constitution being amended to overcome the results of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Golaknath Case.
In the meantime, that is three years after the Golaknath
decision, the Supreme Court had changed its minds and in the
147 •case of Kesharalfanda Bharati v. Union of India it held 
that the constitution invested the parliament with the right 
to alter or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, provided the "basic", "essential", and 
"fundamental" elements and features of the constitution
were not destroyed. These fundamental features were 
said to be democracy and the freedom of the individuals.
This decision, and the Indian approach generally to 
the protection or enforcement of individual rights, 
emphasize the point that there are certain subjects which 
the constitution deals with as fundamental and solemn parts 
thereof which, though amendable, call upon some implied 
or inherent limitations to the power of amending them in 
the sense that the essential features of fundamental rights 
and democracy as protected by the constitution cannot be 
destroyed. In Zambia such amendments to the constitution as 
those which gave power to the government to acquire 
compulsorily any property with almost no limitations on the 
exercise of that p o w e r , o r  excluded the courts from 
entertaining (as before) detainees' applications for damage 
in respect of proved unlawful detentions,or removed 
the freedom to form or belong to any political party (in 
effect abolishing an organized parliamentary opposition) - 
and many other similar incidences dealt with in various 
parts of this work, clearly amount to a destruction of the 
right involved under the bill of rights. In India these 
types of amendments may have, in the light of the decision 
in the Keshavananda case, provoked some interesting judicial 
controversies, and presumably some of those amendments 
might have been struck down as invalid.
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In concluding our survey of the 'form and contents' 
of the Zambian bill of rights, it will be observed that 
its provisions were carefully constructed so much so that 
to a government genuinely committed to upholding respect 
for human rights, the foundation for the realization of 
that ideal was undeniably laid down. However, realization 
of an effective protection of human rights depends not on 
legal provisions only, but also on how courageously the 
judiciary is prepared to stand in defence of the liberties =
t
of individuals by the interpretations * I places on the bill 
of rights. Thus, the next ' „ chapter* will examine the
role of the judiciary in the enforcement of the guaranteed 
rights and freedoms under the constitution.
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CHAPTER 6
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CLAIMS 
OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
In the last chapter we noted that constitutional bills of rights 
in most Commonwealth African states were "justiciable" - that is, the 
arduous task of interpreting and enforcing the guaranteed rights was 
assigned to the courts. In practical terms, this meant that whenever 
there was a complaint by an individual alleging a violation of any of 
the guaranteed rights and freedoms, the individual could apply to the 
High Court for redress. Provided the application for redress in 
respect of such an alleged constitutional violation is properly before 
the court, the jurisdiction to hear and determine is compulsory on the 
part of the court.1 If the court finds that the complaint is well founded, 
it is its duty to declare unconstitutional and void any executive or 
legislative act found to be inconsistent with any provisions of the bill 
of rights, to the extent of the inconsistency.
In this chapter two questions are posed, viz., To what extent has 
the Zambian judiciary fulfilled its role as the guardian of personal 
liberties and freedoms? Secondly, What does a study of the decisions 
on fundamental rights reveal about the way courts go about resolving 
the issues involved?
Unfortunately, like anywhere in Commonwealth Africa, there are 
relatively few cases decided upon the bill of rights in Zambia, except 
in respect of the right to personal liberty. It should perhaps be 
mentioned here that the Zambian courts have, more than anywhere in the 
Commonwealth African jurisdiction, dealt with more fundamental rights 
cases in the area of the right to personal liberty and the freedom of 
movement. Most of these cases have involved the courts in deciding upon
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issues of the legal validity of detention orders executed by the 
President under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations. It 
is therefore suggested to discuss the theme of this chapter in relation 
to an examination of the judicial intervention in the area of personal 
liberty and the freedom of movement. The final part of the chapter is 
devoted to a brief discussion of the judicial intervention in the 
enforcement of other rights and freedoms under the bill of rights which 
have been the subject of judicial interpretation.
A. Personal Liberty and the Freedom of Movement
There is no doubt that the rig^ ht to personal liberty and the 
freedom of movement (at least to the extent that it directly 
disturbs the physical comfort of the individual once invaded in 
relation to him) are the most fundamental in any society. It is 
therefore, a painful reality to learn that these are the two 
freedoms on which there has been the greatest encroachment under 
the emergency (or security) laws in Zambia. Emergency powers in 
Zambia, as in other African States are formally very wide and 
drastic, especially when a declared State of Emergency is in 
existence. A declaration of a State of Emergency, as stated in the 
preceding chapter, is invariably followed by the statutory 
empowerment of the President to detain or restrict those persons 
whose acts he suspects could be prejudicial to national security 
and public order. In this respect Zambia represents a special case 
in that, there, a declared State of Emergency has been in existence 
since 1964 (i.e., since independence) with the result that over the 
whole of this period the power to detain or restrict individuals has 
always been available to the executive for use at any moment. Quite 
a considerable use has been made of this power, and this has given
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rise to a number of cases contested in courts on the question of 
the constitutional validity of some of the detention or restriction 
orders executed by the executive. While the President can detain 
or restrict any person in exercise of his powers under any of the 
security statutes that restriction or detention is not valid until 
the constitutional provisions providing for safeguards to detainees 
or restrictees are complied with. And the courts have to decide 
whether a particular detention or restriction order has been 
validly executed in accordance with the requirements set by the 
Constitution. How much judicial intervention in defence of these 
constitutional rights and safeguards available to detainees and 
restrictees has been forthcoming?
| Before discussing the central theme of this chapter, it is
| necessary to outline briefly the formal nature of security powers
2 . m  Zambia, and the context within which the power to detain or
i  restrict is exercisable by the government. The substance of the
iI
i constitutional safeguards relied on in the cases to be discussed
|
| will also be reviewed.
1. Security Powers
i) The Declaration of an Emergency as a Prerequisite 
to the Exercise of the Power to Detain or Restrict
As already indicated in the last chapter, the 
rights to personal liberty and freedom of movement 
are among the rights and freedoms which, under the 
Constitution, can be derogated from by a law authorizing 
measures to be taken for the purpose of dealing with
an emergency situation declared in terms of the
3 . 4Constitution. Further, as explained again, once a
2 90
State of Emergency has been declared, this brings into
operation either the Emergency Powers Act,^ or the
6
Preservation of Public Security Act, depending on 
whether a "full emergency" or a "threatened emergency" 
is declared. Each of these security Acts, once invoked, 
empower the President to make such regulations under 
their authority as appear to him to be necessary or 
expedient to control certain named public and private 
activities in the country and measures to maintain public 
security and order.^ In particular, such regulations 
may provide for the detention of persons or the 
restriction of their movements, and for the deportation 
and exclusion from the Republic of persons who are not
g
citizens of Zambia. Regulation 33(1) of the
Preservation of Public Security Regulations, for example,
under which most of the detentions in Zambia have been
made, read as follows: that
"Whenever the President is satisfied that 
for the purpose of preserving public 
security it is necessary to exercise control 
over any person, the President may make an 
order against such person, directing that 
such person be detained and thereupon such 
person shall be arrested...."
However, the point of emphasis here is that in Zambia
there cannot be detentions or restrictions without trial
9
except during the existence of a declared emergency,
ii) Is the declaration of emergency justiciable?
Another noteworthy aspect of the President's power 
to declare an emergency is that the Constitution left 
undefined the circumstances which would constitute an
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emergency, war apart. The Constitution vests the 
discretion to say when a public emergency exists such 
as to justify the invocation of the wide powers con­
ferred by the relevant security statutes on the 
President: all that is needed is his subjective
satisfaction that a state of public emergency exists.
The question, however, arises whether, if the President 
exercises his power to declare an emergency "improperly" 
an interested person can go to the courts to question 
the legal validity of that declaration by, for example, 
purporting to show that there was no material that could 
justify it or that the declaration was motivated by some 
ulterior motive.
The issue as to the justiciability of a declaration 
of emergency by the executive arose in the Malaysian case 
of Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia.^ In this case the 
appellant was Chief Minister of the State of Sarawak of 
the Federation of Malaysia. He received a letter from 
the Governor of the State calling upon him to tender his 
resignation on the ground that a majority of the members 
of the Council of Negri (i.e. Parliament) had 
represented to the Governor that the Chief Minister had 
ceased to command their confidence. After some protests 
from the Chief Minister on this decision, the Governor 
informed him that he had ceased to hold office. The 
appellant thereupon started an action in the High Court 
in which he sought a declaration that he was still Chief
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Minister of Sarawak. The Court gave judgment in his 
favour, holding that the Governor had no power to 
dismiss him. Thereupon the Federal Government 
proclaimed a State of Emergency throughout the 
territories of the State of Sarawak. The Government 
then passed the Emergency (Federal Constitution and 
Constitution of Sarawak) Act 1966, which,inter alia, 
empowered the Government to dismiss the Chief Minister 
should he refuse to resign his office upon a vote of no 
confidence passed against the Government. By virtue of 
this new legislation, the appellant was removed as Chief 
Minister of Sarawak. He immediately brought an action 
in the Federal Court of Malaysia arguing, inter alia, 
that the proclamation of emergency was not a valid 
proclamation, and therefore the Emergency (Federal 
Constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act, under 
which the Government acted in removing him, was invalid. 
The appellant further argued that the clear purpose of 
the proclamation was to dismiss him from his office, and 
therefore this constituted an improper exercise of the 
power to declare an emergency.
On behalf of the Government it was argued that the 
validity of the proclamation is an issue which is not 
justiciable; that the power to make the proclamation is 
satisfied if the authority in which that power is vested 
is satisfied that there is an emergency or a threat to 
the security of the country, and that there is no limit 
to the grounds on which it may act. The question is not
whether an emergency exists, and that the bona fides 
of the proclamation cannot be attacked. It was further 
argued that if the Court was allowed to investigate the 
bona fides of the proclamation, then the question as to 
whether an emergency exists would be determined by the 
judgment of the Court and not the judgment of the Head 
of State.
On this issue of the justiciability of the 
proclamation, the Federal Court of Malaysia held that 
(by a majority of two to one) the validity of the 
proclamation was not justiciable. On appeal to the 
Privy Council, this issue was not (unfortunately) decided 
upon by the Council, which declined to do so.
Two Nigerian cases which were decided earlier on 
than the Malaysian case discussed above, also threw some 
light on the question of whether or not the discretion 
to declare an emergency can be questioned in court as to 
its validity. Under the Nigerian Constitution, the power 
to declare an emergency was vested in the federal 
Parliament. In Williams v.Majekodunmi,** Ademola, C.J.F., 
ruled that:
"That a state of public emergency exists in 
Nigeria is a matter apparently within the 
bounds of Parliament, and not one for this 
Court to decide. Once that state of 
emergency is declared, it would seem that 
according to the Constitution, it is the 
duty of the Government to look after the 
peace and security of the State, and it 
will require a very strong case against it 
for the Court to act".
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The view that the existence of an emergency is a non- 
justiciable issue was again re-emphasized by Chief
Justice Ademola in another Nigerian case of Adegbenro v.
12A-G, in a much more clear form. There it was held that:
! "...We however feel that on the question
I whether or not there were sufficient
I grounds for Parliament to declare a
i  State of Emergency, it is unnecessary
for us to rule on the submission that 
if Parliament acted bona fide in making 
a declaration of a state of public 
emergency the Court could hold invalid, 
since it is impossible to say in the 
present case that there was no ground 
[ to justify a declaration...."
! True, as the above decisions clearly imply, the
I
r
| responsibility for the security of the state and for
I the maintenance of public order lies with the executive,
not with the Courts. In Zambia, alongside many 
democracies in the world, the responsibility for the 
security of the state and for the maintenance of public 
order lies with the executive, not with the Courts. Thus, 
it is the executive which, admittedly, must be vested 
with sufficient power to act in advance to prevent any 
acts of activities which may prove prejudicial to the 
security of the state. However, as Baron J.P. (as 
he then was) pointed out whilst referring to the powers 
of the President under Zambian law to detain, that these:
"....are far-reaching powers. In particular 
it must be stressed that the President has 
been given power by Parliament to detain 
persons who are not even thought to have 
committed any offence or to have engaged in 
activities prejudicial to security or 
public order, but who, perhaps because of 
their known associates or for some other 
reason, the President believes it would be 
dangerous not to detain...."^
Therefore it appears that these powers pose perhaps the 
greatest threat to the liberty of individuals, in the 
sense that the President has uncontrolled powers to 
deprive any citizen of his personal liberty, and his 
freedom of movement on a mere belief that this person 
is about to engage in activities prejudicial to state 
security. The comparable situation in Tanzania prompted 
President Julius Nyerere, speaking of detention without 
trial, to remark that:
"It means that you*re imprisoning a man when 
he has not broken any written law, when you 
cannot be sure of proving beyond reasonable 
doubt that he has done so. Youfre 
restricting his liberty, and making him suffer 
materially and spiritually for what you think 
he intends to do, or is trying to do, or 
what you believe he has done. Few things 
are more dangerous to the freedom of a 
society than that. For freedom is 
indivisible, and with such an opportunity 
open to the Government of the day, the 
freedom of every citizen is reduced. To 
suspend the rule of law under any 
circumstances is to leave open the 
possibility of the grossest injustices
being perpetrated".**
iii) Reasonableness of measures taken during 
a declared emergency
Even when an emergency is declared the measures
taken to deal with the situation must, according to
the Independence (1964) Constitution, be such "as are
reasonably justified for the purpose of dealing with
16the situation that exists during that period". The 
One-Party Constitution (1973), which will be discussed 
later, re-enacted this requirement, but worded it 
differently to read that:
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"....nothing done by any person under 
the authority of any such law (i.e. an 
emergency law) shall be held to be in 
contravention....unless it is shown that 
the measures taken exceeded anything 
which, having due regard to the circum­
stances prevailing at the time, could 
reasonably have been thought to be 
required for the purpose of dealing 
with the situation in question*1. *'
In other words, while the executive can take any measures
under the authority of an emergency statute (even in
contravention of some of the guaranteed rights under
the Constitution), it is upon condition that those
measures must bear some rational relationship with the
I
| purpose sought to be achieved by the emergency law in
I
18question. Thus, in one of the detention cases before 
the Court of Appeal for Zambia, it was argued that having 
regard to the circumstances prevailing when the arrests 
were made, it was not reasonable for the executive to
I resort to detaining the applicant rather than to prefer
a criminal charge, which was a lesser measure, and
therefore that detention exceeded anything which was
reasonably required for the purpose of dealing with the
situation in question, in terms of the Constitution.
Leo Baron, Judge President, as he then was, dealt with
this aspect of the applicant1s argument, and ruled that
"It is not open to the Courts to debate 
whether it is reasonable for there to be 
in existence a declaration under Section 
29 (i.e., a state of emergency)...."^
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iv) Constitutional safeguards available to a 
restricted or detained person
Although the powers of detentions and restrictions
that have been described are wide, the constitutions of
Commonwealth African states - except that of Sierra
Leone - do in fact spell out the conditions on which the
lawfulness of a detention of restriction depends.
Thus it is a precondition of a lawful detention that the
arrest with a view to detain or restrict a person must
have teen effected in accordance with the requirements of
law. This proposition was long ago established in 
20Dale’s case where Brett, L.J., declared that the Courts,
"will not allow any individual to procure 
the imprisonment of another unless he 
takes care to follow with extreme 
precision every form and every step in 
the process which is to procure that 
imprisonment11.
It should be noted that the constitutional safeguards 
we are about to discuss were liberally entrenched in 
Zambia’s Independence Constitution, in favour of 
detainees or restrictees. Soon after independence, 
however, the amendment which were passed to the 
Constitution had the effect of attenuating the effective­
ness of these safeguards, and thereby enhancing the 
position of the executive vis-a-vis the detaining power. 
It seems proper, therefore, in discussing this subject, 
to examine first the degree of protection afforded to 
the detainees and restrictees at independence, and to 
follow this up with the changes made to these safeguards 
after independence before looking at how the judiciary
have so far handled cases arising from these provisions.
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a) The position under the Independence Constitution
The relevant section in the Independence 
Constitution guaranteeing the rights of the detained 
or restricted persons was Section 26(2):
”26(2) Where a person is detained by virtue 
of such an authorization as is referred to 
in subsection (1) of this section (i.e. the 
section in the Constitution authorizing 
detensions under any of the emergency laws) 
the following provisions shall apply:
a) he shall, as soon as reasonably 
practicable and in any case not more than 
five days after the commencement of his 
detention, be furnished with a statement in 
writing in a language that he understands 
specifying in detail the grounds upon which 
he is detained;
b) not more than fourteen days after the 
commencement of his detention, a notification 
shall be published in the Gazette stating that 
he has been detained and giving particulars
of the provision of law under which his 
detention is authorized;
c) not more than one month after the 
commencement of his detention and thereafter 
during his detention at intervals of not 
more than six months, his case shall be 
reviewed by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law and presided 
over by a person appointed by the Chief 
Justice;
d) he shall be afforded reasonable facilities 
to consult a legal representative of his own 
choice who shall be permitted to make 
representations to the tribunal appointed for 
the review of the case of the detained 
person; ,
e) at the hearing of his case by the tribunal 
appointed for the review of his case he shall 
be permitted to appear in person or by a legal 
representative of his own choice;
(3) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance 
of this section of the case of a detained 
person, the tribunal may make recommendations 
concerning the necessity or expediency of 
continuing the detention to the authority by 
which it was ordered, but unless it is other­
wise provided by law, that authority shall not 
be obliged to act in accordance with any such 
re commendat i ons11.
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In addition to the safeguards available to detained
persons under the Constitution, the Preservation of
Public Security Regulations and the Preservation of
Public Security (Detained Persons) Regulations also
provide for some protection for detainees whilst in
prison. For example, these regulations authorize
the legal representative of a detained person to 
21interview him. They also allow his relatives to
visit him and ascertain his physical and mental
. . 22 .condition. The use of force by a prison officer on
a detained person is prohibited "unless its use is
necessary, and no more force than is reasonably
23necessary" can be used. Further, and most 
important, the regulations provide for the appoint­
ment by the President of two or more persons to
constitute a "Committee of Inspection" for any place 
24of detention. One of the functions of the Committee
is to ensure compliance with the Preservation of
Public Security (Detained Persons) Regulation. The
Committee may also visit the place or places of
detention at least once a month for inspection. The
Committee is further empowered to hear any complaint
(not being complaints relating to the validity of a
detention order or relating to the grounds upon
which such detention order was made) which any
detained person may wish to make. The recommendations
which the Committee makes in respect of the complaints
of any detained persons are sent to the Commissioner
25of Prisons "without delay" for action.
Furthermore, review of a detaineeTs case 
by a tribunal within one month after the commence­
ment of the detention, is provided for by the
26Preservation of Public Security Regulations.
As to the constitutional safeguards afforded 
to detainees under the Independence Constitution, 
it will be observed that these provisions were, in 
the circumstances of an emergency, a fair way of 
guarding against arbitrary treatment of those 
falling prey to the executive’s extraordinary 
emergency powers. However, events after independence 
were soon to change the picture.
The position after 1969
27The 1969 constitutional amendment seriously
modified both the content and the effect of the
detainees1 safeguards. By this amendment, which
also affected several other facets of the bill of 
28rights, the time for furnishing grounds to a 
detained person extended from five to fourteen days, 
and the time for gazetting the detention was 
similarly extended from fourteen days to one month. 
The right to automatic review of the detention after 
a duration of one month was abolished altogether, and 
in its place was substituted a review on request 
made by the detainee^himselfi the time for the 
first such review was extended to one year, with 
yearly intervals thereafter. Further, a new clause 
was added which provided that, with regard to the
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functioning of the triunbal established under 
these constitutional provisions,
"Parliament may make or provide for the 
making of rules to regulate the proceedings 
of any such tribunal including....rules as 
to evidence and the admissibility thereof, 
the receipt of evidence (including reports) 
in the absence of the restricted or detained 
person and his legal representative, and the 
exclusion of the public from the whole or any
portion of the p r o c e e d i n g s " .29
This addition to the constitutional rights of
detained persons may have been deemed desirable as
a way of phasing out from the detainees and the
public at large information the disclosure of which
might prove prejudicial to national security, or
which might adversely affect some foreign power.
However justified its inclusion in the Constituion
may be, this provision can be used by the government
deliberately to arrange the receipt and admission
of evidence in such a way as to prejudice the
position of a detainee, especially in cases importing
controversial political issues.
When, in 1969, the Constitution was amended,
in the manner described above, there was no
corresponding amendment to the Preservation of Public
Security Regulations, which continued to speak of
automatic review within one month and thereafter at
six-monthly intervals. The question therefore arose
30m  Smkamba v. Brian Doyle whether the two 
provisions were "cumulative"; that is, was the 1969 
amendment to be regarded as setting out only the
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minimum rights to which the subject was entitled, 
and which could be supplemented by other 
legislation, without any risk of a conflict with 
the Constitution? Rejecting this view, the Court 
of Appeal for Zambia ' that the provisions under 
the regulations which must therefore be held to 
have been impliedly repealed. The Court further 
emphasized that the 1969 amendment was not merely
r i.e r o
setting out general limits of permissible
but did in fact prescribe the limits of a detainee's
rights.
Another effect which the 1969 amendment
produced was that all the new provisions it enacted
were made equally applicable to restriction. This
meant, for example, that the one year period
prescribed for detention, now applied also to
restriction; also a restricted person in Zambia
now has all the rights which a detained person has -
to be furnished with grounds, to have his
restriction published in the Gazette, and to have
the services of a lawyer - rights to which a
restrictee was not entitled before 1969. It
should also be mentioned here that in none of the
other Commonwealth African states are these rights
31available to restricted persons, and so Zambia 
presents a unique situation in this regard.
However, the constitutional amendment 
passed in 1974 crucially affected further the 
rights of detainees in a material respect.
Following upon a series of cases (some of which are 
discussed later in this chapter) in which heavy 
damages were awarded against the government for 
unlawful detention and ill-treatment in violation 
of the constitutional guarantees of personal 
liberty, the government introduced in Parliament 
proposals to amend the Constitution to read that
"No court of law shall make an order for 
damages or compensation against the 
Republic in respect of anything done under 
or in the execution of any restriction or^ 
detention order signed by the President".
After a heated debate in the National Assembly, in
which the weight of opinion was against the Bill
because quite clearly many MPs sensed the dangers
it posed to "the judicial protection of individual
3Aliberty", the government withdrew it for 
modifications to some of its objectionable features. 
In its amended form the Bill preserved the 
jurisdiction of the court in respect of claims for 
damages or compensation arising from physical or 
mental ill-treatment during detention or from any 
error in the identity of the person restricted or 
detained, but not in respect of claims based on 
technical errors, such as failure to furnish grounds 
within the prescribed period, or failure to gazette
the detention. With regard to these, and in 
other cases in which a court of law was precluded 
from making an order for damages or compensation, 
the amendment provided that:
"....the tribunal reviewing the case of a 
restricted or detained person in 
pursuance of Article 27 may, if it finds 
that such person has suffered loss or 
damage as a result of anything done under 
or in the execution of a restriction or 
detention order signed by the President, 
recommend to the President that 
compensation should be paid to such person 
or to any dependent of such person, but 
the President shall not be obliged to act ^5 
in accordance with any such recommendation".
The actual effect of this amendment was clearly to
make the President an effective authority in
determining the amount, if any, of compensation
awarded to a detainee who has suffered loss or ,
damage while in detention. In saying this it must
be remembered that the President is also the detaining
authority in Zambia. Not only this, but in the area
of regulating national security, he is the real
legislator of the emergency laws which confer a lot
36of power upon himself. Thus in the realm of 
national security, the President combines and 
performs the functions of a legislator, executor, and 
now with the passage of the constitutional amendment 
under reference, he shares the authority to decide 
upon disputes of when to award compensation and how 
much in respect of. an aggrieved detainee or 
restrictee. It might, however, be argued that in 
modem times it is not uncommon to find numerous
incidences when the executive arm: of the government 
performs all those functions. However, when this 
practice is extended to cases involving personal 
liberties of individuals without a proper system of 
controlling that power, then the matter becomes 
pretty dangerous.
It has already been noted that the Constitution
(i.e., of 1964 as amended) prescribes certain
procedural safeguards to protect the detainees. It
is necessary to consider how far, if at all, failure
to comply with any of these procedural requirements
may render a detention being held to be unlawful and
invalid by the courts. It is convenient to examine
this subject under two headings, viz., the question
of procedural validity of a detention or restriction,
and the question of substantive validity of a
detention or restriction.
The Question of Procedural Validity 
of a Detention tor Restriction
Under this heading there are at least five substantive 
items, namely, the effect of failure to supply grounds of 
detention and failure to publishftdr the same within the prescribed 
period, the effect of failure to supply a "detailed" account of 
the grounds of detention as required by the Constitution, the 
effect of failure to establish a review tribunal after one year, 
and finally the effect of failure to comply with the other 
requirements. We now discuss these as follows:
i) Effect of the failure to supply grounds, to 
publish the detection, to establish a review 
tribunal, etc.
37Chipango v. Attorney-General was the first Zambian 
case which dealt with the general question of the effects 
of non-compliance with the procedural requirements in the 
Constitution consequent upon detaining a person, and in 
particular with the effect of failure to furnish grounds 
and to gazette the detention within the specified time.
Thus the court here gave interpretations to important 
sections of the bill of rights, and the judgment was to 
influence future decisions bearing upon those areas of the 
Constitution.
In the Chipango case the applicant was detained by an 
order of the President made under Regulation 31A of the 
Preservation of Public Security Regulations, which order 
was executed on 12th February 1970, The grounds for his 
detention, which should have been furnished not more than 
fourteen days after the commencement of the detention, were 
in fact furnished on 28th February, that is, sixteen days 
after such commencement. The detention order, required to 
be published in the Gazette not more than one month after 
the commencement of the detention, was published • on 
2nd April, namely some seven weeks after the commencement. 
The issue before the court was whether these contraventions 
made the detention of the applicant unlawful.
Justice Magnus in approaching the question before him
38detected that the basic rule was set out in Dale’s Case, 
already referred to, in which Caton, L.J., said:
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”1 quite agree with Brett, L.J., that when 
persons take upon themselves to cause another 
to be imprisoned, they must strictly follow 
the powers under which they are asumming to 
act, and if they do not, the person imprisoned 
may be discharged, although the particulars 
in which they have failed to follow those 
powers may be matters of mere f o r m " .
The state submitted that this rule applies to steps to be 
taken before imprisonment could lawfully be effected, and 
that nothing which happened later could invalidate an 
imprisonment which had already been validly effected. In 
other words, the state first accepted that there were 
contraventions of the constitutional provisions under 
reference in that the grounds of detention and their 
publication were done outside the prescribed period. But 
the state’s case was that these contraventions did not 
invalidate the detention, but merely entitled the applicant 
to other remedies, such as damages. This reasoning was 
based on the proposition that "a defect is only fatal when 
compliance is a condition precedent to the validity of 
the imprisonment, but not where it is a condition 
subsequent". The basis of this proposition was the analogy 
which counsel for the state tried to draw between a rest­
riction of the freedom of an individual and a breach of 
contract. In the case of a contract, the state submitted, 
breach of a condition precedent prevents the contract from 
ever becoming operative, whereas breach of a condition 
subsequent need not render the contract void, but may 
be answerable in damages only. It was therefore urged that 
even in the case of a breach of a constitutional condition
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subsequent to arrest, as in the instant case, the same 
principle applies so that the detention order is not 
declared unlawful, but entitles the applicant to recover 
damages. In reply the Court said that:
"....We are not here concerned with 
contractual relations between two 
contracting parties. We are here 
concerned with the right of the state 
to deprive a citizen of his personal 
liberty which is otherwise protected.... 
by the Constitution".^
Magnus, J., relied heavily on the Indian authorities for
the obvious reason that the Indian Preventive Detention
Act 1950, has provisions which are roughly similar to
those contained in the Zambian Constitution relating to
detentions, and a large volume of cases decided on the Act
by the Indian Supreme Court is available. Basu, a leading
commentator on the Indian Constitution, has analysed and
discussed most of these constitutional cases. But for our
present discussion, the Zambian Court in the Chipango
case adopted the view of Basu when, in dealing with the
meaning of the words "as soon as may be" in the Indian
provisions for bringing an accused person before the
courts, he says:
"But it will be possible for the Court in a 
proceeding for habeas corpus to pronounce 
whether the arresting authority has 
communicated the grounds as soon as is 
reasonable to the circumstances, and if it 
finds that a reasonable time has already 
passed and the accused person has not yet 
been informed of the grounds of his arrest, 
the Court would order his immediate release.
The reason is that the two conditions of 
arrest embodied in this clause are consti­
tutional conditions subsequent to arrest, and
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there is no reason to construe these 
conditions as other than mandatory, 
being valuable fundamental rights of 
the individual. So, even though the 
arrest has been initially valid, the 
failure to supply the grounds within 
a reasonable time may render further ^
detention unconstitutional or illegal".
On the authority of this principle as stated by Basu,
Magnus, J., held that the requirements that the detainee
be furnished with grounds of his detention, and that
the same be published as provided for by the Constitution:
"....are constitutional conditions subsequent 
to arrest, they are mandatory and fundamental 
rights of the individual, and if they are 
not followed, I can only conclude that such 
non-compliance must render further detention 
unconstitutional and unlawful".42
The Court, however, left one vital question unresolved,
namely, that assuming that non-compliance with Paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 26A(2) renders further detention
unlawful, as was so held in this case, does the same effect
apply to failure to comply with the remainder of the
conditions specified under Section 26A(2) - which relate
to a review of a detention by a tribunal at the request of
the detainee, affording his reasonable facilities to
consult his lawyer of his own choice, and the right to
appear in person or by a legal representative of his own
choice? Magnus, J., merely made a passing comment when he
replied to this question in the following terms, that:
"It may well be that if for example, under 
Paragraph (c) a detainee requests a review 
after he has been in detention for a year, 
and review is not carried out, or is not 
carried out in accordance with the paragraph, 
then he is entitled to be released. It may 
even be that breaches of the other two 
paragraphs will have the same effect. I do
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not have to decide that in this case, and
therefore, the point must be left open
for the future".43
On appeal to the Court of Appeal the State based their 
grounds of appeal on two sets of arguments. First, it 
was contended that the court below erred in holding that 
failure to comply with the constitutional conditions to 
supply grounds of detention and its publication in the 
Gazette out of the specified time rendered an originally 
valid detention order invalid. It was argued that those 
conditions were all conditions subsequent to the detention 
order and could not affect the validity of that order, 
but that failure to observe them would open the way to other 
remedies, such as mandamus. In the second place, it was 
submitted that the section in the Constitution embodying 
the detainees1 rights (i.e. Section 26(A)(2)) must be taken 
as a whole, so that the effect of non-compliance with 
any one of its paragraphs must have the same effect. But, 
the State argued, this cannot be so, because it would have 
the effect of producing some blatant absurdities - as, for 
example, holding that failure to comply with condition (e), 
which relates to representation before a tribunal, should 
invalidate the originally valid detention order. Thus, 
the "unresolved" issue in the court below came up again 
on appeal, and we should perhaps note how the Appeal Court 
attempted to resolve it.
With respect to what we have called the "unresolved" 
issue in the court below, Doyle, C.J., held that:
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"....I would not agree with the contention 
of the learned Attorney-General that each 
of the conditions set out in Paragraphs 
(a) to (e) of Section 26A(2) are in the 
same position and that failure to comply 
has the same result in each case. The 
Courts have in the past held that where 
a provision lays down a number of require­
ments, some might be held to be mandatory 
while others might merely be directory".
And later on in his appellate judgment the Chief Justice
remarked that the conditions under Section 26A(2) "appear
to be in some order of descending importance" - thereby
implying that some conditions under the relevant section
in the Constitution may not have the effect of
45invalidating a detention order. In a later case, the 
High Court for Zambia held that where, pursuant to 
Section 26A(l)(k) of the Constitution, the detainee had 
requested the review of his case, and that was not done 
for over three months after such a request was made, 
although in these circumstances "an unreasonable delay 
[had] occurred..." in making such a review, "the proper 
remedy", however, "does not lie in a writ of habeas corpus" 
but in other remedies which would secure the constitution
eri"
of a tribunal, i.e. mandamus: and that . most habeas
corpus would be an ultimate remedy if one fails to get 
the review.
So, in fact, the Zambian Courts have laid down the 
principle that not every one of the procedural safeguards 
available to a detained or restricted person would, if 
not observed, render the detention order invalid, and 
that non-compliance with some of them may in fact be 
answered with other remedies, such as damages or an
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issuance of an order of mandamus directing the detaining
authority to comply with the requirements of the law.
This is one aspect in which the Indian provisions differ
from the Zambian ones, since with respect to the former,
non-compliance with each and every one of the "safeguards
46against arrest" renders the detention invalid. The 
differences in the degree of effectiveness between the 
Indian and Zambian provisions was acknowledged by 
Doyle, C.J., when he said that "it must be borne in mind 
that the Indian safeguards are effective - indeed much
more effective than those provided in Section 26A...."
. 47In the Indian case of Ram Krishnan v. State of Delhi, 
the Supreme Court of India expressed itself as to why 
it traditionally assures a solid stand against any 
attempted invasion of the safeguards under reference.
The Court explained that:
"Preventive detention is a serious invasion 
of personal liberty and such meagre safe­
guards as the Constitution has provided 
against improper exercise of the power 
must be jealously watched and enforced 
by the Court".48
On the other hand, the words of Chief Justice Doyle of
Zambia in respect of the same matter ring a little faint
when he declared that:
"Section 26A appears in a part of the 
Constitution which has formally and 
deliberately set out to enshrine the 
rights and freedoms of the people of 
Zambia. It is a section introduced 
to provide for the protection of those 
rights and freedoms and where possible
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it should be interpreted effectively 
to protect the fights and freedoms.
That the protection given is a limited 
protection is no reason for cutting 
down what is given" .**9
However, #ne more substantive issue of appeal m  
the Chipango Case was, as pointed out earlier, whether the 
requirement that supply of grounds of detention and its 
publication would, if not done within the constitutionally 
prescribed time, make a detention order invalid (as was 
held by the court below) or whether the omission would be 
remedied by damages or an order of mandamus. It is 
interesting to note that in their approach to this 
question, the Courts in Zambia have declined to follow 
authorities available from within Commonwealth African 
jurisdiction, and, in one instance, an English authority 
directly on the subject. They have instead adopted the 
Indian authorities, at least in the interpretation of 
Zambia’s detention laws.
For instance, the decision in the Ugandan case of 
Ex Parte Matovu^ was directly in point as regards the 
consequences of non-compliance with the provisions of 
Section 26(A)(1)(a) of the Zambian Constitution. In this 
case a person had been detained under the Ugandan 
Emergency Legislation. Section 13(1)(a) of the Ugandan 
Constitution required that such a person should be served 
with a statement of the grounds for his detention.
Although in this case grounds for detention were supplied
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to the detainee apparently within the prescribed period, 
it was in issue whether the statement of those grounds 
was sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of the 
constitutional provision. This being the case, the 
applicant argued that the particular section in the 
Constitution had, in fact, not been complied with. Sir 
Udo Udoma, C.J., who pronounced the judgment of the 
Court, ruled:
"Insufficiency of the statement of the grounds 
of detention served on the applicant is a mere 
matter of procedure. It is not a condition 
precedent but a condition subsequent. We 
hold therefore that it is not fatal to the 
order of detention made by the Minister. It 
is curable because the High Court under 
Article 32(2) of the Constitution, has the 
power to give such directions as it may 
consider proper for the purpose of enforcing 
or securing the enforcement of any of the 
provisions [under the bill of rights]".31
In the High Court for Zambia, Magnus, J., had rejected
the findings of Udo Udoma in the above case,
"particularly" because "he seemed to base his finding on
a distinction between condition precedent and condition
subsequent, which I have already said is more appropriate
to the law of contract than to cases relating to the
liberty of the subject". And in the latter Zambian
cases which we will be discussing in due course, Zambian
courts have not agreed entirely with Chief Justice Udoma1s
statement that insufficiency of grounds of detention is
not fatal. True, as Justice Magnus seems to imply, where
an individual has been deprived of his liberty through
having been detained he is, or must be, entitled to know
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the reasons for his detention so that he can utilize 
these for the purposes of making representations to a 
review tribunal or the detaining authority in order to 
secure his release. He can only do this if the alleged 
grounds of his detention are stated more precisely and in 
a sufficiently detailed form. We discuss the subject 
of the effect of supplying vague or insufficient grounds 
of dentention later.
Moreover, the Court of Appeal has ruled as 
unacceptable the argument that, admitting that the time 
set for the communication of grounds and publication of 
the detention had expired, the state can remedy the 
situation by giving notice of grounds and publication in 
the gazette immediately it discovers the omission, albeit 
out of time. Gardner, J.A., in the same Chipango case 
observed that:
"As soon as the executive discovered that the 
time for service of notice or issuing a 
publication had expired the remedy was 
enitrely in its hands, that is to say, a 
new order for detention could have been 
made and thereafter the terms of Section 26A 
could very well have been observed".52
53But m  a later case of Re Piita an interesting analogous 
issue arose. The applicant had been detained by the 
President pursuant to the Preservation of Public Security 
Regulations. The detention order proved to be defective 
because it recited a wrong section of the regulations on 
authorizing detention. The executive, on discovering this 
four days later, immediately revoked it and replaced it
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with a fresh one. The revocation of the original order 
took place before the expiry of fourteen days - the time 
required to communicate grounds of detention. The 
applicant claimed that there were two separate detentions 
which required two separate statements specifying the
f\4
grounds of detention. In other words, the applicatea was 
saying that there was an obligation on the part of the 
executive to supply grounds in respect of the original 
detention order which was revoked within fourteen days.
He further claimed that a person detained for any period 
of time, no matter how brief, must be supplied with the 
necessary grounds, otherwise such detention becomes invalid. 
It will be recalled that the relevant provision in the 
Constitution about supplying grounds, provides that "as 
soon as is reasonably practicable and in any case not more 
than fourteen days" after the commencement of the detention 
the grounds must be furnished. After citing, with approval, 
the remarks by Doyle, C.J., in the Chipango case, to the 
effect that "a person is entitled to know within a short 
period why he is detained", Cullinan, C.J., in the Re. Puta 
case held that:
"I would venture to say therefore that the 
emphasis is upon the obligation to fumigh 
grounds as soon as is reasonably practicable 
rather than within fourteen days. Further­
more, while it seems that a detaining 
authority is under no constitutional 
obligation to furnish grounds in r espect of 
a detention which has been revoked within
fourteen days I would have thought that
grounds should nevertheless be furnished 
subsequent to revocation if only to 
establish the bona fide of the detention 
order and to establish that it was not
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reasonably practicable to furnish
grounds during the brief detention....
With [this] qualification the
executive was under no strict 
constitutional obligation to furnish 
grounds in this case in respect of 
the first detention".5^
In other words, the Zambian courts have endorsed the view
that the Executive has power lawfully to detain a person
for any period up to fourteen days, and provided that he
was released within that period, no grounds need be
furnished. This, in effect, means that an individual
who is detained within the period of less than fourteen
days (one month now) cannot even claim compensation,
assuming that he was unlawfully imprisoned, since according
to the constitutional amendment of 1974, which we have
discussed above, it is only those detainees who can
establish procedural irregularities in their detentions
who are entitled to claim compensation from the reviewal
tribunal which, in any case, can be established after
a period of one year.
Coming back to the arguments before the Court of
Appeal in the Chipango case, another high English
55authority, Greene v.1. Home Secretary, was cited, m
56addition to Ex Parte Matovu to establish the point that 
breach of the requirement to supply grounds of detention 
within the statutory specified period does not invalidate 
the otherwise originally valid detention. The appellant 
in that case had been detained under the United Kingdom 
Defence (General) Regulations, 1939. The Advisory 
Committee to whom the appellant made objections was
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required by paragraph (5) of Regulation 18B to give the 
appellant the correct reasons for this detention. This, 
by mistake, the Committee failed to do. However, the 
House of Lords held that the mistake did not invalidate 
the order for detention. Lord Macmillan, who dealt with 
this matter at length, made the following relevant remarks:
11 Nothing could be more unfortunate
than that in a matter in which scrupulous 
accuracy is imperative the impression 
should be created that the safeguards 
prescribed for the protection of detained 
persons are carelessly observed and 
administered. The Court of Appeal has 
found that the appellant has not suffered 
any material prejudice by reason of the
error I have, however, to point out
that what is before your Lordship is an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus 
and that the appellant’s complaint is that 
he has been and is being detained without 
any legal reasons. The mistake, the 
occurrence of which your Lordships deplore, 
does not in any way affect the validity 
of the detention order which is the 
answer to the appellant’s application. It 
affects the due observance of the procedure 
prescribed for the further consideration 
of the case of a person who is ex hypothesi 
under lawful detention. Consequently 
the mistake affords no ground for invalidating 
the detention order and does not help the^-, 
appellant in his piresent application...."
The Court of Appeal, however, declined to follow the
English and Ugandan authorities in preference to the
Indian decisions. Hence the Court of Appeal upheld the
judgment of Magnus, J., in the High Court by ruling that
the Constitutional provisions under discussion "must be
adhered to strictly and failure to do so causes further
imprisonment under the detention order to be invalid".
However, the basis of differences between the English
and the Zambian approach might be explained on the ground
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that the Zambian court was primarily concerned with 
the interpretation of the constitutional provisions 
as opposed to a mere statutory provision, as was the 
case in the English situation referred to above. It 
is difficult to understand why the Zambian courts have 
refused to follow the Ugandan authority in preference 
to those of the Indian Supreme Court, since like in 
Zambia, the Ugandan Constitution was very similar to 
that in Zambia and embodied all these procedural safe­
guards of detainees. Quite clearly the Zambian judges 
might have perceived that the principle enunciated by 
Chief Justice Sir Udoma was unsound.
ii) The effect of supplying insufficient or vague 
grounds for detention
It will be recalled that the constitutional 
provisions embodying the safeguards available to 
detained or restricted persons stipulate that where a 
person’s freedom of movement is restricted or he is 
detained under any of the emergency laws discussed above, 
it is his constitutional right to be furnished with a 
statement in writing
11 specifying in detail the grounds ,-g
upon which he is restricted or detained".
This "statement" is to be made out and supplied by the
detaining authority - in Zambia this is the President.
As is to be expected, the question has frequently arisen
before the courts calling upon them to say what exactly
is meant or implied by the phrase "specifying in
detail". Apart from having to face the task of defining
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the scope of this phrase, "specifying in detail" the 
grounds of detention, the courts have also to say what the 
effect would be in cases where they find that the grounds 
supplied to a detained person are not sufficiently detailed 
to enable him to know what is being alleged against him.
Happily, the courts in Zambia have been able to 
provide some responses to the questions posed above in 
a series of cases. Again, in the determination of these 
questions the courts in Zambia have tended to follow the 
Indian decisions, but in at least one notable instance, 
the West Indian high authority on this subject has been 
adopted with approval.
The first attempt by a Zambian court to give meaning 
to the words "specifying in detail" as used in the 
Constitution, was the view expressed by Magnus, J., in 
the Chipango case when he said that the grounds supplied 
to the detainee "must be at least particularized as they 
would be in a pleading in an ordinary action". On appeal 
to the Court of Appeal, this view was rejected and indeed 
subsequent cases, discussed below, since the Chipango 
case in Zambia have similarly refused to adopt Magnus’ 
definition of "specifying in detail".
The most celebrated Zambian decision which dealt 
directly with the questions in how much detail should 
the grounds for detention be communicated to the detainee, 
and what is the effect of failure to satisfy this 
requirement, was the Kapwepwe and Kaenga v. Attomey- 
General.^
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Although the case of Kapwepwe and Kaenga came 
before the Court of Appeal for Zambia as a single appeal, 
it was agreed that, in effect, there were two separate 
applications which referred to different persons and were 
based on different facts - and in any case were separately 
made to the High Court. Here, because the grounds stated 
for the detention of Kapwepwe and Kaenga, respectively, 
varied and because the decisions of the courts in respect 
of the two applications were different, it is proposed 
to deal with the two cases individually.
Simon Kapwepwe was detained on 4th February 1972, 
by an order made under the Preservation of Public Security 
Regulations. The grounds stated for his detention were 
that during the months of December 1971, January and 
February 1972, he and other members of his United
Progressive Party " conspired to engage in activities
to endanger the safety of persons and property", in 
consequence of which, eighteen named persons were assaulted 
and threatened with death and the property of twenty- 
three named persons was damaged; also that during those 
same months he and other members of his party likewise
" conspired to be deviant of and disobedient to the
law and lawful authority and published by word of mouth 
and by way of circulars, statements, defamatory and 
contemptuous of the Head of State and the Government".
The question before the court was whether the statement 
of grounds as stated above complied with the constitutional 
requirement to give grounds "in detail". In considering
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what amount of detail can be said to be sufficient in
any given case to comply with the Constitution, the
court had first to consider the character of the relevant
constitutional provisions and the objects which they were
designed to achieve. No clearer definition of the object
of these provisions can be found than that which Lewis,
C.J., gave in the West Indian case of Herbert v. Phillips 
60and Sealey. The Constitution of St. Christopher, Nevis 
and Anguilla, on which the case was based, contains a 
bill of rights closely resembling that of Zambia and has 
similar provisions relating to the rights of detainees. 
Moreover, it also has a stipulation to the effect that a
detained person must be " furnished with a statement
in writing in a language that he understands specifying 
in detail the grounds upon which he is detained". 
Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal of the 
West Indies Associated States, Lewis, C.J., elaborated 
on the objects of the constitutional stipulation under 
reference in the following manner:
"The object of requiring a detainee to be 
furnished with a statement specifying in 
detail the grounds upon which he is 
detained is to enable him to make adequate 
representations to the independent and 
impartial tribunal which the same section 
of the Constitution requires to be set up 
for the review of his case. The statement 
is not required to contain the evidence 
which has come to the knowledge of the
Governor  But it must, in detailing
the grounds for detention, furnish 
sufficient information to enable the 
detainee to know what is being alleged 
against him and to bring his mind to bear 
upon it. A ground which is vague, roving 
or exploratory is insufficient to enable a 
detainee to bring his own mind to bear upon
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any acts or words of his which may 
possibly have attracted the attention 
of the authorities and from which the 
Government has drawnconclusions adverse 
to him which satisfy [the detaining 
authority] that it is necessary to 
exercise control over him. With such 
a ground an innocent person would not 
know where to begin with the 
representation of his case to the 
tribunal "
11 It is the detainee against whom
action has been taken, it is his acts 
and words which have been the subject 
of investigation by the executive, and 
he is entitled to be told sufficiently 
to enable him to explain them or to refute 
the conclusion before the tribunal, if he 
is able to do s o . . . .754
Further, the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court in
62State of Bombay v. Atmaran, and Naresh Chanda v. the
63State of West Bengal had further laid down criteria of 
what is, and what is not, a "vague" ground. In the former 
case, Kania, C.J., states that:
"....’vague1 can be considered as the 
antonym of ’definite’. If the ground 
which is supplied is incapable of being 
understood or defined with sufficient^ 
certainty it can be called vague...."
On the other hand,
" If on reading the ground furnished it
is capable of being intelligently under­
stood and is sufficiently definite to 
furnish materials to enable the detained 
person to make a representation against 
the order of detention it cannot be
called v a g u e " . 5^
Further, these Indian authorities have also laid it down 
that "vagueness" is a "relative term" - that is, its 
meaning must vary with the facts and circumstances of each
case. And:
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"it is improper to contend that
a ground is necessarily vague if the 
only answer of the detained person 
is to deny it".
Baron, Judge President, for example, gave a thorough
illustration of the application of this last test and
by reference to possible ways in which the grounds of
detention might be set out. If, for instance, the
grounds were a mere recitation of the relevant
legislation, as for instance:
" a belief that you have engaged or
are likely to engage in activities 
prejudicial to the preservation of 
public security...."66
In the above situation,
"it is clearly impossible for the detained 
person to do no more than deny that he has 
ever engaged, or would ever engage, in 
such activities",
and such a representation would obviously have no chance
whatever of success.
But suppose the grounds were:
" a belief that during the month of
January you a dvocated the use of violence 
against persons of different political 
or tribal affiliations...."67
In this case the detained person could make representations
on the basis of either alibi or mistaken identity and also
on the merits. He could, for instance, say that he never
addressed a meeting in the place mentioned, or he could say
that during the month in question he was engaged in a
course of study outside Zambia. If any of these
representations is advocated, the detaining authority
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would, no doubt, initiate immediate enquiries to
establish the truth of these statements which, if true,
must mean that a mistake had been made. On the other
hand, the detainee may agree with the fact that he addressed
meetings during the months in question to the associations
mentioned, but deny that he ever advocated violence of 
68any kind. It is this representation which is no more 
than a denial which cannot render the information given 
to be inadequate only for that reason - i.e., of having 
denied it.
With these expositions of the way courts in India 
and the West Indies have approached the interpretation of 
somewhat similar provisions, the Court of Appeal for 
Zambia came back to the issue of what the phrase "in 
detail" as used in Section 26(A) of the Zambian Consti­
tution means. As in the case of the identical preventive 
detention legislations in India and the West Indies that 
we have referred to, the Court of Appeal held that the 
whole of Section 26(A)(1), embodying safeguards for 
detained persons in Zambia,
" is directed to providing machinery to
enable a detainee to make representations 
to the detaining authority and to the 
tribunal established by [the Preservation 
of Public Security] regulation 33(7) for 
the purpose of obtaining relief; it is 
to this end that 1 grounds in detail* must 
be furnished. Such grounds must enable 
the detainee to make representations not 
only on the basis of mistaken identity, 
alibi, and the like, but also on the 
merits; the detainee must be put in a 
position where he can dispute the truth 
of the allegations against h i m " . 69
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How then did the aforegoing tests apply to the grounds 
supplied to Kapwepwe? It will be recalled that the first 
ground given to him alleged a conspiracy during stated 
months with other members of the United Progressive Party 
to endanger the safety of persons and property, and 
further alleged that, in consequence of that conspiracy, 
a number of people were assaulted and threatened with 
death and the property of a number of people was damaged 
or destroyed. The applicant argued that there was 
insufficiency of detail here, in that the persons with 
whom he was alleged to have conspired were not named, and 
further that the precise nature of the conspiracy was not 
stated. Baron, J.P., promptly replied that:
"I am unable to accept this argument; the 
detainee has been told the nature of the 
conspiracy, the period, and that the 
conspiracy was with other members of the
United Progressive Party  It may
well be that in the face of an allegation 
such as this the only representation the
appellant could make would be a
denial, but it cannot possibly be said 
that he does not know what is alleged 
against him".^
The second ground communicated to Kapwepwe, it 
will be recalled, was a conspiracy during the stated 
months with other members of UPP to be deviant and 
disobedient to the law and lawful authority, and to 
publish material and circulars defamatory and contemptuous 
of the Head of State. Doyle, C.J., remarked that "the 
material and circulars made on behalf of the Party are
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within the knowledge of the detainee”. However, the 
appellant attacked this ground on the footing, that it 
did not disclose in what way the appellant conspired to 
be deviant of and disobedient to the law and lawful 
authority. This argument again the court turned down, 
since it was common ground that the appellant knew what 
was being alleged against and from there could make a 
meaningful representation.
On the other hand, the grounds upon which Kaenga was 
detained were that he was alleged to have conspired 
between August 1970 and September 1971 with others to 
publish circulars which were subversive, and which among 
other things, claimed that duly elected members of the 
Government, including His Excellency the President, were 
not Zambian nationals; secondly, that during the same 
period he had been actively engaged in organizing the UPP 
in a manner designed to create tribal conflict; and 
thirdly, that he had conspired and assisted others, or 
that his activities in furthering the aims of the UPP, 
knowingly or unknowingly, had assisted in obtaining from 
governments hostile to Zambia materials, including fire­
arms, and the training of Zambian nationals with the 
intention to dislodge by unlawful means the legally 
constituted government.
By a majority decision of two to one the Court of 
Appeal held that, while the rest of the grounds supplied 
to the applicant were not vague and that on them he could
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make a meaningful representation, the second ground, 
relating to allegations that the applicant had been 
engaged in organizing the UPP in a manner designed to 
create tribal conflict, was vague because:
" the detainee could not possibly know
to what particular physical manner he 
himself acted to bring about the alleged 
intention to create tribal conflict".
The incidence of the Kaenga application is clearly 
illustrative of a situation where some of the several 
grounds supplied are vague while the rest remain valid.
Does this render the detention invalid? In the case
discussed above, the Court of Appeal in fact necessarily 
implied that the detention would become unlawful if one 
of the several grounds supplied to the detainee is vague. 
However, no reasons were given to justify this rule. But 
Basu explains that in India, where this rule obviously 
originated, the courts have held that the rule is justified 
on the basis that:
".....it can never be certain to what extent 
the bad reasons operated on the authority 
or whether detention order would have been 
made at all if only one or two good
reasons had been before them. In such a
case, the Court is bound to quash the order, 
unless it can be predicated that the 
irrelevant ground was of an unsubstantial 
or inconsequential nature".
Four years after the decision in Kapwepwe and Kaenga 
was given, another interesting case based on similar issues came
for decision before the High Court for Zambia. The case
72of Gilbert Mutala v. the Attorney-General is of
interest here because of the manner in which it was
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distinguished from the Kapwepwe and Kaenga case and 
also because, in this particular instance, a detention 
order was declared unlawful because, in the view of the
presiding judge, Bweupe,,V the grounds furnished to the
applicant are so vague that he cannot make meaningful 
representations to the detaining authority or any 
tribunal.11
The applicant sought a declaration that his 
detention under Regulation 33(1) of the Preservation of 
Public Security Regulations was unlawful by reason of the 
fact that the detaining authority had not complied with 
Article 27(1)(a) of the Constitution which requires that 
the applicant be furnished with a statement in writing 
specifying "in detail11 the grounds upon which the applicant 
is detained.
The statement furnished to the applicant read as 
follows:
"That between 1st January 1971 and 11th 
December 1973 you conspired with other 
persons in Zambia to commit crimes and 
that you organized and managed the 
commission of serious crimes in Zambia 
which acts are prejudicial to the security 
of the Republic of Zambia".
The Court held that these grounds were not detailed enough
to meet the standard envisaged by the Constitution.
Bweupe, J., argued that since the applicant was alleged
to have "conspired with other persons to commit
crimes" and that he "organized and managed the commission
of serious crimes", there was no doubt that, when the
detaining authorities referred to "crimes", they must 
have meant "crimes" in the Penal Code. But under this 
code there are numerous crimes ranging from misdemeanours 
and felonies to treasonable acts, so that "the applicant 
was left to wonder as to whether he conspired with others 
to commit and organized and managed the commission of, say, 
treason, stock theft, murder, aggravated robbery, kid­
napping, rape....". "This", his Lordship continued:
"was not the intention of parliament 
that the detainee should be left in the
dark  It is my considered view
[therefore] that the grounds as given 
would not assist the applicant to direct 
his mind to them if he decided to make 
meaningful representations".
In other words, what the court was saying was that 
the detaining authority was under a duty to specify the 
nature of the crime which the applicant was alleged to 
have conspired to commit. This finding was in line with 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Zambia in 
Eleftheriadis v. the Attorney-General, and in the 
Kapwepwe and Kaenga case discussed above. In the former 
case, for example, the grounds read:
"That between the 1st day of December 1973 
and the 31st day of January 1974, you 
conspired with persons within Zambia to 
corruptly procure import licences of the 
Republic of Zambia enabling Kingstones 
(Zambia) Limited to import goods without 
valid import licences...."
The difference in this case the Mutale case under
discussion is that in the Eleftheriadis case the nature
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of the crime was named which was to "corruptly procure 
import licences". The same applied to the Kapwepwe and 
Kaenga case where particular crimes were cited alleged 
to have been committed by the applicants, namely conspiracy 
to assault, to cause death, to damage or destroy 
properties, and to publish statements defamatory of the 
Head of State and Government.
However, the que stion can be asked here, was it
really necessary for the detaining authority to name in
specific terms the crime or crimes which the applicant
was alleged to have conspired to commit? In other words,
was it insufficient for the executive merely to make a
general reference to the activities of the applicant
prior to the arrest and for the executive to refer to
these activities as amounting to "crimes", not in a
specific, legal sense of the word, but in its general
usage. This is a point of immense significance here,
because the authorities relied upon in the Mutale case
also tend to support the proposition that the allegations
against the detainee need not be particularized in the
sense of containing all details of facts. In State of
74Bombay v. Anna Ram Vaidya, which (though in point here) 
was not referred to by Bweupe, J., in the Mutale case, 
Kania, C.J., said that:
"By their very nature the grounds are 
conclusions of fact and not a complete 
detailed recital of all facts".
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Further, the dicta of Doyle, C.J., in the Kapwepwe 
and Kaenga case (to which Justice Bweupe referred) seem 
to suggest that use of "general language" in a statement 
of grounds does not, ipso facto, render those grounds 
vague, but that:
"It is a matter of fact in the particular 
circumstances of each case what and how 
much detail must be given. Where facts 
are notorious or the detainee must 
himself know them, it cannot be said that 
a failure to refer in the ground to these 
facts causes the ground to fail to be 
in detail".
However, even after citing this dictum His Lordship 
still insisted that this passage had no relevance to the 
present case, where no particular crime is mentioned in 
the grounds furnished. But, in the particular circumstances 
in which this detention arose, it could have been argued 
that the crimes referred to in the grounds supplied 
were within the knowledge of the applicant. The reason 
for saying this was as follows: prior to his being
detained, the applicant had been convicted by the High 
Court on three counts of the crime of "Aggravated Robbery", 
and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment on 
each count to run concurrently. The applicant appealed 
to the Supreme Court against these convictions and 
sentences. The appeal was allowed, and the convictions 
set aside. The applicant was not, in fact, released from 
custody, but instead the Assistant Superintendent of 
Police, on learning of the decision of the court, served 
the applicant with a detention order exercising his 
powers under the Preservation of Public Security
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Regulations. After six days this order was revoked
and simultaneously replaced by a detention order signed
by the President pursuant to his exercise of the powers
76under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations.
However, in these circumstances the applicant must have
known that his detention followed his trial for the
criminal offence of aggravated robbery and the consequent
failure by the state to secure his conviction. Moreover,
there was no interruption of events from the time of his
arrest for the crime of aggravated robbery, his trial
for this offence and his conviction by the High Court, his
acquittal by the Supreme Court, his detention by the
police officer, and finally his formal detention by the
President. In these circumstances, was it really necessary
for the detaining authority to specify that the crime
which the applicant allegedly committed was that of
aggravated robbery? As Lewis, C.J., has said, the
detainee himself will be deemed to know
11 the acts or words which may possibly
have attracted the attention of the 
authorities and from which the detaining 
authority has drawn conclusions adverse to 
him which satisfy the detaining authority 
that it is necessary to exercise control 
over h i m 11.77
Once he has this information the detainee is able to bring 
his mind to bear upon what he knows he did, and to make 
meaningful representations.
3. The Question of Substantive Validity of Detentions
The question under consideration here has two dimensions 
to it: in the first place, there is the question whether the
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executive can detain a person on allegations or grounds 
which clearly constitute a criminal offence or offences; 
secondly, can the executive detain in a situation where a 
person has been prosecuted and acquitted of a criminal charge - 
basing his (the executive1s) grounds of detention on the same 
allegations on which a person has been cleared by the courts?
The first question arose in the Kapwepwe and Kaenga 
case, discussed above. In that case it was urged, inter 
alia, on behalf of the first applicant (Mr. Kapwepwe) that 
the discretion to detain him was wrongfully exercised because 
the grounds stated for the detention amounted to criminal 
offences, for which a criminal prosecution could have been 
instituted. This at once raised the question of the nature of 
the relationship between the grounds for a detention order and 
those for a criminal prosecution. This question was dealt 
with in clear terms by the Court of Appeal through Baron, J.P., 
(as he then was) in the following manner, that:
"The machinery of detention or restriction without
trial is, by definition, intended for
circumstances where the ordinary criminal law 
or the ordinary criminal procedure is regarded by 
the detaining authority as inadequate to meet 
the particular situation. There may be various 
reasons for the inadequacy: there may be
insufficient evidence to secure a conviction; 
or it may not be possible to secure a 
conviction without disclosing sources of 
information which it would be contrary to the 
national interest to disclose; or the 
information available may raise no more 
than a suspicion, but one which someone 
charged with the security of the nation dare 
not ignore; or the activity in which the 
person concerned is believed to have engaged 
may not be a criminal offence; or the 
detaining authority may simply believe that
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the person concerned, if not detained, is 
likely to engage in activities prejudicial
to public security....”^
An Indian Supreme Court Judge, Mukherjee, summarized neatly 
the argument that the executive can detain irrespective of 
whether or not the grounds on which a person is detained 
amount to a criminal offence. In Gopalan v. State of Madras, 
Mukerjee, J., said:
11....Preventive detention....is not a punitive
but a precautionary measure. The object is 
not to punish a man for having done something 
but to intercept him before he does it and 
to prevent him from doing it. No offence is 
proved, nor any charge formulated; and the 
justification is suspicion or reasonable 
probability and not criminal conviction which 
only can be warranted by legal evidence**.
Further, it can be said on behalf of the government that it
has the right to choose which legislation, penal legislation
or a preventive detention legislation, etc., it intended to
enforce in order to achieve the object in view in any given
situation. It is common knowledge that if it chooses to
enforce a penal offence under a penal code, the state faces
the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt - a.
consequence which the executive can try to avoid by merely
preferring to exercise its discretion to detain under the
preventive detention legislation, since again here there is
no onus on the detaining authority to prove any allegations
beyond reasonable doubt, nor indeed is he required to support
any suspicion on which he bases his satisfaction of the
necessity to detain. The point, however, is that both the
Zambian and Indian authorities are unanimous in support of
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the proposition that there is no legal obligation on the 
executive to prosecute in the criminal courts, even in 
situations where the grounds of detention amount to one or 
more offences under the criminal code. But a contrary view 
worth pointing out here was expressed by the minority
(Mahajan and Mukherjee, JJ) in the Indian case of Ashutosh v.
80State of Delhi., To them,
"There could be no better proof of mala fides 
on the part of the executive authorities than 
a use of the extraordinary provisions 
contained in the Act (i.e. the Indian 
Preventive Detention Act, 1950) for purposes 
for which ordinary law is quite sufficient".
But this is again to miss the point we have discussed above,
namely that the grounds for a detention order and for a
criminal prosecution are entirely different: the first aims
at preventing the commission of what is considered prejudicial
to the state, the activities intended to be prevented may or
may not amount to a criminal offence: therefore, merely
because the allegations for a detention may have been sufficient
for a criminal prosecution and the detaining authority did not
prosecute is not: necessarily proof of mala fides on the part of
the executive authorities.
The second aspect of the que stion of substantive validity 
of detentions takes the matter discussed above a little further. 
Here the position is that an order of detention has, in fact, 
been made against a person on the very grounds on which he 
has been prosecuted in the ordinary courts. Can the executive 
effectively detain in these circumstances? On the face of it,
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it can be contended that by such order of detention the
ordinary laws (as opposed to the extraordinary laws of
preventive detention) are circumvented and the court’s
orders defeated.
The question posed above arose in a neat form in another
. 81Zambian case of Re Henning Buitendag. The applicant in this
case applied to the court for a writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum. He had been tried before the High Court on four
counts under the State Security Act and was acquitted on all
four counts. On the same date he was detained by order of the
President under Regulation 33 of the Preservation of Public
Security Regulations. And on the thirteenth day after he was
detained he was furnished with a statement specifying the
grounds upon which he was detained. The court found that:
"It is not disputed that those grounds 
are identical to the particulars of the 
fourth count on which he was acquitted 
at his trial".
The applicant urged that his detention was therefore unlawful.
The Indian authorities, to which Cullinan, J., referred,
had held that an order of detention is not mala fide by reason
merely that the order was made after failure to secure a
82conviction under the criminal law; similarly, where there is 
a pending criminal case against a person - if the case is with­
drawn and an order of detention is made a gainst him, the order
83is not necessarily mala fide. Further, the Indian authorities 
have held that there is no rule of law that where a person can 
be prosecuted under the ordinary criminal law, no order of 
detention can ever be made against him.^ Finally, that the
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proper approach is to consider the facts of each case 
to determine whether the order was mala fide or not.
With the assistance of these principles derived from 
the Indian decision, Cullinan, J., concluded that:
"It seems to me that where a detaining 
authority decides to lay a criminal charge 
rather than detain he is not then precluded 
by an acquittal per se from doing that which 
he always had power to do, that is, to 
detain. I do not see therefore that there 
can be any general rule that where a 
detaining authority decides first to lay 
a criminal charge that he cannot then 
detain when the allegations are not proved 
to . courtfs satisfaction beyond 
reasonable doubt".
Nowhere is the harshness of detention more evident than what is
implied in these decisions, for it means that a person who is
found not guilty by a court of law on a particular set of facts,
can still face inprisonment on those very facts. One would
have thought that the executive should be obligated to give a
fresh set of grounds of detention other than those upon which
a criminal charge failed.
At this point it is appropriate to make the point that so 
far the cases we have been discussing above show that courts 
in Zambia have tended to approach the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions embodying the safeguards of detainees 
with boldness, in that they have not hesitated to strike down a 
detention order as invalid if the executive fails to observe 
the procedural requirements attendant upon arresting an 
individual. Two factors, at least, have contributed to the 
proposition that the Zambia judiciary has not, after all, 
performed all that badly in the enforcement of some aspects 
of the freedom of personal liberty. First, its refusal to
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adopt the English, and even some of the Commonwealth African, 
decisions which, as we have seen, have declined to hold that 
a slight procedural mistake in effecting a detention order, 
or failure to comply strictly with the conditions imposed 
by law in arresting a person, renders the imprisonment unlawful. 
Secondly, the courts* inclination to follow Indian decisions 
in the determination of cases involving the constitutional 
provisions relating to personal liberty, and in particular 
to detentions, has been the major factor in influencing the 
judiciary*s interpretation of the constitutional provisions 
embodying the rights of detainees. This attitude has been one 
of "following in the footsteps" of the Indian Supreme Court 
in ensuring that the safeguards constitutionally available 
to a detainee must be interpreted strictly or effectively in 
favour of protecting the detainee from the actions of the 
government.
The choice by the courts of Zambia to follow the Indian
approach in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions
under discussion Was one of the reasons which prompted the
government in 1974 to introduce an amendment to the 
87Constitution, the effect of which was to "transfer from the 
courts to the tribunal the questions of whether and, if so, 
how much compensation should be paid...." to detainees who 
proved that they had been detained unlawfully. This followed 
the many incidences in which the courts were awarding large 
sums of money to detainees who showed that their detention 
orders were defective from the procedural or technical point
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of view. Mr. Silungwe, the Attorney-General, outlining the 
objects sought to be achieved through the Bill, explained to 
the House that:
"....Courts in Zambia have tended to follow 
decisions of Indian courts. In India if the 
executive makes a procedural mistake or one 
sheer technicality, they say that the 
executive must be penalised. This is the 
view that has been adopted in this country.
Mr. Speaker, the position in Britain is
different. In Britain they hold that
any technicality or matters of pure 
procedure should not affect a detention or 
restriction. So, what we intend to do is 
to fall in line with the position as it 
obtains in Britain, which, I submit, is the 
correct one, so that we can exclude matters 
of pure procedural or technical mistake".
But, as has been explained earlier, the Bill did no more than 
what the Attorney-General stated as above, namely, that hence­
forth, should a court find that a detention or restriction is 
unlawful on a procedural or other technicality, it can never­
theless make an order for the release of the detainee or 
restrictee, blit not for the payment of compensation by the 
state. But even with this effect, the Bill was severely 
criticised by a majority of the Members of Parliament who saw 
its effect "as an erosion of the rule of law and a deprivation
of an individual's common law remedies and other common law
89causes of action". It was in response to these criticisms 
that the government assured Parliament that the Bill would not 
attenuate the rights of detainees. "The position after this 
Bill has become law", explained the government through the 
Attorney-General, will be:
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"(a) the right of an individual to see and 
avail himself of all statutory remedies 
is unaffected;
(b) the right of an individual detained or 
restricted by any person other than the 
President to sue and recover damages
or obtain other remedies is also 
unaffected;
(c) the right of a person detained or restricted 
by an order of the President to sue and 
recover damages or obtain other remedies 
remains unaffected in respect of any claim 
arising from:
i) physical or mental ill-treatment; and
ii) any e rror in the identity of the 
person restricted or detained;
(d) the right of a detained or restricted person 
to challenge the legality of detention or 
restriction, for example, by an application 
for a declaration that the order of detention 
or restriction is unlawful, or by an habeas 
corpus application for the release of the 
applicant has not been taken away".90
Quite clearly therefore, the amendment did not affect in any
material way the established judicial attitude towards the
enforcement of the rights of detainees and restrictees as
provided for under the Constitution of Zambia. The courts in
Zambia have continued to apply the Indian authorities in the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions, although
Zambian judges cannot possibly go as far.as the Indian-Supreme
Court has gone in the enforcement of individual rights.
B. Judicial Enforcement of the other Rights under the Bill of Rights
In the first part of this chapter we indicated that apart from 
cases involving the previsions of the right to personal liberty, 
there are indeed very few Zambian cases which have been decided upon 
the remaining fundamental rights provisions. Indeed, the few cases
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which are available have already been referred to in the last 
chapter in connection with the meaning which courts have placed on 
the qualifying phrase to most of the guaranteed rights and freedoms 
under the Bill of Rights, that is the expression "reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society". Further, the famous Zambian 
case of Harry Nkumbula v. Attorney-General, which dealt with the 
freedom of association and assembly in connection with the intro­
duction of a one-party state is discussed at length in a later 
chapter on the,"One-party State and Human Rights". What this part of 
our investigation will concern itself with, therefore, is to examine 
how Zambian courts have gone about resolving the few fundamental 
rights cases that have come up before them, with specific reference 
to the extent of how their interpretations tend to favour or not 
favour the position of the individual in the dispute. We discuss 
this subject, therefore, under two sub-headings, viz., those aspects 
of constitutional interpretation which inherently favour the 
individual, and those which operate against him.
i) Aspects of constitutional interpretation favouring 
the position of an individual
Generally speaking, judicial interpretation of the 
fundamental rights provisions has tended to support not the 
position of the individual, but that of a governmental authority. 
This is so, even during normal times. During a declared 
emergency it would be understandable that strict interpretation 
of the provisions under the bill of rights would normally be 
in favour of the executive actions, since it is upon the 
executive that the task to preserve the security and safety of 
the nation devolves. In this connection it is to be observed 
that Lord Atkins1 highly influential dictum in the English war
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case of Liversidge v. Anderson has not influenced the approach
of Zambian judges in the interpretation of human rights
provisions. In this case Lord Atkins, in the course of his
judgment, said that:
"I view with apprehension the attitude of 
judges who on a mere question of construction 
when face to face with claims involving the 
liberty of the usbject show themselves more 
executive minded than the executive. Their 
function is to give words their natural 
meaning, not, perhaps, a wartime leaning 
j towards liberty, but following the dictum of
| Pollock C.B., in Bowditch v. Balchin,??...
j [that] 1 In a case in which the liberty of
I the subject is concerned, we cannot go beyond
t the natural construction of the statute*.
I In this country, amid clash of arms, the laws
j are not silent. They may be changed, but
I they speak the same language in war as in
| peace....1'
I
! However, the decision-, of the majority in Liversidge v.
Anderson (and, it might be added, those of other wartime cases
93which went before English courts) indicate a reluctance on 
the part of the courts to intervene in favour of the rights of
1I
: individuals against public authorities when there is in existence
i 94a declared national emergency. However, these English cases
involved the interpretation not of some provisions in a bill
of rights, but of ordinary Acts of Parliament or, in certain
cases, interpretation of subsidiary legisaltion. As
Professor Read observes:
"The courts of England lack experience in 
applying constitutional texts and common law 
rules of statutory interpretation are therefore 
inadequate guides for the judicial construction 
of bills of rights".95
The question of whether or not a constitution should be
interpreted differently from an ordinary Act was dealt with
96m  the Kenyan case of Republic v. El Man/), which held,
97following an Indian authority, that:
"....in one cardinal respect we are 
satisfied that a constitution is to be
construed in the same way as any other
legislative enactment, and that is, where 
the words used are precise and unambiguous 
they are to be construed in their ordinary 
and natural s e n s e " .98
99In the Zambian case of Patel v. Attorney-General, which we 
have already referred to, the state submitted that a consti­
tutional statute must not be given "a narrow and technical 
construction". The applicant, however, urged the court to 
follow the US case of Grau v. US,^^ which held that "the
provisions of the Bill of Rights are to be broadly construed"
so that they may be "protected against gradual encroachment 
that seeks to deprive them of their effectiveness". In other 
words, what was urged was that a bill of rights must be broadly 
construed in favour of the individual rather than in favour of 
the state. ^  Magnus, J., made this important observation:
"....If, therefore, I had to depend entirely on 
extrensic construction for the meaning of the 
word 'law1 in the relevant provisions, I would 
be inclined to follow that construction which 
favoured the applicant rather than that which 
favoured the state".
Further, His Lordship also held that Zambian judges were not
bound by the decisions of other jurisdictions in the area of
constitutional interpretations, although those decisions may in
certain instances be of great assistance. Earlier on in the
Kachasu case, Blagden, C.J., cited with approval the words of
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102Lord Radcliffe in Adegbenro v. Akintola in relation to the 
study of decisions on the interpretation of constitutions of 
other words as follows:
"••••It is in the end the wording of the 
constitution itself that is to be interpreted 
and applied, and this wording can never be 
overridden by the extraneous principle of 
other constitutions which are not explicitly 
incorporated in the formulas that have been 
chosen as the frame of this constitution".
However, courts in Zambia have upheld the principle
. . 103enunciated by the Maltese case of Olivier v. Buttigieg, 
that:
"Where fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual are considered a court should be 
cautious before accepting the view that some 
particular disregard of them is of minimal 
account".
In the Kachasu case, whose facts have been stated in the last 
chapter, Blagden, C.J., stated there may be a breach of a 
person's right to freedom of conscience if there is even a 
slight degree of hindrance in his enjoyment of freedom of 
conscience or religious thought as provided for in the consti­
tution. His Lordship therefore held that the applicant in 
that case:
"Was hindered in the enjoyment of her freedom 
of conscience by being put under coercion 
through the application of ministerial 
regulations to sing the national anthem against 
her religious beliefs, and by being suspended 
from any government school because of her 
refusal, on religious grounds, to sing the 
national anthem or salute the national flag".
However, in the same case the court, while agreeing
with the applicant's argument that a subjective ' should be
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used in determining whether one holds a religious opinion,
nevertheless held that an objective must be used in
determining whether a ceremony or observance is religious in
nature. The basis of the applicant’s case rested on the
provisions of an Act of Parliament, the Education Act, 1966,
which provided that:
"24. No pupil shall be refused admission to
any school on the grounds of his....
religion.
25. If the parent of the pupil attending
any school requests that he be excused
from taking part in or attending any
religious ceremony or observance, then, 
until the request is withdrawn, the pupil 
shall be excused therefrom accordingly11.
Quite clearly under these provisions the applicant was entitled
to be excused from participation or attendance at any religious
ceremony or observance if her father did request so. The
father of the applicant in fact had so requested in relation
to the ceremonies of singing the national anthem and saluting
the national flag. The court had therefore to decide whether
the singing of the national anthem and/or the saluting of the
national flat constituted religious ceremonies or observances.
The applicant tried to urge the court that in accordance with her
Watchtower faith, these activities were religious ceremonies and,
since they were not directed at worshipping her God (but of
Worshipping secular symbols) she could not participate in them.
Blagden, C.J., on the authority of the USA Supreme Court
104 . .decisions, held that an objective test must be applied m
deciding whether the singing of the national anthem and the 
saluting of the national flag, can be regarded as religious
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ceremonies or observances. The court further observed that 
since these ceremonies were instituted on the direction of the 
state, and not of any church or religious organization, and 
since the ceremonies were not invested with the trappings of 
religious worship, nor were they conducted by a priest in a 
place of religious worship, they could not be considered to be 
religious in character. Consequently, the court concluded that 
the applicant’s claim that she was entitled to be excused from 
singing the national anthem and saluting the national flag on 
religious grounds pursuant to the provisions of the Education 
Act failed. In this case it will be seen that the court made 
what seems to be an important distinction between cases where a 
religious opinion is in question, and in cases where the dispute 
is over the nature of a ceremony or observance. In the former 
the court ruled that a subjective test must be applied since, 
"••••it is impossible to test something so personal as an opinion 
in any other way". With respect to the latter case, an 
objective test must be used. This means that the subjective 
views of the person attending the ceremony is not to be taken 
into account however much he may believe and convince himself 
that he is participating in a religious activity. However, it is 
difficult to see how one can separate an opinion about the 
ceremony from the action taken as a result of holding that 
opinion. The applicant was suspended from school because she 
refused to sing the national anthem and to salute the national 
flag. Her refusal to participate in these activities directly 
arose from her conviction and belief (or of her opinion) that
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the singing of the national anthem and the saluting of the 
national flat were religious ceremonies, or rather, that these 
amounted to worshipping a god other than her god. Therefore, 
her suspension from school was directly related to her holding 
the opinion that these ceremonies were of a religious character.
ii) Aspects of constitutional interpretation disadvantaging 
the position of an individual
Here it can almost be said that one of the obvious reasons 
why fundamental rights cases have invariably been decided in 
favour of the state as against the individuals concerned, is 
that it is the individual who carries the burden of proving that 
any of the guaranteed rights under the bill of rights has been 
contravened. The applicant in a fundamental rights case has not 
only to show that the challenged law, or anything done under its 
authority, is not required in any of the specified interests, but 
also that it is not "reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society". The underlying reason for this is that the 
US Supreme Court, the Indian Supreme Court, and Zambian courts 
have upheld the principle that there is a presumption that the 
legislature has acted constitutionally and that the laws which 
it has passed are necessary and reasonable. Further, Zambian 
courts have also held that this presumption extends to rules 
made by a minister under statutory powers conferred on him by 
the legislature. In order to demonstrate how this principle of 
presumption operates, and how it particularly affects the 
position of an applicant, it is proposed to examine the 
provisions guaranteeing the freedom of conscience under the 
Zambian Bill of Rights and to discuss these in relation to 
the decision in the Kachasu case.
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Section 21 deals specifically with the protection of the 
freedom of conscience. It is divided into five subsections. 
Subsections,(1) and (2) read as follows:
"(1) Except with his own consent, no person 
shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his 
freedom of conscience, and for the purposes 
of this section the said freedom includes 
freedom of thought and of religion, freedom 
to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with 
others, and both in public and in private, 
to manifest and propagate his religion or 
belief in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance.
(2) Except with his own consent (or, if he 
is a minor, the consent of his guardian) 
no person attending any place of education 
shall be required to receive religious 
instruction or take part in or attend any 
religious ceremony or observance if that 
instruction ceremony or observance relates 
to a religion other than his own"
We omit subsections (3) and (4) because they are of no relevance
to the facts of the Kachasu case. There follows subsection (5),
which is of the greatest importance here:
"(5) Nothing contained in or done under the 
authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of this 
section to the extent that the law in question 
makes provision which is reasonably required -
(a) in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality 
or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights 
and freedoms of other person, including 
the right to observe and practise any 
religion without the unsolicited inter­
vention of members of any other religion;
and except so far as that provision or, as the 
case may be, the thing done under the 
authority thereof is shown not to be 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society".
It will be recalled that the applicant in this case had been 
suspended from school and refused readmission because, being a 
Watchtower Witness, she refused to sing the national anthem and
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to salute the national flag, as required by ministerial 
regulations. The applicant now argued that her suspension 
from school constituted "hindrances" as provided for under 
Section 21 of the Constitution reproduced above, and further 
that the ministerial regulations under which she was suspended 
were themselves in conflict with Section 21 of the Constitution, 
and in consequence invalid.
The onus of proof put on the applicant in this case assumed 
three dimensions, viz.,
i) that she had to prove to the court that she 
was hindered in the enjoyment of her freedom 
of conscience, thought and religion;
ii) that the regulations under which she was
suspended were beyond the extent of what was 
reasonably required in the interests of 
defence, public,safety or public order; 
and finally,
iii) that any one of the hindrances she suffered to 
her enjoyment of freedom of conscience - the 
coercion, the suspension and the exclusion - 
went further than was reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society.
We should hasten to point out here that the court had further 
ruled that:
"Where a court is called upon to adjudicate on the 
effect of a legislative measure, it is concerned 
only with the validity of the measure, its meaning 
and its application. It is not concerned with its 
wisdom or even its reasonableness'*.
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Thus, although the applicant succeeded in discharging that 
she had been hindered in the enjoyment of her freedom.of 
conscience, she still had to face burdens (ii) and (iii) as 
stated above. With respect to burden (ii), that is whether 
it was reasonably required in the interests of public safety, 
or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of 
others that children in government schools should be required to 
sing the national anthem and salute the national flag, the court 
observed that, "The criterion is reasonableness, not essentiality" 
and that "a requirement can be reasonable without being essential" 
It was therefore ruled, as we have seen earlier, that the 
applicant had not shown that the requirement was not reasonable 
since, "a regulation requiring children in government schools 
to sing the national anthem and to salute the national flag is 
reasonably required...." in the interests of national unity 
and national security, "and for the purpose of protecting the 
rights and freedoms of others". We have also indicated that 
with respect to burden (iii) stated above, the court holding 
that the applicant had not discharged the burden involved 
concluded that:
"A regulation requiring pupils in government 
schools to sing the national anthem and to 
salute the national flag, and a regulation 
giving the head of a school the power to 
suspend for failure to do so, are both 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society".
It is interesting to contrast the Kachasu case with another
important Zambian fundamental rights case of Patel v. Attorney- 
106General, in as far as the fixing of the burden of proof is
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concerned. This case concerned the seizure, opening, and 
examination of the postal articles of the applicant by a 
Customs officer who suspected that these articles contained 
money which the applicant intended to send abroad illegally, 
and in breach of the foreign exchange regulations. In opening, 
examining and seizing the said postal articles the Customs 
officer had acted on the authority of the Exchange Control 
Regulations, 1965. The applicant challenged the validity of 
the Exchange Control Regulations under whose authority the 
Customs officer acted as contravening his right to privacy of 
property, his freedom of expression, and his right to the 
protection from deprivation of property as guaranteed 
respectively by Sections 19, 22 and 18 of the Constitution of 
Zambia (1964).
Taking first the applicant’s claim that his right to 
protection from deprivation of property under Section 18 of the 
Constitution, the relevant parts of that Section are as follows:
"18(1) No property of any description shall be 
compulsorily taken possession of, and no 
interest in or right over property of any 
description shall be compulsorily acquired, 
except where the following conditions are 
satisfied, that is to say:
(a) the taking of possession or acquisition 
is necessary or expedient -
(i) in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public 
morality, public health, town and 
country planning or land settlement; 
or
(ii) in order to secure the development or 
utilisation of that, or other, property 
for a purpose beneficial to the 
community;
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The court stated that the relationship between a law restricting 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual set out 
under the Bill of Rights, and the permitted restrictions there­
under, must be rational and proximate; and that exchange 
control is not sufficiently proximate to public safety to warrant 
the Exchange Control Regulations, 1965, being adopted "in the
interests of public safety". However, the court held that
the Exchange Control Regulations, 1965, are sufficiently proximate 
to "the development or utilisation of property for a purpose 
beneficial to the community" to justify such regulations being 
adopted for such purpose, and the taking of possession and 
search of a postal article pursuant to the authority conferred 
on Customs officers by the Exchange Control Regulations is 
"expedient" and "reasonably required" for a scheme of exchange 
control designed for such purpose. However, Magnus, J., in 
this case refused to follow the ruling of Blagden, C.J., in the 
Kachasu case, as on whom the burden of establishing whether a 
law is "necessary or expedient" or "reasonably required". The 
"test", Magnus, J., said, as to whether an Act is "necessary or 
expedient" within the meaning of Section 18(1)(a) or "reasonably 
required" within the meaning of Sections 19(2) and 22(2), is an 
objective one, and the burden of establishing whether an Act is 
"necessary or expedient" or "reasonably required", rests not 
upon the individual, but upon the state. The reason given for 
this view was that the onus of proving that the legislation 
concerned comes within the permitted derogations must rest on 
the state rather than on the individual was that "....such 
matters are within the peculiar knowledge of the state".
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The decision in the Kachasu case regarding the presumption 
of constitutional validity in favour of the legislation, has 
also been criticized as constituting an instance of "judicial 
self-imposed restraint or judicial passivism".The criticism 
was based on the commentator’s observation that:
"Since 1938, the US Supreme Court has held that the 
presumption of constitutional validity of a 
statute is not applicable where a statute appears 
prima facie to invade the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.... In such a jQg 
case, the presumption is rather to the contrary".
There is no doubt that this doctrine can be found in the US,
109 . . .Indian and Nigerian cases, and that the Zambian decision was
based on the Nigerian precedents.^^ It was further asserted 
that the presumption in favour of constitutionality "....is 
self-imposed in as much as neither Constitution [i.e. of USA 
or of India] has laid down any rule of presumption in this respect 
either way" . But surely this can only be true with reference to 
the constitutions of the USA and of India, and not those of 
Commonwealth African countries, such as Zambia. For example, 
under the Zambian Constitution, the wording of many of the 
provisos to the guaranteed rights and freedoms, i.e., "except
so far as that provision is shown not to be reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society", clearly means that the 
applicant must show that it is not reasonably justifiable. But 
the important aspect of the decision in the Patel Currency case in this 
context is the rejection of the view of Blagden, C.J., in the Kachasu case 
that the individual must prove both that the impugned legislation is not 
reasonably required in any of the specified interests, and
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further that that legislation is not reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society. The Patel Currency case lightened the 
burden on the applicant by holding that while it is his burden 
to show that a particular legislation goes further than is 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, the state carries 
the burden to prove that that legislation comes within the 
permitted derogations, that is, that it is "reasonably required" 
in any of the specified interests.
The Patel Currency case further ruled that the word 
"correspondence" implies a communication of ideas; and that a 
series of signs and symbols unaccompanied by an explanation of 
what they denote is not a communication of ideas and, hence, 
not "correspondence" within the meaning of Section 22 of the 
Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of expression. The court 
further held that a search without a warrant of a postal packet 
is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society when the 
Customs officer making the search is duly authorized, has a 
"reasonable suspicion that was objective and not subjective", 
formed his suspicion in respect of a particular postal packet 
before he entered the post office, and had satisfied someone 
of the grounds of his suspicion. However, the court warned 
that a Customs officer who opens a postal packet without first 
obtaining a search warrant does so at his own risk; and if 
the packet turns out to be "correspondence" within the meaning 
of Section 22 guaranteeing the freedom of expression, there will 
have been a breach of the sender’s rights under Section 22, 
which will be the personal responsibility of the Customs officer.
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In conclusion, it may be stated that the way most of 
the rights and freedoms are formulated under the Zambian Bill 
of Rights (and indeed, under many of the African constitutions), 
coupled with a somewhat passive attitude of the judiciary 
towards their enforcement constitute at least one fundamental 
reason explaining why many of the human rights cases have ended 
up in favour of the government. However, the most controversial 
provisions under the Zambian Bill of Rights have been those 
guaranteeing property rights. It is in this area of the bills 
of rights that virtually all African governments have come to 
concern themselves because property rights guarantees were looked 
upon as standing in the way of social and economic reforms, 
which those governments had set themselves to implement after 
independence. The subject of the relationship between the 
constitutional protection of property rights and the needs of 
economic development in the context of African circumstances 
is an important one, and would therefore require a separate 
chapter of its own. In the next chapter we take up this 
subject.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
THE NEEDS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN EMERGENT STATE: 
THE ZAMBIAN EXPERIENCE1
" the Constitutional protection of individual
rights might prove to be an embarrassing 
obstruction in the way of socia.1 and economic 
projects "2
In the present chapter we examine the extent to which the 
protection of property rights in the Commonwealth African Constitutions
proves the charge that these provisions have had the undesirable effect
*A -
of limiting the power of African governments to initiate 
development programmes along socialist lines. In the event of the 
existence of those restrictive provisions in the bill of rights, we 
further examine the measures taken by the African governments to 
alter the character of the bills of rights after independence, so that 
the constitution in question was geared to be more responsive to efforts 
intended to induce socio-economic transformation that all new nations 
desperately need.
However, before coming to deal with the central theme of this 
chapter as explained above, it is suggested saying something brief about, 
firstly, the nature of the relationship between human rights and the 
ideals of socio-economic security, and secondly, about the origins and 
bases of the phenomenon of "economic nationalism" in emergent states. 
Finally, an account of some relevant facts about Zambia's economic 
background is undertaken. The ground would then have been cleared 
from which to discuss the theme of this part of the thesis.
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A. Human Rights and the Needs of Socio-economic Development
Among the most urgent priorities in the newly independent 
countries of Africa, no doubt economic development and national 
security can perhaps be rated to be in the forefront'. It is therefore not 
surprising that the nationalist governments which took over from 
the colonial governments saw as their major post-independence task 
the need to make improvements in the socio-economic well-being 
of their respective peoples and countries. Thus the whole 
government machinery was harnessed, not just to the creation of 
appropriate democratic institutions necessary to uphold the 
dignity of man as an individual, but also for the creation of 
the social, economic, educational and cultural conditions which 
are regarded as essential to the full development of his 
personality.
The view that effective exercise of the rights of the individual 
includes improvements in the quality of his economic, social, 
educational and cultural life was expressly recognized both at 
the International Congress of Jurists in New Delhi in January 1959, 
and at the African Conference on the "Rule of Law" held in Lagos, 
Nigeria, two years later. The Declaration of Delhi, which sums up 
the conclusions reached by the Congress, states, inter alia:
"This International Congress of Jurists recognizes that
the Rule of Law is a dynamic concept for the expansion and 
fulfilment of which jurists are primarily responsible and 
which should be employed not only to safeguard and advance 
the civil and political rights of the individual in a free 
society, but also to establish social, economic, educational 
and cultural conditions under which its legitimate aspiration 
arid dignity may be realized... ."J
Here it is not intended to denigrate the importance to the 
individual of civil or political rights (e.g. freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, etc.) which every free and democratic
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society must aspire to uphold. But it is unlikely that a hungry, homeless, 
poverty-stricken man would be excited about his freedoms ; an illiterate 
man, for example,will certainly not effectively make use of his 
freedom of expression. He needs something more than that.
However, it is possible that the proposition to the effect that 
material well-being is more important to an individual's 
personality and dignity may be over-stated. For example, it 
has been observed that:
"It is arguable that personal liberty is more
intrinsically bound up with the worthiness of the 
individual’s existence than food and clothing, housing,
education, etc......The truth is that both liberty
and material comfort are both necessary for a happy 
life. There should be no question of having one and 
not the other. Both must need co-exist...."^
Even the above view at least recognizes the fact that material
comfort has become to be an equally important component of
the individual's life. This is a very relevant point in conditions
of the Third World, where a greater number of the human race suffer
from abject poverty, disease, and from ignorance. Efforts to
improve the quality of the life of the individual in these areas,
therefore, must start with the need to combat the three ills of
ignorance, disease and poverty. A new nation must aim at securing
to the individual the minimum basic requirements for human existence -
food, clothing, shelter, education, medical and sanitary services,
etc. The practical fulfilment or achievement of these objectives
is possible only under a socialist pattern of social and
economic organisation of these societies. The identifying
characteristics of a socialist economic system are chiefly these:
a) a vast increase in the range and detail of government 
regulation of privately-owned economic enterprises;
b) the direct furnishing of services by government to 
individual members of the national community; and 
this is important to the instant inquiry)
c) increasing government ownership and operation of 
industries and business which, at an earlier time, were, 
or would have been operated for profit by individuals or 
private companies, mostly those having connections with 
the colonial power. **
This last point necessarily implies that effective realization 
of socialist ends, at least in emergent states, would involve buying 
out existing private and foreign-owned businesses through the 
mechanisms of "nationalizations" or "partial take-overs". Yet active 
state intervention in the national economy involving forms of 
control and nationalization is obviously fraught with a strong 
likelihood of conflict with individual rights - especially the 
protection of property rights in the national constitution. 
Invariably, in all the Commonwealth African bills of rights, private 
property rights were, at the time of independence, entrenched so 
as to make it difficult (indeed almost impossible) for a new state 
to acquire private businesses compulsorily for the proper and bona 
fide utilization and development of the same for the benefit of 
the whole community. Now, it cannot be disputed that in the conflict 
between nationalization or state take-over with individual property 
rights, the interests of economic development must prevail - of 
course subject to certain safeguards.
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B. Basis and Origins of Economic "Nationalism11 in Emergent States 
Practically all leaders of emergent states assert that they 
have opted for some kind of "socialism" as an appropriate system 
through which economic development can successfully be attained. 
This naturally raises a problem in these areas, since the former 
colonial power before departure had ensured that the capitalist 
economic system should continue to operate* For instance, 
it is not surprising that at independence the inherited economic 
institutions continued, as before, to operate on capitalist lines 
and only interested in generating large profits for transfer of 
the same to their overseas shareholders. These institutions were 
only seeking to maintain the status quo. It is clear, therefore, 
that a new nation anxious to pursue a socialist approach to
i
development is first of all faced with the problem of *
or completely removing economic institutions that grew up under 
the auspices of laissez-faire capitalism. As one African 
intellectual has pointed out:
"The problem with the economic development of an African 
country such as Zambia is not how to improve within the 
system; for not much benefit could be derived from such 
improvements in an under-developed economy. The problem 
is to establish a new society, which means first of all, 
the creation of the basis of this society, that is, its 
economic, political and technological infrastructure.^ 
Economic development encompasses all this, and more".
With this background to the problems of African economic
development, it is easy to see why it is that African leaders have
always looked upon political independence as incomplete, although
a necessary and indispensable prerequisite to the attainment of
economic independence and social equality. In this regard, the
late President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya expressed what seems to be
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a representative view of all African leaders in rather eloquent 
language when he stated that:
"Our achievement of independence, for which we have 
struggled for so long, will not be an end in itself.
It will give us the opportunity to work unfettered 
for the creation of a democratic African socialist 
Kenya. Democratic because we believe that only in a 
free society can each individual develop his talents 
most fully to serve his fellow citizens. African 
because our nation must grow organically from what is
indigenous socialist because political freedom and
equality are not enough; our people have the right 
to be free from economic exploitation and social 
inequality".7
Implicit in the African attitude, as expressed above, is that 
Africans consider "colonialism" to comprise many components. 
Conspicuous among these are political subordination, economic 
subordination, social and cultural subordination. What may not be 
so apparent is that African leaders and national movements are, or 
were, in revolt against economic domination in exactly the same way 
as they are or were in revolt against political domination (and indeed 
they are also in revolt against social institutions and values 
that colonialism fostered). Lord Brockway has expressed the nature 
of the African resentment in the above matters as follows:
"Africans resent alien economic control as much as they 
resent alien political control. They are frustrated by 
alien ownership of mines, plantations and factories, and 
by the racial inequality of alien managements, alien 
skilled crafts, alien workers paid more than African
workers on similar jobs  They resent the way in which
white settlers and financial corporations have taken 
possession of their best land in many parts of Africa.
They regard themselves as living under an economic 
occupation and identify their economic masters with the 
colonialism against which they are in revolt".**
In the context of the above remarks, it is clear that
African leaders have always felt a sense of commitment to the
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emancipation of their respective countries from the economic 
domination of the former colonial interests. They regard it 
as an extension of political nationalism to free their countries 
from foreign control of their economies, and see socialism as 
the most effective weapon with which to achieve this emancipation. 
This is why it is said with respect to an African leader that,
"his nationalism leads him instinctively to socialism". He is 
obsessed with the idea that in order effectively to induce rapid 
economic development, the dominant foreign-owned industries ought 
to be subordinated to public control or ownership. Now, the 
practical implication of adopting a socialist mode of economic 
development means that the basic means of production - "the 
commanding heights in the economy", as President Nyerere likes to 
call them - have to be bought out. And in a new, emerging state 
where there is lack of private capital, it is only the state that 
can find the enormous sums of money and organizational skill 
involved in the whole exercise of take-overs.
There is one relevant point that needs to be pursued further
here, and this relates to the importance the new nations attach to
the role of the state in national development. According to
Marxists, the state must wither away after the introduction of
communism, a higher phase of socialism. This assertion was based
on the postulate that the bourgeois state was a tool for the
establishment of "democracy for a small minority, democracy for 
9the wealthy". The Marxists therefore take up the position that 
this apparatus, this bourgeois state, should be destroyed and
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replaced by another, a proletarian rule. With the end of 
an economy based on bourgeois capitalism and class conflict, 
the state would become superfluous, and both the state and 
its product of coercive law would become unecessary and would 
"wither away". In the political and economic context of the 
new nations this is not the way the problem is looked upon.
The state appeared as a result of successful struggle for 
national liberation. The state came together with independence. 
The state is viewed as the most effective means of preserving 
political and economic independence, of liberating the country 
from foreign tutorship.
Here, therefore, we cannot avoid reaching the conclusion 
that the African conception of the state differs considerably 
from the Marxist conceptions in terms of the definition and 
the functions of the state, and the question of the withering away 
of the class struggle within the framework of the state. So 
it is that the state is presumed, and is under a duty, to be 
the chief organ for the purposes of ensuring that the country*s 
wealth and resources are exploited for the maximum benefit of 
the people instead of leaving the task to the mysteries of the 
open market. Professor Ann Seidman has clearly stated the case 
for the crucial importance of the role of the state in the 
economic development of the emergent nations, when she writes 
that:
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"It is evident that to leave critical
investment decisions entirely to private 
enterprise motivated by the search for 
profits was to leave the economy essentially 
as it was inherited from the colonial era: 
a dual economy hinged through the export 
enclave to the uncertainties of the world 
market. If the structure of the economy was 
to become more internally integrated, geared 
to increasing productivity to raise the levels 
of living of the entire population, it was 
necessary for the state to intervene to ensure 
the implementation of a meaningful development 
strategy'1.11
From what is stated in the preceding paragraphs it is . 
beyond doubt that the evidence available support&the proposition 
that one of the true motivations of the socialist option in 
the newly-liberated states of Africa is nationalistic, i.e., 
an extension of political control. In the second place, there 
is also a genuine desire on the part of African leaders to 
terminate alien economic domination, and to safeguard national 
economic interest. State participation in the economy, however, 
which socialism envisages, involves the nationalization of 
assets belonging to foreign nationals. However, the problem 
in the realization of economic development through the mechanism 
of nationalization was that the independence constitution 
written for Zambia, for example, "completely" prohibited 
confiscation of property by the new African government.
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C. The Extent to which the Protection of Property Rights in 
Commonwealth African Bills of Rights ”impeded 1 Economic .
Deve lopment
In the preceding paragraphs we have stated that a bill of 
rights can, depending upon the nature of the protection, entrench 
private property rights without regard^  to the needs of economic 
development. It becomes relevant, therefore, to examine the extent 
to which the protection of property rights in the Commonwealth 
constitutions supports that charge.
To start with, it should be noticed that compulsory
acquisition of private property in all these bills of rights is
permitted, but within a relatively narrow range. There are at
least two discernible approaches that Commonwealth bills of rights
exhibit; the first one is that represented by Uganda (1962),
Kenya (1963), and Sierra Leone (1961). These bills of rights
provide that no property of any description shall be compulsorily
taken possession of, except where the taking possession of, or
acquisition is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety,
public order, public morality, public health, town and country
planning or the development or utilization of any property in such
a manner as to promote the public benefit; and further that it has
to be shown that the necessity is such as to afford reasonable
justification for the hardship that may result to any person
12
having an interest m  the property acquired. The second approach 
is represented by Malawi (before 1966), Zambia (before 1969), and 
Botswana. In this category of the bills of rights, the government 
can justify the acquisition on the ground that it is either
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"necessary" or simply that it is "expedient" in any of the
specified interests. Once again, it is worthwhile to restate
the proposition that the above provisions necessarily imply
that compulsory acquisition cannot be embarked upon unless that
acquisition can be demonstrated to be "necessary" or expedient
for one of the specified purposes. In other words, the necessity
or expediency of the acquisition is a condition precedent to the
constitutionality of compulsory acquisition. But what do the
principal expressions, "necessary" and "expedient" mean in the
context? How do the two conditions compare in terms of scope
within which they allow compulsory acquisition? In the Zambian
13case of Jasbhai Patel v. Attorney-General, Justice Magnus, as he
then was, defined the expression "expedient" as something "conducive
to the purpose" in hand, or "suitable to the circumstances of the
case"; and it is, therefore, far short of what is "necessary"
or what is "reasonably required". The Judge then held that the
seizure, under statutory powers, of postal packets containing
currency notes which were illegally exported out of the country,
was expedient for a scheme of exchange control designed to secure
the development of the nation1s financial resources for a purpose
. 1 4beneficial to the community.
The second point to take notice of is the fact that 
confiscation or compulsory acquisition of property without 
compensation, is virtually prohibited in the Commonwealth African 
bills of rights. However, the only limited scope within which 
confiscation is given recognition really amounts to no
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confiscation at all properly or strictly so-called. Indeed, 
a closer examination of the circumstances in which a constitutional 
authorization of confiscation is given reveals that the act of 
deprivation of the property does not arise from a purely positive
act of confiscation, "but from the failure of the owner to assert
his right in time", it is, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council has rightly observed, "thanks to his own inaction".'^
It is quite plain that this is the correct inference about 
"confiscation" in Commonwealth African bills of rights where 
recognition of it, for example, arises in situations where property 
is taken:
i) in satisfaction of a tax, rate or due;,
ii) in execution of a judgment;
iii) by way of penalty for breach of some law;
iv) as an incident of a lease, mortgage or charge;
v) in circumstances where it is reasonably necessary
to do so because the property is in a dangerous
state or injurious to the health of human beings,
animals or plants;
vi) in consequence of any law with respect to the 
limitation of actions;
vii) for so long as may be necessary for the purposes
of any examination, investigation, trial or inquiry or, 
in the case of land, for the purpose of the carrying 
out thereon of work of soil conservation or other 
natural resources or work relating to agricultural
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development or improvement, being work relating to
such development or improvement that the owner or
occupier of the land has been required, and has
without reasonable excuses refused or failed to carry 
16
out.
The bills of rights, then, add that in each one of these situations 
the law authorizing the deprivation of property as well as any 
action taken thereunder must be reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society. None of the situations mentioned above in 
which confiscation is authorized can be said to amount to a direct 
conferment of authority on the part of the government to deprive 
the owner of his property. In other words, confiscation, as a 
"positive" act, is absolutely prohibited in the Commonwealth African 
bills of rights.
As it has been asserted elsewhere in this inquiry, it is proper 
that a bill of rights should have a moral basis and should seek 
to uphold decent moral ends in the society in which it operates.
By their very nature, confiscatory acts are associated with 
discriminatory measures aimed at certain individuals or groups of 
individuals and take the form of a penal measure. They are therefore 
in direct conflict with all accepted codes of morality. To compel 
certain individuals in a community, or certain categories of 
individuals, to give up their property for the general welfare of 
the larger community without compensation is a very unfair situation. 
Property is, generally speaking, a result of legitimate labour or 
arduous venture, and the compensation paid to the owners of the 
property taken represents precisely the corresponding contributions
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made by the rest of the community in order to equalize the 
financial incidence of this taking of private property. Thus 
the cost of acquisition in an ordinary case should be borne by 
the society as a whole, and so the owner of the property is 
compensated for the special loss he suffers. But it is submitted 
that no morality is violated in a situation where the owner of 
the property has been at fault as in a case where he obtained 
the property through force, corruption, threats or deceit or through 
any other immoral methods. In these circumstances, confiscation 
may, in fact, be the restoration to the people of property illegally 
taken away from them.
It is morally objectionable that any individual
or company should claim ownership of mineral rights in perpetuity
as did Cecil Rhodes and the British South African Company with
respect to the rich minerals of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).
What is even more uncompromisingly objectionable is that an alien
individual or foreign company should claim to own the mineral wealth
of any country in perpetuity. In fact, if a strict view is taken
about the circumstances in which the mineral rights of Northern
Rhodesia were acquired and the extraordinary profits made over the
years at the expense of the people, the nationalization of the mining
industry in 1969 could have been carried out without material
compensation, since the investors would be deemed to have more than
17compensated themselves. It is obvious that Zambia’s philosophy 
of humanism and the desire to retain the services of the skilled 
foreign miners contributed to the respect for rights illegally 
acquired.
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It is plain that the British Governments intention at the 
time of writing the independence constitution of Zambia was to 
entrench the mineral rights of the British South African company 
by totally prohibiting "positive" confiscation of property. Lord 
Brockway has in fact stated the case rightly when he writes that:
"The financiers and capitalist*of Europe and America would 
care little if they were to lose all their possessions on 
the continent of Africa so long as they retained their mineral 
wealth. Capitalism in Africa is the ownership of its minerals. 
One cannot think of an Africa which is socialist without the
1 O
transference of its mineral resources and wealth to the people". 
The prohibition of expropriation without compensation in the 
Zambian independence constitution was a very serious legal hurdle to 
the utilization of the mineral resources for the development of the 
country for the benefit of the community as a whole. It is necessary 
to pursue this matter a little further, and to show the seriousness of 
the aspect of the constitutional provision under reference.
D. The Constitutional Prohibition of Compulsory Acquisition without 
Compensation and its Impact on Economic Development in Zambia
When one talks about "economic independence", this should not
be understood to be referring to or confined to Africa, or even to
the under-developed countries only. Economic independence is a
universal question. It is said, for example, that such rich and
industrialized countries as France and Canada have been concerned
at the large-scale American investment without any local control on
the same. With respect to Canada, it is estimated that more than
50 per cent of the country’s entire production economy is American-
owned. 25 per cent of Canada's fuel companies (oil and coal) are
American; 60 per cent of Canada's gas industry, 62 per cent of her
mining and smelting, 25 per cent of her railways, 13 per cent of her
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utilities are in American hands. This is what the former 
Progressive Conservative Party leader, John Diefenbaker, once 
said about this state of affairs:
"Canada’s economy is altogether too vulnerable to sudden 
changes in the trading policy of Washington. Canadians 
do not wish to have their economic, any more than political, 
affairs determined outside Canada. Moreover, we have become 
dependent on the USA, which now largely controls our iron, 
petroleum, copper and the like". ^
It is self-evident that the inability of a state to control 
any aspect of its national activity leads to resentment and 
frustration. But the problem is, however, more acute in Africa, 
in the states that have recently attained political independence.
Zambia, in particular, affords a very revealing example of 
economic dependence than any other country within Commonwealth 
Africa. At Independence in 1964, virtually the whole of the 
manufacturing industry, mining and the financial sector and a large 
part of other service sectors, including wholesale/retail, were in the 
hands of foreigners. And because of Zambia’s long economic 
association with the south, most of the businesses in the country 
continued to be dominated and controlled from Salisbury and South 
Africa.
But by far the most serious aspect of Zambia’s economic 
dependence is the extraordinary dominance of copper in the economy. 
Copper forms the backbone of the country’s economy, as is indicated 
below:^
GDP GNP EXPORTS REVENUE EMPLOYMENT
Zambia 40 34 93 68 15
Congo (Kinshasa) 18 23 51 45 2
Chile 4 3 65 14 3
Peru 2 1.5 18 12 1
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None of the other three copper-producing countried depend so 
extensively on the commodity for their GDP, GNP, Exports,
Revenue or Employment.
The neighbouring Congo (Kinshasa) in fact does so almost to 
the extent of half of Zambia’s dependence. It is essentially 
because of this problem - that is, the country’s extraordinary 
dependence on copper - coupled with the Zambian government’s 
inability to influence its price and to direct its proper development 
for the benefit of the Zambian people as a whole, that there was a 
growing impatience that the copper industry should be nationalized. 
But government could do nothing in the meantime, since it had no 
legal power to acquire property without compensation. It is clear 
that the British plan to prohibit expropriation of property without 
compensation in the Zambian independence constitution was still 
persistently hindering the utilization of the country’s mineral 
resources for the development of Zambia.
Apart from ownership of the title to the minerals, the BSA 
Company also had the power to decide who should prospect and where.
A prospector had to obtain the licence from the BSA Company to 
operate if and when he desires to start mining operations. If 
mining was successful, he had to pay royalties on production to the 
BSA Company. Indeed, as far as mining was concerned, the BSA Company 
was the government of Zambia. The rich copper ores of the country 
were mined by two company groups: the Rhodesian Anglo-American
Limited, and the Rhodesian Selection Trust Limited (known as 
Rhoanglo and RST, respectively). Exclusive rights had been given 
and held by these companies ever since the 1920’s to prospect,
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explore and mine in certain areas which covered 70 per cent of the
country’s surface. The mining rights granted by the chartered
company to the two mining groups included those granted in perpetuity
under special grants. ”It seemed morally indefensible”, one
commentator exclaimed, "that these rights should be protected against
22expropriation except on terms of payment of compensation". It 
was this state of affairs that the 1969 Constitutional Amendment 
was intended to correct, namely, to permit acquisition of the rights 
granted in perpetuity by the state without compensation. President 
Kaunda at Mulugushi directly attacked the Constitution. He said:
"Perhaps this is an appropriate time for me to announce that 
Government has accepted in principle the need to amend that 
part of the Constitution which relates to the compulsory 
acquisition of property. As humanists we are dedicated 
to upholding the protection of fundamental rights and the 
freedom of the individual. However, property rights must 
be subject to the common good and to the general interests 
of the community. The existing Section 18 of the 
Constitution must be examined and replaced by more 
realistic provisions".23
24The Constitutional Amendment of 1969, which was passed to 
give effect to this new government policy, greatly extended the 
permitted scope of confiscation beyond that stipulated in the 
Independence Constitution. The important new areas in which 
confiscation is now authorized include; a law which vest in the 
President rights of ownership, searching for, mining and disposal 
of minerals, and which empowers him to revoke grants of prospecting, 
exploration or mining licences upon failure to comply with the 
conditions of such licences; in addition, confiscation is 
permitted by any law relating to (i) exchange control:
(ii) abandoned, unoccupied, unutilized or undeveloped land;
(iii) absent or non-resident owners; (iv) the acquisition of 
shares or a class of shares, in a body corporate on terms agreed
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by the holders of not less than nine-tenths in value of those 
shares or that class thereof; (v) the forfeiture or confiscation 
of the property of a person who has left Zambia for the purpose 
or apparent purpose, of defeating the ends of justice; (vi) the 
administration or disposition of property by the President in 
implementation of comprehensive land policy or of a policy designed
to ensure that the statute law, the common law and the doctrines
of equity relating to or affecting the interests in property
| enjoyed by chiefs shall apply with substantial uniformity
I . 25| throughout Zambia.
i!
For the purpose of implementing the amendment, two pieces of
I
legislation were enacted. These were the Lands Acquisition Act 
1970,^ and the Mines and Minerals Act 1969,^ (effective on 
January 1, 1970).
| The Land Acquisition Act empowered the President compulsorily
to acquire any property of any description whenever he is of the
opinion that it is desirable or expedient in the interests of the 
28
Republic so to do. This Act actually replaced the colonial
.. .  . 29legislation - the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance. One
discernible feature of the colonial legislation was that government 
policy relating to acquisition of property could be frustrated by 
the complicated definition of ’’public purpose". For any 
acquisition of property, the government had to show that it is 
justified on the ground that the particular property was needed for 
a public purpose. The new Act avoids this by vesting a discretionary 
power on the President who has to be subjectively satisfied that the
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acquisition is in the interests of the Republic. The advantage
of the new legislation is that the owner of the property acquired
will find it extremely difficult to defeat government action in a
court of law merely by arguing that the acquisition was not in the
interest of the Republic. There is a considerable number of
judicial decisions to the effect that the exercise of a discretionary
power cannot be challenged unless it can be shown that the person
vested with the power acted in bad faith or from improper motives
or on extraneous consideration or under a view of the facts or the
31law which could not reasonably be entertained.
The Land Acquisition Act 1970, also provides that no 
compensation is payable where an undeveloped land has been acquired. 
Also no compensation is paid in respect of unutilized land of an 
absentee owner. The only exception in this respect is that 
compensation is payable for any unexhausted improvements on 
unutilized land belonging to a resident in Zambia. But if the land 
is unutilized land belonging to an absent owner, i.e., a person 
not ordinarily resident in Zambia, no compensation is payable. 
Unexhausted improvement is defined in the Act as any quality 
permanently attached to the land directly resulting from the
expenditure of capital or labour and increasing the productive
32 . . . .capacity, utility or amenity thereof. The justification for the
expropriation of unutilized land belonging to absentee or non­
resident owner was explained by the then Minister of Land and 
Natural Resources, Mr. Solomon Kalulu, when he was presenting the 
Bill in the National Assembly:
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" Later in the 1950's as the cry for independence
hotted up in Northern Rhodesia, most of these settlers 
(white settlers) began to go away - of course having 
fenced up their farms. Now these farms are lying idle.
We cannot touch them because legally they belong to 
absentee owners. This Gordian knot can only be untied 
by legal means, and the? legal means'is the Bill which 
is before this House. Either this Bill passes through, 
or the nation is held at ransom by absentee owners *who 
demand as high as K3,000.00 per acre for the land which 
they originally got at 6d an acre. I will not allow my 
Ministry to be a party to this comedy of weakness”.^ 3
Evidently it is the abandonment of the land that prompted the
government to arm itself legally to obtain these land by forfeit.
In fact, the white settlers had grabbed most of the fertile
agricultural lands. The Monckton Commission of 1960 had revealed
that the white settlers, numbered only in thousands, in the
Rhodesias (Northern and Southern) took about 48 million acres of
. . . . . . 3fertile land, as against 41 million occupied by the African millions.
Most of the land that Africans occupied was comparatively poor, and
with low capacity of soil fertility. In these circumstances, it
was only a reasonable recourse that the fertile agricultural lands
belonging to absentee owners should revert to the state for its
proper utilization in the interests of the nation.
The Mines and Minerals Act, on the other hand, vests all rights
of ownership in, of searching for, mining and disposition of-
. 35minerals, in the President on behalf of the Republic. By virtue 
of this Act, e very title to, interest in right over any minerals,
of whatever nature, subsisting immediately before the commencement
36of the Act were extinguished. Thus all the concessions acquired 
at the beginning of the century by the BSA Company came to an end.
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Minerals not included in the Company1s rights, such as those
lands reserved to the Paramount Chief of Barotseland (now
Western Province) as a result of the concession agreement with
37the company also passed to the state. Introducing the Mines and 
Minerals Bill in the National Assembly, the then Vice-President, 
Mr. Simon Kapwepwe, spoke at length in outlining the objectives 
which the Bill was intended to achieve:
"The vast undeveloped areas over which mining rights 
have been tied up, stagnating for years, decades, 
almost for centuries will now be thrown open for 
development. Let us not shed any tears for those who 
have lost their mineral rights today. If they had 
prospected and explored their areas with energy and 
enthusiasm, if they had the courage to invest 
money in the development of new mines, we would have 
been only too pleased to encourage them. But they did
not....... Through the attitude of these people,
development of the Zambian mining industry has been 
crippled and deliberately held up. This was a 
situation which we as a peoplefs government could not 
tolerate and which it was our duty to correct. The 
Bill which I am introducing achieves that object; by 
eliminating the old concession and Special Grants, the 
Bill will provide up-to-date procedures designed to 
control prospecting and mining activities in Zambia for 
the benefit of the people of Zambia. We are going to 
make quite certain that there is no repetition of Cecil 
Rhodes and his granting of mining rights in "perpetuity" 
or "forever and e v e r " " .38
It is evident, therefore, that the government's policy 
behind the passage of this Act was to ensure that in future 
prospecting rights, exploration rights or mining rights will 
only be held for bona fide purposes of prospecting, exploration 
or mining, as the case may be. The Act stipulated the period of 
time for which these rights would be held - a mining licence was 
to be initially valid for six months, renewable for a further
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period of twenty-five years as long as the holder of the licence
submits a satisfactory programme showing that ore reserves remain 
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to be exploited. In each case the government reserved the right 
to participate in any mines which might result from any new mining 
operations^ Government's ultimate aim in passing this law was 
obviously to induce rapid development of the mining industry by 
making it possible for vast areas previously held by the two major 
companies, the Anglo-American and Roan Selection Trust, and which 
areas were hitherto unexploited under the special grant system, to 
become available for prospecting by other interested companies.
E. Compensation Provisions in Commonwealth African Constitutions 
and their Relationship to Economic Development
Having demonstrated that Commonwealth African bills of rights 
in fact completely prohibit expropriation of property of any 
description without compensation, it is now appropriate to look 
at the technique adopted by most of the African countries within 
the Commonwealth family to acquire property compulsorily. The 
practice of compulsory purchase has been instituted by most of 
these countries, so that the owner is compulsorily required to 
part with the property, and for this he receives for the property 
acquired its equivalent in money. In a sense it is as if the 
property has only changed the form as a result of a compulsory 
order of the government. It follows from this that if the 
property is not diminished in amount, but has only changed in 
form; the owner is entitled to its corresponding equivalent amount 
in the form of money. The underlying idea is that the owner of
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the property purchased compulsorily ought to be put in as good 
a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property 
had not been taken. The question of the quantum of compensation 
with respect to a property purchased compulsorily assumes 
considerable importance in a development state from at least two 
points of view. First, is the immediate financial effects of 
payment on the nation's limited domestic capital essential to 
economic development; and second, is the effect on foreign sources 
of capital as regards future investment in the country. For the 
present purpose our attention shall be focused primarily on the 
first of these view points, because the second view does not raise 
any problems of a constitutional significance.
In practically all of the Commonwealth independence bills 
of rights, payment of "adequate" and "prompt" compensation is a 
condition sine qua non if nationalization of foreign property is 
undertaken, Tanzania, which has never had a bill of rights, is 
the only exception. But even here, the Tanzanian statutes provide 
for "full and fair" compensation for the exporpriated property 
rights, and prima facie, therefore, Tanzanian compensation laws 
do not provide for "prompt" or 'Immediate" compensation at the time 
of taking,
i) "Adequate"
The first constitutional condition subsequent to 
nationalization is that "adequate" compensation must be paid 
to the owner compulsorily deprived of his property. The 
inherent problem here is one of finding a workable definition
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which should be attributed to the concept of "adequate"
compensation. Should this, for instance, be taken to mean
that the owner of the property acquired should be indemnified
the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property
taken? The USA Supreme Court had no difficulty in finding
some practical standard by adopting the concept of market
value. The owner has been said to be entitled to the "value",
the "market value", and the "fair market value" of what is
taken. By this the Court presumably meant that the owner is
entitled to be awarded the amount equivalent to the price he
would have bargained for if he was a willing seller selling in 
41 . .
the open market. This is obviously the intendments of the 
bills of rights; in fact, the Kenyan bill of rights omits 
the use of the expression "adequate", and in its place 
stipulates "full compensation". Granted, therefore, that open 
market value is a permissible basis for calculating "full" 
and "fair" compensation, its application will certainly raise 
a complex of difficulties. Chief of these is the difficulty 
of imagining the circumstances in which open sale of the 
undertakings might take place. Where, for example, can an 
open market sale be available for the sale of the assets 
belonging to the mining companies, to the international banking 
institutions, or to the large industrial undertakings operating 
in the new nations? It is obvious that in these cases the 
assessment of ordinary market value will just involve 
assumptions which will make it unlikely that the appraisal will
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reflect the true value of assets with precision. This, in 
effect, means that the application of the concept of market 
value in the above circumstances will involve, at best, a 
guess by informed persons.
It might be contended that where an open market does 
not exist, then the fair value of the property at the time 
of nationalization must be awarded. The problem of using 
"a fair market value" as the basis of paying compensation, is 
that it can be challenged by the owner of the property that 
a fair market value is something less than a full market value, 
and not, therefore, equal to "adequate compensation" within 
the meaning of the Constitution. It is quite obvious that a 
fair market value may be, and often is, less than full market 
value. Where an owner of the property was dispossessed of it 
compulsorily^ therefore, he was able to challenge the
’ ' &-of the statute on the ground that a fair
42market value was something less than adequate compensation.
Quite rightly he pointed out that a fair market value was not 
an exact or full equivalent in money to a full market value, 
and therefore the expropriating authority had given him an 
amount which fell short of that which the Constitution envisages. 
Thanks to the open-mindedness of the Nigerian court which 
refused to declare the statute void on the ground that it is 
not always that a willing seller in the market gets a full 
market value; and so if he gets a fair market value he is 
happy and contented - and accordingly compensation based on 
fair market value is adequate compensation within the meaning
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of the constitutional provision. Moreover, a fair 
compensation, the court added, though not an exact or full 
equivalent in money, is nevertheless a just equivalent.
The experience encountered in the Nigerian High Court 
shows that unless the court is open-minded with respect to 
the prevailing economic needs of the country, government's 
programmes of the expropriation of private assets can easily 
be frustrated by the legal alertness of the owners of the 
assets concerned that they are entitled to a correct 
constitutional standard of assessing compensation. But what 
is more interesting about the Nigerian experience, is that 
the Gourt decided the case on purely "policy" considerations - 
the policy that government's genuine intention of bringing 
about utilization of a property in the interests of the whole 
community surely prevail as against individual enjoyment of 
that property. There are few lawyers in the common law 
jurisdictions who address themselves to the question that law 
is not purely an institution of conflict-resolution mechanism- 
Unlike the judge(s) who decided the Nigerian case, most of the 
lawyers in the Anglophonic legal world do follow the classical 
English legal ideology, analytical positivism, which teaches 
that the correct concern of a jurist is what the law "is".
By this is meant that once a conflict is brought before the 
court, that court has to resolve the conflict from within the 
existing, or from pre-established, rules; analytical 
positivism does not train a lawyer to resolve the conflict by
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taking into account what the law "ought" to be - i.e., from
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policy considerations. The guiding dogma m  the training 
of a lawyer in the whole of the Commonwealth world revolves 
on the concept of what Max Weber has called a "logically 
formal rationality";
"Legal thought is rational to the extent that it relies 
on some justification that transcends the particular 
case, and is based on the existing, unambiguous rules; 
formal to the extent that the criteria of decision are 
intrinsic to the legal system; and logical to the 
extent that rules or principles are consciously 
constructed by specialized modes of legal thought 
which rely on a high logical systemization, and to 
the extent that decisions of specific cases are 
reached by processes of specialized deductive logic 
proceeding from previously established rules or 
principles".^
The function of the courts was thus limited to law-finding 
since its sources were limited to the legal order itself. To 
say that decisions of courts must be derived from pre-established 
rules is to leave no room for the court to generate appropriate 
law in an ongoing society. Courts do not function in a vacuum; 
they must follow the example of the Nigerian court which decided 
the Esi case by appreciating the fact that legal decisions must 
be reached from the background of the primary concern of a new, 
developing nation namely, economic development. The 
interpretations of the constitutional provisions in emergent 
states must surely take account of socio-economic realities 
and needs of these areas, and should not merely end at 
satisfying one individual as against the community at large,
ii) "Prompt"
Commonwealth bills of rights further required that in the 
event of a compulsory acquisition of property, "prompt" payment 
of compensation must be made. This requirement of prompt
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payment probably constitutes a serious challenge on the
capacity of a new nation to launch development plans along
45
the lines of state ownership. The grave effects of
the stipulations in the constitutions of emergent states
I^MT) ta< *6
that compensation must be paid promptly, ..has commented
" It is a drag on development, because a new state,
desirous of pursuing a programme of public ownership 
in both the industrial and commercial sectors, may 
lack the capital to pay Rrornpt compensation for taking 
over privately-owned industries, banks, building 
societies, insurance companies and other commercial 
enterprises. What is objected to here is not the
principle of compensation as such, for......its
right that, in the ordinary case, the state should 
pay compensation for depriving a person of the
legitimate fruit of his labour or investment. But
the principle of compensation should have been satisfied 
by the state accepting the liability to compensate, 
but without being obliged to do so promptly. Instead of 
prompt payment, the value of the property could be treated 
as a loan to be paid out of the profit of the business 
over a period of y e a r s " .46
In fact, the viewpoint expressed above, was raised by 
Mexico in her dispute with the United States. Mexico pleaded 
economic inability to pay "prompt" compensation for the real 
properties she had nationalized. She contended that a 
"transformation of the country, that is to say the future of 
the nation, could not be halted by the impossibility of paying
immediately the value of the properties belonging to a small
number of foreigners who seek only lucrative ends".^ In 
answer, United States Secretary of State, Hall, rejected this 
on the ground that under every rule of law and equity no 
government is entitled to expropriate private property for
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for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate 
and effective payment therefor. Hall's argument has been 
reinforced by Rea who contends that:
"Irrespective of the national policy underlying the 
expropriation, be it a general reform measure 
calculated to achieve social justice or an ordinary 
taking for the construction of a highway, for 
example, foreigners are entitled to compensation 
pursuant to the requirement of international law".
In the same way Domke has put it that:
"No justifiable reason appears to exist which would 
impose upon foreign owners the burden of contributing 
to economic improvements in the country from which 
they, mostly non-residents, will not derive benefits 
themselves". 49
One should probably comment here that these arguments are 
not wholly empty; but they unsympathetically fail to 
appreciate the situation that exists in the new and developing 
states. The issue is not that compensation shall not be 
awarded in respect of any nationalized foreign-owned assets, , 
but one of devising a more realistic method of payment, taking 
into account the financial position of new nations. Many o,f 
these countries had endured long periods of exploitation by 
the nationals of the colonial masters, together with their 
profit-motivated companies.
It is quite obvious that this state of affairs must be 
corrected immediately after political independence - and the 
process of correction cannot be expected to wait until a new 
state is in a position to pay "prompt" compensation to the 
aliens. A German court has expressed sympathy for the position
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of an ex-colonial country. That court in the Indonesian 
50
Tobacco Case held that the principles of compensation would 
be applied to:-
"Individual expropriation of the usual kind and...
here, however, the expropriation of the Dutch companies 
constitutes at the same time a shifting of proprietary
relations which was effected by a former colony
after its independence in order to change the social
structure  Compensation could not be paid in
| full and promptly out of the substance, but only made
out of the proceeds of the nationalized enterprises. 
Compensation as to time and amount must therefore be 
made in accordance with the conditions in the 
expropriating state. Thus the long-standing principle 
| of strong protection of private property clashes here
| with the modern concept that under-developed countries
| must be given the possibility of using their own
natural resources”.
i
i . .5J
I In the international arena, the Harvard Convention has
i squarely repeated the position taken by the German court.
|
| That convention has declared that where property is taken by
| a state in furtherance of a general programme of economic and
[
! social reform, compensation may be paid over a reasonable period
i ' r(noclaK4 t_oS
of years, provided that the method and * •-• * . payment
: apply to nationals and non-nationals alike, a reasonable part
of the compensation due is paid promptly, taking into account 
the general financial situation of the non-nationals 
concerned.^
The prohibitive effect on socialist programmes of 
development of the guarantee of property in terms of prompt 
payment of adequate compensation, led Kenya to reject 
nationalization as a technique of development. According to 
the government White Paper on "African Socialism and its 
Application to Planning in Kenya”, it is beyond doubt that
399
the principal influencing factor for the decision to 
reject the direct development strategies via the institution 
of nationalization, was the consideration of the cost of 
compensation. In the words of the Paper:
"nationalization is a useful tool that has been used 
in Kenya and will be used again when circumstances 
require. The pertinent questions,are at what cost,,* 
for what pruposes, and when. The Constitution and 
the KANU Manifesto make it clear that African 
socialism in Kenya does not imply a commitment to 
indiscriminate nationalization. These documents do 
commit the Government to prompt payment of full 
compensation wherever nationalization is used. Kenya1s 
policy with respect to nationalization should be 
clearly defined within these stipulations". 53
It is, of course, true that other factors were also mentioned
in support of the Government’s argument against state
ownership; these included, for example, the fear that
nationalization may create a possible disincentive on individual
enterprise and it may discourage private investment, especially
from the capitalist countries - contrary to the Government’s
proclaimed objective of creating a "hospitable investment
climate". The government was also worried over the question
of syphoning limited domestic capital for the purpose of paying
compensation to owners of the nationalized assets. This
situation was correctly considered undesirable in that the
money to be used to pay for the nationalized assets to the
owners would most obvious leave the country increasing the
country’s foreign exchange and skilled manpower problems.
In spite of all these problems that accompany nationalization,
Kenya did not entirely reject resort to that technique as a
means towards economic development. There were specified 
circumstances within which compulsory acquisition was 
considered to be a reasonable resource, irrespective of the 
costs involved. Nationalization will be used in Kenya in 
the following situations:
Mi) When the assets in private hands threaten the
the security or undermine the integrity of the 
nation; or
ii) When productive resources are being wasted; or
iii) When the operation of an industry by private
concern has a serious detrimental effect on the 
public interest; and
iv) When other less costly means of control are not
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available or are not effective. "
Also specifically mentioned as an area where nationalization
is desirable regardless of cost, is where a service is vital to
the people and must be provided directly by government as
55
part of its responsibility. In all cases the Government of
Kenya has insisted that when an industry is nationalized, it
must be operated efficiently so that it can cover its costs
and earn a profit at least equivalent to the taxes paid when
operated privately. This should be so, the government further
argues, because if taxes are used year after year to subsidize
the nationalized industries, the nation has in fact gained
56
little if anything by the act of nationalization.
The Kenyan Government is also using its limited 
development money to buy some of the formerly European-owned 
land and to make it available to Africans. Such purchases
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have avowedly proceeded on a willing buyer/willing seller 
basis so as to avoid the constitutional provisions which 
would operate to control the transactions if such land was 
compulsorily acquired. Yet such purchases would have the 
same effect on development as indiscriminate nationalizations; 
namely, substantially to reduce the amounts the government can 
spend on new development schemes.
F. The Procedure for Assessing and paying Compensation under 
the African Commonwealth Independence Bills of Rights
One further interesting feature that merits discussion with
respect to the taking of possession of property under practically
all the independence bills of rights in Commonwealth Africa, is
in reference to the following provisions: that the determination
of (a) the legality of acquisition; (b) the right of the owner of
property to compensation, and (c) the amount of such compensation,
shall be matters within the jurisdiction of an ordinary court of
law to adjudicate upon. Under the independence constitutions of
Uganda (1962), Sierra Leone (1961), Malawi (1964), and Zambia
(1964), the provisions were substantially similar in wording,
namely, that where property is compulsorily taken possession of
under any of the exceptions, the act of dispossession shall only
be justified where:
11 Provision is made by a law applicable to that taking
of acquisition securing to any person ha ving an interest 
in or right over the property, a right of access to the
High Court (only "court" in Zambia) whether direct
or on appeal from any other authority, for the 
determination of his interest or right, the legality of 
the taking of possession or acquisition of the property, 
interest or right, and the amount of any compensation 
to which he is entitled, and for the purpose of obtaining 
prompt payment of that compensation". 57
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And, although the Kenyan independence constitution of 1963
contains a somewhat different wording, the basic principle under
reference is nevertheless upheld, namely that:
"every person having an interest or right in or over property 
which is compulsorily taken possession of or whose interest 
in or right over any property is compulsorily acquired shall 
have a right of direct access to the Supreme Court to:
(a) the determination of his interest or right, the legality 
of the taking of possession or acquisition of the property, 
interest or right, and the amount of any compensation to 
which he is entitled.. •."58
It should be pointed out here that the suitability of the
regular court of law to determine the legality of an acquisition
of property and the owner1s right to compensation is not questioned:
this is, in fact,a traditionally appropriate function of a law court.
But is the court a fit or appropriate forum for the purposes of
assessing the amount of compensation? The exercise of assessing
compensation is a technical and complex matter that does not, and
cannot, only be based on formal accounting principles, in which case
expert knowledge and advice can be available. Nor can one argue
that controversies arising out of the implementation of socialist
programmes can be disposed of by applying legal principles and
procedures, pure and simple. Such considerations as the country’s
financial position, its foreign exchange position, the existing
priorities and allocations between competing claims and the like -
all these are matters that cannot be left out in the process of
59deciding upon the amount of compensation payable. Thus it can be
argued that the court is ill-qualified for the task, especially if
what is acquired is a big business enterprise whose assets include
60goodwill and profit prospects.
As can be seen, the task of arriving at the amount of 
compensation can sometimes be a matter of straight bargaining in 
which policy and other considerations may be of primary importance.
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G. Should Loss of "Goodwill11 be Compensated?
In the ensuing discussion, an attempt is made to address
ourselves to the pertinent question of whether or not loss of
"goodwill" in relation to a property taken away should be
compensated for or not. All along it has been assumed that a taking
of any property by the government relates only to a taking of
tangible or physical assets. But can property rights in the
nature of intangible "assets" (of which "goodwill" is an example),
be said to be the subject of a taking for which compensation must
be paid? Put differently, would the action of destroying goodwill
amount to an expropriation for the purposes of compensation? It
has been said, for example, that where an enterprise is seized
by the state, the normal method of computing compensation would be
to take into account the value of the enterprise as a going
concern; and as such, compensation would usually include at least
some payment for "goodwill". This is so, it has further been
suggested, because one of the elements of "value" of individual
pieces of property which a state might seize, includes the unique
61
value of the property to its owner. Consequently, a new nation 
employing the technique of nationalization as a means towards 
economic development, is urged to include payment of goodwill in 
every compensation amount in respect of any property acquired.
There is no doubt that the claim that goodwill forms a substantial 
part of the value of the property in question, is a desire to 
introduce a capitalist criterion in assessing compensation. It 
must be pointed out here that the criterion to be used in computing
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compensation is of critical significance in terms of future 
supplies of foreign investment and technology. Thus:
"how much to pay depends fundamentally on whom the
country is trying to satisfy a payment that
succeeds in not scaring off capitalist investors 
in time should generally satisfy investors from
countries where previous shareholders live the
more a country rejects capitalist criteria for 
compensation, the more likely it is that the 
socialist countries will be pleased and willing to 
supply technical expertise".
For the foregoing, it is clear that the choice of a criterion
for compensation must be consistent with future economic
planning and foreign aid in the fields of skilled manpower and
financial investments. But whatever the case may be, it does
not seem proper that goodwill in an emergent country must be
compensated for. Moreover, it does not seem morally justifiable
that even after the former owners of the businesses taken over
have been extracting massive profits over a period of half a
century using an unbelievably cheap labour, should still get
large sums of compensation by insisting that invisible property
rights should be taken into account as subjects of compensation.
It must also be added that the owners of these businesses earned
the so-called "goodwill" due to a number of factors - one of which
was the supply of cheap labour by the economically colonized
country; yet it is not known, and indeed highly unlikely, whether
they ever took into account the fact that the country should be
left with something in appreciation of its role in making their
success possible.
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Further, -it should, not be imagined that economic right of 
a foreign country can continue indefinitely in the nationalizing 
state free of legislative interference; for "property.1 ... .is. no 
longer defined as a compound of tangible, real and personal assets,
but is the totality of all rights and interest capable of legal
j 16 3
I protection which had economic value*’. . . Further, as Fatouros has
| said: "
I
j
"A radical change of the existing conditions may eliminate 
altogether the value of certain intangible assets. Thus,
| in a socialist economy operating under a strict state
j plan, the concept of goodwill or poseession of customers
largely loses its meaning".
! An undeveloped country should therefore be left to pay as much
and "no more" than will buy what it wants, whether it be management
goodwill or investor goodwill.
H. The Need to create a Consistent Legal Infrastructure
as a Prerequisite to Economic Reforms
Admittedly no ex-colony wanting to push through some
programme of rapid economic, or even political change can succeed
in this endeavour unless it makes bold changes in its laws - 
especially changes in its constitution. Radical social trans­
formation implies a radical change in the law. It is for this 
reason that the constitution must be the first target in the 
process of inducing rapid economic development; that is, the 
inhibitive provisions on economic development must first ber' 
removed and replaced by more realistic ones. The Zambian experience 
in this regard again provides an excellent example of the way public
ownership must first start with changes in the law. Thus it becomes 
necessary to illustrate our theme by recounting that experience.
4 0 6
1. Constitutional and economic reforms in Zambia
Zambia, like many other ex-colonies, inherited a typical
laissez-faire capitalist economy that was built on the
principles of free enterprise, private ownership of resources,
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and on profit motive. It was this economic order that was 
reflected in the entrenched clauses of the independence 
constitution. Zambia, soon after independence, had formulated 
ambitious economic projects which could not be implemented 
without making some fundamental changes in the bill of rights. 
The economic development programmes which the government 
intended to embark upon were announced in the form of policy 
statements by President Kaunda. Since the attainment of 
independence in October 1964, there have been three such 
policy statement, viz.,
a) The Mulungushi speech on April 19, 1968, entitled
it * i  • fl 6 6Zambia1s Economic Revolution ;
b) The Matero speech on August 11, 1969, entitled
"Towards Complete Independence";^ and
c) A speech on November 10, 1970, entitled
it • • 6 8This Completes Economic Reforms: Now Zambia is Ours .
. i) The take-over of the industrial sector of the economy
At Mulungushi, the state sought to invite 27 companies to 
offer to the state a 51 per cent shareholding in their 
enterprises. The measures were taken to guard against 
exploitation by the foreign and expatriate-controlled companies. 
President Kaunda elaborated on this when he charged that:
"They (the firms affected) operate price rings with 
similar companies and create a false monopoly position 
because of the buoyant demand and the difficult supply 
position. They do not make enough efforts to move 
away from unacceptable sources and out-dated management 
philosophies. They still maintain personnel and 
training policies which are not in accord with the 
nation’s present needs. They are failing to reinvest 
sufficient portion of their profits for the general
expansion and development we have to safeguard
the national economy and prevent unfair exploitation 
of the boom of conditions".69
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It is thus evident that. Government’s 
motive for the take-overs of the industrial field was the ; 
desire to check inflation and to supervise investment policies 
in the interest of the nation, and also the need to put up 
comprehensive programmes for the localization of staff in 
their section/^ It is probably appropriate at this juncture 
to point out that the government was made sensitive by the 
unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia, and by 
the boom condition it induced in Zambia for both foreign- 
owned and expatriate-controlled non-mining companies. The 
"profit boom" occurred in the 1966/67 period when these 
companies made fantastic profits which, according to the 
government, enabled these companies to expatriate a 
substantial proportion of it from the country. The Mulungushi 
speech, therefore, was intended to design measures to prevent 
exploitation by these foreign and expatriate-controlled 
companies. The companies selected were in the construction 
industry where "prices have soared to astronomic heights"; 
in the transport section to "rationalize and co-ordinate the 
activities" of the transport companies "to direct them to 
co-operate in the national interest"; in the retail/wholesale
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sector, 'Including all five retail chain stores, as a measure 
of control and a check on inflation?; in the brewing industry 
because of the monopoly position and "excessive profits";
71 # p.and a few miscellaneous ones. The Industrial development 
Corporation Limited (INDECO) was charged with the responsibility 
of looking after the stateTs participation in the industrial 
private business. Suffice it here to mention that INDECO was 
already in existence even before the above events had taken 
place; and had been established earlier as the arm of the 
government in business, and participated in that regard to 
a greater or lesser extent in some twenty companies in commerce, 
industry, transport and other fields.
INDECO, being a commercial public corporation incorporated
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under the Companies1 Act, was charged to run the companies
taken over in a proper and businesslike way, keeping in mind
the national interest. It was also left to INDECO to negotiate
values and terms of payment, but the President made it clear
"that what they will pay is a fair value represented by the
book value. There is no such thing as business goodwill or
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paying for future profits as far as I am concerned . He 
further threatened that should the negotiations result in a 
deadlock, government was going compulsorily to acquire the 
shares in the enterprises concerned. One interesting aspect 
about the implementation of these take-overs was that the 
owners of the businesses taken over came out comparatively 
well as far as negotiations on the question of compensation 
were concerned. In the first place, they accepted an assessment
4 09
based on "fair value represented by the book value", which, 
because it excluded goodwill and future profits, was clearly 
less than the adequate compensation stipulated in the 
Constitution. In the second place, they accepted to be paid 
out from future profits. It should be pointed out here that 
when these take-overs took place, the Constitution had not 
been amended and had the "adequate" and "prompt" payment 
provisions still standing. Had the owners of the companies 
taken over insisted on their rights under the Constitution, 
the reforms might have proved difficult to implement, since 
the government would not easily have raised the needed large 
sums of money to compensate the owners. On the other hand, 
the affected companies were.also well advised to agree to payment 
of compensation being spread over a period of time if they 
wished their activities to continue in Zambia. They were also 
well advised that it was realistic for them to adopt a positive 
attitude to the new form of co-operation, and to negotiate for 
the most favourable form of agreement as a basis for their 
future activities. It is true that government also contributed 
to the overall success of the negotiations by offering 
attractive incentives. For although the state became the 
majority shareholder in those businesses, operational control 
of the companies remained in the hands of the former owners 
under the management/consultancy agreements. The government 
in entering into these agreements had intended to retain the 
expatriate staff in view of the lack of skilled personnel
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locally - particularly at the managerial level. The 
government also agreed to relax the exchange control 
regulations so as to exempt the 49 per cent shareholders 
from the requirement that the amount of remittable profits 
be limited to 50 per cent.
On the other hand, the take-over of the mining 
industry involved a considerable amount of background work 
on the part of the government. Here the amount of money 
involved was so enormous that it seemed unrealistic on the 
part of the government to trust to the mining companies 
accepting its terms. Moreover, it was not an easy task for 
the government to change the Constitution at that time in 
order to remove the restrictive provisions relating to 
property rights under Section 18. It will be recalled that 
at Mulungushi President Kaunda had announced that government 
had accepted in principle the need to amend that part of
the Constitution which related to the compulsory acquisition
74 . . . . .of property. The British had ensured in writing the
independence constitution for Zambia that none of the 
fundamental rights (protection of private property right 
included) could be altered - except with the approval of 
a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly and also the 
approval of a 51 per cent majority of those of the electorate
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entitled to vote in a referendum. Moreover, the 51 per cent 
required was to be out of the registered voters; which meant 
that those who were absent, those who did not vote properly 
and those who were dead, were counted as if they had indeed 
voted. It was in these circumstances that a referendum was 
held on 17 June 1969, to remove the above constitutional 
provision requiring that a referendum should be held prior to 
the amendment of the fundamental freedoms and certain other
provisions. An overall majority was duly obtained approving
7 6this course, and the Referendum (Amendment) Act was passed 
to implement the above new developments. The only requirement 
now to change Chapter III of the Constitution was a two-thirds 
majority of the National Assembly/^ With this the government 
was now in a position to repeal Section 18. Mr. Simon Kapwepwe, 
the then Vice-President and leader of government business in 
the House, spoke highly of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 
when he was presenting it to the House. He said:
11 With this mandate (approval by the electorate to
remove the referendum clause in the Constitution), we 
are now capable of going forward to remove the colonial 
obstacles which were put in our Constitution with 
satanic intentions. I have used the word "satanic"
purposely, because this Constitution was imposed
on us. It was to protect the British interests in 
this country. As such we were left out of the economic 
stream and our people could not participate in the 
economy of their country. In some cases we, the 
government, were left powerless to fight poverty and 
economic inequalities. Let it not be said that we 
got political independence, but we failed to achieve 
the economic independence for our people11.
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It has already been said that the 1960 Constitutional 
Amendment enabled the government to acquire without compensation 
mineral rights still held by individuals and private companies. 
But its relevance in the present context is that the 
restrictive provisions in the Constitution were abolished.
The abolished provisions were:-
Ma) The requirement that compulsory acquisition had to be 
necessary or expedient in certain specified interests;
b) The requirement that compensation had to be adequate and 
paid promptly;
c) The guarantee of the right of the owner to remit the 
compensation money to any country of his choice;
d) His right of access to the court for the determination of
79compensation was also abolished!'.
The amended Constitution authorized compulsory acquisition 
effected under the authority of an Act of Parliament which 
provides for payment of compensation for the property, or 
interests, or right dispossessed of. An Act of Parliament such 
as is referred to above would, among other things:
"i) Provide that compensation shall be paid in money;
ii) Specify the principles upon which the compensation is 
to be determined, and
iii) Provide that the amount of the compensation shall, in 
default of agreement, be determined by resolution of 
the National Assembly. No such compensation determined
by the National Assembly can be questioned in any court
. • ii 76on the grounds that it is not adequate,.
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The Lands' Acquisition Act referred to already, was 
passed to implement these provisions,
ii) The take-over of the mining industry
With the above changes in the Constitution, the
President announced the government's intention to acquire 
a 51 per cent share participation in the two mining 
companies. The mining companies were those of the Anglo- 
American and Roan Selection Groups. With regard to the v
value and terms of payment, the President announced that
he again intended to leave these matters to INDECO to 
negotiate. However, he made it clear once more that what 
the government would pay was a fair value represented by 
the book value, and that the government had no money to pay 
as a deposit against the shares acquired. INDECO was 
therefore left to negotiate payment out of future dividends.
For the Zambia Anglo-American groups, the assets,
undertakings and liabilities of Nchanga, Rhokana, the
Rhokana Copper refineries, and Bancroft, in which the government
wished to acquire a 51 per cent holding, all merged into
one operating company, the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines
Limited (NCCM Ltd.). 51 per cent of the shares of this
company was then to be distributed to a newly created
government mining company, the Mining Industrial
Corporation Limited (MINDECO Ltd.). The agreed audited 
80accounts of the assets of Anglo-American at
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31 December 1969, gave a total book value of K127,642,137
(US$178,698,992). Repayment of this amount was to be in the
form of a compensation stock to be issued by the wholly
government-owned Zambia Industrial and Mining Company (ZIMCO),
which in turn wholly owned MINDECO Ltd. This stock was to be
repayable in 24 semi-annual instalments at 6 per cent per annum
interest,each of $10,551 ,639 - as from 1 April 1970, and ending
on 10 April 1982. The only qualification to this was that if,
in any year after the fourth repayment, the total amount of
interest and principal repayable in that year was more than
two-thirds of the dividend that MINDECO received from NCCM,
then there would be an accelerated repayment amounting to
81
two-thirds of the "full market value"; so that if good will
of the businesses acquired had been, taken into account, the
compensatible amounts would certainly have been much higher.
One can therefore conclude that the Constitutional Amendment
of 1969 served a useful role in ensuring the successful
implementation of the take-over measures.
iii) The Take-Over of the Financial Sector
Although state participation had so far been extended to the
mining sector and the industrial field, the state did not have any
stake in the area of finance, that is, the fields of banking,
♦
insurance and the building societies. It was imperative, therefore 
that the government should take measures to bring the financial 
sector under government control if the other take-overs referred 
to above and the measures to indigenize the retail/wholesale
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businesses were to be effectively implemented. For how could 
an emerging, but aspiring Zambian businessman, who had just taken 
advantage of the new reforms in the retail/wholesale field of the 
economy, be expected to go very far in the absence of favourable 
credit facilities which could only be granted by financial 
institutions? The evidence available at the time of the 
nationalization of the financial sector, indicated that banks in 
the country formulated their investment policies primarily in terms 
of the interests of their outside parent organizations, rather 
than by the interests of the new nation. President Kaunda was 
very open in condemning the attitude of banks in Zambia: ,
"Comrades, traditionally banks have been seen as the epitome 
of capitalism, the ultimate owners of the means of production. 
Our experience in Zambia has been rather different. We 
disapprove of many of the policies of the head offices of the
local banks  I would merely say that they have been
exclusively conservative in their staff policies, in opening 
new branches in the rural areas and in their credit policies. 
For example, they have only iust started recently making 
loans to emerging farmers". ^ 2
The take-over of a 51 per cent share participation in all 
banks in the country was announced on 10 November 1970, in a speech 
to the National Council of the ruling United National Independence 
Party (UNIP). The government took these measures in the hope that 
in future banking facilities would be spread to the rural areas 
where they were urgently needed, and also to influence formulation 
of more liberal policies towards lending money to emerging Zambian 
entrepreneurs. In the same speech the President announced that 
government had decided to nationalize completely building societies 
doing business in the country.
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The reason for this decision was that building societies 
had been slow in adapting themselves to the interests and needs 
of the nation. For example, they still preferred commercial loans 
to housing loans; they still preferred to lend to companies rather 
than to individuals; they liked to lend in the urban and not in 
the rural areas. The government intended to provide remedies for 
the above inadequacies. To implement the one hundred per cent take­
over of the building societies, the Building Societies' (Amendment)
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Act 1970, was passed. Section 3 of the Act amends the principal 
Act so that now the Minister of Finance may, "if he is of the opinion 
that it is in the public interest so to do, cancel the registration 
of a building society". The discretionary power conferred on the 
Minister was no doubt intended to be used in order to implement 
government policy to assume a monopoly position by the state in the 
building field of the economy. Section 4 of the Act provides that 
a building society may, by resolution of its board of directors, 
transfer its engagements to the Zambia National Building Society.
In the field of insurance, President Kaunda also announced that 
no insurance company was going to be allowed to write up new 
business in Zambia. The already established Zambia State Insurance 
Corporation was to be enlarged in order to become the only insurance 
company in the country. The then existing insurance companies were 
not, as from 31 December 1970, to renew their existing insurance 
policies. They were to hand over their operations to the State 
Insurance Corporation which was to remain the only insurance company 
in Zambia. The government passed the Insurance Companies' (Cessation 
and Transfer of Business) Act 197$^- "An Act to restrict, regulate
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and prohibit the carrying on of insurance business in Zambia; 
to provide for the transfer of subsisting contracts of insurance; 
to make provision for the protection of policy owners, and to 
provide for matters incidental thereto". The Act prohibits any 
person other than the State Insurance Corporation to enter into 
any contract of insurance after the end of the current year (i.e.
1970). Further, no person other than the Corporation was to renew
85any contract of insurance. In Section 5(1) of the Act, all 
contracts of insurance subsisting at the commencement of the Act 
were to be transferred to the corporation. The Act imposes the 
duty on the corporation to provide, in accordance with sound 
insurance principles, adequate and proper insurance services and 
facilities of all classes throughout Zambia.
In order to administer the field of national finance, a new
corporation called the Financial Development Corporation Limited
(FINDECO), was set up. The idea of establishing a monopoly over
the entire insurance business had been applied in Tanzania in 1967.
The Tanzanian legislation, the Insurance (Vesting of Interests and
86Regulation) Act 1967, provided for the acquisition of the entire 
insurance businesses in the country, and the vesting of a monopoly 
of insurance in the National Insurance Corporation. The Tanzanian 
and Zambian Acts sanctioning the transfer of all insurance businesses 
into a state-controlled company, do not provide for compensation to 
be awarded to the former owners of the insurance assets - the 
implication being that the owners of the companies affected are 
without remedy in Tanzanian and Zambian laws. This brings us to
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a consideration of a pertinent question in this regard, namely:
Were not the owners of the insurance businesses who were forced 
to pack up and go, not entitled to some form of compensation? 
Although the state merely proclaimed a total monopoly position in 
this field, and did not actually transfer to itself any corporeal 
assets, yet it is arguable that the government by so doing had 
incurred actual losses of a foreign insurance company forced to 
discontinue its activities. The losses thus incurred include:
"The losses incurred in closing down the company’s business, 
disposing of assets, premises, office equipment, etc., the 
original expenses of which would have been incurred as an 
investment in the expectation of continuing business in 
the future; another example of the same kind of los- would 
be expenditure on training local citizens in insurance 
work....
On the other hand, it has been argued that no government is
bound to allow foreign interests to carry on business indefinitely,
and that a foreign investor must take the risk of changes in the law 
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of the country. Assuming that this argument is tenable, the 
government is nevertheless under some moral duty as to how it 
terminates the permission given in the past to earn livelihood in 
the country. For although that permission might have been given by 
the former colonial power, still this alone should not be reason 
for an abrupt cancellation of insurance licences of foreigners. 
Moreover, Article 10(3)(a) of the Harvard Convention on the 
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 
referred to already, provides that:
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MA taking of property includes not only an outright taking 
of property but also any such unreasonable interference 
with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as to 
justify an inference that the owner thereof will be able 
to use, enjoy or dispose of the property within a 
reasonable period of time after the inception of such 
interference".89
Obviously, the declaration of a total monopoly by the state 
in the field of insurance business, rendered the property of 
those formerly participating in the business economically useless, 
so as to frustrate the proper enjoyment of the property. Nor is it 
conceivable that the property involved could be disposed of within 
a reasonable time after the inception of government interference.
The former insurance companies may have entered into contracts 
that extended over a considerable period in the future, and their 
performance may thus have been completely frustrated, and the 
expected profits thereon lost. In Zambia, Kaunda announced 
that as from 31 December 1971, existing companies would not be able 
to renew policies in the country. He said this on 10 November 1970 - 
and so the period of grace given to the companies to wind up their 
affairs was only one year. In Tanzania, the creation of a state 
monopoly of insurance was to have immediate effect, first with 
respect to life policies, and later, after an interval of eleven 
months, all forms of general insurance. The point that is intended 
to be put across here is that any government which excludes aliens 
from a certain means of livelihood, must allow them a reasonable , 
time in which to arrange their affairs. The fixing of the time 
must not be determined arbitrarily, but must be based on accurate 
professional information as to how long it can take an insurance 
company to dispose of its assets. It must be emphasized that this
is intended for the protection of individuals who have lost their
90
means of livelihood, rather than for the companies.
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J, The Indigenizatiori of the Retail/Wholesale Sector of the Economy 
One notable feature of the economies of emergent states soon 
after independence is the domination of the retail and wholesale 
businesses by foreigners. Probably with the exception of the 
remote rural areas, practically all of the urban retail/wholesale 
activities are controlled and dominated by European and Asian 
business communities, whose members have been resident in those 
countries for many years. The take-over of the big commercial, 
financial, industrial and mining concerns would, therefore, still 
have left the retail and wholesale trading enterprises in the hands 
of foreigners. Yet this is one area where local entrepreneurship 
would conceivably be promoted quite readily, and with minimum 
organizational and financial difficulties. This is so because 
most of these concerns are relatively small businesses which can 
easily be handled. Consequently, most of the newly-liberated 
African countries have taken measures intended to achieve 
indigenization of the retail and wholesale field.
At Mulungushi, simultaneously with the take-over of the twenty- 
seven selected companies in the industrial sector, President Kaunda 
also announced far-reaching measures intended to activate Zambian 
entrepreneurship. The President complained that:
"The banks, the insurance companies, the building societies, 
the hire purchase companies, and other financial 
institutions have not been willing to assist the Zambian 
businessman. So the level of Zambian business has remained 
low and unless we take firm action now, our Zambian 
businessmen will never catch up with the level of the 
resident expatriate businessman. These people have access 
to loan funds from banks, building societies, insurance 
companies, hire purchase companies, and every financial 
institution that exists in the country. It is therefore time 
to take more drastic steps to assist the people’s buoincurs 
business to bridge the gap that exists between it and the 
resident expatriate business".91
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The first measure which the government took in this regard,
was to restrict local borrowing of expatriate enterprise, i.e.
from this moment henceforth, the banks, the building societies,
the insurance companies, the hire purchase companies and all the
other financial institutions in the country were, instructed to
ensure that before approving a loan for business purposes to a
company or partnership or an individual businessman, they must be
satisfied that if it is a company its members and its shareholders
are Zambians; if it is a partnership, that all the partners are
92
Zambians; if it is an individual, that he is a Zambian. At the
same time, it was announced that if the application for a loan
came from a non-Zambian, the matter was to be referred to the
Exchange Control Authorities who would approve it or reject it using
the same criterion as the one obtaining in approving or rejecting
. 93applications for loans from foreign-controlled companies. Now, as 
a matter of explanation, foreign companies, even before these 
measures were introduced, were not allowed to borrow money without 
limits. The amount of money they could borrow stood in some kind
of relationship with the amount of money they brought into the
94 . . .
country. This is the criterion that the government intended to use
with respect to the resident expatriate-controlled retail/wholesale 
enterprises, namely, the amount of money they were allowed to borrow 
was going to depend on the amount of their own investment. By this, 
the government thought that the financial institutions would then 
deflect their excess liquidity to promote Zambian business.
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In the second place, the government took the measure of
confining the areas of retail trading by non-Zambians to the
centre of ten big towns only. From 1 January 1972, the ban on
retail trading licences to non-Zambians was extended to the main
town centres. Implementing these measures, the Trades Licensing
Act was amended to contain additions to the effect that:
"Save with the consent in writing of the Minister responsible 
for Commerce and Trade, no Licensing Authority shall issue 
a reserved licence to an applicant who is not a citizen of 
Zambia " ^
The Act also provided that if any such reserved licence was issued
in contravention of the above provision to a person who is not a
.96citizen of Zambia,it shall be void, if such a licence is issued to
a person who, by reason of any event, ceases to be a citizen of
Zambia during the period of validity of the said reserved licence,
. 97it shall upon the happening of such event, expire. Further, the 
Minister responsible for commerce and industry was empowered to
revoke, by statutory order, any reserved licence issued earlier to
98a non-Zambian. By Section 17(4), a citizen of Zambia means:
"a) In relation to an individual, an individual who is a 
citizen of Zambia;
b) In relation to a partnership, a partnership which is 
composed exclusively of persons who are citizens of Zambia;
c) In relation to a body corporate, a body corporate which is 
incorporated under the laws of Zambia Cap 686 - i.e., the 
Companies Act, and
' i) is certified under the hand of the Minister to be 
controlled by the State
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ii) A) whose membership is composed exclusively of persons
who are citizens of Zambia; and
B) whose directors are exclusively citizens of Zambia;
and
C) which is not controlled, by any means, directly or 
indirectly, outside Zambia, or by persons who are not 
citizens of Zambia or who are associated in the 
capital structure thereof with persons who are not 
citizens of ZambiaV.
The stated objective of the ban recounted above in the area 
of retail/wholesale of the national economy was to compel non- 
Zambians to sell their businesses to Zambians through normal 
private contracts. This being the case therefore, there was no 
question of compulsory acquisition within the meaning of the 
Constitution. What had happened, in effect, was that the government 
had simply used its power through the mechanism of granting or 
denial of trading licences. The interesting legal issue is, however, 
whether the owners of these businesses could have successfully argued 
that the measures taken by the government amounted to a contravention 
of the constitutional protection against discrimination. Our* view is 
that it is difficult to sustain that contention for the following 
reasons:
i) The relevant provision in the Constitution on the protection 
against discrimination is contained in Article 25(1), which 
reads:
"Subject to the provisions of Clauses 4, 5 and 7, no law 
shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of 
itself or in its effect".
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This protection,, however, is made subject to 
the provisions contained in Clauses 4, 5 and 7. Clause 4 
provides that Clause 1, that is, the protective provision, 
"shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes
provision: ... (b) with respect to persons who are not
citizens of Zambia " The effect of these provisions
in fact, amounts to a non-protection (so far as the 
constitutional guarantee against discrimination is concerned) 
of non-citizens of Zambia,
ii) Secondly, the law regulating the issue of trading licences,
The Trades1 Licensing Act 1968, which has already been 
referred to, vests the discretion in the licensing authority 
to refuse an application for a licence if he is satisfied 
that it would be against the public interest to issue it,
and the Minister can say on behalf of the authority what
99appears to him to be against the public interest. As has 
been said elsewhere in this inquiry, an exercise of a 
discretionary power requires only the subjective satisfaction 
of the person or body vested with the discretion - in this 
case, the licensing authority. It seems clear therefore, 
that a denial of trading licences to non-citizens by the 
licensing authority cannot easily be challenged to be unlawful 
on the ground that it is against the public interest. This 
last statement should be tied up with our third reason, 
namely,
iii) That measures which are taken, such as the denial of
trading licences to non-citizens, which are intended to 
transfer the economy, or an aspect of it, into the hands of 
the indigenous people, are measures "reasonably justified 
in a democratic society" such as Zambia - and any constitution 
deeply rooted in the values of democracy must seek 
to advance that objective. Let it be stressed here once again, 
that one of the primary functions of any democratic government 
in the newly-born state is to seek to establish the socio­
economic conditions under which the dignity of its indigenous 
people must be founded - and the indigenization of the retail 
trading field is surely one practical and effective step 
towards that end.
Some Experiences in Uganda and Botswana
Of course Zambia was not the only African country which 
encountered the kind of legal problems that we have been explaining 
in the preceding paragraphs which were holding back efforts to 
induce development. Thanks to the decision by the Tanzanian government
'tO)
not^incorporate a bill of rights in the Constitution of its country, 
Tanzania has, perhaps, been in the forefront in initiating and 
implementing socio-economic reforms. Had the country1s Constitution 
included a bill of rights, the crisis there between human rights and 
efforts to transform its society socially and: economically, would 
certainly have been greater. On the other hand, Uganda and Botswana, 
both countries with a bill of rights, experienced some of these 
problems.
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1) Uganda
The stated socialist policy of Dr. Obote’s government in
Uganda was called by the name of the "Move to the Left"
strategy.^ It might be pointed out here that the military
government of Amin was completely unfettered by any
constitutional restraints in its endeavour to bring about the
localization of the economy, while on the other hand, Dr. Obote's
government had to start from the point of restructuring the
inherited legal framework, which was not always facilitative
in the implementation of the much needed economic programmes
along socialist lines. The purpose of this section of the *
IS
inquiry therefore, to trace the history of economic 
nationalism in Uganda in the context of the kind of legal 
problems encountered in that part of Commonwealth Africa, and 
also to show how the constitutional protection of private 
property rights in the Ugandan independence constitution was 
altered to permit the acquisition of property by the state 
under more realistic conditions.
The genesis of economic nationalism in a clearly articulated 
form is probably traceable to the adoption of "The Common Manfs 
Charter'^  Siy the Annual Delegates1 Conference of the ruling 
Uganda People1s Congress, as the broad and basic policy of the 
Party and government. This document, "The Comman Man's Charter", 
was adopted "for the realization of the real meaning of 
independence, namely, that the resources of the country, 
material and human, be exploited for the benefit of all the
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people of Uganda in accordance with the principles of 
102
socialism". What the Party affirmed therefore, was a
fundamental belief that economic power in Uganda should be
vested in the majority of the people and not in the minority,
most of whom were aliens at that time. It was in consequence of
this that the charter stated that "the guiding principle will be
that the means of production and distribution must be in the hands
of the people as a whole", and that the "fulfilment of this
principle may involve nationalization of the enterprises privately 
103
owned". The Annual Delegates1 Conference of UPC directed the 
government to work towards the objective of whatever is desirable 
in the interests of the people, nationalizing any or all privately 
owned enterprises, freehold land, and all other productive
104
assets of property, at any time, for the benefit of the people.
But "The Move to the Left" strategy, as stipulated in the 
charter, could not easily be realized because, as was the case 
elsewhere in Commonwealth Africa, the independence constitution 
written for Uganda in 1962 and also its Republican constitution of 
1967, contained provisions entrenching the protection of private 
property rights. The provisions in question are the same
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requirement about "prompt payment of adequate compensation".
Naturally, the first task in the direction of "The Move to the Left", 
was for the government to use its legislative power to remove the 
constitutional obstacle posed to the realization of the 
nationalization stipulation in the charter. This was duly done in
106
1970 by the enactment of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1970.
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The Amendment Act deleted the reference in the Constitution to 
’’prompt" and "adequate" compensation, and thereafter the 
obligation was only "the payment of reasonable compensation".
The Amendment came into force on the first day of January 1970, 
and five months later an Act was passed to provide for acquisition 
of shares by the government or other public bodies in companies
incorporated under the Companies’ Act. The Companies (Government
   108
and Public Bodies’ Participation) Act, enacted that:
"As from the close of business on the 30th day of April 1970, 
the Government, or other public body declared by the 
Minister as such for the purposes of this Act by statutory 
instrument shall be deemed to have acquired such number of 
shares, not exceeding 60 per cent of each class of shares 
issued, and shall, after the coming into force of this Act, 
acquire 60 per cent of any shares which may be issued by 
the companies specified in Schedule 1 to this A c t " .109
The Schedule under reference in the Act, listed 84 companies with
issued share capital which were affected by virtue of the coming
into operation of the Act. Moreover, the Minister was empowered by
the Act to amend Schedule 1 by statutory order to add to, or subtract
110
from, the list of the affected companies. It was further provided 
that until such time as nominees of the government or other public 
body were appointed to the Board of Directors of every affected 
company, such company was prohibited, on penalty of fine, to do any 
of the matters which were specified in Schedule 2 of the Act.^ Thus, 
a company to which the Act applied was forbidden to dismiss or 
engage staff, sell its assets including stocks and shares, declare 
dividends, take on new liabilities, issue new shares, change its 
assets, change the salaries or terms of employment of staff, 
including terminal benefits, cancel or allow to lapse existing
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insurance policies, go into voluntary liquidation or otherwise 
stop business, appoint new directors, or in any way vary the 
conditions, terms of service of remuneration payable to its 
directors." '&e obvious intention of the government in writing 
these provisions into the Act, was to check on the anticipated 
possibility that some of the affected companies may engage in 
activities likely to frustrate government efforts to introduce a 
national component in the economy.
As regards compensation to be paid to the former owners of 
the shares acquired, the responsible Minister was to appoint a 
number of valuers to determine the values of the shares acquired; 
and payment for such shares acquired was to be made on the basis 
of the valuation made by the valuers. As in Zambia and Tanzania, 
the Ugandan Act specifically provided that the government was to 
pay for the shares so acquired from the profits received from the 
company, but in Uganda this was to be effected within a statutory 
period of time not exceeding 15 years. And any shareholder 
aggrived by the determination of the value of his property by the 
valuers, has a right of appeal, first to a tribunal appointed by 
the Minister under the Act, and from there to the High Court. It 
is significant, perhaps, to mention here that as far as valuation 
of the amount of compensation of the acquired property is concerned, 
the Minister plays a very major role, which may sometimes operate to 
the detriment of the former owner. Under the Companies* (Government 
and Public Bodies Participation) Act, for example, the Minister may
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make regulations providing for procedure for the valuation of
shares, and may also make the same to provide for membership of
113
the tribunal m  hearing appeals under the Act. It is not without
substance to allege that the Minister may prefer governmentTs
interest in the matter to prevail over and above that of an
individual owner who is left completely unrepresented in the
valuation process of his property. Through the Minister’s statutory
power to appoint valuers and also members of the appellate tribunal,
plus his power to lay down the regulations providing for procedure
for the valuation of shares, political considerations can predominate
in the whole exercise so as to stultify the owner’s entitlement to
compensation. On the other hand, the owner’s right of appeal to
the High Court is at least a relief in the sense that any assessment
based on extraneous considerations and which operates unfairly to
the former owner can, hopefully, be checked.
At. the same time, the Companies’ (Government and Public
Bodies Participation) Act provided for a complete nationalization
114
of the import and export trade. After the 6th day of May 1970, no 
person other than the government or other public body was 
authorized to engage in import and export business; and any 
licence granted to anybody under any provision of any written law 
which was in force immediately before the appointed date of 6th May
1970, was forthwith cancelled - but without prejudice to goods
115 . 116 
in transit. The Export and Import Corporation exercised the
sole right in the country, on behalf of the government, to import
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and export goods of any class or description for the purpose
of trade. The Corporation is empowered, for the purposes of
carrying out its export and import business, to acquire
compulsorily any of the premises, fixtures, fittings or any
ancillary equipment used by the former importer or exporter
in the course of his business^Any such former importer or
exporter whose property has been subjected to compulsory
acquisition effected under the authority of the Act, has a
statutory entitlement to compensation,from the Corporation.
The compensation is assessed on the basis of a valuation
made by the valuers appointed in accordance with the
provisions of the Companies’ (Government and Public Bodies
Participation) Act 1970, which has already been discussed.
It is an offence, under the Export and Import Corporation Act
1970, punishable by fine, to refuse to give or in any way to
obstruct the Corporation from taking of any premises, fixtures,
118fittings or ancillary equipment.
-ii) Botswana
In 1969, Botswana also joined Zambia and Uganda in the 
recognition that there was need to adjust the Constitution to 
permit the objectives of economic development to be implemented.
The Constitution (Amendment and Supplementary Provisions) Act
119 .1969, allowed the Government of Botswans to acquire compulsorily
property if the purpose of the act of acquisition was to secure
the development or utilization of the property for a purpose
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beneficial to the community. The actual and compelling
motive behind the government's intention in passing the
Amendment was the need for the exploitation, on a commercial
basis, of the mineral deposits in Botswana, and the obvious
necessity of having the mineralization of the country under
120the control of the state. For this reason the Amendment 
went beyond the existing provisions which permitted compulsory 
acquisition if it was necessary or expedient in order to 
secure the development or utilization of property for a 
purpose beneficial to the community - now the Amendment 
specifically extended the authority of compulsory acquisition 
to the development or utilization of the mineral resources of 
Botswana. In the second place, the Amendment enacted that 
the stipulation about "prompt payment of adequate compensation" 
"shall be deemed to be satisfied in relation to any law 
applicable to the taking of possession of minerals or the 
acquisition of rights to minerals if that law makes provision
for the payment at reasonable intervals of adequate
.. 121compensation .
It will have become clear from our survey of the nature of the 
constitutional provisions protecting property rights in Zambia and other 
Commonwealth African states, that they operated to inhibit governments' 
plans intended to induce the much needed socio-economic improvements in 
the lives of the people, and the well-being of the country. The 
constitutional reforms that we have noted were a response to the 
frustrations engendered by those provisions on the part of the government. 
However, in the process of effecting alterations to the bill of rights,
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there is no doubt that the value of the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution - especially the right to property ownership - has been 
greatly diminished. It can therefore be said that the exigencies of 
economic development, like those of national security, constitute an 
incidence operating to limit the full enjoyment of human rights. However, 
there is yet another factor explaining why human rights have failed Ho 
operate successfully in emergent states. The incidence of a one-party 
state is also one factor whose features, or some of whose features are 
incompatible with a bill of rights. The next chapter examines the 
extent to which the system of a one-party system impinges on the practical 
fulfilment of the principles implied in the concept of human rights.
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CHAPTER 8
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ONE-PARTY STATE (l)
A question can be posed here as to how far is the effective 
protection of fundamental human rights compatible with the adoption 
of a single-party system of government? Of the twelve Commonwealth 
African states, five are or have been established as de jure one-party 
states - these are Ghana (1964-66), Tanzania (1965), Malawi (1966),
Zambia (1972), Sierra Leone (1978). Three of these, that is Nkrumah*s 
Ghana, Tanzania, and Malawi rejected the incorporation of a bill of 
rights as a substantive part of their single-party constitutions. It 
is thus notable that Zambia (1973) and more recently Sierra Leone (1978), 
the two most recently created de jure one-party states in Commonwealth 
Africa, have on the contrary, opted for the retention of a bill of 
rights in their single-party constitutions. Recently, in September 1976, 
an international seminar organized by the International Commission of 
Jurists on * Human Rights in a One-Party State*, urged in its 
conclusions that:
11 national constitutions [i.e. of one-party states]
should include justiciable bills of rights".*
But can an enforceable bill of rights exist in, and be compatible with,
a de jure one-party system? If it can, are there areas of the bill of
rights which, nevertheless, cannot operate within the single-party
constitutional set-up? Since, among the single-party systems, it is in
Zambia that individual rights have received formal constitutional
protection for the longest period, the question posed for the present
investigation will be answered with reference to the Zambian experience -
although of course some comparisons with the positions obtaining in
Tanazania, Malawi and Sierra Leone will be included in the appropriate
contexts.
However, before coming directly to the central theme of this 
chapter, it is obviously necessary to appreciate the background to 
the establishment of single-party systems in Commonwealth Africa - 
their origins and spread, reasons for their adoption, and the various 
methods employed for their establishment.
A. The Origins and Spread of Single-Party Systems 
in Commonwealth Africa
i) Origins:
Although rule by a single-party made one of its first 
appearances in the communist countries of Russia and China, 
its origins and spread in Africa seem to have arisen from 
the constitutional experiences of the francophone African 
states. Before the adoption of either presidential rule or 
single-party systems in Commonwealth Africa, the francophone 
states had already experienced governments under these systems. 
Thus it might be hypothesized that events in the neighbouring 
francophone states might have provided a cue for similar 
events in the neighbouring Commonwealth African states.
Ghana, for example, which first adopted the one-party system 
in anglophonic Africa was in proximity with francophone 
colonies like Guinea, Senegal, Mali and the Ivory Coast - 
all of which had already established single-party systems 
of government.
It is relevant to observe that human rights in those 
constitutions which drew their inspiration from the Gaullist 
model of France are protected merely by way of a preamble.
The constitutions of francophone African states have indeed
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implemented the approach to the protection of the
* Rights of Man and Citizens1 with which the mother country -
France - is traditionally associated. It is interesting to
note that this approach is closely reflected (though in
different forms) in at least three of the de jure one-party
states in Commonwealth Africa - Ghana (1960), Tanzania 
. 2and Malawi. It is not out of place to conclude, albeit 
tentatively, that the constitutional practices in the 
francophonic Africa had some impact on the constitutional 
developments in post-independence Commonwealth Africa,
ii) Spread
As already stated, Ghana became the first Commonwealth 
African state to establish a de jure one-party state in 1964. 
The Convention Peoples’ Party (the CPP) under President Kwame 
Nkrumah therefore became the only legally recognized party.
A year later, Ghana’s example was followed by Tanzania which 
constitutionally established the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU), on mainland Tanzania, and the Afro-Shirazi 
Party (ASP) on the island of Zanzibar as the only political 
parties in the ’Union’ of Tanzania through which all political 
activities are to be conducted. TANU and ASP have now merged 
into one party, the Chama Cha Mapunduzi Party since the 
union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar became complete in 1977. 
In 1966 Malawi followed suit when Dr. Itamuzu Banda’s Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP) became the ’’only one National Party”. 
Zambia became legally a one-party state seven years later 
in 1973. Sierra Leone is the newest single-party state, 
having adopted this system of government in 1978.
Apart from these de jure one-party states on the African 
political scene, another set of de facto one-party states has 
arisefu With the banning of the only remaining opposition 
party, the Kenya Peoples1 Union (KPU), Kenya has been, since 
1966, a de facto one-party state - the only party remaining being 
the late Jomo Kenyatta’s Kenya African National Union (KANU).
Uganda too had in effect become a de facto one-party state in 
1969 with the disappearance of the Kabaka Yekka (KY) and the 
Democratic Party (DP). President Obote's Uganda Peoples'
Congress (UPC) remained as the only party in the national 
politics of Uganda.
A peculiar situation also arose in 1970 in Lesotho, Ruled 
since independence by Chief Leabua Jonathan, who executed, a coup 
in 1970 when it became clear that his party was losing the first 
general election since independence. He is currently heading a 
civilian revolutionary government without parliament, and so this 
type of governmental system may be regarded as a 1 no-party system1. 
Also included in this category are those states ruled by military 
governments - Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda.
The final picture that emerges from the Commonwealth 
African political situation is that out of these twelve states 
only two, Botswana and Gambia, have preserved a multi-party system 
of government, and even these have 'dominant-party' systems. The 
question is naturally prompted as to the reasons for the increasing 
predominance of the one-party system in Africa.
B. Reasons for the Adoption of Single-Party Systems in Africa
b<£-n
A number of reasons have ' advanced in support of the case 
for the establishment of a one-party system of government wherever
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this has occurred in Africa. On this matter the Zambian
situation is in marked contrast with that of Tanzania.
In Tanzania the case for a one-party system was largely
based on the fact that throughout the political history of that
country, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) had
received overwhelming support from the people of Tangyanika.
Since 1958, when the first elections to the Legislative Council
were held in Tangyanika, and from then on in all successive
electoral contests, both national and local elections, TANU had
3been winning virtually all the seats. Indeed, there were many 
unopposed seats in favour of TANU, and opposition in Tangyanika 
had virtually disappeared at the time of independence in 1961.
As the Presidential Commission on the establishment of a Democratic 
One-Party State asserted after recounting the country's political 
history,
"....the prospects of contested elections has steadily 
receded and Tangyanika in fact, though not in law, is 
now a one-party state".5
From this the government argued that so long as the law permitted
other parties to exist, TANU was bound to fight elections, both
national and local, on a party basis. Since candidates put
forward by TANU had been overwhelmingly successful, many even
being unopposed, the people had in effect abandoned their right
to choose representatives to parliament. It was therefore argued
that only in a single-party system in which candidates belonging
to the same party, TANU, could compete for election would the
principle of choice be restored to the Tanganyikan electorate.
Because almost all members of parliament were TANU 
members, discussions in parliament, even on important issues 
of policy were inhibited because MPs were required to accept 
party discipline as to how they ought to behave in parliament.
Nyrere himself put this argument in this rather eloquent fashion:
"Given the two-party system some limitation of freedom is
essential - both of election time and in debate - in order 
to enforce party discipline and unity. And we have seen 
that these restrictions are not necessary where you have 
only one party. It seems at least open to doubt, therefore, 
that a system which forces political parties to limit the 
freedom of their members is a democratic system, and that 
one which can permit no party to leave its members their 
freedom is undemocratic. Where there is one party, and 
that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the 
foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever 
be where you have two or more parties, each representing 
only a section of the community".5
Thus the Tanganyikan case for the establishment of a one-party
state in the political circumstances outlined above, seems to rest
on a persuasive ground. The story in Zambia was, however, almost
the opposite to the one prevailing in Tanganyika.
Unlike the case of Tanzania, Zambia has been a multiparty state
since even before independence (1964). The Nationalist Movement
split in 1958 when the present ruling party, the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) broke away from the African National
Congress (ANC) led by Mr. Harry Nkumbula. There was also a white
settler political party, the United Federal Party (UFP), which
changed its name after independence to 'National Progressive
Party' (NPP). Moreover, the opposition in Zambia had a strong
base of support in certain parts or provinces of the country.
Further, the electoral performance maintained by the opposition
parties in Zambia show that its strength had steadily been
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gathering momentum. In the 1962 elections, which were held with
a view to introducing self-government in Northern Ehodesia, UNIP
was unable to secure the required number of seats in the
Legislative Council in order for it to form the government.^
UNIP had to form a coalition with ANC in order to prevent the
settler United Federal Party from seizing power. At independence
the three parties, UNIP, ANC and NPP, competed for power in the
1964 elections. Out of the contest UNIP had fifty-six elected
members in Parliament, ANC obtained eight seats, and the NPP came
out with ten members elected on the reserved European roll. 1968
also happened to be an election year. The NPP having been
dissolved in 1968, the contest was between UNIP and ANC. The
results were that UNIP emerged with eighty-one elected members and
ANC with twenty-three members only. What was interesting about
the results of the 1968 election was that Western Province,
formerly a UNIP stronghold, rejected almost all candidates
sponsored by UNIP.
The government of Zambia, through the President, had in fact
recognized the potency of opposition and so had envisaged the
creation of a one-party state, not by 1 force1, but 1 consensus1.
President Kaunda, in March 1964 (i.e. seven months before
independence) had assured the nation that:
" any disappearance of the parliamentary opposition in
this country and the introduction of one-party system 
would not be, and I emphasize, would not be an act of the 
government, but would only be according to the wishes of the
people of this country as expressed at the polls in any
future elections11.**
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Three years later, that is in 1967, the President reiterated the 
same principle when addressing an Annual Conference of UNIP held 
at Mulungushi; he summarized government’s stand on this matter 
through four neat points, viz.,
"1. That we are in favour of a one-party state;
2. That we did not believe in legislating against
the opposition;
3. That by being honest to the cause of the common man 
we would, through effective party and government 
organizations, paralyze and wipe out any opposition, 
thereby bringing about the birth of a one-party state;
4. That we go further and declare that even when it
comes about we would still not legislate against
the formation of opposition parties, because we might be 
bottling up the feelings of certain people no matter 
how few”.9
One of the obvious effects of the results of the 1968 elections was 
that it worked against government’s plan for the destruction of 
the opposition through the ballot box. The government's hope for 
a voluntary disappearance of the opposition further suffered a 
set-back with the occurrence of certain political developments in 
1972. Chief of these developments was the formation of the United 
Progressive Party (UPP) headed by the former Vice-President, Mr. 
Simon Kapwepwe, The political implications engendered by the 
formation of UPP were so vast - for example, most of its leaders 
were eminent figures in Zambian politics who had played an 
important role in the nationalist struggle, and who were the 
founders of the nationalist movement. Secondly, the new party's 
base of support was among the Bembas, the most dominant and 
populous tribe in Zambia (covering three of the eight provinces 
of the country, including the most populous province of the 
Copperbelt).
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The political climate which resulted from the emergence 
of UPP on the political scene of Zambia was tense and manifested 
itself in nationwide appeals not only for the detention of its 
leaders, but also for the introduction of a one-party state. In 
the wake of these demands from every part of the country, the 
government abandoned its original stand, which was that although 
the one-party state was desirable and perhaps inevitable, no 
legislative action should be taken to prohibit other parties. 
President Kaunda now insisted that the government’s decision to 
bring about a one-party state through legislation was in 
accordance with the wishes of the people, because:
" since independence there has been a constant demand
for the establishment of a one-party state in Zambia.
The demands have increasingly become more and more wide­
spread in all comers of Zambia. In recent months I have 
received hundreds of messages and letters from 
organizations and individuals appealing to me to take 
concrete steps to bring about a one-party system of 
government. In the resolutions passed by almost every 
conference, whether political or non-political, 
unequivocal demands have been made for government to 
introduce a one-party system of government. Chiefs last 
year joined the chorus of the overwhelming majority of 
the people. Indeed, the UNIP National Council sittin^in  ^
Mulungushi Hall between 1 and 3 October last year, ' < ^
the central committee of the ruling party to work towards 
the achievement of a one-party democracy....
But, as Nwabueze had observed, these demands which the President
was referring to "were made by UNIP partisans, and should not
be taken as conclusive of the wishes of the Zambian people as
a whole".  ^*
However, Zambia did not provide an ideal situation, as did 
Tanzania, for unilateral action on the part of the government to 
introduce a one-party state. That this nevertheless happened,
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meant that the opposition parties of UP? and ANC, which 
enjoyed popular support in some provinces of the country, 
were forced out of existence,
i) The argument based on national unity
Probably the most forceful argument in favour of the 
introduction of a one-party state in Zambia was that Zambia 
needed a one-party state not because, as in the case of 
Tanzania, the country was solidly united; but because the 
country was dangerously divided. Zambia, like many other 
African states, is a culturally heterogeneous society 
consisting of a series of ethnic groupings (about 73 such 
groupings in all). The political order established in 
Zambia at independence, being a blend of Westminster 
parliamentary democracy, was devised on the assumption that 
power to rule was to be the subject of political competition 
between the various political parties. Now, while the 
dominant party, UNIP, evidently projected a national outlook 
and endeavoured to recruit membership and support from every 
comer of the country, the smaller parties were content to
seek support and loyalty from a particular region or tribe
12 . . . .from where the top leaders came. A Zambian cabinet minister,
Mr. Sikota Wina, speaking in-’ favour of the introduction of a 
one-party state in Zambia warned that:
"Without the emergence of a dominant single party such 
as the United National Independence Party which comprised 
all the tribes, the post-independence government of 
Zambia could only have been formed by a coalition of 
four or more tribal political parties, since political 
parties would necessarily have been along purely 
provincial lines, with obvious and tragic 
consequences".13
Mr. Sikota Wina therefore submitted that "....it alone 
[i.e. the one-party state] permits the growth or creation
of a sense of nationhood in newly independent African
_ • „ 14countries .
There is no doubt that the need for national unity is 
a compelling one in new nations of Africa, and that any 
arrangement which would foster its realization must be 
preferred. Moreover, it is only when national unity, and 
therefore stability, is assured that the government can 
proceed effectively to plan and execute socio-economic 
projects intended to raise the level of standards of 
living among the people. The masses were led to believe 
that once independence was achieved, immediate improvements 
in their social and economic condition were to follow - and 
most of these promises came from the leaders of the 
dominant party. Hence continued survival of the party, and 
therefore the government, depended largely on how quickly 
the impact was made on satisfying the basic needs of the people. 
Moreover, the opposition would naturally exploit the failures 
of the government in economic planning and in the 
implementation of programmes designed to induce the equal 
redistribution of wealth to the benefit of the people.
Few would dispute the validity of the argument based 
on national unity in the circumstances of new African states. 
True, all those forces that operate to draw people apart 
must be discouraged, and a base conducive to securing national 
solidarity must be laid down. But this does not prevent one
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asking the question as to the best means of achieving that 
solidarity. It can thus be argued that any such method 
necessary to bring about national unity must not lose sight 
of the interests of all people and the desire to maintain 
a democratic society founded on respect for human rights.
The question of how best to preserve human rights is, of 
course, a moot question as experience has shown in Britain, 
Tanzania and some other countries which have no constitutional 
bills of rights but where, nevertheless, personal liberty 
forms part of the whole basis of their democratic practice.
The one-party state creates a constitutional system whereby 
certain individuals or a group of individuals are denied the 
same basic, fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the 
freedom of association, the freedom of expression, and the 
freedom against discrimination, on grounds of political 
opinion. Thus, in the Nkumbula case|~* counsel for the 
appellant argued that the setting up of a Gommission to work 
out a one-party constitution was ultra vires the Inquiries Act 
under which the Commission was set up, because it cannot in 
law be for the "public welfare" with the meaning of that Act 
to prepare to deprive a citizen of any of the fundamental 
rights protected by the existing constitution. The Court of 
Appeal for Zambia, of course, replied by saying that whether 
or not a matter is one of "public welfare" is subjectively 
to be decided by the President, and that that decision cannot 
be challenged in a court of law unless bad faith or improper 
motive is alleged.
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ii) Other alleged motivations for the introduction 
of single-party systems
Apart from the argument based on national unity, there
were some other isolated reasons advanced to justify the
establishment of a single party in Zambia. Chief of these
was the consideration of the geo-political position Zambia
occupied in Southern Africa at the time of the moves to
introduce the one-party state. Zambia is the only country
which shares borders with the minority regimes of Rhodesia
and South Africa (through Namibia/South-west Africa which it
controls and rules), and with the former Portuguese
territories of Mozambique and Angola. These two former
Portuguese territories have now become independent (1975 and
[i> *
1976, ~-4'* 0* Because Zambia offered bases to the
liberation movements to carry out their guerilla campaign
in these territories, there has constantly been infiltration
by Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African troops into
Zambia, and they have carried out activities which were
obviously intended to, and did in fact result in, sabotage of
16Zambia's strategic installations. In particular, Zambia 
depended on her southern neighbours for the importation of her 
. and also for the supply of vitally needed manufactured
t-
goods, and for the supply of power to feed her industries - 
especially the copper mining industries.
In order, therefore, for Zambia to organize resistance 
to these outside, subversive attacks and for her to plan to
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to save the economy from disruption by Rhodesia and South
Africa, it was urged that the country needed to secure to
itself a united and vigilant population under the guidance
of one party and a strong executive. If a multi-party
system was allowed to continue operating - with its
undesirable effects of dividing people politically, the enemy
would easily attempt to exploit the situation, and proceed to
harm Zambia permanently. Thus, although the National
Commission on the One-Party State recommended a reduction
in the executive poweis of the President generally and, more
18specifically, in his security powers, the government 
rejected this recommendation on the ground that:
"Zambia has many enemies surrounding her and therefore 
the implementation of the One-Party Participatory
Democracy together with the attendant problems, ^
require a unified command under an Executive President".
The need for an autochthonous constitution was also
frequently mentioned as one of the motivating factors in the
introduction of a one-party state. This has been the view
shared by many of the African states, namely the desire to
see to it that any constitutional order bestowed on them must
derive its authority from within these nations, and that the
contents of the constitution must bear some relevance to
their national sentiments and consciousness. As Professor
Wheare has eloquently written of new African states:
"For some members of the Commonwealth, it is not enough 
to be able to say that they enjoy a system of 
government which is in no way subordinate to that of 
the United Kingdom. They wish to be able to say that 
their constitution has the force of law and if 
necessary of supreme law within their territory
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"through its own native authority and not because 
it was enacted or authorized by the parliament of 
the United Kingdom - that it is, so to speak, "home­
grown", sprung from their own soil, and not imported 
from the United Kingdom". 0^
It is precisely within this framework of thought that the
National Commission on the One-party State in Zambia perceived
the need of removing all legal ties between the one-party
constitution and all British legal sources. The Commission
remarked that:
"We observed that Appendix 1 to the Laws of Zambia, 
the Zambia Independence Act and the Zambia 
Independence Order appeared as one document with 
the Constitution of Zambia. We examined these 
British legal documents and came to the conclusion 
that with the establishment of the One-Party 
Participatory Democracy, Zambia should no longer 
be tied to the British constitutional provisions 
in this respect. Our Constitution should stand by 
itself".21
And when the Constitution of Zambia Bill, 1973, which sought 
to introduce the one-party system of government was being 
presented to parliament, the then Vice-President, Mr. Chona, 
called the moment one of "great significance and historic 
importance", because
"As we all know, up to now we have been governed 
under a constitution which was enacted by the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. It will be a 
matter of pride for us and for the whole nation 
to have our constitution which is more suited to 
our own conditions and which is more pertinent 
to the aspirations of our p e o p l e " . ^2
There is therefore no doubt that within the government circles
there were those who saw the moment of the introduction of a
one-party state as an opportunity to remove from the political
system the last vestiges of colonial imprints, and to give the
new system a distinct national character and form.
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Although not frequently advanced in Zambia at the time 
of the introduction of a one-party state, there is an argument 
which asserts that the one-party state is the only system of 
government fairly corresponding to certain traditional African 
styles of political system. In traditional African political 
systems there were no political parties, because as Nyerere 
argues, in the African traditional society there were no 
strong issues nor were there in existence private interests 
which would have formed the basis upon which parties could 
emerge to defend one or the other of those interests. Nyerere 
further argued that:
"The European and American parties came into being as 
the result of existing social and economic divisions - 
the second party being formed to challenge the 
monopoly of political power by some aristocratic or 
capitalist group. Our own parties had a very different 
origin. They were not formed to challenge any ruling 
group of our own people; they were formed to challenge 
the foreigners who ruled over us. They were not, 
therefore, political "parties" - i.e. factions - but 
nationalist movements. And from the outset they 
represented the interests and aspirations of the whole 
nation".24
The thrust of the argument is that since there are, as yet, 
few divisions based on economic or social classes in Africa, 
there can only be one movement for the entire country: or
as is sometimes stated differently:
"Since parties reflect class divisions, the appearance 
of an opposition party must be prevented in order to 
avoid the development of a class s t r u g g l e " .25
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C. The Mode of adopting the One-party System:
A Comparative Summary: Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania
Here we are not concerned with how the one-party state
originated in countries like Kenya and Uganda where the system
has never been formally established by law. In Kenya, for
example, the one-party state came about as a result of a voluntary
merger of existing parties and also by proscription of the
opposition party, the Kenya Peoples1 Union, led by Oginga Odinga.
Similarly in Uganda under Milton Obote, the one-party state,
though not formally established by law, was a product of a
combination of defections to the ruling party and of proscription
 ^  ^ . . . 2 6  of the opposition parties.
i) Ghana
Ghana formally became a one-party state in January 1964.
This came about following a referendum organized in terms of
the 1960 Republican Constitution. The electorate voted
overwhelmingly in favour of the government’s proposal to
27introduce a one-party state. Following the referendum, the 
constitution was amended to provide that "there shall be one 
National Party", which "shall be the Convention Peoples’ 
Party".28
ii) Malawi
In Malawi, the question of whether or not the country 
should become a one-party state was at no point put to the 
people for approval. True, Malawi has always had only one 
political party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). In July 1975, 
the government set up a Constitutional Committee, "to consider
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and make recommendations with regard to the provisions of
the new Constitution required to give effect to the decision
29
that Malawi should become a Republic". It is important to
note that the Committee was never asked to consider the
question of the establishment of a one-party state in Malawi.
It would have appeared that the question of a one-party state
was just one of those questions which the Committee considered
in recommending the form the Republican Constitution was to
take. Thus, among the specific questions which the
Constitutional Committee answered, was:
"Will Malawi become a One-Party State under the 
Republican Constitution?"3*3
To this question the Committee answered in the affirmative.
The Committee submitted its proposals for the Republican
Constitution to the National Convention of the Malawi Congress
Party in October 1965, and these were "unanimously" accepted.
The proposals were subsequently endorsed by the Malawi
government as the basis of the Republic Constitution. Thus,
when the Republic Constitution became operative in 1966, it
also provided that:
"There shall be in the Republic after the appointed 
day only One National Party",
and that
"The National Party shall be the Malawi Congress 
Party".31
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iii) Tanzania
Tanzania, followed by Zambia, took a completely 
different course in the manner of adopting a single-party 
system, from that adopted by Ghana and Malawi. In Tanzania 
the decision to introduce a one-party state was made by the 
National Executive of TANU. The people were not consulted 
upon that decision, either in a referendum or otherwise.
The decision having been taken, a Presidential Commission 
was appointed to consider "the changes in the Constitution of 
Tanganyika and the Constitution of the Tanganyika African 
National Union, and in the practice of Government that might 
be necessary to bring into effect a democratic One-party State 
in Tanganyika". In other words, the question of the 
desirability of a one-party state was not open for discussion 
either by the Commission, or by the people. Thus, although 
the Commission consulted widely on the form of the new 
Constitution, it did not receive submissions for or against
the one-party state. The recommendations of the Presidential
32Commission*, as approved, after amendment, by the government, 
formed the basis of the One-party Constitution in Tanzania.
The new Constitution provided that:
"3(1) There shall be one political party in Tanzania", 
and that:
"(3) All political activity in Tanzania shall be
conducted by or under the auspices of the Party".
The Tanganyika African National Union, TANU, and the Afro- 
Shirazi Party (ASP) are specifically mentioned as such
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one political party respectively for Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar.
D. The Mode of adopting the One-Party System in Zambia
i) The National Commission on the One-Party 
Participatory Democracy
As indicated above, the method by which the one-party 
system originated in Zambia closely followed the approach in 
Tanzania. On the 25th of February 1972, President Kaunda 
announced that the Cabinet (not the party central organ, as 
in Tanzania) had taken a decision that the future Constitution 
of Zambia should provide for a One-party Democracy, and that a 
Commission would be set up with the task of determining the 
form which that One-Party Democracy should take. The 
Commission was duly appointed on 1st March. The general terms 
of reference were to "consider changes in
(a) the Constitution of Zambia;
(b) the practices and procedures of the Government 
of the Republic; and
(c) the Constitution of the United National 
Independence Party" ,33
necessary to bring about and establish a one-party participatory
democracy in Zambia. The Commission, like its Tanzanian
counterpart, was thus precluded from entertaining submissions
for or against the principle of a one-party state. However,
precisely because Zambia have had a strong base of opposition,
it was not surprising that a number of petitioners were unable
to confine themselves within the Commissions terms of
reference. As the Commission stated in its Report:
"A number of petitioners did not confine themselves 
strictly to the terms of reference regarding the 
form of the One-party Democracy as such and 
discussed matters relating to the pros and cons of 
its establishment. We, however, insisted that our 
task was not to listen to petitioners who gave 
reasons for or against the establishment of the One- 
party system".3^
It is also relevant to note that the ANC President and his 
deputy, Mr. Harry Nkumbula and Mr. Nalumino Mundia, were 
appointed to the Commission, but declined to serve because 
of their opposition to the whole idea of creating a single­
party system in Zambia.
The President had also set out a number of principles 
to be adhered to by the Commission in its consideration of 
the matter. These included the principle that "The 
fundamental rights and freedom of the individual shall be 
protected as now provided under Chapter III of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Zambia".
The Commission was required to investigate a number of 
crucial issues, including the nature of the presidency in a 
one-party state, the nature and structure of government in 
general Xincluding the important question of the relationship 
between cabinet, parliament and the central committee of the 
party), the nature and structure of parliament in a one-party 
state and its relationship to party organs, especially to the 
National Council. The composition of the Commission was 
representative of people from various walks of life. The 
Commission also toured the country widely, collecting evidence 
from the people as to the form the new constitution should 
assume. The Commission ceased taking evidence in June, and
presented its report to the President in October 1972.
The one-party state was formally established on 13th
35December 1972, when the short Constitution Amendment Act^
implementing the decision, received the presidential assent.
The Constitutional Amendment stipulated that:
"There shall be one and only one political party in 
Zambia, namely, the United National Independence 
Party" .36
However, the government move to introduce a single­
party was challenged - not only through political means, but 
also through a court action instituted by the opposition 
leader, Mr. Harry Nkumbula. The case is an important one 
in the constitutional history of Zambia, and merits an 
extended discussion in the present context, for the 
arguments involved pertain to the basic question of the 
compatibility of a single-party system with the enforceable 
protection of human rights.
37ii) Opposition in the Courts: The Nkumbula Case
In this case, the applicant sought a declaration from 
the High Court to the effect that the introduction of a one- 
party state was "likely" to infringe fundamental rights 
guaranteed to the petitioner by the constitution as it existed
at that time, that is to say, the right to assemble freely and
38associate with other persons as a member, and as leader, of
the African National Congress, the right to express and receive
. . 39 • . . . .opinion, and freedom from discrimination on the grounds of
. . . .  40political apinion. It was argued that these rights could
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not exist or be enjoyed unhindered under a single-party 
system, since such a system is incompatible with such 
freedoms; alternatively that the introduction of a one- 
party state is manifestly contrary to the spirit of the 
Constitution.
On behalf of the petitioner it was argued that the fact 
that the one-party commission was enjoined to adhere to the 
principle that "the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual shall be protected as now provided under Chapter III 
of the Constitution of Zambia" meant that the freedom of 
association, including the right to form political parties, 
would be retained even after the new Constitution was 
established. It therefore implied that following from 
this witnesses were allowed to give evidence opposing the 
creation of a one-party state. (Surprisingly, no argument 
in reply to this and many others on behalf of the State are 
stated in the report.) With respect to the above contention 
by the applicant, Doyle, C.J., who handled the case in the 
High Court, observed that:
"Quite clearly, S.23 in its existing form would be 
inconsistent with the notion of a one-party state 
in that at present it guarantees freedom of 
association, including by implication power to 
form political parties".- *
However, his Lordship considered that the principle referred
to by the President regarding the retention of a bill of
rights in the proposed constitution was "merely a guiding
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factor in considering the approach to the form of a 
One-party State", and that the reference to that principle 
did not mean "that S.23 must be rigidly adhered to in its 
present form". It was the Court’s view that it would be 
outside the Commissioner's terms of reference to allow 
witnesses airing their views either for or against the 
proposal to create a one-party state. In any case, the 
Court observed, the petitioner was at liberty to put forward 
his views in public or in private in support of, or against, 
the one-party state. That he could not put forward particular 
views before a Commission set up to deal with certain matters 
was no restriction upon his freedom.
The petitioner further argued that his freedom of 
expression was likely to be infringed because there was an 
authorative statement by or on behalf of the Government of 
Zambia inhibiting any expression of opinion against the 
introduction of a one-party state. The basis of this claim 
referred to the statement made by the district governor for 
Lusaka, Mr. Justin Kabwe, that "UNIP was ready to crush anyone 
who opposed the formation of a one-party state", and that 
"Whether people liked it or not, the one-party democracy had 
come to stay in Zambia". Meanwhile, Doyle, C.J., conceded 
that if the petitioner succeeded in showing that the Government 
of Zambia did take steps or threatened to take steps in 
furtherance or pursuance of its decision to introduced a one- 
party state, and if it could be shown further that such steps 
would be likely to infringe his rights under the Constitution
before its amendment, "that would be contravention of S.22 
of the Constitution, and the petitioner would be entitled 
to redress". But were the utterances or verbal 
intimidations by Governor Justin Kabwe such a step? While 
deprecating the "somewhat extravagant language" in which 
Mr. Kabwe’s statement was couched, the High Court held that
J uni O-r*
"an isolated statement by a comparatively ‘ \ official"
could not be said to be official government policy; on the 
contrary, the evidence showed that the petitioner had freely 
expressed his opinion against a one-party state in a television 
interview, and at a large rally in Lusaka which he addressed.
The last declaration asked for by the petitioner was 
that the introduction of a one-party state was contrary to 
the spirit of the Constitution. Doyle, C.J., started 
considering this question with the assertion that:
"I have no doubt that the introduction of a One-party 
State will prohibit the formation of political 
parties, and that it will be a restriction on the 
present rights of assembly contained in S.23. In 
that sense.it is inconsistent with the present
consitution".
There is an inherent difficulty in the petitioner’s argument 
on this ground. In the first place there was no evidence that 
under the then Constitution any action was to be taken to 
prevent the formation of political parties. The prevention 
was only to take place after the Consitution was amended - 
and the amendment would obviously involve alteration of S.23, 
restricting rights of assembly by different political parties. 
What the government did was no more than to make a declaration
of its intention to introduce legislation in parliament to 
amend the constitution, for the purpose of creating a one- 
party state. By law the government possessed the right and 
power to amend the Constitution for any purpose - including 
an amendment to the bill of rights as long as the prescribed 
majority in parliament was secured. Surely a mere prior 
announcement of an intention to exercise that right and 
power cannot be challenged as likely to infringe rights 
under the Constitution. And when the right and power had 
been exercised, and a one-party state has been created, the 
rights alleged to have been infringed would have disappeared 
with the coming into effect of the amendment. In the event, 
the petitioner would no longer have those rights.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Zambia (before 
Baron, J.P., Hughes, J.A., and Chomba, A.J.A.) the arguments 
took a completely different line. In the first place it was 
argued that the setting up of the Commission could not be
"for the public welfare" within the meaning of the Inquiries
42 . . .
Act under which the Commission was appointed, because it
cannot in law be for the public welfare to prepare to deprive 
a citizen of any of the fundamental rights protected by the 
existing Constitution'.!. The Inquiries Act vested in the 
President a discretionary power to appoint a Commission to
"inquire into any matter in which an inquiry would, in the
„ 43opinion of the President, be for the public welfare .
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This clearly made it a matter for the subjective decision 
of the President to say which subjects were "for the 
public welfare", calling for an inquiry by a Commission.
The exercise of such a power, under the usual administrative 
law, was beyond challenge in a court of law, unless it was 
alleged that the President acted "in bad faith or from 
improper motives or on extraneous consideration or under a 
view of facts or law which could not reasonably be 
entertained".
But whether in setting up the Commission the President 
had acted on a view of the facts or the law which could not 
reasonably be entertained would turn on the description of 
"public welfare". In the view of the petitioner, public, 
welfare meant the welfare of the individuals comprising the 
public, so that to derogate from individual rights and 
freedoms cannot be for their welfare. This, the Court 
refused, holding that the meaning of the "public" in the 
context of the Inquiries Act "is the community in general, as 
an aggregate, the people as a whole". Thus, in the opinion 
of the Court,
"What is in the public interest or for the public 
benefit is a question of balance; the interest of 
the society at large must be balanced against the 
interests of the particular section of society or of 
the individual whose rights or interests are in issue, 
and if the interests of the society are regarded as 
sufficiently important to override the individual 
interests, then the action in question must be held to 
be in the public interest or for the public benefit".
Accordingly, the setting up of the Commission was within the
powers of the President under the Inquiries Act and therefore
lawful.
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On the second ground of appeal the petitioner argued 
that the Court below had erred in law in holding that his 
rights had not yet been infringed unless and until the 
Constitution was amended, and the one-party state established.
It was asserted that the petitioner does not have to show 
that his rights under the bill of rights after the 
introduction of a one-party state are likely to be contravened 
in relation to him, but that it is sufficient for him to show 
that the introduction of a one-party state will infringe his 
rights under the Constitution in the present form: this
approach, the argument further asserted, accords with the
44
words in Section 28 of the Constitution: "is likely to be".
The Court, however, noted that under Section 28(5), no 
application can be brought to the High Court under Section 28(1) 
on the grounds that any guaranteed right under the bill of 
rights was likely to be contravened by reason of proposals 
contained in a bill which has not, at the time of application, 
become a law. The existence of this provision makes it clear 
that if the only step taken by the executive is the introduction 
of the bill, the enforcement procedure under S.28(1) of the 
Constitution cannot be invoked. Baron, J.P., then concluded 
that:
"In my judgment, therefore, Section 28(1) has no 
application to proposed legislation of any kind, 
far less to a proposal to amend Chapter III itself..."
In holding thus, the Court of Appeal was merely confirming
the view of po^le, ClJ., in/the Court below that, for an
applicant to have locus standi to seek redress under
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Section 280), it is not sufficient to plead a mere 
declaration of intention by the Government to introduce 
legislation in future, but that the applicant must be able 
to show actual or threatened action by the executive *r\ 
violation of his rights. Since in the Nkumbula case, the 
appellant failed to show that the executive or any of his 
administrative officers had taken some action in relation 
to him in the sense described above, or that any such action 
was threatened to be taken, Section 28(1) was not successfully 
invoked.
The decision in the Nkumbula case may be compared with
the Sierra Leonean case of Steele and Others v. Attorney-
45 •General decided by the Supreme Court for Sierra Leone m
1967. Interestingly, although this was also a case challenging
the constitutionality of the government's plan to introduce
a one-party state, it was never cited in the Nkumbula case.
The initial point must be made here that the Constitution of
Sierra Leone is, or was, in many respects similar to that of
Zambia, with a justiciable bill of rights protecting individual
rights and freedoms. In its 1965-66 session, the Parliament
of Sierra Leone passed a resolution to the effect that
"Government give serious consideration to the introduction of
a One-Party System of government in the country". Consequently,
the government issued a White Paper on the "Proposed
Introduction of a Democratic One-Party System in Sierra
Leone". In this Paper the government set down its views about
the subject, and also set out some proposals about what type of
the one-party system it wanted to introduce. The White Paper
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then concluded:
"In making these proposals Government will endeavour 
to ensure that no person in Sierra Leone is deprived 
of his fundamental rights to life, liberty, security 
of his person, the enjoyment of property and the 
protection of the law, his fundamental freedoms of 
conscience, of expression and of assembly, and 
respect for his private and family life".46
A One-Party Committee was then set up by the government, with
the following terms of reference:
"To collate and assess all views on the One-Party 
System both in and out of Parliament and to make 
recommendations on the type of One-Party System 
suitable for Sierra Leone and the method by which 
it should be introduced".47
As in Zambia, the Committee in its consideration of this
matter was to take into account the government's view that
fundamental rights and freedoms must be retained in the
proposed system, together with other principles, such as the
maintenance of the rule of law and the independence of the
judiciary.
It was from this background that the dispute in the 
Steele case arose. The plaintiffs in this case brought an 
action under Section 24(1) of the Sierra Leonean 
Constitution which, like Section 28(1) of the Zambian 
Constitution, sets out the provisions for the enforcement 
of the guaranteed rights, and reads as follows:
"24(1) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (6) of 
this Section, if any person alleges that any of the 
provisions of Sections 12 to 23 (inclusive) of this 
Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be 
contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice 
to any other action with respect to the same matter 
which is lawfully available, that person may apply 
to the Supreme Court for redress".
471
The claim of the petitioners was that the appointment of 
a One-party Committee by the Government constituted and was a 
a threat to, or infringement of, the constitutional provisions 
contained in Sections 12 to 23 (inclusive) of the Constitution, 
and was specifically in breach of Sectionc22 guaranteeing freedom 
of assembly and association, including the right to form and 
belong to any political party. Cole, C.J., viewed the 
construction of Section 24(1) in the same way as did Baron, J.P., 
in the Zambian case. The Chief Justice observed that:
"What does S.24(1) of the Constitution mean? This question 
is relevant because it is. my view that on a proper reading 
of S.24(1) of the Constitution, the plaintiffs-respondents 
must allege material facts on which they rely to show that 
any of the provisions of SS.12 to 23 (inclusive) of the 
Constitution has been, or is being, is or likely to be, 
contravened in relation to them. In my considered opinion, 
what the section means is this: To entitle a person to
invoke the judicial power of this Court, that person must 
show by allegations of material fact in his pleadings that 
as a result of the legislative or executive acts complained 
of he has sustained, or is sustaining, or is immediately 
in danger of sustaining, a direct injury, and this injury 
is not one of a general nature common to all members of the 
public". 48
Unlike in the Zambian case, the petitioners in the Sierra 
Leonean case did not allege infringement of the freedom of 
expression since the government, although it had decided to 
introduce a one-party state, did not prohibit people from 
expressing their views for or against the decision, in this 
respect the government had categorically stated that:
"Any changes in our political system which are proposed, 
will only be brought about if the people agree to them, 
after being consulted by a method which is both constitutional 
and popularly acceptable". 49
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But like in the case of Zambia, what the Sierra Leonean 
government did was merely to set up a Committee with the task 
of considering what form of constitution would be suitable to 
give effect to the introduction of a one-party state. There was 
therefore no question of having taken a positive step in the form 
of introducing legislation to bring about the single-party state.
It is therefore interesting to note that the sort of issues which 
arose in the Nkumbula case did not arise in the Sierra Leonean 
Steele case. This may be explained on the ground that in Zambia 
the government in setting up the One-party Commission did so through 
a statutory instrument made pursuant to an Act of Parliament - 
the Inquiries Act. The setting up of the One-party Commission was 
made pursuant to this statutory instrument which the applicant 
challenged as invalid because of its alleged contravention of 
certain constitutional provisions guaranteeing the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of association and assembly in particular. 
In Sierra Leone, on the other hand, the setting up of a Committee 
for the purposes of introducing a One-party State was done merely 
through the passage of a parliamentary resolution and no legislation 
of any kind was ever passed for that purpose.
The decisions in these two cases, but especially in the 
Zambian case, provide good examples of the nature of problems that 
courts frequently face when dealing with cases in which the political 
factor is centrally significant. What the Court was asked to pronounce 
on in the Nkumbula case was to declare that the government's 
plan or policy to bring about what it considered to be the best 
form of political system for the country was unlawful and therefore
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null and void. It amounted to something like saying that the 
government did not have power to impose restrictions on individual 
liberties. Surely if the Courts were bold enough to hold just 
that, this would have aroused a serious uproar of political 
controversy between those who consider themselves representatives 
of the people on the one hand, and the Courts on the other. But, 
as Baron, J.P., remarked in the Nkumbula case:
".... it is unthinkable to suggest that the government of
a country elected to run an ordered society is not 
permitted to impose whatever constitutional restrictions 
on individual liberties it regards as necessary to enable 
it to govern to the best advantage for the benefit of the 
society as a whole".
It was in predictions of this kind of possible clash between the
executive and the judiciary that the Presidential Commission on
the Establishment of a Democratic One-party State in Tanzania,
partly based its argument, it will be recalled^for the omission
of a bill of rights in the proposed one-party constitution for
Tanzania.
In a situation such as that which arose in Zambia, how much 
justified the applicant’s case would have been in law, it is 
questionable whether a judge presiding over the case would find 
against the government. He has no choice except to find some way 
out of the controversy by presumably putting up some learned 
arguments and rationalizations to justify his findings in favour 
of the party and government. This is what we may term here as 
"constructive bias" by the judiciary in favour of the government: 
it is "constructive" because at least it has the merit of avoiding 
an unnecessary conflict between the Court and the executive. This
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also ensures that the administration of justice would not be 
adversely affected by the ensuing political controversy.
E ) Provisions Made for Human Rights in the One-party Constitutions 
of (jjhana, Tanzania and Malawi
It has already been stated at the beginning of this chapter,
that the one-party constitutions devised for Ghana (1964), Tanzania
(1965) and Malawi (1966) did not incorporate bills of rights:
indeed, in Tanzania and Malawi the issue whether or not to
incorporate a bill of rights in their respective one-party
constitutions was extensively discussed, and in each state the
idea was rejected. In the light of this development, this section
investigates the reasons adduced for the rejection of the bill of
rights, and secondly, discusses the alternative means to the
protection of human rights in the absence of a bill of rights in
these countries.
i) Ghana
In Chapter Two we indicated.that, at the time when Ghana 
became independent (1957), bills of rights in the Commonwealth 
were not generally accepted as the best constitutional 
techniques for limiting governmental powers - the Anglo-Saxon 
sceptism towards constitutional affirmations of human rights, 
it was explained, had first to be overcome. Thus, Ghana’s 
independence constitution of 1957 did not incorporate a bill 
of rights, and this continued when Ghana's Republican 
Constitutional again omitted a bill of rights. The only 
reference to human rights to be found in the Republican 
Constitution of 1960 was in connection with a "declaration"
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which the President was required to make on his assumption 
of the office of Presidency. In that declaration the President 
was called upon to declare adherence to a number of 
"fundamental principles", which included the principles that:
" freedom and justice should be honoured;
that no person should suffer discrimination on grounds 
of sex, race, tribe, religion or political belief; 
that chieftaincy should be guaranteed and preserved; 
that every citizen of Ghana should receive his fair 
share of the produce yielded by the development of the 
country; that subject to such restrictions as may be 
necessary for preserving public order, morality or 
health, no person should be deprived of freedom of 
religion or speech, of the right to move and assemble 
with hindrance or of the right of access to courts of 
law; that no person should be deprived of his 
property save where the public interest so required 
and the law so provides "50
The constitution then purported to entrench this article by
providing that "the power to repeal this Article, or to
alter its provisions otherwise than by the addition of
further paragraphs to the declaration, is reserved to the
people"."** Thus when the single-party form of government
was introduced in Ghana in 1964, this declaration remained
in the Constitution, which was merely amended to provide
for the one-party state. No debate whatsoever ensued on
the crucial issue of whether or not it was desirable to
incorporate a bill of rights in the one-party constitution
of Ghana - in contrast to Tanzania and Malawi. Thus it was
that Ghana*s one-party constitution did not include justiciable
guarantees of individual rights and freedoms.
As regards the presidential declaration itself, the
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Court of Ghana in the case of re. Akoto and 7 Others.
This case was important in that it decided whether, by reciting 
the "fundamental principles" embodied in the presidental 
declaration and enjoining the President to declare his 
adherence to them, the Constitution had conferred upon them 
the character of legally enforceable rights operating to 
limit the powers of parliament. In this case, the appellants 
were arrested and placed under detention pursuant to an order 
made by the Governor-General and signed on his behalf by the 
Minister of the Interior under Section 2 of the Preventive 
Detention Act, 1958. It was argued on behalf of the appellants 
that the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, by virtue of which the 
detention orders were executed, was contrary to the solemn 
declaration of fundamental principles made by the President on 
assumption of office. The Court dismissed as "untenable" 
the suggestion that the declarations made by the President on 
assumption of office constitute a "Bill of Rights" in the
sense in which the expression is understood under the
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Constitution of the United States of America. The Court 
then went on to explain the legal nature of the declaration 
thus (per Korsah, C.J.):
"It will be observed that Article 13(1) [i.e. the Article 
providing for the ’declaration1] is in the form of a 
personal declaration by the President and is in no way 
part of the general law of Ghana. In the other parts of 
the constitution where a duty is imposed the word "shall" 
is used, but throughout the declaration the word used is 
"should". In our view the declaration merely represents 
the goal which every President must pledge himself to 
attempt to achieve. It does not represent a legal 
requirement which can be enforced by the Courts.
"On examination of the said declarations with a view 
to finding out how any could be enforced we are 
satisfied that the provisions of Article 13(1) do not 
create legal obligations enforceable by a court of law. 
The declarations however impose on every President a 
moral obligation, and provide a political yardstick 
by which the conduct of the Head of State can be 
measured by the electorate. The people’s remedy for 
any departure from the principles of declaration is 
through the use of the ballot box, and not through 
courts".54
Clearly this decision confirmed the assertion that the 
President in Ghana was free to assent to any Bill, even if 
this derogated from any of the principles embodied in the 
"declaration". This was rather surprising in the context of 
the Ghanaian constitutional arrangement since, apart from 
this Article on the "declaration", there was no other 
incidence in the Constitution, or indeed in any ordinary 
legislation, expressly protecting individual rights and 
freedoms and providing for some machinery to deal with 
executive encroachment of these rights. In other words, 
under the Republiean/One-party Constitution of Ghana, there 
was no formal arrangement whereby an individual whose rights 
have been violated by the executive could challenge the latter’ 
action either before the Courts, or before some form of a 
tribunal, or any sort of body - in order to obtain a remedy. 
The executive was left to run the affairs of the government 
almost uncontrolled. It is partly due to the absence of 
adequate constitutional and other safeguard on the resultant 
power structure under the Ghanaian Presidential/One-party
Constitution of 1960-6 that accounted for the rule of tyranny
55
and oppression in Ghana under President Kwame Nkrumah.
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’’The executive President in Ghana, 1960-66 ", comments 
Nwabueze:
"had progressively g athered to himself the supreme power 
in the state, erecting himself above the legislature and 
the party, and had then proceeded to use this absolute 
power to tyrannize and oppress people by a systematic 
desecration of their civil liberties".
Not surprising, it was in the area of personal liberty that
these powers had the greatest impact, and the main instrument
through which personal liberty in Ghana was under constant
erosion was the Preventive Detention Act, 1958. Under this
Act the President could detain persons in both normal and
emergency times. When the Act was enacted, it was announced
as a temporary measure - to expire after five years. However,
the Act had been re-enacted and established on a permanent
basis until it was repealed after the army coup in February
1966.
Since its introduction in 1958, the Act had been 
extensively used and many opposition leaders and dissidents 
were detained, including some former cabinet ministers who 
were allegedly implicated in a plan to assassinate President 
Kwame Nkrumah. It has been estimated that since 1961 over 
1,000 Ghanaians were detained under the Preventive Detention 
Act for periods ranging up to ten years in conditions of 
severity worse than those laid down by law for convicted 
prisoners.^ Unlike the detention legislation of some other 
African countries, the Ghanaian legislation never prescribed 
any rules which could be described as "minimum safeguards" 
to protect detained persons. The requirement to publish
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detentions in the official gazette, though it existed 
initially, was discontinued; the executive was under no 
duty to communicate grounds for detention to a detained 
person, and no review of detention by any person or body 
was ever instituted. The late Dr. Busia, an ardent opponent 
of Nkrumah’s rule, and later on Prime Minister of Ghana, 
singled out five objectionable features of the Preventive 
Detention Act, namely that:
Ma) the Act empowers the President, solely in his
discretion, to deprive any subject of his liberty, 
virtually for life;
b) the Ghana Courts have held that the discretion is 
absolute;
c) the President in the exercise of this absolute 
discretion is not answerable to Parliament, or any 
court or tribunal;
d) the person detained is denied the elementary, 
natural justice of facing his accusers or putting 
his case;
e) there is no provision or protection whatsoever 
against the indiscriminate abuse of the powers 
conferred by the A c t " . 5 8
The use made of the Preventive Detention Act was so drastic
in extent that it attracted the attention of the International
Commission of Jurists which undertook a study of that Act.
The findings of the Commission confirmed the validity of
Dr. Busia*s criticisms^ The Commission concluded:
" there are certain factors in connection with the
Ghana Act which, from a legal point of view, are not 
satisfactory.
i) The maximum duration of the preventive detention 
seems long especially when it is taken into account that 
there is no indication that the term of detention comes 
up for regular review by the executive...
ii) On account of the inability of the detainee to 
to face his accusers and put his case there appears
to be an infringement of a rule of natural justice....
iii) There is no independent tribunal before whom the 
detainee can make his objection.
iv) Because of the narrow subjective interpretation 
of the words "if satisfied", the Courts have 
precluded themselves from investigating the grounds 
of the PresidentTs satisfaction. Judicial review, 
therefore, does not seem to have provided in Ghana ^  
a strong safeguard for the liberty of the subject".
From these accounts, it will be seen that the re-enactment
and further use of the Act in the one-party state after 1964
even worsened the position in Ghana, for it meant that the
personal liberty of the subjects of Ghana was further eroded,
since now the President had control over both Parliament and
60the judiciary; for one of the proposals that had been
submitted at the referendum which sought a mandate to
introduce a one-party state in Ghana, was that the President
should be empowered to dismiss judges of the Superior Courts
"for reasons which appear to him sufficient". In March 1964,
barely three months after the introduction of a one-party
state, three judges from the Supreme Court and one from the
61High Court were dismissed. The actual operation of human 
rights in a one-party state, including that of Ghana, will be 
discussed at a later stage in this work, but suffice it here 
to observe that in Ghana, no serious attempt was ever made 
to subject the one-party government to some form of legal 
or even political control mechanisms specifically devised to 
project individual grievances in respect of alleged violations 
of personal liberties by public officers or agents. These 
legal control mechanisms need not be in the form of a 
constitutional bill of rights, but some form of institution
specifically charged to act as a watchdog against 
infractions of individual rights and freedoms by the 
various arms of the executive and the legislature was 
surely needed. In this respect, the Ghanaian constitutional 
arrangements, especially in relation to the provision made 
for the protection of human rights, stand in increasing 
contrast to those of Malawi and Tanzania, although Malawi 
perhaps comes next in terms of the deficiency of provision 
for the protection of human rights,
ii) Malawi
When Malawi, formerly the British Protectorate of
Nyasaland, was granted internal self-government in 1963,
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a bill of rights was included m  the Constitution. This
bill of rights was also carried over into the independence
63constitution of 1964. This document was, however, discarded 
when the Republican/One-party Constitution was finally enacted 
in 1966. This was indeed expected, since even the original
inclusion in the constitution of 1963 was accepted by the
64
Malawi Government "with considerable reserve".
The rejection of a bill of rights as part of the 
Republican Constitution was actually recommended by the 
Constitutional Committee set up by the government to consider 
and recommend what type of constitution would be suitable for 
Malawi as a republic. The Committee in its report observed 
that:
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" the inclusion in the Constitution of a written
declaration of the natural rights and liberties to 
be enjoyed by any portion of the community is worthless 
unless the preservation of these rights is reflected 
in the genuine wishes of the people as a whole. In a 
democratic state laws depend for their ultimate 
authority upon the desire of the people to see them 
enforced, and it was felt that it was the duty of 
a responsible government to guide and tutor the 
people in the appreciation of the benefits of fair and 
impartial laws, rather than arbitrarily to impose 
constitutional protection for minorities which are 
valueless unless they enjoy popular understanding and
acceptance".65
This argument seems not to take into account the fact that Bills 
of Rights are not only devices for the protection of minorities, 
but, more important, they are intended to ensure that the rights 
and liberties of the people as a whole are sheltered against? 
arbitrariness by the agents of the state. However, the 
government based its objection for the inclusion of a bill of 
rights in the new constitution on three grounds. Firstly, it 
was argued that the laws of the country already provided an 
elaborate code for the protection of individual rights against 
either private or public interference. Secondly, it was also 
said that since Malawi now became (upon the attainment of a 
republican status) a full member of the United Nations, it
will be 1 to the observance of the United Nations*
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Declaration of Human Rights. The final objection advanced 
was that the presence of a bill of rights in the constitution, 
coupled with a provision for the enforcement of these rights 
in the courts, would only invite unnecessary and harmful 
conflicts between the executive and the judiciary.
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In place of a bill of rights, the Constitutional 
Committee recommended that there be incorporated in a 
preamble to the constitution, a declaration of the fundamental 
principles of government. The recommendation of the Committee 
was duly implemented.
When the Republican Constitution of Malawi finally came 
into operation in 1966, it incorporated six "fundamental 
principles of government" ^  of which three are relevant to 
the present investigation. The first of these state that:
"No person should be deprived of his property without payment 
of fair compensation, and only where the public interest so 
required", the second asserts that it is "the paramount duty 
of the Government to safeguard and advance the interests and 
welfare of the Malawian people", and finally, the third 
principle states that "the Government of Malawi and people" 
recognize "the sanctity of the personal liberties set out in
the United Nations1 Charter of Human Rights". In 1968, the
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Government passed a Constitutional amendment, which added 
to these provisions by enacting that, "nothing contained in 
or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be 
inconsistent with or in contravention of [the declaration of 
principles] to the extent that the law in question is
reasonably required in the interests of defence, public
69safety, public order or the national economy".
As to the question of the justiciability of the basic 
principles of government enshrined in the Malawian Republic 
Constitution, it has been held by eminent constitutional
lawyers that the principles cannot form the basis upon 
which a legal action can be founded. In other words, 
under the Malawi Constitution there is nothing in the 
nature of a scheme specifically devised to ensure the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens.
In this respect the Malawian constitution is akin to the 
Ghanaian one; in fact it has been claimed that the 
Republican/One-party Constitution of Malawi drew heavily 
for its inspiration upon the Ghana Constitution of 1960.
On the other hand, the Tanzanian scheme, though also lacking 
a formal bill of rights, differs markedly from those of 
Malawi and Ghana in the way the scheme places emphasis on 
individual rights and freedoms,
iii) Tanzania
Tanzania, alongside Ghana and Malawi, as indicated 
already above, rejected incorporation of a bill of rights in 
its One-party Constitution of 1965. (Tanganyika had also 
rejected a bill of rights in its Independence Constitution 
of 1961.)
The Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a 
Democratic One-party State, which was appointed by the 
Government of Tanzania and which was charged with the task 
of recommending an appropriate constitution necessary to 
bring into effect a one-party state in Tanzania, considered 
at length the issue of whether or not a bill of rights was 
an effective means to protect the rights of the individuals 
in the circumstances of Tanzania - particularly in the
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context of a one-party administration: "In making our
recommendations to the institution of government appropriate 
to a one-party state", the Presidential Commission avowed,
"we have had constantly in mind the need to ensure that any
^ t r o n c W
new arrangements we propose will not unnecessarily
on the freedom of the individual". ^  However, the Commission
felt that this cannot be realized through the mere incorporation
of a bill of rights in the Constitution which, "in the
circumstances of Tanganyika today" would be "neither prudent 
72nor effective". A number of plausible arguments were 
adduced by the Commission to justify its verdict. We first 
state these arguments before commenting on their validity 
in the circumstances of a new nation like Tanzania:
a) In the first place it was argued that Tanganyika was still 
a young nation which lacked a "long tradition of nation­
hood" and also lacked a strong basis of internal national 
security. As such it was exposed to disruption by a 
handful of disgruntled individuals. In these circumstances, 
a bill of rights would be disadvantageous because "it 
limits in advance of events the measures
which Government may take to protect the nation from
73the threat of subversion and disorder".
b) In the second place it was argued that a bill of rights 
once included in the constitution would invite conflict 
between the judiciary and the executive and legislature.
This is self-evident since the presence of a bill of 
rights in the constitution would naturally be coupled 
with a provision requiring the Courts to declare invalid
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any law passed by parliament or any executive action 
if it were inconsistent with a provision contained in 
a bill of rights. "By requiring the Courts to stand in 
judgment on the legislature", the Commission argued,
"the judiciary would be drawn into the arena of political
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controversy", - and this could have damaging effects on 
the administration of justice by the Courts,
b) In the third place, the Commission raised the objection 
that Tanganyika intended to initiate "dynamic plans for 
economic development" along socialist lines, and that the 
implementations of these plans would require relaxation of 
some of the inhibitive provisions in the bill of rights 
on the power of the state.^ As the Commission put it:
"Decisions concerning the extent to which individual 
rights must give way to the wider considerations of 
social progress are not properly judicial decisions. 
They are political decisions best taken by political 
leaders responsible to the electorate".
The Commission further stressed that the rights of an individual
in any society depend more on the ethical sense of the people
than on the formal guarantees in the law - as the British
constitutional tradition has always demonstrated.
There is no doubt that the aforegoing reasons advanced by
Tanzania in rejecting incorporation of a bill of rights in its
one-party constitution were indeed powerful and convincing. In
the first place, it must be remembered that the paternity of
human rights is, as already indicated in the first chapter, the
European Convention "which is replete with liberal and laissez-
faire philosophy and may be appropriate for the 
advanced economies and more stable political conditions 
of Western Europe". ^  But can the same code of human 
rights be suitable for a developing fragile polity, 
avowedly committed to the implementation of economic 
development plans? In a newly-emerged state there are 
far more points or areas of conflict among the people 
themselves or among a section of the population against 
the government.
Thus the need to invest sufficient power in the 
state to deal with any possible danger which would 
threaten the security of the country. This is the 
thrust of the first argument adduced by the 
Presidential Commission, as recounted above. However, 
this argument falls short of persuasion, since almost 
all of the rights and freedoms guaranteed under 
the bill of rights can be qualified in the 
interests of defence, public order, public safety, 
etc., as is the case under the Zambian
Constitution. In the Zambian case of Kachasu v Attorney
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General, which we have already referred to, the High Court
of Zambia upheld the argument of the state that a law or
measure taken under it derogating from a guaranteed right
under the constitution in the interests of national security,
78was "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society".
In the second place, all African Commonwealth states do 
possess to themselves adequate power and authority under the 
various security and emergency legislations to take all 
necessary action for the purposes of dealing with any threat 
to national security or public order or any form of subversion.
As regards the argument that a bill of rights in fact 
has the effect of imposing restrictions on the power of the 
state in the implementation of the needed socialist development 
programmes, one has only to take the Zambian experience to 
justify the validity of this assertion. We have noted in the 
last chapter that the independence constitution handed over to 
Zambia left the nationalist government legally powerless to 
nationalize certain privately owned assets which were vital to 
the economic survival of Zambia. The Government of Zambia 
had therefore to revise the colonially-inherited provisions 
relating to the protection of property rights in order to 
permit implementation of its economic development plans.
Thus, a bill of rights can prove inhibitive on the ambitions 
of a new nation anxious to push through development projects 
to induce social and economic progress.
The interesting point, however, about the rejection of 
a bill of rights in Tanzania is that this seems to be the 
exclusive idea of the Presidential Commission which was, no
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doubt, influenced by the previous precedents of omission
of a bill of rights after the Independence and Republican
Consitutions of 1961 and 1962 respectively. This is confirmed
by the fact that, within Tanganyika during the time when the
Commission was taking evidence from people about the new
constitution, there was a certain section of the population .in
favour of the inclusion of a bill of rights as an integral
part of the new constitution. The memoranda submitted to the
79Commission by the Tanganyika Law Society, through its
President, urged for a constitutional incorporation of human
rights. In the words of the memoranda:
"A provision should be incorporated in the Constitution 
stating that all laws which are repugnant to or 
inconsistent with or take away or abricla the 
fundamental rights are null and void".
The rights and freedoms which the Society considered should
have been incorporated in the Constitution were those which
in the first place, are found in other Commonwealth African
constitutions - that is, "the right to life; freedom from
inhuman treatment; freedom from slavery; the right to
liberty; the right to property; freedom of expression;
freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom of
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worship; and freedom from discriminatory legislation".
In addition, "cultural and educational rights" were also 
included in the list of the traditional civil liberties. It 
will be difficult to see how cultural and educational rights, 
if incorporated as part of the bill rights, would have been 
enforced through the Courts, which, the memoranda said:
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" must have unfettered power to safeguard and
enforce the rights guaranteed under the Constitution;
and to this end, the remedies such as the writs of
habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus, etc., available 
under all democratic legal systems, should also be 
available here [i.e. in Tanganyika]11. ^ 2
There was nothing in the Presidential directives to the
Commission which suggested that a bill of rights was not the
appropriate device to protect the rights of citizens in one-
party Tanzania. If anything, President Nyerere, in his
document entitled "National Ethic", circulated to members of
the Commission to assist them in their task, enumerated all
the known traditional civil liberties - freedom of expression,
of movement, of religious belief, of association, equality
before the law, property rights, freedom from arbitrary arrest,
etc., which he said." lie at the basis of the Tanganyika
nation, and the whole political economic and social 
organization of the state must be directed towards their rapid
OO
implementation". ° cHere it is not claimed that the 
Tanganyikan leadership was necessarily thinking of the 
inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution as the best 
method to guarantee those rights, but rather that there was 
scope for the Commission to recommend the adoption of a bill 
of rights, and there was no reason why such a recommendation 
could not have been accepted by the government.
Apparently a bill of rights was feared because the 
Commission felt that it would "have the effect of limiting 
actions of the Government and Party", not necessarily in 
relation to individuals, but to "the task of nation-building".
Thus, in recommending an alternative mode for the protection 
of individual rights, the Commission looked to a safeguard
which would not have the restrictive effects on the actions
84of the Government and Party.
What the Commission recommended as an alternative to a 
bill of rights was that the one-party constitution should 
provide for the establishment of an institution to be known
£.n^u«ir-|
as the "Permanent Commission of . * ", whose members
should be appointed by the President. The Commission was to 
have a wide jurisdiction to enquire into allegations of 
abuse of power by officials of both government and party alike. 
This Tanzanian "Ombudsman"-like scheme is discussed in some detail 
at a. later stage, where it is compared with its Zambian 
counterpart - the "Commission for Investigation". However, 
suffice it here to make the point that the device does not, 
to a considerable degree, serve the same purpose and function 
as a bill of rights. Institutions like the "PCE" or "Cl" are 
devised with the purpose of providing some means of sheltering 
individuals from administrative abuse of power or arbitrariness. 
They are not instituted to check the actions of the government 
in the sense that if it found an executive or legislative 
action violative of any of the stated individual rights and 
freedoms, it could declare those actions unlawful and therefore 
null and void, as does a court of law. The clear dichotomy 
that exists between the functions of an "Ombudsman" and that 
of a bill of rights is confirmed by the fact that both 
institutions are provided for in the Zambian One-party
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Constitution of 1972. It is therefore paradoxical to speak, 
in the context of Tanzania, of the MPCEM as an alternative 
to a bill of rights. In fact, what the Tanzanian scheme for 
the protection of individual rights was intended to achieve, 
as indicated above, was the result that the government must be 
left free from the inhibitive or restrictive effects of a 
legally enforceable bill of rights. This fact is further 
confirmed by the fact that the new Constitution of 1965, which 
formally established a one-party state in Tanzania, confined 
all reference to human rights to a preamble. The preamble to 
the "Interim Constitution" of Tanzania recites as "inalienable" 
and as "the foundation of freedom, justice and peace; life, 
liberty, security of person, property, the protection of person, 
freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, association and 
privacy of family. But, as stated elsewhere in this work/a 
preamble forms no part of a statute, and so can create no legal
rights or obligations, though admittedly its spirit may be a
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guide in the interpretation of the substantive provisions.
From this it follows that the recital in the Tanzanian preamble 
embodying human rights can only play "a moral and an educative 
role" - a way of trying to "entrench the national ethic in 
the moral imagination of the people", as the framers of the 
constitution viewed it: or again, that the "national ethic"
enshrined in the preamble represents " a consensus between
the people and their leaders about how the process of Government
„ 86should be carried on .
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However, the framers of the Tanzanian Constitution 
recognized that mere recital in a preamble is not enough, 
and that in addition "everything possible should be done to 
win for these principles a strong commitement from the
it 87citizens .
The subject of the provision of human rights in the 
Tanzanian one-party constitutional scheme having be&A 
reviewed, something brief should now be said about how it 
compares to other one-party schemes in terms of effectiveness 
in the protection of human rights. Thomas Franck summarizes 
the issue well when he concludes that:
"The broad declaration of principle in the preamble 
to the Tanzanian Constitution perhaps conveys a more 
meaningful description of a democracy to the average „gg 
citizen than the rather legalistic Nigerian provisions..
In the circumstances of African states, perhaps this
assertion conveys a lot of truth. There is a very low
educational level in the vast majority of the African societies,
with the result that a large number of the citizens are often
ignorant about the whole idea of individual rights
enshrined in the constitution'and when and how to assert the
them in the Courts, even if they have been infringed in ^
relation to them. . Secondly, the judicial process
itself is too technical for a vast number of people to
understand, and in any case, many people live far away in
the rural areas, and hence have to travel long distances to
come to the Courts in the urban areas. Thirdly, in any
case, many people are poor, and even in getting the basic
requirements of life like food, clothes or shelter they will
have to struggle for them: hence, they cannot possibly
be expected to meet the huge expenses and costs involved 
in court litigations. There are thus structural and 
procedural problems inherent in the machinery of justice 
through the ordinary Courts, which we also fully discuss 
in the f,ollowing chapter.
From what is stated above, it could be argued that 
unlike the ideal conditions present in the advanced countries 
of the West where people understand their rights, know how to 
go about enforcing them when violated in relation to them; and 
are economically in a far better position to meet the litigation 
expenses - in less-developed countries it is a case of looking
to a different set of institutions and methods in the
enforcement of the rights of people which would be understood 
by the people and would be utilized and appreciated by them. 
Provided the government and party is serious enough to see the 
ideals stated in the preamble to the constitution to be 
translated into practice, there is no reason why this new 
approach to the attainment of respect for individual rights 
should not deliver goods. Perhaps this is what Thomas Frank
means, or implies, in the quotation above.
F) Retention of a Bill of Rights in the Zambian One-party 
Constitution, 1972.
As stated already, Zambia presents the only case in
Commonwealth Africa where a bill of rights exists as a
89substantive component of the one-party constitution.
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In this section we briefly explain how and why this situation 
was brought about. In the second place, a critical appraisal 
is attempted of whether the guaranteed rights under the 
bill of rights (or most of them) are capable of existing 
within a one-party state.
It will have been noted from the preceding paragraphs 
that in Tanzania and Malawi - but not in Ghana - the 
introduction of a one-party state was accompanied by the 
promulgation of new constitutions which were fundamentally 
different from their predecessors. The position was, however, 
different in Zambia where the introduction of a one-party state 
was originally effected through an amendment to the Republican 
Constitution, while the latter preserved its structure and its 
formal contents. Hence the Zambian conception of establishing 
the one-party state did not incorporate the desire to do away 
with the Republican Constitution completely. On the contrary, 
it was the wish of the government to retain, wherever possible, 
the institutions already existing under the Republican 
Constitution. The terms of reference to the National Commission 
confirmed this when it stipulated that its assignment was 
"to consider the changes in the (a) Constitution of the Republic 
of Zambia,...." necessary to bring about and establish the one- 
party participatory democracy in Zambia. A bill of rights had 
been a fundamental feature of the Zambian Constitution since 
1965 and had probably won more acceptance and appreciation by 
the people of Zambia and of some of its progressive leaders 
than was the case in Malawi or Tanzania. In Ghana the fact
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that the one-party state was not followed by promulgation 
of a new constitution, but was effected through an amendment 
to the Republican Constitution of 1960, which did not have 
a bill of rights, meant that no issue of the suitability of 
a code of human rights in a one-party state could, in fact, 
ever arise.
In the second place, unlike again the circumstances in 
Tanzania and Malawi, in Zambia the National Commission 
was expressly directed by the President to "pay due regard 
and adhere to" some nine principles "as cardinal, inviolable 
and built-in safeguards of One-party Participatory Democracy". 
Two of these principles are relevant to the present discussion, 
namely (i) "that the supremacy of the rule of law and 
independence of the judiciary shall continue to be maintained"; 
and (ii) that "the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual shall be protected as now provided under Chapter III
90of the Constitution". In other words, the National 
Commission was precluded from considering whether or not a 
bill of rights should be included in the new constitution - 
this decision had already been taken by the government.
In Tanzania, President Nyerere had given some "guidance" 
to the Presidential Commission about the need to promote "the 
National Ethic" in the one-party state by a strict adherence 
to the rule of law and the protection of human rights. As 
we have seen, he left the issue on whether to have a bill of
rights for the Commission to resolve. In Malawi, on the 
other hand, there was no such thing as any "directives" or 
"guidance" from the government as to how the Constitutional 
Committee was to approach its task, and, more than this, the 
discussion on whether or not the new Malawian Constitution 
should provide for a bill of rights was touched on as a reply 
to a question "Will Malawi become a one-party state under the 
Republican Constitution?"
Probably of all bodies appointed to recommend the best 
forms of constitutions suitable for one-party systems of 
government in Commonwealth Africa (notably Tanzania, Malawi, 
Sierra Leone), Zambia's National Commission displayed a 
characteristic courage and independence in its recommendations 
of the principles underlying the one-party state, especially 
those that related to the place of fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the proposed single-party system. The Commission's 
recommendations on personal liberty and the right to freedom, 
for example, were characteristically liberal in favour of 
detainees or restrictees, and were intended to enhance the 
value of those rights by suggesting some curtailment to the 
powers of the executive over those detained or restricted.
In recommending this, the Commission was merely projecting the 
general revulsion which many petitioners displayed in condemning 
certain features of the provisions in the Republican 
Constitution which related to personal liberties. The 
Commission reported that:
"Many petitioners made strong representations in 
favour of the right to personal liberty and the 
right to freedom of movement as enshrined in the 
Constitution. They criticized many aspects of the 
provisions relating to restrictions and detention 
without trial...
However, the Commission felt that:
" in the interest of security, provisions for
detention without trial should be retained in the 
Constitution provided the powers of the executive 
were curtailed, the detention period before the 
review was reduced, the grounds of detention were 
served in a shorter period and that detainees were 
free to communicate with their lawyers and relatives".
It is interesting to note that the safeguard for detainees
or restrictees which the Commission proposed to be written
into the One-party Constitution would, if they were
implemented by the government, have reversed the position
regarding those provisions to that obtaining under the
Independence Constitution before it was amended in 1969
(as we have seen in Chapter Six). First it is important
to note what the safeguards recommended by the One-party
Commission were:
1) that there be no detention without trial except 
during a state of emergency;
2) that a detainee or restrictee be furnished with 
a written statement specifying the grounds for 
his detention or restriction within ten days;
3) that the notification of detention or 
restriction be published in the Government 
Gazette within fourteen days of such detention 
or restriction;
4) that a tribunal be established to review the 
detention or restriction within three months 
and that its decisions be binding on the 
authority;
5) that the composition of the tribunal which may 
sit in public or in camera be as follows: the 
chairman and two other persons (one lawyer and 
one other person) to be appointed by the Chief 
Justice in consultation with the President of 
the Republic.
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6) that detainees be free to communicate with 
their lawyers and relatives and not be held 
incommunicado;
7) that whenever a state of emergency is declared 
while parliament is not in session or after 
its dissolution, the National Assembly be 
summoned within twenty-eight days of the date 
of the proclamation for approval;
and
8) that a declaration of a state of emergency 
ceases to have effect after a period of six 
months from the date of the proclamation unless 
the National Assembly approves its continuation.
The government, however, rejected the suggested safeguards,
arguing that " at this stage in the nation's development
and in view of Zambia's geo-political position in Southern
Rhodesia these recommendations could not be implemented
93without detriment to Zambia's security and sovereignty".
The provisions of Chapter III under the Republican Constitution, 
under which detentions and restrictions were declared, were 
therefore to remain. In any case, there seemed to be a 
paradox in the Commission's recommendations in one of the 
vital areas of a bill of rights, in the view of the presidential 
directive that "the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual shall be protected as now provided under Chapter III 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia". In other 
words, by virtue of this directive it was arguably outside 
the Commission's terms of reference for it to suggest any
changes with regard to the form or content of the bill of
94 . . .  . .rights. But this directive was in itself contradictory, in
that certain sections of the bill of rights, like the freedom 
of assembly and association which gives people the right to 
form rival political parties, could not be retained in the
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One-part Constitution. The Commission noticed this and 
then commented that:
"Notwithstanding the directive in our terms of 
reference that the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the individual shall be protected as now provided 
for under Chapter III of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Zambia, we considered that by implication 
those sections which gave people the freedom to form 
more than one political party could not be retained 
in the constitution".95
Apart from this change, the bill of rights as it existed
in the Republican Constitution - both in form and substance -
was reproduced in the One-party Constitution which came into 
force on 13th December 1973.
The critical question of whether or not a bill of rights
can co-exist with a one-party state should now be examined
in the next chapter.
5 01
NOTES
1. International Commission of Jurists (Search Press,
London, 1976), p.112.
2. This is discussed at a later stage in this chapter.
3. For a statistical account of TANUfs electoral programme, 
see Report of the Presidential Commission on the 
Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State, Paras.25-32.
4. Ibid., Para.31.
5. Quoted in The Executive in African Governments by B.H. Selassie
6. For a somewhat extended discussion about political parties in 
Zambia, see William Tordoff and Ian Scott, "Political Parties: 
Structure and Policies", in Politics in Zambia by William 
Tordoff (ed.), (Manchester University Press, 1974), p.107.
7. See David Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Elections 
(1962), especially Ch.VI.
8. Legislative Assembly Debates, March 20, 1964, Col.420. Also 
speech at Chifubu on January 17. 1965, quoted in Colin Legum (ed.), 
Zambia: Independence and Beyond
9. Proceedings of the Annual General Conference of the United 
National Independence Party, held at Mulungshi, August 14-20, 1967, 
ZIS, Government Printer, Lusaka, pp.10-11.
10. Press Conference on February 25, 1972. Quoted in the Report of 
the One-party State Commission, Para.2(1975).
11. Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa, ibid., p.225.
12. On this subject see Robert Matteno, "Cleavage and Conflict in
Zambian Politics: a Study in Sectionalism", in Politics in Zambia
by William Tordoff (ed.), op.cit., p.62.
13. Nshila (No.276), August 23, 1968. Quoted in Cherry Gertzel (ed.), 
materials about The Political Process in Zambia,
University of Zambia, Vol.I, p.243.
14. Ibid.
15. Nkumbula v. Attorney-General for Zambia, HP/CONST/Ref./1/1972, 
of April 1972, unreported.
502
16. For an excellent exposition on this subject, see
Jan Pettman, Zambia Security and Conflict (London, 1974), in 
particular Chapter Five. See also Robert Matteno, "Zambia 
and the One-party State", East Africa Journal, February 1972, 
pp.14-16.
18. See Report of the One-party Commission, Paras, 33, 41, 42 
and 57.
19. Government White Paper on Summary of Recommendations Accepted 
by the Government, oft.cit., p.4. Author’s own emphasis.
20. Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth
21. Report of the One-party State Commission, Para.16.
22. National Assembly Debates, Hansard No.33, of July 4-August 30,
1973, Col.87.
23. See Kenneth Robinson, Autochthony and the Transfer of Power, 
for an extended account of this proposition as it happenedin 
other parts of Africa.
24. Julius Nyerere, quoted in B. Selassie, The Executive in African 
Governments, op.cit., p.149.
25. Ibid., p.150. But see a contrary and completely different view 
about the justification of the one-party system on tradition.
26. Ibid. For an extended discussion of how the one-party state in
Kenya originated, see Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth 
Africa, op.cit., pp.217-20. For further details, see Nwabueze, 
ibid., pp.220-21. All opposition parties in Uganda were banned
in 1969, following an attempt on the life of President Milton
Obote.
27. As to whether the results of the referendum reflected the genuine 
expression of the people’s choice, see William Harvey, Law and 
Social Change in Ghana (1966), p.323, who thinks that the election 
was rigged.
28. Article 1A.
29. See Malawi Government White Paper (No. 002 of 1965) Introduction.
30. Question No.7, see Government White Paper (No.002 of 1965).
31. Section 4(1)(2) of the 1966 Malawi Constitution.
32. See Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment 
of a Democratic One-party State, Dar es Salaam, 1964, Government 
Printer.
503
33. Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of
a One-party Participatory Democracy in Zambia, Lusaka, 1972, 
Government Printer, see Appendix 1.
34. See Report of the National Commission, ibid., Para. 13.
35. Constitution (Amendment) (No.5), Act. No.29 of 1972.
36. Section 12A(1), ibid.
37. Section 23 of the 1964 Constitution.
38. (1972) ZLR III.
39. Section 22 of the 1964 Constitution.
40. Section 25, ibid.
41. Per Cole, C.J., at p. 114, ibid.
42. Cap.181 of the Laws of Zambia, 1972 edition.
43. Section 2 of the Act, ibid.
44. "28(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (6) of this
section, if any person alleges that any of the provisions of 
Sections 13 to 26 (inclusive) of this Constitution has been,
is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him,
then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to 
the same matter which is lawfully available, that person may 
apply to the High Court for redress.
(2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction
(a) to hear and determine any application made by any
person in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section;
(b) to determine any question arising in the case of any
person which is referred to it in pursuance of sub­
section (3) of this section;
and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions 
as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or 
securing the enforcement of any of the provisions of Sections 13 
to 26 (inclusive) of this Constitution.
(5) No application shall be brought under subsection (1) of this 
Constitution are likely to be contravened by reason of proposals 
contained in any bill which, at the date of the application, has 
not become a law".
45. African Law Report, SLI (1967), p.l.
46. Quoted ub tge judgment at p.8.
47. Ibid., p.10.
48. Per Cole, C.J., at p.13.
504
49. Quoted by Cole, C.J., at p.7 in Steele1s case, ibid.
50. Article 13(1) of theRepublican Constitution of Ghana (1960).
51. Article 13(2), ibid.
52. C19611 GLR 523.
|
| 53. Per Korsah, C.J., ibid., p.534.
54. Ibid., p.535.
55. See K.A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, 1967), Chapter 8; also Nwabueze, 
Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa, op.cit.,~pp.92-98.
j 56. Nwabueze, ibid., p.92.
i .  .
| 57. See Nwabueze, ibid., p.336.
i 58. Quoted in Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy, op.cit., p.131-32.
|
59. Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, No.18,
March 1964, p.10.
60. K.A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy, op.cit., p.133.
61. K.A. Busia, ibid., p.127. For comments on the circumstances
! leading to these events, see T.M. Franck, Comparative
I Constitutional Process (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1968), pp.151-152.
62. Section 1, 1963, No.883, Schedule 1 , ss.1-16.
63. Section 1, 1964, No.916, Schedule 2, ss.11-17.i
| 64. See Malawi Government White Paper (No.002 of 1965), upon the
Republican Constitution (Para. 24).
65. Ibid. This view presumably was a response to the Minorities1 
Commission in Nigeria, supra.
66. For the content of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, refer to 
Chapter 1.
67. These are contained in Chapter 1, Section 2 of the 1966 Malawi 
Republican Constitution.
68. Section 2(2).
69. For a discussion of some laws passed in apparent inconsistency 
with the basic principles of government, see Simon Roberts,
Public Law (1966), pp.321-22. Also by the same author in Journal 
of African Law, Vol.10, No.2, at p.131.
70. See Simon Roberts, Public Law (1966), p.304.
71. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of
a Democratic One-party State in Tanzania, op.cit., at p.30.
72‘ Ibid-> P-31-
73. Ibid., p.3. For a detailed account of the relationship between 
the need to secure public order and security on the one hand, and 
civil liberties on the other, see Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan, 
Public Law and Political Change in Kenya (Nairobi, 1970),
pp.407-56.
74. Report of the Presidential Commission, op.cit., Para.102.
75. As to the extent to which this problem manifests itself in
a new emergent state, see B.O. Nwabueze, Presidentialism in 
Commonwealth Africa, op.cit., Ch.XII. Also D.V. Cowen,
The Foundations of Freedom (Oxford, 1961), Ch.6.
76. Report of the Presidential Commission, op.cit., Para 103.
77. Ghai and McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya, 
op.cit., p.429.
78. Supra,
79. The excerpts of the Memorandum are quoted in K.A. Busia,
Africa iti Search of Democracy, op.cit., at pp. 136-37.
80. Ibid., at p.137.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. See Report of the Presidential Commission, op.cit., Para.13.
84. Ibid., p.32.
85. See Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa, op.cit., 
at pp.303-4.
86. See Report of the Presidential Commission, op.cit., p.32.
87. Ibid.
88. In T.M. Franck, Comparative Constitutional Process, op.cit., p.8.
89. Sierra Leone (1978) has also retained a bill of rights in its 
one-party constitution.
90. Report of the National Commission, op.cit., at p.ix.
1
5 0 6
91. National Commission, ibid., Para.32.
92. Ibid.
93. Government White Paper on "Summary of Recommendations 
Accepted by Government", p.3, op.cit.
94. These ’presidential directives’ to the National Commission 
were clearly part of the terms of reference since the 
Commission were "in their considerations and recommentations", 
to "pay due regard and adhere " to them
95. Report of the National Commission, op.cit., Paras. 30 and 31.
CHAPTER 9
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ONE-PARTY STATE (II)
A.. The Impact of the Single-Party System on 
the Protection of Civil Liberties
It is often thought that the concept of a one-party state
is in itself incompatible with the constitutional protection of
human rights. Dr. Aihe, for example, considers that "...the
adoption of this system of government (i.e. the one-party state)
is clearly inconsistent with the enjoyment of the fundamental
1 1rights of the individual...." Professor Ifaabueze, too, agrees
with this view when he says that a bill of rights cannot co-exist
with a de jure one-party state "without serious modifications and 
2qualifications". Dr. Busia has also denounced the single-party
formula and questions " whether it is the best way to ensure
the democratic values of freedom, justice, human rights, and the 
3Rule of Law", which all African leaders avow. Many other writers 
on African political and constitutional affairs, Africans and out­
siders alike, have given similar views on the implications of one- 
party states. Yet very few, if any, of these writers have attempted 
to show precisely how, or to what extent, the introduction of a one- 
party state undermines the enjoyment of civil liberties. It is 
therefore necessary to consider in detail how many of the rights 
and freedoms protected under the bill of rights can be shown to 
be possibly affected by the introduction of a one-party state.
While it is obviously true to say that the adoption of a 
single-party system will inevitably impinge on the enjoyment of 
certain rights and freedoms, especially those of a political nature, 
it is also true that in fact many of the guaranteed rights can 
exist and operate effectively within a one-party state. For
/
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example, under the Zambian Bill of Rights, it is difficult to 
see why such guaranteed rights as the right to life; personal 
liberty; freedom from slavery, forced labour, inhuman treatment, 
and deprivation of property; the right of privacy of the home, 
and the protection of the law and freedom of conscience - must 
necessarily fail to operate within the context of a single-party 
situation. It can, of course, be argued that even these rights 
and freedoms are vulnerable to erosion in the political 
circumstances of a one-party state, because the requirement of a 
specified parliamentary majority for the amendment of the 
Constitution is diminished in extent; Parliament may at any time 
and with ease, amend the Constitution - including the Bill of 
Rights - to suit the political ends of the government. Personal 
liberty is not secured by a constitutional guarantee of rights 
alone. No constitution, however strongly entrenched, can prevent 
the powerful executive in a one-party state against the temptation 
to encroach upon the liberties of individuals, unless there is a 
legislature willing to act as a counterpoise against such temptation. 
Moreover, in a young, largely illiterate country like Zambia, where 
a vigilant and responsive public opinion is absent, coupled with the 
fact that the Government is in complete control of the mass media, 
there is clearly no means by which any incipient tyranny by the 
executive can be exposed, criticized, and resisted. These factors 
are also relevant when considering the position of the judiciary in 
the event, for example, of a conflict arising between it and the 
Government, perhaps over a court decision declaring a governmental 
measure invalid. The court will have no outside ally, like an 
Opposition in Parliament or a critical public opinion, which would
support its decision against an embittered executive. The point 
intended to be advanced, however, is that the political and social 
conditions such as we have referred to above, do not create a 
favourable climate in African one-party states whereby individual 
liberties can claim a sacrosanct status within those constitutional 
systems.
The observation made above would lead us to qualify the 
assertion made earlier that most of the rights and freedoms under 
the bill of rights are not incompatible with a one-party state.
What this means is that, provided the single Party and its government 
share a genuine commitment to respect for individual liberties, there 
is no reason why a substantial number of rights and freedoms may not 
operate within the framework of a one-party constitution.
In relation to Zambia, the point has already been made that 
the introduction of the one-party state in 1972 did not, in any 
substantial way, alter the substance of most of the rights and 
freedoms that had previously existed under the independence 
constitution. Most of these rights and freedoms were reproduced 
intact in the one-party constitution. Hence, of the fourteen 
guaranteed rights and freedoms under the independence constitution, 
only three can be shown to have been directly affected by the 
establishment of a one-party state. These are freedom of assembly 
and association; freedom of expression; and freedom against 
discrimination on political grounds.
510
i) Freedom of assembly and association and the one-party state 
It is self-evident that the freedom of assembly and 
association - which confers on all individuals the rights, 
among other things, to form or to belong to any political 
associations - cannot possibly exist under a de jtire one-party 
constitution. Thus, as the National Commission on the 
Establishment of a One-party Participatory Democracy observed:
"Notwithstanding the directive in our terms of reference 
that the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual shall be protected as now provided under 
Chapter III of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Zambia, we considered that by implication those 
sections which gave people the freedom to form more 
than one political party could not be retained in 
the Constitution".
That freedom of association and the single-party system are two
' s-doctrines, arises from the fact that not merely
is the basic idea underlying the one-party state in that only
one political party is allowed to operate but, further, that
all political activity in the country is to be conducted by,
or under the auspices of, that one party. This means that an
individual either joins the party or is left without any
political association. In other words, the one-party system
restricts the right of those who, for whatever reasons, do not
join the ruling party, to form or to belong to any other
political party. Thus the Constitutional Amendment of December
1972, which legally constituted a one-party state in Zambia,
stipulated that it is unlawful for any person to:
" form or attempt to form any political party or
organization other than the Party [UNIP] or to belong 
to or assemble, associate, express opinion or do any, 
other thing in sympathy with such political party for 
organization".^
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However, the Constitution still leaves people free to form 
and to belong to non-political associations provided they are 
not prejudicial to the national interest. But the important 
point here is that, by virtue of the provisions in the 1972 
Constitutional Amendment cited above, it is clear that those 
persons who fundamentally disagree with the ruling party on 
points of principle or ideology in the conduct of government 
are not free to form rival political associations to enable 
them to promote their views in competition with the ruling
party. Under the one-party system, only members of the ruling
party are entitled to participate in the political processes 
of the country by the opportunities given to them to criticize, 
to express and to participate in the formulation of policy 
opinions within the established party organs. This means that 
party membership is a pre-condition for the exercise of political 
rights (except the right to vote in parliamentary and presidential 
elections) in a one-party state.
a) The importance of party membership in a one-party state 
The National Commission remarked that:
"We considered the question of party membership
very seriously as we felt that it was the key
to the success of the One-Party Participatory
Democracy. We did not favour the idea of 
exclusive party membership as it meant that only 
a few people would have the privilege of 
belonging to the only political party contrary 
to the spirit of participatory democracy*'.
True, one of the justifications for the establishment of
a one-party state was that the dominant party like UNIP
or TANU, was a mass party as opposed to an elite group,
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that is a minority ideologically dedicated group who 
provide from the above the leadership necessary to 
activate the inert mass of the community. This is the 
model of one-party systems which is to be found in Russia 
and its satellite states in the East, and also in China. 
The Presidential Commission in Tanzania, though 
appreciating the practical advantages the elitist view 
of the party may have in terms of dynamic leadership 
(as in China and Russia), nevertheless decisively rejected 
that the one-party system in Tanzania should be based on 
that model. The Commission in rejecting the elitist view 
of the party remarked that:
,fWe find it at variance with democratic principles 
and, in particular, with the principle of 
democracy as understood in traditional African 
society. We do not see TANU as an elite but as 
a mass party through which any citizen of '
goodwill can participate in the process of 
government".^
Hence one of the distinctive features of African single­
party systems is that the ruling party itself is seen as 
a mass party or as "a National Movement which is open to
g
all - which is identified with the whole nation...." 
President Nyerere in his usual eloquent style of arguing, 
has put forward the rationale in opting for a mass party 
as opposed to an elitist party within the context of a 
single-party system. Perhaps because of the relevance 
and pointedness of his views on the matter under 
discussion, he deserves to be quoted in full:
Si 3
"No party which limits its membership to a clique 
can ever free itself from the fear of overthrow 
by those it has excluded. It must be constantly 
on the watch for signs of opposition, and must 
smother ’dangerous1 ideas before they have time 
to spread.
But a National Movement which is open to all - 
which is identified with the whole nation - has 
. nothing to fear from ■the discontent of any excluded .
section of society, for there is then no such section.
- Those forming the Government will, of course, be 
replaced from time to time: this is what elections
are for. The leadership of our Movement is 
constantly changing: there is no reason why the
leadership of the Nation should not also be 
constantly changing. This would have nothing to do 
with the overthrowing of a Party government by a rival 
Party. And, since such a National Movement leaves no 
room for the growth of discontented elements 
excluded from its membership, it has nothing to 
fear from criticism and the free expression of 
ideas.
On the contrary, both the Movement itself and the 
Nation have everything to gain from a constant 
injection of new ideas from within the Nation 
and from outside. It would be both wrong, and 
certainly unnecessary, to feel we must wait until 
the leaders are dead before we begin to criticize 
them". 9
Thus it is that in a one-party state, the prohibition of 
rival parties may involve a total exclusion from 
organized politics for some people, because they do not 
either wish or are not allowed to join the only party.
Hence the possibility of total exclusion which may follow 
from the prohibition of rival parties makes the right to 
join the party and to remain in it a very vital one, which, 
it is suggested, deserved to be specially protected by the 
constitution. In what was hitherto a multi-party state, 
as in the case of Zambia, the chances of exclusion from 
organized politics are pretty real, since certain leaders 
of the defunct opposition parties might be denied
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admission into the single party because of their past 
record of opposition. Happily, in Zambia it was a 
declared policy of the one-party government not to refuse 
admission to UNIP to former members of ANC or UPP.
However, as we shall see, most former members of UPP and 
ANC have not taken up membership of UNIP.
The critical question is, however, what are the 
conditions of admission into and explusion from the 
single party, both in Tanzania and Zambia? In discussing 
this theme it is to be observed that two rights are here 
in conflict, viz.:
11 the right of an interested individual not to
be excluded from participation in politics within 
the single party, and the right of any organization 
to determine who to admit as member and the 
conditions of such membership".* 0
In this respect the Tanzanian approach to the conflict is
instructive to note. The Tanzanian Interim Constitution
resolves the conflict by providing that:
"Every citizen of Tanzania who has attained the age 
of eighteen years and who subscribes to the beliefs, 
aims and objectives of the Party as expressed in the 
Constitution of the Party shall, on payment of the 
fees and subscriptions provided for in the 
Constitution of the Party, be entitled to be a 
member of the Party".^
In recommending this provision in the Constitution to
serve as a criterion for the admission of people to
membership of the Party, the Presidential Commission quite
rightly argued that if membership of the party is
automatic by right of citizenship alone and with no
commitment to the beliefs, aims and objectives of the
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party, then the party would have become co-extensive
with the nation, and thereby cease to function as a
12political party m  any serious sense. And in the view
of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One-
party Participatory Democracy in Zambia, automatic
membership of the only party would be "tantamount to a 
13partyless state". The Tanzanian Presidential Commission 
further argued that it should not be objectionable to 
require adherence to the beliefs, aims and objectives of 
the party, because the principles expressed therein are 
not based upon any narrow ideology. To insist on "a 
narrow ideological conformity", the Commission admitted,
" would clearly be inconsistent with the mass
participation in the affairs of the party which
we regard as essential..... The principles of
TANU do not contain any narrow ideological
formulations which might change with time and 
circumstances. They are a broad a statement of
political faith  A party based on these
principles and requiring adherence to them as a 
condition of membership would be open to all but 
an insignificant minority of our citizens and 
would, we believe, be a truly national movement".
It must perhaps be accepted here that the conditions of
membership stated above are liberally formulated and
demand from an interested person only minimum requirements
to be satisfied for admission as a member of the party.
But of great importance is the fact that once admitted
as a member of TANU, the Constitution of the Party gives
protection against arbitrary expulsion to any such
member. Thus a person may be expelled only, on grounds of
disloyalty to, or violation of, the beliefs, aims and
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objectives of the party or default in payment of fees 
and subscriptions, but not because he is critical of, 
or opposed to, the leadership or to certain policies 
pursued by the government.
The Tanzanian approach of admission to party 
membership was never followed in Zambia. In fact, 
unlike the Presidential Commission in Tanzania which 
discussed at length how it saw the character and role 
of TANU in a one-party state with emphasis on whether it 
should be operated as an elitist or mass party, the 
National Commission in Zambia never offered any theory on 
the character and role of UNIP once it became the only 
party in the country. However, it is clear that UNIP in 
Zambia operates on much the same principles as those 
upon which TANU in Tanzania operates.
Unlike that of Tanzania, the national constitution 
in Zambia does not contain any provision specifying 
conditions of admission into UNIP. This means that
the question of having some kind of constitutional 
protection of the right to belong to, and remain in the 
party is not available under the one-party constitutional 
arrangement in Zambia. The matter is left entirely to 
the discretion of the party in accordance with its 
constitution. However, because of the National 
Commission's recommendations "that people should be free 
to join and to belong to the only political party",^
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the UNIP Constitution also formulates a liberal 
criterion for membership which is to the effect 
that:
"Membership of the Party shall be voluntary and 
open to any Zambian citizen who accepts the 
objectives and rules of the party".
Thus both in the case of Tanzania and Zambia, the
insistence on an aspiring member of the party is that
he must be prepared to adhere to its aims and objectives.
This requirement should be defended in that an
organization which is open to all notwithstanding that
they may be disloyal or hostile to the aims and objectives
of the association, or which has no power to expel those
guilty of flagrant breaches of its rules or other serious
misconduct, can hardly be expected to be able to maintain
its authority. Also "this sort of membership", in the
view of the National Commission, "might bring in many
unwilling Party members".^
b) Party identification in Zambia
Since party membership is the basis for the
exercise of certain important political rights in a single
party state, it is only proper that this discussion
should touch on the whole question of how, in practice,
the people of Zambia have come to be associated with UNIP
as members of the Party. For the more people come to be
identified with the farty as members, the more
representative and legitimate the government becomes.
Conversely, if a large proportion of the population fail
to become party members for various reasons - either due
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to sheer apathy among the people, or because of political 
frustrations engendered by the introduction of a one-party 
rule, then the government cannot claim true legitimacy 
for itself. It will be recalled that we quoted President 
Nyerere as saying that:
" A National Movement which is open to all,
which is identified with the whole nation, has 
nothing to fear from the discontent of any 
excluded section of the society, for there is
no such section".
The question is whether there is such a section in Zambia.
The evidence available indicates that the position
regarding fully paid-up membership of UNIP after three
years of one-party rule was one of almost "apathetical
attitude of people towards joining the Party as registered
19card-carrying members”. In that period only five per
cent of the total population of Central Province were
20fully paid-up members of the Party. And of the 1,185,000
residents in the most populous province of the Copper
21Belt, only 32,194 were paid-up members of the Party.
The position was hot any better in the remaining provinces.
The report in the government-owned national national paper,
. 22The Zambia Daily Mail, indicated that:
"There is not a single province in the country 
which had been in the position of boasting of 
party membership which reflects the true 
population of the area". And "For one reason 
or another, the past two years have been very 
bad for UNIP membership".
As a result of the reluctance of people voluntarily to
take up membership of the Party, UNIP officials launched
a "vigorous membership drive" campaign, resorting to door-
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to-door card-checking and refusing to allow individuals
without cards to enter and buy from markets, shops, bars,
23etc. , and from riding on fbuses. However, there was
evidence that many former members of the banned United
Progressive Party and the African National Congress were
not willing to join UNIP. In fact, ex-UPP members and
their leaders in particular, were openly accused by the
government to be engaged in "dark corner meetings". As
to these reports, the government, through its Minister of
Home Affairs, responded by instructing the police to
arrest "on the spot" any ex-UPP leader or member found
24"organizing or attending such subversive meetings".
All this boils down to the assertion that the introduction
of a one-party state in Zambia left a large segment of the
population politically frustrated. In any case, even when
the National Commission was receiving evidence to assist in
establishing the form of one-party system in Zambia, it was
reported that "three-quarters of the petitioners were ruled
out-of-order" because their submissions were outside the
terms of reference, which did not allow the Commission to
hear evidence supporting or opposing the introduction of
25a one-party state.
The effect of having only a few citizens taking up 
membership of the only party, as shown with respect to 
UNIP in Zambia, is of constitutional significance, since 
this may well determine the extent to which citizens are
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able to participate in the process of government -
thereby defeating the ends of "participatory democracy",
an ideal with which the single-party system was closely associated.
c) Integration of non-political organizations
It is true that even in a one-party state people
are free to form and belong to non-political organizations
"provided they are not prejudicial to the national 
26interest". This means that formation of non-political
associations based on tribal loyalties with intent to
engage in tribal, regional, racial or religious propaganda
to the detriment of any other' section of the community is
27prohibited. Under the Societies* Act, : for example, the
Registrar of Societies is empowered to refuse registration to any
organization if it appears to him that such an organization
"has among its objects, or is likely to pursue or to be
used for any purpose prejudicial to or incompatible
28with the peace, welfare or good " of the Republic.
Apart from this limitation placed on the freedom to form 
a non-political organization - which sounds justified in 
the circumstances of an African society - individuals 
have retained their right to associate freely with other 
persons and in particular to form or belong to non­
political associations like the trade unions, even within 
the context of a single-party system. However, the 
reality of this freedom is further attenuated by the fact 
that invariably all the one-party governments, at least 
those of Commonwealth Africa, display a tendency towards 
co-opting every organization of any public significance
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like trade unions, women1s and youth associations,
co-operative societies, farmers’ associations, students’
unions, etc., under the umbrella of the ruling party.
Following the example set by Ghana under Kwama Nkrumah
and his Convention People’s Party, and that of Tanzania 
29and Malawi, Zambia also instituted the device of 
"affiliated membership". It is important to explain 
here the point that under UNIP's Constitution there are
two classes of members, viz., individual members and
30 . . .affiliated members. Affiliated membership consists of
organizations designated as "affiliated organizations".
-liASs*
The National Commission listed,as the Zambia Congress
Trade Unions, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the
National Women’s Council, the National Youth Council of
Zambia, farmers’ organizations, co-operative movements,
and all professional societies, such as the Law
. 31Association of Zambia.
The effect of having integrated or affiliated these
organizations is that they cease to operate independently
of the party and government as before. In the one-party
state they are brought under the control of the party and
the government. Their activities are henceforth required
to conform to the constitution and rules of the party.
Executive members of some of these organizations are also
members of the National Council of the Party, and hence
take part in the deliberations that lead to policy
32formulation of the party and government. In the second
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place, representatives of each of the trade unions 
affiliated to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, and 
at least one delegate from each organization affiliated to 
the party, and all members of the national Council (which 
is also composed of representatives of affiliated
organizations) are delegates at the General Conference of
33 .the Party. The importance of this is that under the
Zambian Constitution, it is the members of the General
Conference who elect a person to be a president of the
Party who then becomes the sole candidate in an election
34to the office of President. Thus the status of being an
"affiliated organization" involves more than being a 
member of the party, but also extends to the actual 
absorption of the organization concerned into the party. 
Perhaps this can best be illustrated by looking at the 
relationship that exists between the trade union movement 
in the country and the government. It should be appreciated 
at the outset that the government's concern over the 
operations and activities of the trade unions is under­
standable since, being the watchdogs of the workers' 
interests, these are strategically well-placed to shake 
the political standing of the government. Thus it was 
necessary to devise some system whereby the activities of 
all trade unions in the country should be placed under 
close control and supervision. This was done through 
creating one statutory organization, the Zambia Congress
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of Trade Unions (the ZCTU), to which all the various
trade unions in the country are statutorily required to 
. . 35be affiliated. As we have seen above, the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions is itself affiliated to UNIP - 
but there are more direct ways in which it is under the 
control and supervision of the government. The Secretary- 
General of the Zambia Congress of the Trade Unions is 
appointed, and can be dismissed, by the President. The 
Secretary-General of the ZCTU co-ordinates the activities 
of all other trade unions in the country. He is the 
chief executive officer and chief spokesman of the union, 
responsible for its overall supervision and management, 
and for the appointment and dismissal of the other general 
officers. He is the union1s spokesman at all conferences 
and at general and executive council meetings. In the 
discharge of his functions he is nevertheless subject to 
the directions and instructions of the Minister of Labour. 
He is also, of course, responsible to the President. Thus, 
in the circumstances, the governments control over the 
trade union movement in the country could not have have 
been more complete.
However, there is here a direct relationship between 
the practice of forcing private associations to be wings 
of the only party on the one hand, and protection of 
human rights on the other. The clear result of so doing 
is to deprive those associations of their independence 
to run their affairs free from interference from the
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party and government. Experience has shown that 
effective protection of human rights is further enhanced 
in circumstances where those private organizations like 
the trade unions, and professional associations are 
allowed to operate independently and for them to act as 
agitators for the rights existing within their sphere of 
operations. For example, trade unions are in fact 
"guardians” of the interests and rights of the workers 
which they are prepared to defend in the face of 
encroachment by the government or by the employers.
The legal profession, organized in an association has 
surely a vital role to play in the vindication of 
individual rights under the law.
In this connection, the late Dr. Busia has made 
the relevant point that:
"Democratic governments usually respect the 
independence of private associations and 
where necessary they provide the constitutional 
framework within which they can function and 
pursue their objectives; but authoritarian 
regimes seek to curb or swallow up all such 
associations in a monolithic single party. In 
the democratic society, the associations are 
recognized as promoting one interest or another, 
or of safeguarding one form of liberty or 
another; but authoritarian regimes see them as 
undesirable sources of independent power to be 
checked in the interests of 1 social order1".36
It is true that the rights of the workers to
associate in a trade union have not been interfered with
under the one-party constitution, even though the
structure of the union movement and its relationship with
the party and government has radically been changed in
order to ensure governments control over unions. But it
is the forcing aspecting of requiring certain private 
associations to affiliate to the party which is 
objectionable. The right to associate necessarily 
implies the right not to associate. Those associations 
should be left entirely free to choose whether to or not 
to be affiliated to the party - in the same way that a 
citizen should be left alone to choose whether to join or 
not to join the party as a member.
ii) Freedom from discrimination on grounds of political 
opinion and the one-party state
Interestingly, the National Commission did not perceive
th$t discrimination on grounds of holding different political
opinions might be commonplace in a one-party state. The
constitutional provision relating to non-discrimination is
contained in Article 25, which is a replica of a similar
provision in the independence constitution. It provides that
" no law shall make provision that is discriminatory either
of itself or in its effect". And the following subsection
defines the expression "discriminatory" to mean:
"Affording different treatment to different persons 
attributable wholly or mainly to their respective 
descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, 
political opinions, colour or creed, whereby persons 
of one such description are subjected to disabilities 
or restrictions to which persons of another such 
description are not made subject or are accorded 
privileges or advantages which are not accorded to 
persons of another such description".
In the exception clauses that follow, no mention is made to
the effect that the provision on non-discrimination will not
apply to non-members of the ruling party who, as we have seen
earlier, are obviously subjected to disabilities or
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restrictions in the enjoyment of certain of their political 
rights which are enjoyed by members of the party. The reason 
why other people do not become members of the party, as we 
have again shown, may stem from their genuine conviction in 
principles, policies or ideologies which may be different from 
those pursued by the ruling party. In other words, their 
political opinions about a number of fundamental subjects of 
politics are not identical with those of the Party, and this 
is what prevents them joining it. Quite clearly the exclusion 
of non-members from party membership and hence from the 
enjoyment of some essential political rights is explicable on 
the grounds that they may hold different political opinions.
This is therefore a clear incidence of discrimination against 
a section of the community on grounds of their political views. 
By extension of this argument, it could be submitted that the 
law introducing a one-party state was, in effect, discriminatory 
in its application to those who could not join the party on 
account of their different political views. This point, 
unfortunately, was not raised, and therefore not discussed in 
the Nkumbula case which tested the constitutionality of the act 
of introducing a one-party state.
The reality of a one-party state vis-a-vis the protection 
from discrimination on the ground of political opinion, becomes 
evident when one remembers that a non-member of the party is 
barred from standing for parliamentary and presidential 
elections, nor can he seek election as a councillor. He
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nevertheless retains his right to vote in these elections.
Further, with the announcement in December 1976, as policy
of the party, that "appointments to posts of management in
parastal organizations should be limited to UNIP supporters
37who identify themselves without the Party*s aspirations", 
a non-member is again put to a disability in that his chances' 
of access to some executive posts in the government and in 
the public corporations of alLkinds. - including institutions 
of higher learning - is blocked by a definite policy of the 
party, and hence of the government,
iii) Freedom of expression and the one-party state
Next in the line of freedoms that are bound to be 
curtailed by the introduction or existence of a de jure one- 
party state is the freedom of expression. This freedom is one 
of the most important elements in. the sustenance of a free and 
democratic society. As one political scientist has said, "the 
freedom of expression", taken together with other freedoms 
(like the freedom of assembly and association) is:
" primarily concerned with a citizen*s right to
political self-expression - effective participation 
in political life, and hence constitutive of 
democracy itself".38
And as Dr. Busia has pointed out:
"Democracy is government by consent. Public discussion, 
free elections, the right of freedom of speech and 
association are regarded as essential because they are 
necessary for achieving consent". 35
Freedom of expression can therefore be regarded as the
instrument through which the wishes, preferences and dislikes
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of the people are or can be discerned. By affording some 
formal means whereby an individual, whether alone or in 
association with others, can express his opinion on any 
matter of some public significance and try to win others to 
his point of view - there is generated an continuing debate 
about how matters of public affairs should be run. It is in 
this context that the medium through which this debate on 
public issues is conducted should also be free from executive 
interference. The “national debate" is formally conducted 
through the legislature by the people's representatives, or 
in the case of a one-party state, through the party organs 
on top of the platform provided by Parliament. Mass media 
is the next important mechanism that handles public debate on 
issues of national importance.
To what extent then, are parliament and the mass media, 
as the major articulators of public opinion, independent of 
the executive in a one-party state? Secondly, within what 
degree of latitude is freedom of speech allowed in a one-party 
parliament? Finally, how free is the mass media in the task 
of mobilizing public opinion even against the government, in 
cases of overt misuse of power? Before dealing with these 
questions, it is important to consider the prospects for 
freedom of speech within the party's central organs themselves, 
i.e. in the National Council and the Central Committee,
a) Freedom of speech in the central organs of the party
The experience in Tanzania and Zambia confirm the 
statement that in a one-party state the tendency has been 
one of encouraging free and frank discussions about any
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matter of public concern including the airing of 
critical views about the activities of the government 
and its officials within the central organs of the 
party. For one thing, it must be remembered that the 
proceedings in the party organs concerned are conducted 
in privacy, and therefore the discussions can be freer 
and more critical "without offending a government's 
natural sensitivity to criticism conducted in the view 
and hearing of the public". In Zambia, for example, the 
National Council of UNIP is the originator of all 
legislative proposals which are thoroughly discussed 
before they reach Parliament. All MPs are members of 
the National Council. This means that most MPs do have 
the opportunity of expressing their views on particular 
legislative proposals during the discussions in the 
Council. When these matters come to Parliament, it would 
be hoped that only the barest minimum of discussion would 
therefore be necessary. In fact, as will shortly be 
shown, the Zambian experience, perhaps unlike that of 
Tanzania, has been that it is in Parliament that MPs 
have shown a record of independent criticism and action.
It was due to this unexpected action of many MPs whereby, 
in spite of their prior participation in discussions 
about legislative policy in the National Council, they 
still strongly attack some of these policies in Parliament, 
that led President Kaunda to make this rather 
surprising remark:
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"It is most unprincipled and undemocratic^ for 
a Member of Parliament who has had the chance 
to discuss Party policy in the National Council 
to somersault in the National Assembly and 
begin condemning a collective decision to which 
he was a party.
 If the National Council decides that a
certain action has got to be taken by the
government, in order to implement a given policy 
programme, that has got to be done. If it is 
legislative action that is needed to implement 
a decision of the Council, the National Assembly, 
as an arm of the Party, must act accordingly, 
without question".40
However, it is to be noticed that even if discussions 
within the central organs of the party are freely 
conducted, this in itself does not adequately meet the 
needs of democracy. Although they may serve to check 
and temper the government, the sanction of publicity is 
missing. The absence of publicity ensures that the 
public is not made fully aware of the mistakes and short­
comings of the government. The one-party state therefore 
operates in such a way as to shield the government from 
public exposure of its shortcomings and mistakes, so that 
it does not need to fear loss of confidence with the 
people which might result in its eventual defeat at the 
polls.
b) Freedom of speech in the one-party Parliament
Unlike the independence constitution, the one-party 
constitution contained an express provision to the effect 
that "Members of the National Assembly shall be free to 
speak and vote on any issue in the Assembly".^ This 
provision was indeed intended to implement the National 
Commission’s recommendations on the whole question of
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how much freedom of speech by members of Parliament 
should be allowed in a one-party state. The Commission 
had recommended that "members of parliament be free to
A O
speak and/or vote as they like on any issue". Though
.. .  . . 4 3 sthe Government initially accepted this recommendation,
it later clarified what it meant, namely that:
"A member would of course be allowed to [criticise] 
provided they are also allowed to support the 
Government especially if they realize that the 
basic function of members is indeed to support the 
Government". 44
As for Ministers, they are not allowed to be free to
criticise government policy publicly unless they resign
their positions. The reason given for this ban on the
part of the Ministers was that it would be contrary to
.. .  45the principle of collective responsibility. But, it 
would appear that the concept of "executive responsibility 
to the legislature" within a single-party constitutional 
arrangement loses much of its meaning. Is the cabinet 
really responsible to parliament in Zambia? In the first 
place the President, who presides over cabinet meetings 
and who undoubtedly has a dominant voice in decision­
making in the cabinet, is directly elected by the people 
and parliament has no role in his election. He is therefore, 
net responsible or accountable to parliament, and the 
latter cannot remove him by, say, a vote of No Confidence.
In the second place, it is true that all ministers must be 
members of the National Assembly - naturally because they 
must be there to answer questions and participate in 
discussions. It must be pointed out that under the Zambian
one-party constitution, the cabinet is merely an 
agent of the Central Committee and the National Council 
of the Party. Legislative proposals are made by the 
National Council which merely directs the Minister 
responsible to obtain the necessary legislation and to 
implement the policy involved. In the third place, the 
Central Committee of the party is elevated above the 
cabinet as the chief policy-maker. Having formulated 
the policy, the cabinet is directed to implement that 
policy and should there be a conflict between the 
decision of the Central Committee and that of the 
cabinet, the decision of the former prevails. The point 
is that the cabinet in these circumstances, cannot be 
held responsible for decisions which it does not normally 
take. Policy decisions are taken by the Central Committee, 
legislative proposals are taken by the National Council of 
which all MPs are members. Moreover, with each member of 
the cabinet concentrating exclusively on administration 
in his own field, there is no shared policy responsibility 
to bind them together and make them collectively 
responsible for anything.
However, in spite of the limitations imposed on 
members of parliament, it has emerged that "the quality
of debate in the National Assembly is much higher today
46than it was under the multi-party system' " There
is no doubt that the one-party Parliament in Zambia has not
5 33
infrequently debated, very critically and frankly,
controversial proposals which the government sought to
47be given legislative effect. ■- The most notable 
incident when members of parliament refused to back 
a Government bill, was when the first Constitutional 
(Amendment) Bill was presented to the House in August 
1974. Had the Bill been passed, its effect would have
been to curtail the individual’s right to sue the
48government for wrongful detention. However, the Bill 
was attacked by MPs and was severely criticized and 
condemned as being " an erosion of the rule of law
and a deprivation of an individuals common law remedies
\ 49
and other common law causes of action". When the
Constitution of Zambia Bill 1973 (which1formally brought
into effect the one-party constitution) was under
consideration by the House, some MPs were critical of the
fact that the provisions of the new constitution did not
"Seem to embrace the Chona recommendations""^ which
sought to curtail the powers of the executive over the
cabinet and its powers in relation to the protection of
personal liberties during an emergency. In the view of
some MPs these recommendations ought not to have been
dropped by the government because they "reflected the
5 raspirations of the people".
Moreover, the one-party Parliament itself has been 
very apprehensive of attempts by "outsiders" to tamper
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with its parliamentary privilege and has acted
promptly in its defence when occasion.has arisen.
Under the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges)
52Act, it is provided that:
"There shall be freedom of speech and debate in 
the Assembly. Such freedom of speech and debate 
shall not be liable to be questioned in any 
court or place outside the Assembly".
On 13 February 1973, the Speaker of the National Assembly
received a letter of complaint from an MP in connection
. 54with an article m  The Times of Zambia. The article 
stated that a speech delivered in Parliament by one MP 
was prejudicial to the trial of a top government official 
for corruption. This statement had been made by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, who also accused the MP 
for commenting in Parliament on a matter which was sub 
judice, saying that the nature of his comments could not 
not fail to influence potential witnesses who were being 
approached in connection with the case - and indeed might 
have the effect of intimidating some of them so that they 
might decline to give evidence.
The MP concerned, with the support of many of his 
fellow MPs, claimed that an infringement of Parliamentary 
privilege had taken place in that his freedom of speech 
in the House had been attacked and questioned outside the 
Assembly by the Director of Public Prosecutions in a court 
of law. The Speaker of the House, upholding his 
contention lfad:strongly defended the sanctity of the
535
freedom of speech in the House, saying that:
11....1 have to rule that a breach of privilege
has been committeed and, on behalf of the House,
I have to give a final warning to all outsiders 
that Parliament will not hesitate to punish 
anyone who tampers with the rights and privileges 
of honourable Members- "55
These events, took place on the eve of the first sittings
of the one-party parliament; and within two years
thereafter MPs had become more critical of the activities
of the Government and Party. This prompted President
Kaunda to issue stern warnings against the growing
"indiscipline" among the members of parliament. In what
came to be called the "watershed" speech to the National
Council of the United National Independence Party, the
President * that:
" ever since our last meeting the nation has
been hearing strange 'outpourings' from the 
National Assembly. Members of the Central 
Committee, Ministers and other Party and Government 
leaders have been maligned. They have been accused 
of all sorts of oddities - tribalism, corruption, 
nepotism, and so on. The Party and Government have 
been severely criticized for alleged inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness. Some Members of Parliament 
have, in fact, been speaking as if they are not 
members of the Party and as if this Government 
is not theirs. Their anti-Party and anti-Government 
mouthings have left some of us with the impression 
that they are seeking to be an opposition Party in 
our one-party participatory democracy...
Hence, in order to place some restraints on the extent to
which Members of Parliament could be free to criticize
the Government and the Party, the President instructed
the Speaker to take action in making disciplinary rules
of the Party part of the Standing Orders of Parliament.
Briefly, the "disciplinary rules" of the Party which are
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annexed to the Party Constitution^ specify "offences"
which a member of the Party may commit against the Party
and also the punishment consequent upon breach of these
rules. Two of these rules are relevant to this
discussion. Firstly, it is an offence against the Party
to "[carry] on false information or propaganda which tends
to injure the reputation of the Party or of any of its
officials"; secondly, it is also an offence against the
Party to "[publish] or [cause] to be published, orally or
in writing, any matter which in the opinion of the Central
Committee or the National Council is an attack on the
Party or an attack on a member or official of the Party
in relation to the discharge of his functions as a member
58of official of the Party". The punishment for breach 
of any of these and other rules range from dismissal from 
office, debarring from holding office, suspension from 
membership and/or office, to expulsion from the Party. Of 
course these rules applied to Members of Parliament in 
their private capacities as members of the Party; but the 
effect of making them part of the Standing Orders of 
Parliament was that the rules applied to them "within the 
precinct of Parliament". In other words, their 
parliamentary privilege and freedom freely to criticize 
the activities of the Party together with its officials, 
was now restricted.
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c) Freedom of the press and the one-party state
The ICJ Seminar on Human Rights meeting in Dar es 
Salaam in 1976, observed, in relation to the subject 
under discussion, that:
"Probably the most important element of freedom of 
expression is freedom of the press. The Seminar 
was unanimous that a high degree of freedom of the 
press is consistent with a one-party state. Its 
importance is even greater than in a multi-party 
state owing to the absence of any institutionalized 
opposition, so that the press constitutes the main 
vehicle through which views and grievances can be 
aired. A free and enlightened press is a powerful 
instrument for the protection of fundamental human 
rights".59
Experience, however, shows that this is not the way the 
role of the mass media has or is being looked at in a 
one-party state. Mass media, instead, is used^an 
instrument in promoting the ends of the party and the 
government alike. They are not independent institutions 
which can process the views of sections of the society 
holding contrary views about the political affairs of the 
country. The fate of the mass media in Zambia since the 
introduction of a single-party system in 1972, and more 
specifically, after President Kaunda's famous "Watershed" 
speech of July 1975, is self-evident of the extent to 
which the protection of the freedom of the press in a one- 
party state can systematically be weakened.
Since independence in 1964, there has always been 
three main national newspapers in Zambia, viz., The Times 
of Zambia, The Sunday Times of Zambia, and The Zambia Daily 
Mail. The Government has always appointed the Editors- 
in-Chief for all of these papers. Prior to its total
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take-over by the Party (UNIP), The Times of Zambia was 
privately owned by Lonrho, and this explains why, unlike 
the other two papers, it showed some characteristic 
courage and independence in its coverage of the news and 
in objective analysis of important issues to the nation.
On 30 June 1975, however, President Kaunda announced 
that The Times of Zambia and The Sunday Times of Zambia 
were to be taken over by the Party one hundred per cent.
The Zambia Daily Mail had always been owned and controlled 
by the Government. Henceforth The Times of Zambia was to 
be turned into an instrument "to reflect official Party 
and Government thinking", while The Sunday Times of Zambia 
was to "carry analysis.....on the Party and Government and
the nation in general".
At the same time, the whole of the cinema industry
was nationalized to enable the Government to reorient the
61cinema "to reflect our national values". On the. other 
hand, broadcasting - both radio and television - had always 
been wholly in the ownership and control of the Government.
It is true to say that the mere existence of a one- 
party state does not, in itself, mean that the freedom of 
the press is thereby threatened or is necessarily eroded. 
Freedom of the press depends to a large degree upon the 
attitude of its owners - i.e. the Party and Government in
a one-party state. Again, the commitment of the party and
government is of crucial importance for the freedom of the 
press to be effective. The press will certainly need their under­
standing and support if its mission of fostering public
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discussion on important issues and the airing of 
grievances through it is to be realized within the 
single party set-up.
It seems to us that individual rights and freedoms 
are secured partly by ensuring that certain institutions in 
the country should remain independent of the^ executive. We 
have, for example, submitted that Parliament must be left 
free in order for it to perform its function as a 
counterpoose against executive arbitrariness, especially 
where, as in a one-party state, the executive is 
surrounded with a lot of power. The press too must possess 
a reasonable degree of independence in order for it to 
serve as an articulator of public opinion and as an 
educator of the people to acquaint them of their rights, and 
as a motivator in helping to create an informed public 
opinion on the obligations of government officials towards 
the community they serve. There is, however, a third 
institution whose independence of the executive it is even 
more crucial to preserve if an effective protection of 
human rights is to be attained within the context of a 
single-party situation, and this is the "judiciary". 
Independence of the judiciary becomes a matter of even 
extra significance where, as in Zambia, the constitution 
embodies a bill of rights and where, therefore, the Courts 
are made to interpret and enforce the guaranteed rights.
In the light of the evidence presented above to the effect that 
the one-party government does not tolerate certain institutions in the 
country, like Parliament and the mass media, to operate independently
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and to subject it to criticism and checks, to what extent has the 
independence of the judiciary survived the trend in a one-party state 
whereby the norm seems to be established that all 
government institutions must, of necessity, be brought under close 
control of the government? It is thus to a consideration of the subject 
of independence of the judiciary and the one-party state that we should 
now turn.
B. Independence of the Judiciary and the One-party System
The introduction of a one-party state in both Tanzania and 
Zambia was accompanied by a reaffirmation of the desire of the 
respective governments to maintain the independence of the 
judiciary. The Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a 
One-party State in Tanzania, for example, declared that:
" the independence of the Judiciary is the foundation of
the Rule of Law. The Commission believes that this is true
as much in a one-party state as it is where the law of the 
Constitution recognizes the o p p o s i t i o n ".62
In Zambia too, it was one of President Kaunda's directives to the
One-party Commission that:
" the supremacy of the rule of law and independence of the
judiciary shall continue to be m a i n t a i n e d ".63
And the conclusions of an international Commission of Jurists Seminar
on Human Rights in a One-party State, meeting in Dar es Salaam in
1976, emphasized that:
".... The cornerstone of the independence of the judiciary lay
in its power to dispense justice without fear or favour and 
with total impartiality and respect for the principles of the 
rule of law. This should be ensured by the embodiment within 
the Constitution of clear rules governing the qualifications 
and calibre of persons appointed to the bench, objective 
methods of appointment, security of tenure of the office and 
protection from removal from office save on the grounds of 
gross misconduct or physical or mental capacity as determined 
by an independent tribunal or similar means. These safeguards 
were vital to the independent and impartial exercise of 
j udicial authority".64
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It is necessary now to examine the nature of the safeguards 
to secure the independence of the judiciary under the Zambia 
independence constitution before proceeding to note what changes 
were made with the introduction of a single-party system in 1972. 
This will be followed by an examination of the extent of political 
influence on the functioning of the judiciary,
i) The position at independence
a) Some historical background to the development
of the independence of the judiciary in Commonwealth 
Africa
During the colonial period, the judiciary was part 
of the colonial civil service, or rather its special 
branch, the Colonial Legal Service, and as such the 
appointment of judges remained in the hands of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. Like other colonial 
civil servants, judges and magistrates held their offices 
during His (or Her) Majesty's pleasure, which means that
f i Sthey c-i'uld be removed at will and for any reason.
However, in practice there was maximum security of tenure 
of colonial judges and magistrates and their removal since 
1870 involved reference to the Judicial Committee in 
London.^
The colonial practice pertaining to the appointments 
and security of tenure of judicial officers was, quite 
rightly abandoned at independence. Indeed, given the
finature of African societies and politics, it would have 
been imprudent to continue an arrangement whereby the 
executive would be responsible for the appointments and 
removal of judicial officers at his pleasure. A
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constitutional guarantee was henceforth felt to be of 
utmost importance. The African nationalist politicians 
to whom political power was to be handed over had 
absolutely no experience of how to run the government, 
nor did they have behind them a tradition of self-restraint 
in the exercise of governmental powers as do their 
counterparts in Britain or the USA. Moreover, respect 
for the independence of the judiciary in a country like 
Britain is based not only on law, but also on tradition 
and convention which the politicians themselves observe 
as part of the political game. On the contrary, an 
African politician uninhibited by the influence of 
tradition on which respect for the independence of the 
judiciary is based in the known Western democracies, is 
readily to far greater temptation to interfere
with the judiciary, especially in those countries with
✓
bills of rights, with judges having to decide "red-hot" 
political questions concerning the interpretation of the 
bill of rights and of the validity of laws enacted by the 
legislature. A judiciary which frequently, or even 
occasionally, gives decisions which have the effect of 
thwarting government policy will naturally become unpopular 
among.politicians who are set to develop and modernize with 
all possible speed a backward society laid waste by years 
of colonial neglect. In these circumstances, without 
effective constitutional guarantees safeguarding the 
security of tenure of judges, and where the power of
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appointment and removal is vested in the politicians,
there is no doubt that the politicians will easily
proceed to remove judges at their own will and
convenience; therefore, when independence was granted
Wes*
in 1957 to Ghana,- the first British colony in,Africa to 
attain that status - the appointment of judges (other than 
the Chief Justice and Justices of Appeal) was taken away
from the executive and vested in an independent judicial
68commission established directly by the Constitution.
The Chief Justice, on the other hand, remained to be
appointed by the Governor-General acting on the advice of 
. . 69the Prime Minister. The appointments of Justices of
Appeal were also made by the Governor-General acting on
the advice of the Prime Minister, but only after the Prime
Minister has consulted with the Chief Justice.^ The
grounds for removal were also clearly spelt out in the
Constitution, viz., misbehaviour or inability. The
procedure for removing a judge was also expressly stated
in the Constitution and required the executive's address
to the Legislative Assembly to be carried by a majority 
71of two-thirds.
The Ghanaian innovation was improved upon by Nigeria.
In addition to appointment by an independent judicial 
commission, and the stipulation of misbehaviour or inability 
as the only grounds for removal, a new procedure for 
removal was instituted, requiring reference of the matter 
to a local "judicial" tribunal, and further reference, 
should the local judicial tribunal find against the judge,
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to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
72 . .. .London. Under the Constitution, the power to initiate
removal proceedings lay in the executive, and during the
pendency of the proceedings investigating a judge, (the
executive (in effect, the Governor-General acting on the
advice of the Prime Minister) could suspend the judge
under investigation. However, such a suspension ceased
if the removal procedure terminated in the judge*s favour*
Although these provisions were ' _ in most of the
subsequent Commonwealth African constitutions except that
in Zambia, the local judicial tribunal decided without
any further reference to the Judicial Committee of the
Rrivy Council in London.
ii) Provisions preserving independence of the judiciary 
under the Zambian independence constitution
Under the independence constitution of Zambia, in line
with the rest of Commonwealth African constitutions, the
73President appointed the Chief Justice. Puisne judges
of the High Court and Justices of the Court of Appeal were
appointed by the President acting in accordance with the
. . 74
advice of the Judicial Service Commission. And the office
of a puisne judge could not be abolished while there was
75a substantive holder thereof. Removal of a judge of the
Court of Appeal, or of the High Court, could only come
about if proved that for the reasons of inability or
misbehaviour the judge concerned could not perform the
76
functions of his office. And as in Nigeria (1960), the
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initiative for removal proceedings lay with the 
executive - the President, in fact, who was made the 
appropriate authority to demand that a judge be 
investigated with a view to his removal. Having decided 
thus, the President was to appoint a tribunal to consist
of a chairman and not less than two other members who,
. . .  77held or had held, high judicial office. During the
pendency of the inquiry by the tribunal, the President
could, of course, suspend the judge, but as in the case
Nigeria, such a suspension ceased if the outcome of the
78investigation proved to be in favour of the judge.
iii) Impact of the introduction of the one-party state
Basically, the arrangements instituted at independence
safeguarding the independence of the judiciary were retained
in the single-party constitution of Zambia; but some
notable events occurred in this area.
While retaining the Judicial Service Commission,
79a Constitutional Amendment of 1974 altered its
composition. Before this Amendment to the Constitution,
the Commission had consisted of the Chief Justice as its
Chairman, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission,
a judge of the Supreme Court or High Court.designated by '
the Chief Justice, and one other member appointed by the 
80President. This latter must be a person who had held,
1 8 1or was holding high judicial office. So the position at
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independence was that the Commission consisted of three 
judges and one non-lawyer. This composition was retained 
by the One-party Constitution, except that the number of 
the members of the Commission was increased by one, 
expressly by designating the Attorney-General as a member. 
The 1974 Constitutional Amendment referred to above, 
substituted the Secretary to the Cabinet for a judge of 
the Supreme Court or High Court. It also removed the 
requirement that the one member appointed by the President 
must be, or must have been a judge. As reconstituted, 
the membership of the Commission is now the Chief Justice, 
as Chairman, the Attorney-General, Chairman of the Public 
Service Commission, the Secretary to the Cabinet and one 
other member appointed by the President. So unless the 
presidential appointee is a judge or a former judge, the 
Chief Justice is left as the only judicial member of the 
Commission. Clearly, with this composition, the Commission 
now looks largely as an executive body with most of its 
members drawn from the executive side of government 
administration. As such, the Commission is now 
vulnerable to political control by the President himself 
and senior members of the government and party. The 
politicization of the Commission and its eventual 
subordination to the executive, constitutes one clear piece 
of evidence in support of the view that one-party 
governments in Africa do not tolerate pockets of power 
within the state, and hardly allow certain kinds of
547
government institutions to function independently of 
the executive. The tendency is to aggregate and 
concentrate power in the hands of the executive - the 
President, in effect - and there is no doubt that the 
vesting of such an important power as the appointments of 
judicial officers in someone or some authority other than 
an executive, or an executive-controlled authority, is 
incompatible with the attitude of a one-party government 
towards state power.
Perhaps the view that the process of the appointment 
of judges should exclude the influence of the executive 
ought not be entertained in the first place. It has been 
said, for example, that:
" the office of a judge is a strategic one in the
machinery of government, and in any country that 
professes democracy it might be argued that judicial 
appointsments should depend on the consent of the 
people just as those of the legislature and the
executive’1.82
This is indeed the position in some states of the USA, 
where judges are elected directly by the people. (And in 
England, judges are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, 
himself a member of the Cabinet and a politician.) The 
process of direct election of judges by the people cannot 
be used in Africa for obvious "social" reasons. But even 
if the people themselves are not directly involved, it is 
arguable that in the name of democracy, the people’s 
elected representatives in government should be associated 
with the process of the appointment of judges. This 
argument is articulated thus:
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" the executive....has been chosen by the
people and entrusted by them and by the 
Constitution with full responsibility for the 
government of the people. Its responsibility 
for government requires that, except for those 
elected directly by the people, it should have 
an effective say in the appointment of all 
important functionaries of the state. It is 
wrong to deny it this11.83
Perhaps we should reply to this argument by saying that
what is at issue is not that the executive should not be
directly involved in the appointment of judges, or that
political considerations may not play a part in the whole
exercise, but rather whether politicians by themselves
are qualified to choose professionally competent persons
of proven integrity to man the bench. Alternatively, can
one trust politicians to be objective in the appointment
of judicial officers? Quite naturally if the appointment
of judges is left to the politicians, they will tend to
choose those lawyers who hhppen to be their friends, or who
are politically sympathetic with the particular party in
power. This will naturally offend against the accepted
view that "no one should be appointed a Judge for purely
political reasons when he is not otherwise fitted for the
office". ^  The idea of vesting the power to appoint
judges in an independent body like the Judicial Service
Commission, and constituting this Commission mostly of
judges or former judges, is to ensure an objective
selection of people who are well-qualified, competent and
of proven integrity to accede to the important office of
judgeship. Surely judges, or former judges, by virtue of
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their longstanding association with lawyers, and the 
impartiality and objectivity in the handling of legal 
matters which is usually attributed to them, are in a 
unique position to undertake that task.
There is however, one instance under the Zambian
Constitution whereby the executive appoints judges all
by himself without consulting or acting on the advice of
anybody. The one-party constitution, when it was finally
adopted, had abolished the Court of Appeal and replaced it
with the Supreme Court. Under the independence
constitution, justices of appeal were appointed by the
President acting in accordance with the advice of the
85Judicial Service Commission. But under the one-party
constitution justices of the Supreme Court are appointed
86by the President at his own discretion. However, though 
this is so, the President cannot dismiss them except by 
the same procedure, which applies to the puisne judges 
when the question of removal arises. The procedure which 
we have already referred to, is again the appointment by 
the President of a tribunal consisting of a chairman and 
not less than two other members who hold, or have held, high 
judicial office. The tribunal reports back-to the 
President, and advises him whether or not a judge ought 
to be removed. If the tribunal advises that a judge should 
be: removed, ’’the President shall remove such judge from 
office". On the other hand, if the President is advised
by the tribunal that the judge ought not to be removed 
from office, he must comply with this.
However, the practice whereby a judge is appointed to 
a ministerial job or some other post in the public or 
para-statal service, is apt to undermine the security of 
tenure of judges, and therefore the independence of the 
judiciary. In Zambia since the establishment of a single­
party rule, the President on two occasions had appointed a 
judge to become Attorney-General and Minister of Legal 
Affairs.^ The judge was then asked to resign his 
judicial office in order to enable him take up the new 
job. Now, a ssuming that the government did not favour 
a particular judge (and since he could not be removed 
arbitrarily) it can easily employ this device of offering 
him another appointment and asking him to resign as a 
judge. Thereafter he could be dismissed from his new 
post and need not be reappointed as judge again. This 
has not happened in Zambia, but it certainly poses a 
possible threat to the security of the tenure of judges.
C. The Judiciary and Politics in a One-party State
Independence of the judiciary in a multi-party state would 
simply mean independence of the Courts from the influence of the 
executive and the legislature. But in a one-party state the 
"party11 is as much an arm of the government as the executive and the 
legislature are - perhaps an even more important government insitution than 
these two. As-js-u^ h, one would have ..thought that the concept of the
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independence of the judiciary in a single-party state must embrace 
the notion of independence from the influence of the party as well. 
Unfortunately, this is not the way the notion is perceived in one- 
party states. In the first instance, it is argued that in a two or 
multi-party state membership of a judge to any political party is 
objectionable because it would operate to undermine the image of 
a judge as an impartial arbiter. Henceforth, he will be looked upon 
as identifying himself with the interests of one group, and in a 
case pending before him he will tend to promote the interests of 
his group. Even if in deciding such a case the judge concerned 
approached it without regard to the interests involved and gave an 
unbiased judgment but which happened to be favourable to his group, 
still in the eyes of the people the judgment would be regarded as 
interest-motivated: therefore, in a multi-party state it is
understandable why judges must keep out of party politics.
When one comes to a one-party situation, the Dar es Salaam ICJ 
Seminar concluded that:
11 members of the judiciary should be at liberty to join
the party provided that the party was a party of the masses 
with no unreasonable restrictions of membership, but should 
not be members of the policy-making organs of the party".
The justification for:the desirability of judicial officers not to
remain apolitical in a one-party system has nowhere been received
with such a pointed elucidation as that offered by a former Chief
Justice of Tanzania, Mr. Justice Georges. Since Chief Justice
Georges has said almost everything that can be said on this subject,
his account of it perhaps deserves to be quoted in full. He said:
}
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"The concept of the judge as the neutral, belonging to no 
party in the multi-party democracy, can have no meaning 
here where there is one party. If he stands aloof, 
seeming to play the apolitical role which is supposed to 
be his, his motives will doubtlessly be suspected. A. 
new way must be found...
In the case of the elected judge or the English lawyer- 
politician appointed to the bench, whatever posture of 
impartiality may be adopted, it is difficult to believe 
that political convictions or prejudices acquired over 
a life-time and perhaps deeply encrusted can suddenly 
be jettisoned by the mere fact of appointment to the 
bench. What does happen is that the judicial officer's 
sense of professional integrity and his professional 
competence secure some objectivity in the handling of 
legal affairs, despite political commitment. It is my 
view that despite a political commitment to TANU, the 
judicial officer in Tanzania, once he is of the right 
calibre, can secure an equal degree of objectivity in
his legal work. The main planks of TANU's beliefs...
are they can work [sic].
Seen in that context it seems to me that the judicial 
officer should, if he wishes to, become a member of 
TANU, and that at this stage this is perhaps desirable. 
Although politics is much concerned with the struggle 
for power and position, it is not concerned solely with 
that. In Tanganyika a tremendous task of educating 
people still lies ahead and no one should be better 
fitted to instruct on the essential part which the courts 
play in maintaining human rights and helping to secure 
for society that basis of order and respect for law without 
which economic advancement would be considerably hampered. 
This work can best be done from within the party which 
offers a platform largely respected because of its 
achievement in the struggle for independence...
It is too much to expect the politicians to do that job 
for the judiciary. Largely we will have to do it ourselves 
so that a public opinion will gradually be created, 
permeating throughout the party, that the courts must be 
preserved because of the indispensable role which they play. 
The leaders at the top realize it and often stress it.
But the task demands more than the occasional pronouncement. 
For these reasons, I see no harm and much good in party 
membership by members of the judiciary and the use of the 
opportunities which membership offers to show positive 
interest in helping the process of rapid national 
development and to stress the importance of the courts in 
the achievement of that goal".^
Perhaps it could be said here that in the African traditional 
societies there was no equivalent of the doctrine of the 
"independence of the Judiciary", since starting from the Chief 
himself down to his councillors and headmen, dispute-settlement 
was in most cases handled by them. There was no division between 
the executive and the "judiciary". Chiefly functions included 
both law-making, law-execution and dispute-settlement. This 
perhaps went too far than could be accepted in a modern African 
society, but the trend in a one-party state in favour of judicial 
membership to the party has some traces of similarity with the 
position in the traditional societies regarding the relationship 
between the executive and the Courts.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: AN APPRAISAL OF THE PROBLEMS
AFFECTING THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
AFRICA 'AND SOME SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
In our conclusion it may be proper for us to reflect, very 
briefly, on some of the outstanding points which have emerged from 
our study of the operation of human rights within the context of 
the African political systems. It is not, however, intended to 
restate our views on the fine points of this subject, which have 
already appeared in the text, but rather to express our 
concluding remarks with reference to answering three closely related 
questions. First, is the question whether protection of human rights 
through the means of constitutional entrenchment in the form of a bill 
of rights has proved, or can prove effective in the circumstances 
obtaining in Africa today; secondly, assuming that constitutional 
protection of human rights in Africa has not proved efficacious, what 
are the factors explaining that alleged failure? Thirdly, and lastly, 
what means or devices do we see as perhaps being appropriate as 
alternative modes for the protection of human rights, given the operative 
conditions of Africa?
A. Has Constitutional Protection of Human Rights 
Worked Effectively in Africa?
The picture that finally emerges from our account and 
discussion on the subject of the constitutional protection of 
human rights and freedoms in Commonwealth Africa generally, is that 
in spite of the efforts exerted by both the Colonial Office and the 
local nationalist leaders concerned to insure their efficacy, bills 
of rights in their practical operations as apparatus to limit the 
actions of African government^had but a tenuous existence. Indeed,
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one might be tempted to conclude that bills of rights in the
practical politics of African states has but a "decorative"
existence in at least the majority of African states. This would
indeed seem to be a surprising finding,since, as we have shown in
Chapter Two dealing with "the reception of the idea of human rights
in Africa", it was due to the pressures of the local political leaders
themselves taking part in the constitutional discussions in London
that many bills of rights were bargained for to be included in the
independence constitutions of these countries.^ We have shown this
at least with reference to the decision to incorporate a bill of
2rights in the Nigerian Constitution (1960), and that of Northern
3
Rhodesia (1963 and 1964 Constitutions). This fact is further
confirmed by the fact that for a long period the United Kingdom
Government had been opposed to the idea of writing a code of human
rights in the constitutions of its former dominions and colonies
before 1957, and that its attitude in that regard was relaxed after
4
the Nigerian experience which we have described. No doubt,
Britain.1 s approach to the mode of the protection of human rights in 
its former dependencies might also have been influenced by an inter­
national enthusiasm urging for the constitutional incorporation of 
human rights after the Second World War - especially in the I9601s.
But the point is that a demonstrable overriding factor in inducing 
that trend was the views impressed upon the Colonial Office by the 
political leaders of the colonial peoples themselves. It seems 
paradoxical, therefore, that once independence was won and political 
sovereignty placed firmly in the hands of nationalist leaders, they 
turned round and proceeded either to remove, or to attenuate the
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intended effects of constitutionally entrenched bills of rights.
This truth about the post-independence constitutional practice in 
the majority of African states may well serve to justify the 
assertion that in supporting the principles underlying the concept 
of civil liberties before independence, the nationalist leaders saw 
this no more than propaganda to discredit colonialism as being 
incompatible with human rights and of democracy in order to win 
international sympathy to their cause.
It is to be conceded, of course, that in some important aspects 
it was not the actions of politicians that prevented bills of rights 
from working effectively in Africa, but rather some operative 
political, economic, social, legal, etc., forces actively at work 
within the African societies which have proved inhospitable to 
court-enforced bills of rights.
Thus, out of the twelve Commonwealth African states, six - 
Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana - have no 
constitutionally enforceable bills af rights. Again seven of these 
twelve countries - Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, 
Swaziland and Zambia - are either de jure, or de facto, one-party 
states, or indeed, "no-party states". Three - Ghana, Nigeria and 
Uganda - are currently ruled by military governments. Only two - 
Botswana and Gambia - have had so far no serious constitutional 
upheavals resulting in discarding their bills of rights, or 
attenuating their effects in some radical manner# However, in the 
case of Botswana (independet in 1966), what may be seen as a serious 
qualification in its Bill of Rights was apparent with the passage 
(in 1969) of a constitutional amendment"* whose general effect
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"was to revise the constitutional provisions 
relating to citizenship, to modify the Declaration 
of Fundamental Rights to facilitate government 
action in areas of air transport safety, mineral 
exploitation, trade unions organization and the 
application of customary law...."
But in the case of Gambia (independent in 1965), at least up to 1970,
no amendment to its Bill of Rights had ever been passed, and so, to
that extent this is the only stable Bill of Rights in the whole of
Commonwealth Africa. In Kenya (independent in 1963) the Bill of
Rights has been relegated from occupying the early Chapter III at
independence to Chapter V. This may not seem to be a noteworthy
development, but it does, however, show the declining attitude of
politicians 'towards the primacy of a code of human rights as a
constitutional institution. In these circumstances a pertinent
question poses itself here as to why bills of rights, once before and
at independence extolled as symbols of a constitutional democracy,
have sunk into oblivion when in their places of origin in some
European countries and in America they still command a central
authority as the real pivot of democratic life. What are the problems,
factors or variables that explain the - failure of African
states to adopt the Euro-American model for the protection of human
rights? In its wider context this question has been discussed in
the light of the fact that reproduction of the Westminster model of
political democracy in Africa has not worked well. Here, however,
it is intended only to look at one aspect of this political democracy,
namely, the institution of "human rights", and to discuss it with
reference to the fact that its adoption in the African political
situation has not been met with relative success.
B. Factors Explaining Alleged Failure of the Development 
of Constitutionalism*1 in Africa Today
It will have become apparent from our discussions in the 
preceding chapters of this investigation that the subject matter 
of each of these chapters represents an exposition and analysis of 
one problem upon another bearing on the constitutional protection 
of human rights in Africa, and the extent to which these problems 
have operated to undermine the full enjoyment of human rights.
These problems, as has been shown, manifest themselves in all sorts 
of forms, ranging from historical, doctrinal, legal to discussions 
of social, political and even economic contexts. Chapters One and 
Two, for example, have underlined the point that the principles of 
"human rights" which were later transported to Africa, trace their 
origins to the Western politico-philosophical tradition. It is f
true that, with the exception of the Nigerian Bill of Rights (1960), 
what have been called "Neo-Nigerian" bills of rights have displayed 
some attempts to adopt the Western-inspired principle of human rights 
to suit variations in the local conditions prevailing in the various 
former colonies of Britain. Though this is a correct observation, 
the fact still remains that in writing up these African bills of 
rights, the Colonial Office in London drew heavily from the Euro- 
American type of bills of rights. No doubt the authors of these 
documents were under the illusion that since these constitutional 
ideas have operated so well in their place of origin that the same 
results would be induced in their new environment. Britain mighty 
genuinely have been prompted into thinking this way, because after 
all, the "Westminster model" had previously been transplanted 
successfully to America and later to the older British dominions of 
Canada and Australia, and to a large extent to India. One
explanation for a successful importation of British notions of 
constitutional democracy in America and the older Commonwealth - 
i.e. Australia, Canada and New Zealand - is that the people who 
migrated and settled in those areas were of British descent, and 
were therefore brought up nurtured within the British political 
traditions and culture, and who, ipso facto, wanted to construct, qnd 
did indeedy still construct, their system of government on the English 
model with all its trappings and emphasis on the sanctity of the 
rights of an individual. Indeed, the evidence is that wherever 
the British adventurers of the Victoria era went and settled, they 
did not only carry with them the rights which they had attained in 
Britain, but also reproduced British systems of political, economic, 
and even social institutions. The fact is that apart from their 
geographical or physical separateness from mother Britain, they were 
in all essentials "Britons". Even then, one not infrequently 
encounters noticeable differences in the resultant constitutional 
structures of these British-derived systems. The story is, however, 
significantly different in Africa. While, by virtue of their being 
a part of the British tradition of political and even economic way 
of life, the inhabitants of America and the British dominions were, 
and are well qualified to operate a Westminster-inspired model, 
the people who took over the reins of political power from the 
Colonial regime in Africa were Africans themselves who had no idea 
about the Western system of government, except for a handful of 
intelligentsia who happened to have acquired Western education*. 
Because of this it is arguable that the British ought to have 
perhaps placed a heavier regard to the differing cultural and
historical needs of Africa than was the case with respect to the 
white-ruled areas when devising constitutional instruments for her 
African ex-colonies. Because of this lack of vision, as evidenced 
through the mechanical importation into Africa of alien
* ideas, these ideas were bound to come in collision 
with the existing practical realities of Africa, challenging their 
claim as the most fundamental values of the new political order.
To start with the African leaders who were called upon to 
operate the parliamentary system of democracy, though reasonaly 
Western-educated, were, of course, brought up in the traditional 
African way of life, both socially and politically. They thus 
shared along with the rest of the African masses a certain under­
standing of the nature of political power. The African conception 
of political power revolved around the institution of ,!chieftancyn 
and its relationship to other power centres and to the individual 
within the traditional constitutional set-up. In this arrangement 
the chief and the various subordinate chiefs combined all political 
power to themselves - a chief was an executive, a legislator and 
a judge. There is no doubt that the chief in the traditional 
setting was politically powerful and commanded enormous obedience 
and deference from his subjects. We have seen that one of the 
arguments advanced to justify one-party systems of government is 
that their rule marches well with the traditional mode of political 
governance. The truth is that the idea of organized opposition to 
government was quite uncharacteristic of an African traditional 
society, and even in modern times the notion is not readily under­
stood by the majority of ordinary in Africa, including most of their
leaders. In saying this we are not in any way implying that an 
African traditional mode of governance was despotic. On the 
contrary, it can almost be said that the African form of government 
should have created a favourable ground for the development of 
constitutionalism within the context of the post-independence 
political order. Though no doubt African chiefs were powerful, 
African peoples had developed devices whereby a tyrannical ruler 
could be dealt with by dethroning him and forcing him to flee zhe 
kingdom. Further, the art of governance by discussion, tolerance 
of differing individual opinions, freedom of speech in indigenous 
assemblies, were all features of the traditional life.^ But, as 
Professor Cowen has observed:
M it is important to remember that constitutional
safeguards may take many forms, and that safeguards 
which are suited one day and age in a particular 
country may be unsuited to the needs of another 
generation in anothergcountry, or for that matter 
in the same country11.
Thus, the institutions of government and safeguards which evolved
under the traditional modes of political practice are inappropriate
and out of context with the requirements of the political and economic
objectives pursued by the modern industrial states of Africa.
Consequently, though a remarkable degree of "constitutionalism"
might have been attained within the socio-political context of these
societies, this has been of little assistance, if any, in the
perfection of political behaviour suited to the operation of modern "
governments. The precise point at which the traditional mode of
political governance ceased to have overriding claim on the
behaviour of the indigenous people was with the advent of the
colonial rule. One would have hoped that with the advent of the
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colonial regime and with the introduction of more advanced 
techniques of organizing societies politically, economically and 
legally, the ground would have been prepared for the subsequent 
development of "constitutionalism’1. What then has our examination 
of the role of the colonial regime in this respect point to?
Though no doubt the establishment of colonial administration 
played a significant role in at least introducing Africans to a 
more enlightened way of life, and especially in laying down 
conditions for the development of "democracy" patterned on the 
Western system of government, yet paradoxically colonial 
administrative practice had its part in retarding the development of 
"constitutionalism". To start with, the colonial regime having been 
self-imposed it was not based on popular acceptance by the 
indigenous peoples, and above all it was not subject to any popular 
democratic control either through parliamentary or judicial control. 
The courts during colonial rule were, for example, developed and
indeed were looked upon by the colonial peoples, as instruments of
9 . . .colonial policy. They were staffed by judges recruited for colonial
service, and more significantly, the colonial administrators them­
selves, such as Provincial Comissioners, District Commissioners, 
and District Officers, also served as judicial officers. Perhaps 
this practice, in the social context of Africa of that time, would 
be justified in that what mattered during this period was for the 
colonial regime to educate and civilize the otherwise backward 
peoples of Africa, and to steer their social outlook towards 
appreciating the merits of the new order. It was a task that 
' required a practical approach in implementing the intended results of the
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policy of "sacred” • set by the colonial government. And
in a situation where colonial personnel were critically lacking, 
it was only realistic that the available personnel should be 
deployed to undertake the various administrative tasks thrown upon 
the colonial government. In this situation to insist on the primacy 
of strict adherence to the dogma of private individual rights, to 
which the indigenous peoples were nevertheless entitled, would be a 
futile exercise since, in any case, given the social conditions 
which surrounded them, these rights would mean very little in 
practical terms. The important initial task which the colonial 
administration rightly perceived was to create conducive social, 
economic, political and even legal conditions favourable to the 
eventual enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. Even after the 
attainment of independence, many, if not all, African governments, 
are .faced with the task of improving the social and economic well­
being of their citizens and in that context argue that protection of 
human rights should not be sacrificed at the expense of the need to 
bring about material improvements in the life of their peoples.
The point is that this task was even more pressing on the colonial 
regime which had to start from nowhere. Regrettably, this point is 
often ignored by those who frequently express the view that the 
colonial regime was autocratic, as if new governments now operated 
by Africans themselves are perfectly democratic.
The way we see the colonial rule to have failed to foster 
constitutionalism in Africa is that during the whole of its life 
it never established favourable conditions or practices upon which 
African governments could rely in operating a parliamentary form of 
democracy with an opposition ready to challenge its policies and
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practices, of a government whose powers were limited by some 
formal rules as expressed through a constitution; * Further, as 
we have seen, the colonial government was rather harsh in the 
implementation of the law of sedition and in the handling of 
"declared emergencies", and was clearly sensitive to criticisms 
levelled against its practices by colonial subject, especially at the 
height of nationalist politics. It ought also to be remembered 
that under the colonial constitutional scheme there was no bill of 
rights to which the actions of the government could be measured 
and to which appeal could be directed by a colonial 
subject for alleged deviation from a guaranteed right. Of course, 
it is inconceivable that a bill of rights could be incorporated in 
any of the constitutional instruments of any British colony at this 
time, since even in the international arena they had not attained 
the popularity they enjoyed after the Second World War - and even 
after this period they had not immediately captured the imagination 
of British constitutional advisers as possessing any political force.
For the purposes of validating what has been said with respect 
to the role which the colonial rule played in retarding the 
development of constitutionalism, and what we have to say of the 
retarding effect of the post-independence political events on the 
development of that idea, it is suggested to adopt the definition 
neatly framed by Professor De Smith, of what he considered to be 
the minimum requirements of the concept of "constitutionalism".
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" I am willing to conclude that constitutionalism
is practised in a country where the government is 
genuinely accountable to an entity or organ distinct 
from itself, where elections are freely held on a 
wide franchise at frequent intervals, where political 
groups are free to organize and to campaign in between 
as well as immediately before elections with a view to 
presenting themselves as alternative government, and 
where there are effective legal governments of basic 
civil liberties enforced by an independent judiciary; 
and I am not easily persuaded to identity 
constitutionalism in a country where any of those 
conditions are lacking".10
Quite clearly none of these conditions were present in any of the
colonial territories, except where there was present a large
concentration of white settlers, and even here those political
rights were available only among whites and perhaps to a handful
of Africans.**
However, the above remarks should not lead us to believe 
that the factor of "colonialism" comes high in the scale of those 
factors which we identity as being responsible to the flouting of 
democratic practice in post-independent Africa today. The real 
problems to the phenomenon lie in the post-independence nature of 
political and constitutional upheavals which have so far characterized 
the African political scene. Such phenomena as the emergence of 
military governments, of one-party states, the declining assertiveness 
of the courts as guardians of personal liberties, the diminishing 
role of parliaments (where indeed, these exist) as instruments of
r
governance, and the general lack of the supporting infrastructure in 
the enforcement of individual rights. All these, and no doubt 
together with a range of other subtle forces, combine to undermine 
the development of constitutionalism in contemporary Africa. How 
then, within the context of De Smith's prescription of the essential 
features of constitutionalism, have these factors operated to affect 
the practice of constitutional democracy in Africa?
The subject of the protection of individual rights and 
freedoms under a military regime has not been discussed in the 
preceding chapters because it is obviously outside the scope of 
this enquiry. But for the purposes of now exercising an overall 
assessment of those factors that can be identified to be associated 
with giving effect to the retarding of the development of 
constitutionalism, the establishment of military government in some 
African countries and their performance is of great relevance to 
our subject under consideration. With the exception of some isolated 
instances, which we shall indicate in due course, it seems that the
political conditions such as those created under a military government
are incompatible with the legal protection of individual rights 
and freedoms, or more broadly, with the whole idea of constitutionalism. 
Before adverting to substantiating this proposition, it is first 
suggested to look at the extent to which military coups d-*etat
have been a frequent phenomenon in Africa..
By 1972, at least 30 out of about 40 independent African states
had experienced either an army coup dfetat or a serious military
12 . disturbance. Within Commonwealth Africa the following countries had
experienced some coups dTetat: Ghana (1966, 1972); Lesotho (1970);
Nigeria (1966, 1974); Sierra Leone (1967, 1968); and Uganda (1966,
1971) - "The Man on the Horseback", to use Finer*s imagery, has
indeed established himself firmly in the political saddle. The
leaders responsible for engineering these coups are quick to explain
that they took over the government because of tribalism in politics,
and in the allocation of jobs; economic stagnation; regional
imbalances in the distribution of the country’s wealth and development
programmes; corruption, and the arbitrary exercise of power coming
dangerously close to dictatorships.^
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However justified an army takeover may be, especially in the 
context of the African political experience, the effect of the 
establishment of a military regime means that those basic features 
associated with the idea of constitutionalism as postulated by 
De Smith, for example, are discarded. The experience in Africa
njWfl-4-C.
self-proclaimed revolutionary military governments have come into
being is that invariably these regimes suspend all those parts of the
previous civilian constitution which happen to be inconsistent with
their own exercise of absolute powers. Thus democratic institutions
such as parliament, the electoral process, and party politics, become
the first targets for abolition. , Courts, or the legal system in
general, are normally allowed to operate as before, but not least
subject to the superior exercise of decree power of the military
council wielding the executive power. Further, none of these decree
proclamations, such as those of Nigeria (1966) and Uganda (1971),
expressly mention that a bill of rights of the previous civilian
constitution be suspended. Thus, in a Nigerian case of Lakanmi v.
14 .Attorney-General of the West, the Nigerian Supreme Court attempted 
to adopt the view that a bill of rights had not been suspended as 
a result of the military coup. The court argued that unless the 
military government explicitly decrees otherwise, the bill of rights 
will be subject to judicial review. The court went on to explain 
that when Section 6 of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree No.l of 1966 provided that the validity of a decree of the 
Federal Military Government or an edict of a state military 
government:
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"Shall not be inquired into in any court of law".
this
"does not preclude the court from inquiring into 
any inconsistency that may arise (in between a 
decree or edict and the Constitution), but merely 
bars the courts from questioning the validity of 
making the decree or an edict on the ground that 
there is no valid legislative authority to make 
one".15
16But surely as the Pakistani case of State v. Dosso 
illustrates, the destruction of a constitution by a military 
revolution or by a successful revolution for that matter, means that 
no individual can enforce against the revolutionary military 
government in its legislative capacity any of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed to him by the annulled constitution. For, as Chief 
Justice Muhammad Munir in this case explained:
" if the (military) revolution is victorious in
the sense that the persons assuming powers under 
the change can successfully require the inhabitants 
of the country to conform to the new regime, then 
the revolution itself becomes a law^ -creating force 
because thereafter its own legality is judged not by 
reference to the annulled constitution, but by 
reference to its own success".^
This case, which was decided on Hans Kelsen’s theory of the juristic
18implication of a revolution, was also cited with approval by the
19Ugandan High Court in Ex Parte Matoru and by the Nigerian case of 
Lakanmi v. The Attorney-General (West), which we have referred to 
thereabove. Similarly, the Privy Council quoted the decision of the
Pakistani Supreme Court with approval in the Rhodesian case of
20 . . .Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke. The position then is that rule by
a military regime establishes a constitutional order which may not 
accommodate protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, at least 
through a legal means.
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However, recent experiences in military-ruled Africa show that 
not all military regimes can be described as being in the least 
concerned with the prevalence of the rule of law and of respect for 
human rights and for democracy generally. The present military 
governments of Nigeria and Ghana have perhaps shown some 
characteristics of liberalism in preserving the democratic values 
that normally exist under any civilian constitutional system. It 
is true that even here democratic institutions, such as parliaments, 
elections, and organized political parties are not allowed to operate, 
bu* at least when it comes to the protection of human rights it cannot 
be said that these regimes are any worse than the existing civilian 
governments of Africa. After all, even with respect to the other 
remaining civilian governments in Africa, most of these are one- 
party states or "no-party states" as it were, in which the role of 
parliaments, organized political oppositions, and even the electoral 
process do not form the most important instruments of the political 
game in those countries. However, the point is that whether or not 
a regime is a one-party or a military one is irrelevant in assessing 
the protection of human rights - again the willingness and attitudes 
of those who wield power to see to it that these rights and freedoms 
are observed and respected are of great importance. Indeed, there 
are many cases where extreme violations of human rights are committed 
under civilian governments in many parts of the world, and, conversely^ 
there are citable cases where self-proclaimed governments have 
turned out to prove exemplary in upholding the respect for human 
rights and dignity.
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However, a military government can also help to bring into
being intolerably extreme cases of flagrant dictatorial practices
21as the example of Uganda under Idi Amin shows. A report of an 
International Commission of Jurists on the question of the 
observance of human rights revealed that Idi Amin had embarked on 
a regime of mass killings of his own people, former government 
officials, intellectuals, and even his own army officers. He also 
brutalized foreigners who resided in his country, and even expelled 
most of them without due regard to their future and without affording 
them reasonable time to dispose of their properties. Perhaps these 
rare extremes can be explained on the ground of Amin’s own personal 
propensity to cruelty, and his generally evil disposition. But this 
goes to confirm our proposition that what matters in the area of 
operating a government responsive to the maintenance of the rule of 
law and the observance of human rights is the attitude of the 
governors themselves. Elections ensure that the best people should 
run the government, and since the people who operate a military 
government are not elected, the chances of having "bad" personalities 
in those governments are higher than otherwise.
The practical effects of a government operated by a military 
regime on the preservation of fundamental rights and other democratic 
values, has some parallels with one operated by a one-party regime.
The only fundamental difference between the two being that whilst 
a military government is self-imposed on the people, a one-party 
government is brought about after the people have been consulted, 
either through the means of commissions appointed by the government for 
that purpose as in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Sierra Leone, or 
through a referendum as in Ghana (1964). However, there is no doubt
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that in most cases these means of testing whether or not people are
in agreement with the governments proposal to bring about a one-
party state serves but a "decorative1' role - behind the scenes the
decision having already been imposed on the people, as is
22exemplified by the Tanzanian and Zambian experiences. In the case 
of Zambia, even in the only area where people were to participate 
in suggesting the form of a one-party democracy they wanted to see
established in Zambia, their views were turned down by the government's
. . 23final decision on the matter. In the final analysis the details
upon which the one-party constitution was devised in Zambia were 
those of the government and not of the people. In the second place, 
unlike a military regime, it is true that the one-party government's 
continued mandate to rule is often derived from the consent of the 
people obtained through the holding of elections between reasonably 
frequent intervals - however "semi-democratic" or undemocratic the 
conduct of the elections, and however inhibitive the electoral scheme 
may be in allowing competetion between the aspiring candidates in 
presidential and parliamentary elections, and between candidates 
aspiring to membership of the central organs of the Party. We have 
already discussed the impact of a one-party state on human rights, 
but here it is suggested that we look at the electoral practice 
which is available under it, and to consider whether that practice 
is consistent with the right of the people to a popular choice of 
those who should run the government. Constitutionalism, or 
democracy at that, requires that the citizenry must have access t<$ 
a genuine guarantee to participation in the political process, 
especially in the election of those persons who are to run the
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affairs of their government. Our contention throughout this 
inquiry has not been that the establishment of a one-party state 
is in itself at variance with democracy - for it is a recognized 
and sacred principle that every sovereign people is entitled to 
choose any form of government under which it prefers to be ruled.
Our contention rather, has been and is, that that system must be 
democratic in nature and in its practical operation, and in 
particular must foster the spirit among the wielders of power that 
the final say on their remaining in their positions ultimately 
depends on the people, as expressed through a fair and democratically 
conducted elections. For, to be sure, any objective assessment as 
to the extent to which human rights in any political situation are 
adequately protected or observed, must be looked at from the angle 
of how the entire constitutional system, both in its static and 
dynamic setting, operates. How then has the one-party constitutional 
system operated in Zambia with reference to the extent to which the 
electoral scheme under it fosters the practice of popular choice of 
candidates to the office of president, to parliament, and to 
membership of the central organs of the party?
To st art with, the electoral scheme devised under the one-party
constitution of Zambia (1973), requires that to be a candidate for
parliament, one must be a member of the party, and must first of all
. . 24be voted for in the primary elections by the local party officials.
At the conclusion of the primary elections, the names of all the 
successful candidates are to be submitted to the central committee.
In any constituency to the National Assembly, the three persons with 
the greatest number of votes at the primaries qualify for nomination
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as candidates for election to the National Assembly from that 
constituency.
11 unless the Central Committee disapproves the
nomination of any such person on the ground that 
his nomination would be inimical to the interests 
of the State".25
In other words, even if a person is among the three who receive
the highest number of votes at the primary elections, this does not
in itself automatically operate to confer eligibility on him for
election to the National Assembly unless the Party through the
Central Committee says so. In the first elections under the one-
party constitution which were held in December 1973, the Central
Committee exercised its power of "vetting" described above to prevent
26 successful candidates, including those who obviously commanded
popular support in their own constituencies. And the Central
Committee is not required to give reasons for its decision to exclude
those candidates. Again, in the second parliamentary elections under
this scheme held on 12 December 1978, 33 successful candidates were
vetted out by the Central Committee from contesting parliamentary
elections without giving reasons. This time, however, it became
clear that those excluded from parliamentary elections happened to
be the ones who were outstandingly critical of government and party
activities and those of their officials. And in at least two
instances, even those who were unopposed in their constituencies were
vetted out for allegedly being uncompromisingly critical of the
government in the previous House. But what is problematic is
whether a candidate who is disabled from contesting parliamentary
elections after having won the primaries, or who is unopposed
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therein, can challenge in a court of law the action of the Central
Committee as being unfair, and therefore unlawful. In other words,
if, as the constitution stipulates, a candidate who in a parliamentary
election has cause to petition in the High Court as to the validity
26of the outcome of the elections, why should a primary election. 
candidate - who in his case has, after all, won the elections - be 
deprived of this legal right? Although this situation has not arisen, 
nor has it indeed been discussed in Zambia, it seems that two views 
can be expressed in that connection.
In the first place, with the adoption of a one-party
I
constitution in 1973, the Central Committee, or rather the Party itself
has been elevated to assume the status of a constitutional organ -
as such it is in all essentials an organ of the state. One would,
therefore, like to hypothesize that the Party and the actions of its
officials are subject to judicial review in exactly the same way as
are all government agencies and the actions of public officials.
However, even admitting this, the problem still remains, namely, that
the power such as is conferred on the Central Committee is in the
nature of a "discretion". Above all, the Central Committee in the
exercise of that power does not need to give reasons. This means
that, as in the case of the power conferred on the Minister of Home
Affairs to deport an alien without giving reasons, under the
27Immigration and Deportation Act, the action of the Committee cannot 
be questioned in a court of law. But here there is a further 
difficulty which is linked to our second view on this matter.
We have said above that in the case of parliamentary elections, 
an aggrieved candidate has the right to challenge the results of the 
elections in a court of law. It is arguable that the machinery of
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primary elections under the Constitution is in all respects part
0
of the process of parliamentary elections. The process of
electing people to parliament starts from the holding of primary
elections and ends with the declaration of results. It is therefore
arguable that whatever goes wrong in between the process which
results in an alleged unfairness committed against any candidate,
could find its way to the courts for decision. In this context,
therefore, the power conferred on the Central Committee, since it
can also be abused to the extent of promoting unfairness to any
candidate, ought also to be subject to judicial scrutiny.
The controlling role of the Party in the election of
parliamentary candicates is also evident when it comes to presidential
elections. The Constitution stipulates that the members of the
General Conference of UNIP shall elect a person to the President of
the Party, and such person shall then become the sole candidate in
28the election to the office of President. The electorate’s only
role in the matter is confined to accepting or not accepting that
candidate by casting a "Yes” or "No" vote. Further, the Central
Committee of the Party has to agree on the candidates it will support
for the office of the President before the General Conference is 
29held. Quite clearly under this arrangement, the Party is made the 
only effective selector of the President. It is true that the 
Constitution allows anyone who satisfies the prescribed requirements 
therein to contest presidential elections at the Party’s General 
Conference. However, the experience in the last elections in Zambia 
(1978) under this electoral scheme shows that the concept of 
competition for election to the important office of president in a 
one-party state is indeed very much a theoretical possibility. In
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the December 1978 elections in Zambia, three persons, including 
former Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe, a veteran nationalist 
leader in Zambian pre-independence politics and also former leader 
of the opposition party in parliament before the introduction of 
the one-party state, Mr. Harry Nkumbula, indicated their willingness 
to contest presidential elections at the General Conference of the 
Party. Before these elections were held, the Party amended the 
Constitution and the effect of that amendment was clearly to exclude 
these persons from contesting the presidential elections. Their
subsequent petition in the High Court challenging the constitutional
. 3 0  validity of the way the amendment was carried out, was lost.
Finally, the point should here be made that in a single-party 
state it is the Party around which all political activities in the 
country take place. The tendency has been to rule not through 
parliament or the cabinet, but through the Party and its central 
organs. And it is frequently asserted by the leaders that the 
Party and its central organs are supreme compared to those of the 
government like Parliament and the Cabinet. Thus the Central 
Committee of UNIP takes precedence over the Cabinet and one of its 
members, the Secretary-General, is in effect the Vice-President of 
the country and is consulted on the appointment of all Cabinet 
Ministers and other top government officials. Thus any effective 
protection of human rights in a constitutional situation, such as is 
postulated by a one-party state, must certainly also depend on the 
role the Party and its officials are willing to play in that regard. 
It is a function which cannot, as in a multi-party system, be left
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solely to parliament or the courts. For the party controls, in a 
variety of ways, the activities of parliament and even those of 
the courts, not to mention those of the mass media.
Perhaps one of the most important factors central to the
explanation of the alleged inefficacy of the protection of human
rights in Commonwealth one-party states, is the extent to which the
courts have proved to be ineffective apparatus in the actual
enforcement of personal liberties. The evidence that has been
adduced on the question of the role played by courts in the
enforcement of individual rights and freedoms, point to this
31conclusion. With the exception of one instance in the whole of 
Commonwealth Africa, nowhere has there occurred judicial 
invalidation of a legislative measure. With respect to executive 
or administrative actions, it is true, especially in Zambia, that 
instances of such judicial invalidations are comparatively frequent. 
What are some of the reasons for this?
In the first place, the political power situation created by 
the fact of a one-party state or the existence of a dominant party 
holding power continuously presents one definite explanation. It 
must be remembered that the function of judicial review of executive 
and legislative measures precisely means that the courts are engaged 
in the exercise of setting limits to governmental powers vis-a-vis 
individual rights. In a multi-party situation this function is made 
easier to fulfil by the courts since the laws which they invalidate 
are not made by one government but by successive governments who, 
while temporarily in office, make those laws. And a court’s decision
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invalidating a particular law made by one government may be supported 
by the party which was not in government at that time. The situation 
in a one-party state is, however, different. There only one government 
! makes all laws, and any invalidation of any of these laws can be seen or
t
t
( looked upon as purposelyjdirected at exposing failure or failures of the
I
S government to act legally or constitutionally. Further, any
I apparent tendency by the courts to strike down legislative or
I
i executive actions as being unconstitutional on a somewhat frequent
I scale can easily be looked upon as an opposition to the government,
i
I and it is at this point that the judiciary can find itself drawn
i
| into political controversies. A judiciary functioning in a one-
i
! party state can,therefore, feel self-inhibited in taking up the kind
f
| of role the constitution bestows on it.
I The other notable reason is the limitations imposed by the fact
of the background of professional training under which lawyers in 
common law jurisdictions have undergone. All lawyers in Anglophone 
African states have been trained in the English legal tradition.
In this tradition, and because of the nature of the English 
Constitutional practice, lawyers are not oriented to take up the 
type of role which a system of judicial review requires. Because, 
further, in Britain there is no written constitution coupled with the 
entrenched doctrine of legislative sovereignty, the courts have been 
removed from the arena of adjudicating upon the validity of statutes. 
Therefore little assistance in terms of deriving legal precedents 
from English Constitutional practice is available; unlike, for 
example, in criminal or many civil cases. In any case, courts in
Zambia have decisively rejected altogether importation of foreign
. . .  . . . . 32precedents as binding proposition m  deciding constitutional cases.
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There are also other discrete factors which bear upon the 
subject of an ineffective protection of human rights in Africa.
In Africa, unlike Western democracies, there are just 
inadequate legal and social infrastructures necessary to support, 
and agitate for, a strict observance of civil liberties. There are, 
for example, almost no privateorganizations or associations formed 
for the purposes of agitation for the observation of civil rights to 
various groups of the society. In Western countries there are 
numerous organizations which represent the interests of one group 
or another in seeing to it that the rights closely pertaining to 
their members are observed, and in that regard play an important 
role in educating their members about their rights by providing them 
with the necessary information about this subject and even tendering 
some legal advice. Most of these organizations service such groups 
as immigrants, racial and religious minorities, women, etc. The 
trade unions, on the other hand, fight for the rights and interests 
of workers against management and government. But in Africa, 
especially with reference to Zambia and Tanzania as we have seen, 
trade unions are brought under the control of the government, and 
thereby cease to operate independently of governments influence.
The existence of these private organizations ensures that the subject 
of the observation and enforcement of civil liberties is made active 
both in theory and practice. They act as practical means through 
which the various rights and freedoms under the bill of rights can 
be specialized upon through study by a group of individuals for the 
purposes of their practical implementations by the government, 
private institutions, and even the courts. In addition to the
existence of these organizations and the functions they perform in 
the enforcement of civil rights, the availability of a responsive 
legal profession in the Western countries has also made its 
contribution in the enforcement of personal liberties. The legal 
profession in the Western democracies, particularly Britain and 
America, shares the same view with their respective judiciaries in 
giving priority to the preservation of personal liberties. Though 
this is far from suggesting that legal professions in Africa do not 
share the same commitments in seeing that individual rights are 
protected against violations, it is fair to say that perhaps because 
they find themselves in a rather uncongenial political situation, 
these bodies have not been active in encouraging litigations in which 
issues about the constitutionalities of statutes allegedly infringing 
personal liberties are involved.
Added to the factor of the lack of the sort of legal infra­
structure which an effective protection of human rights would 
require, is the problem inherent in the low level of the social 
sophistication of the African masses themselves. Perhaps it is often 
forgotten that the constitutional scheme for the safeguarding of 
individual rights which was handed down to many ex-British dependencies 
left it to individuals themselves to take the initiative in 
challenging any government action allegedly violating any guaranteed 
right. This means that the citizens themselves must be sufficiently 
literate, reasonably educated, and aware of the existence of these 
rights. Moreover, intending litigants must also have the financial 
means to undertake the usually costly litigations in the courts for 
the purposes of seeking redress against breach of their rights. These 
are factors that can be said to be almost non-existent in Africa.
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People are largely illiterate, educationally backward, and above 
all poor. Most important is the fact that the majority of African 
peoples live in the "traditional enclave" and are largely governed 
by customary norms, and are indeed least affected by the new legal 
regime in their day-to-day lives, and it is only reasonable to say 
that they have not heard of anything called a "bill of rights" under 
the Constitution. So this leaves only the few educated and 
modernized elites who live in the urban areas, who can utilize the 
courts to enforce any official actions violative of the guaranteed 
rights.
The above are then some of the factors which, in varying 
degrees, have adversely affected the implementation of the principles 
underlying the concept of human rights in Africa. These factors, 
having been analyzed and having indicated their impact on the development 
of constitutionalism in Africa, a further relevant question poses 
itself, namely, can it, even at this stage, be validly argued that 
writing a bill of rights into the national constitution is the best 
or most effective method of protecting human rights in an African 
country such as Zambia. The experience of how bills of rights have 
operated in Africa would clearly lead us to return a negative reply 
to that question - and we have just finished adducing 
reasons to support this finding. What then do we consider to be 
perhaps the more realistic alternative means for the protection of 
individual rights in the context of an African environment?
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C. Alternative Modes for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa
We have already concluded that in the context of the African 
situation protection of human rights through their entrenchment in 
the constitution and making the courts agents for their actual 
enforcement cannot work, or at least it has not proved to be an 
effective means of their protection, given the operative factors 
prevailing in Africa which we have just discussed above. Indeed, 
this may prove to be the surest way of destroying them completely.
Some other ways must therefore be recommended.
It seems to us that the best approach to the problem would be 
to look for a system of protection which would not, in its practical 
operation, involve the challenge to the authority of the government 
in its exercise of the legislative and executive powers. Protection 
through constitutional guarantee of a bill of rights offends against 
this requirement, since when the procedure under it is invoked it 
invariably entails an individual or individuals to challenge the 
wisdom of a government policy or the validity of a certain law or 
laws.passed by the government. What is even worse is the fact that 
the institution vested with the power to review government acts is 
itself not part of the government legislative or executive machinery - 
i.e. the courts which the constitution purports to remove from the 
political arena. This sys tern for the protection of human rights has, 
of course, its ancestry in the Euro-American constitutional practice. 
On the contrary, a viable system for the protection of human rights 
in Africa must not present itself as controlling or checking the 
activities of the government, and of being apart from the political 
process as such. Such a system must recognize the unhappy practice 
of non-reviewability of state actions, at least to the extent of not
invalidating them at the instance of their repugnancy with some 
superior law; further, such a scheme of protection must also be 
part of the political process and must enjoy the support of the 
"party and government".
Here we submit that at least three institutions or devices 
would satisfy the requirements set out above as to a workable approach 
in the protection of human rights in Africa, and further that their 
potentials as instruments for the realization of individual 
enjoyment of person liberties should be exploited to the fullest.
These are, protection through the means of "Directive Principles of 
State Policy", protection through the means of the institution of 
"Ombudsman" or "Ombudsmanlike institution", and finally protection 
through the political process - especially through the party. We 
now turn to a consideration of the favour of these techniques of 
protection as opposed to the technique of judicial enforcement
i) Protection through the Directive Principles of State Policy
One of the gravest shortcomings of all Commonwealth African 
constitutions (obviously again because of their origins in 
Western conception of constitutionalism) is that they all spoke 
only in terms of power and of rights, but never in terms of 
duties. By this approach these constitutions were merely 
emphasizing what governments should not do, mainly, it would 
appear, in the interests of private rights of which the right 
to private property was the most important. The effect of this 
approach was to limit the power of the new African governments 
concerned. In the context of the economic conditions of 
emergent states, it is arguable that the idea of constitutionalism
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should not be understood only with reference to its 
classical substance or only with reference to the needs of 
political democracy. It is true that in earlier times a 
constitution was merely a political charter, the freedoms and 
safeguards which it ensured being of a political nature. Any 
attempt, if any, to solve economic problems through the medium 
of the constitution was, generally speaking, indirect and flowed 
from the political and civil rights and liberties which were 
recognized. This function of the constitution was appropriate 
when the state was mainly thought to be concerned with the 
maintenance of law and order? the the protection of life, liberty 
and property of the subject. Such a restrictive role of the 
state is no longer a valid concept - more so in a developing 
country. An emergent state is as much concerned to solve 
economic problems as it is to solve political problems. For 
this reason it becomes necessary that increasing attention be 
given also to the solving of economic problems through the 
constitution itself. This means that a constitution in an 
emergent state should devote a special chapter to the future 
economic and social structure of the state. It ought to 
stipulate that economic activity is one of the obligatory 
functions of the state. Incorporation of some form of 
directive principles of state policy in the constitution serves 
the objective in question by laying down certain economic and 
social policies which are to be pursued by the state: the idea
being that these directive principles would impose certain 
duties or obligations on the state to make some positive action
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in certain directions in order to promote and advance the much 
needed material welfare of the African masses.
Thus by including some form of directive principles on 
socio-economic policies in a national constitution, at least one 
major critism against a bill of rights would have been removed, 
namely that in a newly-born African nation it is foolish to 
place such severe and vague limitations upon government that it 
may not be able to carry through plans for the provision of at 
least an adequate minimum of food, clothing and shelter; that 
there can be no point in having freedom of speech, and freedom to
I worship, and all the other worthy classical freedoms that we
have discussed, if the people are not at the same time free from
I the pains of hunger and ill health, and the evils of illiteracy.
I Further, this approach would have satisfied the likings of many
i  African politicians with a socialist outlook in the running of
i f
; the new African states...J
Regrettably, in the whole of the Commonwealth, only three
i
j countries have so far adopted the formula of writing directive
principles of state policy in addition to the existence of bills
i
| of rights in their constitutions: these are India (1950),
Pakistan (1963), and in the newly proposed constitution of 
Nigeria (1979) to be adopted in October this year (1979). The 
provisions are called Directive Principles of State Policy in the 
Indian Constitution, and Principles of Policy in Pakistan,
Nigeria has preferred the Indian nomenclature of "Directive 
Principles", because here the
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"word f Directive1 seems appropriate and
necessary in order to emphasize that though 
not mandatory, they are a constitutional 
directive to the organs and authorities of the 
State to try to pursue the policies declared
in the Directives".^
There is a further advantage of directive principles over
fundamental rights, which is founded on the legal nature of the
former. Both in their place of origin - that is, in the
Constitution of Eire (1922) and in the Indian and Pakistani
Constitutions - directive principles are not made, like
fundamental rights, justiciable. This means that no court can
declare any legislation as being invalid on the ground that it
does not conform to the spirit of any of the directive principles.
The proposition that so far as the courts are concerned the
directives are not enforceable, is explicitly clear from the
Constitutions of Pakistan (1962) and India (1950). For example,
the Pakistani Constitution provided that:
8(2) "The validity of an action or of a law shall 
not be called in question on the ground that 
it is not in accordance with the Principles 
of Policy, and no action shall be against the 
State, any organ or authority of the State 
or any person on such ground".34
Similarly, by Article 37 of the Indian Constitution, the
directives are made expressly unenforceable by the courts. Thus
the Indian and Pakistani approach in the formulation of the
directive principles is of some relevance here, in that it
serves to remove the possible argument by some African framers
of constitutions that inclusion of these directives of state
policy in the constitutions concerned would create difficulties
founded on the possibility that an individual can challenge the
validity of a law as contravening the directives. By making the
directives unenforceable this difficulty is avoided.
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However, the Nigerian approach in the formulation of 
Directive Principles in its proposed civilian constitution to 
be adopted later this year (1979) has gone further than India 
and Pakistan in making these principles justiciable to a limited 
extent. The Constitution Drafting Committee, which was charged 
with the task of formulating a new civilian constitution for 
Nigeria, recommended firstly, the inclusion of Directive 
Principles in the new constitution (the first African country to 
have these principles in its constitution), and then went on to 
state that "...they should be justiciable to a limited extent"^ 
So that it will be possible for interested individuals "...to 
obtain a declaration from the courts as to whether or not some 
action or omission of the government is, or is not, a contra­
vention of the Fundamental Objectives or Directive Principles". 
But, the Report of the Committee went on:
"Such a declaration if obtained, may be a ground 
for further action such as the impeachment of 
the offending functionaries but it should not 
be the ground for invalidating the particular 
action be is legislative, executive or other­
wise". 35
However, by attributing the quality of partial justiciability 
to directive principles and making the judiciary the arbiter 
over such matters, would, as in the case of a bill of rights, 
lead to constant confrontation between the executive and/or the 
legislature on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other.
This would be even an objectionable feature in a country where 
in addition to the existence of the principles in the 
constitution, there is also a bill of rights. The judiciary 
will be placed in a doubly difficult situation because it will
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be called upon to adjudicate upon the compatibility of a 
government action or omission in relation both to a guaranteed 
right and to a directive principle in question. This is not the 
way we perceive the role which a constitutionally provided for 
code of directive principles could play in the enforcement of 
fundamental rights. In this respect, the extent to which the 
Indian directive principles have been put to use in the protection 
of fundamental rights is instructive to note.
a) Utility of the Directives in the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights: The Indian Example
In order clearly to appreciate the usefulness of the 
directive principles of state policy as substantive items 
of the constitution, they must, in the first instance, be 
distinguished from pufely fundamental rights. A guarantee 
of fundamental rights in the Constitution enjoins the state 
from taking any action violative of the rights in question.
In other words, they impose a negative duty on the state.
On the other hand, directive principles will require 
positive action by the state. Moreover, such action can be 
guaranteed only so far as is practicable in the circumstances. 
The expression "practicable in the circumstances" obviously 
refers to the availability of resources which makes it 
possible to initiate any positive action in the implement­
ation of welfare schemes. This is why the Pakistani 
Constitution had expressly provided that "...In so far as 
the observance of any particular Principle of Policy may 
be dependent upon resources being available for the purpose,
the Principles shall be regarded as being subject to the
36availability of resources". For this reason, it would
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be unrealistic for any emergent state to make directive 
principles of state policy to be justiciable for the 
obvious reason of the scarcity of resources.
Perhaps one distinctive feature of directive
principles under the Indian constitutions (and now under
the proposed Nigerian Constitution) is that they are more
widely worded than the declarations regarding fundamental
rights. Possibly the reason for the general and flexible
character of the language of the directive principles is
to leave enough scope to the government to frame their
policies from time to time, according to their own
discretion and the circumstances prevailing. But the
important point is that it may happen at times that a
legislation passed in pursuance of a directive principle
comes in conflict with a fundamental right - and more so
on a guaranteed property right, because efforts to
socialize an economy invariably involves tampering with
private properties or assets. In such an event, the
Indian Supreme Court had no difficulty in holding that a
directive principle cannot override a fundamental right.
37In the case of State of Madras v. Champakam, the Indian 
Supreme Court laid down the principle that:
"The directive principles of State policy 
which are expressly made unenforceable 
by a court cannot override the provisions 
in Part III which, notwithstanding other 
provisions, are expressly made enforceable 
by appropriate Writs, Orders or Directions 
under Art.32. The chapter on Fundamental 
Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be 
abridged by an Legislative or Executive 
act or order, except to the extent provided
5 95
in the appropriate Article in Part III.
The Directive Principles of State Policy 
have to confirm and run subsidiary to the 
Chapter on Fundamental Rights... That is 
the correct way in which the provisions 
found in Part III and IV have to be 
understood.
However, so long as there is no infringement 
of any Fundamental Right, to the extent 
conferred by the provisions in Part Iil, 
there can be no objection to the State acting 
in accordance with the Directive Principles 
set out in Part IV, but subject again to the 
Legislative and Executive powers and limitation 
conferred on the State under different 
provisions of the Constitution”.
But the statements made above should not lead us to
suppose that directive principles, even if included in the
national constitution, would after all be utterly
valueless from a legal point of view. It is the same
38Indian Supreme Court, in Re.Kerala Education Bill, 
which has stated that:
"....in determining the scope and ambit of 
the Fundamental Rights relied on by or on 
behalf of any person or body, the court may 
not entirely ignore these Directive 
Principles but should adopt the principle 
of harmonious construction and should attempt ^  
to give effect to both as much as possible..."
This means that courts can, in fact, use the directives
in interpreting the bill of rights. In the context of an
emergent state directive principles, if substantively
written in the constitution, should exist as qualifications
to some of the guaranteed rights. They can, for example,
be used as an index of what a public interest, or a
public purpose, is intended to be. The point intended
to be put across here is that when a law is challenged
as constituting an unreasonable restriction upon a
fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution, the
court must reject that contention if the law seeks to
carry out an object desired by the directives; for a
restriction which is intended to promote economic
progress in an emergent state cannot be regarded by
courts to be "unreasonable11. Thus, in the Indian case
40 .of Buddu v. Municipal Board, it was stated that 
prohibition of slaughter of cows, bulls and bullocks to 
enable the public to have sufficient supply of milk and 
to ensure availability of sufficient number of draught 
cattle for agricultural operations has been held to be 
a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) in view of 
Directive Principles in Article 47 and 48 of the Indian 
Constitution. As the Court put it:
"If with a view to increase the milk supply and 
the production of foodgrains the Board by 
framing a bye-law placed a ban upon the 
slaughter of bulls, bullocks, cows and calves, 
the action was in pursuance of the policy of 
raising the level of nutrition and promotion 
of public health, a policy which is enjoined 
alike by the Constitution (under the Directive 
Principles, Art.47) and the tfP* Municipalities 
Act".
Again, the Directive in Article 48 of the Indian
Constitution for preserving, protecting and improving
livestocks has been used by the Supreme Court to spell
out the limits within which the state could prohibit the
killing of animals, and thus impose restrictions on the
41trade of butchers under Arts. 19(1)(g) and 19(6).
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Further, it has been argued that:
"The national economy is no less important 
to a new nation than national security, and 
there is no reason why it should be any more 
objectionable as a ground for derogation 
in the bills of rights".42
Only the 1967 Ugandan Constitution expressly recognized
the interests of the national economy as a ground for
derogation in the bills of rights. Moreover, in that
constitution, a number of freedoms - freedoms of
expression, correspondence, assembly, association,
conscience and movements - were all qualified by the
demands of the national economy - so long as the law
authorizing derogation, and the action taken thereunder,
was reasonably required in those interests and was
. . .  . 43justifiable m  a democratic society.
Apart from the Ugandan example under the 1967 
constitution whereby the interests of the national economy 
operated to qualify the enjoyment of some guaranteed 
rights, no similar provisions exist in any of the post­
independence constituions of Commonwealth Africa consulted 
for the purposes of this work. The best so far achieved 
in this respect is the inclusion of a preambulatory 
recital to the Tanzania Interim Constitution to the 
effect that it is the duty of the government to conduct 
the affairs of the State so that its resources are preserved, 
developed and enjoyed for the benefit of its citizens as a 
whole, and so as to prevent exploitation of one man by man.
A similar recital was reproduced in the preamble to the 
Zambian one-party state constitution of 1973. In the latter
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constitution, "Humanism” is also stipulated as the
philosophy of the nation.
On the face of it, one may be tempted to think that
these preambulatory recitals calling upon the state and
government to appropriate the national resources along
certain ideological lines (also stipulated in the
preamble) are, in fact, binding on the government. The
position is that a mere declaration in a preamble has no
legal effect. At least in the British constitution, a
preamble "forms n£ part of a statute, and so can create
no legal rights or obligations, though its spirit may
be a guide in the interpretation of the substantive 
44provisions". So whatever effect the recitals on the 
economic organization in the Tanzanian and Zambian 
preambles have, can only be of a moral and educative one. 
In fact, the framers of the Tanzanian constitution them­
selves recognized the "emptiness" of a mere recital in 
a preamble, and therefore ur^ed that in addition to it,
"everything possible should be done to win for these
45principles a strong commitment from the citizens".
Our view is that the interests of economic development, 
being factors of great importance in emergent states, 
should find a substantive place in the constitutions of 
these areas, and should exist as the framework within 
which the guaranteed rights, including the protection 
of property rights are to be interpreted.
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ii) Protection through the institution of "Ombudsman"
Like protection through directive principles, the 
institution of "Ombudsman" has the potential of securing the 
protection of individual rights in a manner that would not 
assume the form of reviewing governmental actions or measures 
as does a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights. Thus, 
in the work of the Tanzanian Presidential Commission on the 
Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State, the institution 
has
"...the possibility of providing some safeguard 
for the ordinary citizen which will not have 
the effect of limiting the actions of Government 
and Party in a way which could hinder the task
of nation-building".
However, unlike in the case of directive principles, the 
institution of Ombudsman has been adopted in one form or 
another in many parts of the world, including some Commonwealth 
African countries. The institution was first established in 
Sweden in 1809. The idea of Ombudsman, however, did not travel 
outside that country for about 150 years. It was only with the 
adoption of the institution by Denmark in 1954 that the idea of 
Ombudsman started to be exported outside the Scandinavian 
countries. The institution has, to date, been statutorily 
adopted in one form or another by Norway, New Zealand, Australia., 
the Canadian provinces of Alberta and New Brunswick, Britain, 
Hawaii, Guyana, Mauritius, India, USA, Malaysia, Ireland, and 
Switzerland. And, no doubt, many countries will join in the 
adoption of the idea in their constitutional systems. In
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Commonwealth Africa, however, it was Tanzania which established
47the first Ombudsman m  1966, called the Permanent Commission
£  rv^uiniiS
of Enquiries (the PCE). Tanzania was followed by Ghana in 1969.
In the 1969 Ghanaian Constitution, reverting the country to a
civilian rule, provision was made for the office of Ombudsman
although at the time of the military coup in January 1972, those
48provisions had not been implemented. In its one-party 
constitution of 1973, Zambia has also since established the
institution of Ombudsman known as the Commission of Investigation
49 . .(the Cl). It is perhaps significant to note that while m
Tanzania the PCE is the only institutional mode to which an
individual has recourse in defence of his rights, in Zambia and
| Ghana (1969-73) there is/was in addition a justiciable bill of
rights.
The ultimate objective underlying the establishment of the 
Ombudsman institution wherever this has occurred, is basically 
the same, namely, to protect an individual citizen against
I
!
| maladministration, or against administrative partiality,
I
i ♦ • • • • •
favouritism, or against unfair and unjustified decisions that
frequently arise from the business of administration. In this
respect Mr. Chomba, the first Zambian Ombudsman summarized what .
he saw to be the contribution the institution would make to the
countryfs democratic life. He commented:
"...in so far as the Commission will have a duty to 
see that the bureaucracy does not act arbitrarily 
to the detriment of the citizen, it can be said 
to have been established for the protection of 
human rights. In the process of protecting such 
rights it wil simultaneously promote the rule of 
law. Moreover, since in its remedy-seeking role 
on behalf of the common man the Commission will 
contribute to good government and as good 
government is a sine qua non in the advancement of
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democracy, by having a right to make complaints 
against public officials, the common man will 
thereby participate immediately in the system 
of government. In this way the participatory 
democracyT proclaimed by the Constitution will 
be made a reality".
The Zambian four-man Commission for Investigations is patterned
on the same lines as the Tanzanian Permanent Commission of
Enquiry in terms of its functions, jurisdiction, and the
relationship to the President and the National Assembly.^
There are of course, differences between the two sets of
institutions which can now be found in the published literature 
52on this subject. Here, though, we are not primarily concerned 
with an examination of the law specifying the structural and 
procedural aspects of these institutions than their suitability 
as alternative techniques for the protection of individual 
rights, it is worth noticing some few such features of the Cl.
The Commission of Investigation consists of the Investigator- 
General, who is its chairman, and three other persons appointed 
by the President in his discretion. The Investigator-General 
is also appointed by the President, but only after "consultation 
with the .Judicial Service Commission". A person appointed to the 
office of Investigator-General must have been a former judge
or a person qualified for appointment as a judge of the High
53 . . . .Court. Once appointed he is invested with all the security
of tenure of office equivalent to that which applies to a judge
54of a High Court or Supreme Court. His removal from the post 
will require a resolution of the National Assembly supported by 
two-thirds majority, followed by an affirmative recommendation
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by an investigating tribunal of three persons appointed by the 
Chief Justice. The Tanzanian PCE is composed of a Chairman 
and two Commissioners who function as a single body, and are 
appointed by the President. No particular qualifications by 
whiah the President should select Commission members are required. 
It is quite obvious that the insistence under the Zambian 
Constitution that the Investigator-General must possess some 
legal qualifications and must be appointed by the President in 
consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, was the 
desire for the Investigator-General to be appointed solely on 
merit and the necessity that any person in "such a potentially 
sensitive position" must command the confidence of the political 
leadership - especially that of the President. While in the 
Western democracies all political activities are to, a 
considerable extent, supervised and controlled by parliaments, 
in the presidential regimes of African countries, the president 
is the real authority on whom all government institutions depend 
for their support. The institution of Ombudsman cannot be an 
exception to this general rule. Thus, one of the salutary 
aspects of the Ombudsman1s successful adaptations in the 
presidential regimes of Africa, at least in those of Zambia and 
Tanzania, has been to make it part of the administration and 
above all to make it responsible to the President - indeed to 
make it a "presidential watchdog of the administration"."^ In 
both Zambia and Tanzania, therefore, the President has 
considerable influence over the activities and operations of 
the Cl and PCE respectively. Presidential controls over these
institutions are exercised, apart from the power of appointment, 
by the power to initiate or terminate investigations, and by 
the discretion to implement or not to implement sanctions in 
accordance with their recommendations. It is clear, therefore, 
that in these circumstances any successful or effective 
operation of the Ombudsman will depend, to a large extent, on
the support which the President will be willing to give it.
Coming to the scope of the Zambian Commission1s power over 
acts which can lead to its investigation, this is pretty wide, 
and covers:
"...any matter of individual injustice or 
administrative abuse of power and authority 
involving corruption, tribalism, nepotism, 
intimidation and all forms of discrimination".
The range of institutions and public officials into whose
conduct, acts and decisions the Commission may inquire is also
quite vast and broad. These include:
"(a) any person in the service of the Republic;
(b) any person holding office in the Party
(i.e., UNIP);
(c) the members and persons in the service of 
a local authority;
(d) the members and persons in the service of 
statutory corporations, bodies or boards, 
including institutions of high learning, 
established wholly or partly out of public 
funds;
(e) the members and persons in the service of 
any commission established by l a w " .57
The only significant exceptions outside the investigatory
jurisdiction of the Commission is indeed the President himself,
and the whole range of institutions and persons in the private
sector.
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At this point we should now come directly to consider 
the central theme of this part of the inquiry, namely, the 
argument that the machinery of the protection of individual 
rights, such as is postulated by the institution of Ombudsman, 
is of much practical value, given the conditions of African 
states than the one afforded by a court-enforced bill of rights.
In discussing this subject the fine arguments advanced by the 
Tanzanian Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a 
Democratic One-Party State against the adoption of a bill of 
rights in preference to an Ombudsman-like institution (the PCE), 
which we have already discussed in the last chapter, should be 
recalled."*^
On more than one occasion in this inquiry we have said 
that the device of judicial enforcement of personal liberties in 
a country like Zambia, or indeed in any sub-Saharan African 
country, can only be utilized by a handful.of individuals and is 
hardly of any use to the rural population in remote villages, or 
even by the majority of urban dwellers working in the modern 
cities. The technicalities of law and court procedures and 
their costliness make the device or redress through the courts 
out of the reach of the masses. This, therefore, constitutes 
one explanation of why there have been relatively few cases brought 
before African courts in which fundamental rights decisions have 
been sought. Indeed, it is only in the exceptional cases that 
the procedure for the enforcement of the protective provisions 
under the bill of rights have been invoked, and even when this 
had occurred, the majority of the fundamental rights cases do 
not end up in favour of the applicants. There are many reasons
605
for this - for example, the fact that there are just too many 
exceptions to the guaranteed rights under the African bills of 
rights, with the result that they cover almost every conceivable 
situation of controversy; also the language of the protective 
provisions are too vague as to result in giving the courts wide 
discretion in their interpretations of these provisions, so 
that judges can easily manouevre their way out from giving 
decisions which may be looked upon with disapproval by the 
government. But the real problem or handicap besetting the 
enforcement of individual rights is the fact that by far the 
largest segment of governmental powers which public officials 
exercise is in the nature of "discretionary powers", coupled 
with the fact that by their very nature the exercise of these 
powers are not easily susceptible to judicial control.
The vesting of vast discretionary powers in public administrators 
at alL levels of government function is indispensable 
in every country, but is even more compelling in a developing
country like Zambia with ambitious objectives to improve the
social and economic well-being of the people. As the 
Presidential Commission in Tanzania again noted:
"...it is inevitable that many officials, both
of Government and of the ruling Party, should
be authorized to exercise wide discretionary
ii 59 powers .J7
And according to the first Chairman of the Tanzanian Permanent
4t najUK')
Commission of Enqoiijiers:
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"Tanzania is actively engaged in dynamic 
development projects designed to eradicate 
poverty, disease, and illiteracy.... The 
executive has a vital part to play in achieving 
these advocated national ends, and 
consequently many administrative have been 
given wide powers to make decisions. Such 
decisions...could have very serious consequences
for the individual1'. 6P
The problem, however, is that even if a decision arising out
of the exercise of discretionary power may result in
arbitrariness or unfairness to an individual or a group of
individuals, the courts are powerless (save to a very
restricted extent) to intervene in defence of the interests of
the individual or individuals. The Zambian fundamental rights
61case of Harry Nkumbula v. The Attorney-General, discussed 
already, has laid down that the exercise of discretionary 
powers:
"...cannot be challenged unless it can be shown 
that the person vested with the power acted in 
bad faith or from improper motives or on 
extraneous considerations or under a view of the 
facts or the law which could not reasonably be 
entertained".62
And there are many cases both under the bill of rights in the
constitution, and under many statues, where the vesting of
discretionary powers enables government functionaries and public
officials to take a prescribed course of action if satisfied
that "it is necessary in the public interest". In all such
cases the courts have held that they cannot go behind a statement
by the competent authority (in the absence of proof of bad
faith) that it was satisfied that the statutory condition for
63the exercise of the power existed. Further, in another,
64fundamental rights case of Kachasu v. Attorney-General, the 
Zambian High Court has held that it has no power at all to
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inquire into the reasonableness, the policy, or otherwise
the wisdom of an impugned legislative measure for the purposes
of determining its consistency or inconsistency with a
65guaranteed right under the bill of rights. It is thus clear 
that the exercise of discretionary power by a government agency 
or agent may be unreasonable or arbitrary, and yet the courts 
cannot provide any relief.
Shortcomings in the technique of parliamentary control over 
the activities of a one-party executive are even more apparent.
We have already examined these in connection with our discussion 
on the role of parliament in a one-party constitutional set-up. 
Suffice to mention here, however, that there is no such thing 
as "parliamentary supremacy" in a one-party state, but only 
"executive supremacy". Zambia has gone even further than this by 
enacting an amendment to the constitution^ in 1975 to give 
effect to the principle of "Party supremacy". By this amendment 
(and, of course, through other earlier provisions in the 
Constitution and other legislation) the Party, through its
C ^ U A C - i  \
organ (the Central Committee and the National ~ and through
its President, who is also the President of the country) controls 
all political activities in the country. Parliament, in
67particular, is brought under complete control of the Party.
It is, to use President Kaunda*s own words,' "an arm of the 
68Party". But as we have also said elsewhere, the Zambian 
first one-party parliament (1973-78) had shown a record of 
independent criticism against certain government actions and 
policies. However, questions in parliament and parliamentary 
debates have not been directed particularly at cases of
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maladministration than at cases of government policies in 
general. For one thing, there has been a complete lack of 
contact between the masses and their parliamentary 
representatives, and hence the use of parliamentary control 
in the realm of exposing cases of maladministration and abuse 
of power is very limited.
Further, in a multi-party state the problem of abuse of 
power by the whole governmental machinery could, to some extent, 
be controlled through the political process, such as is 
available through the democratic procedure requiring the 
governors periodically to go before the electorate to obtain 
a fresh mandate for their continuance in power. A government 
with a poor record of political accountability and whose 
administration has been publicly exposed, either through the 
opposition in parliament or through a vigilant, critical and 
independent press such as exist in the Western democracies, will 
have itschances to win the next elections diminished. This, no 
government would like to face, and hence the reason for its 
supposedly strict adherence to run the affairs of government 
according to established rules, procedures and political 
convention. In a one-party state, on the other hand, no threat 
founded upon defeat of government through an electoral process 
ever exists. Individual members of parliament, including 
cabinet ministers, may lose elections, but the same government 
continues. Moreover, the fact that individual ministers may 
lose elections has nothing to do with the performance or record 
of the government. However, the device of political control
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over the administration has its own inherent drawback since 
it leaves the problem of abuse of power by the individual 
administrators intact in the sense that unlike a politician, 
an administrator is not under the watchful eye of an electorate 
for he does not have to seek a re-election.
Finally, redress of individual grievances through 
established administrative procedures such as appeals to 
administrative tribunals or appeals to higher authorities which 
many statutes establish, also have their shortcomings. Far 
from suggesting that these techniques might not have provided 
relief sought from them in certain comparatively few cases, it 
is quite obvious that the bulk of the population are quite 
ignorant of their existence, and therefore their use has not been 
available to many. It is only the few enlightened ones and 
those whose attention can be drawn to the existence of these 
procedures that are in a position to utilize them for the 
purposes of obtaining the relief sought.
It is because of the existence of these limitations and 
drawbacks inherent in the systems of judicial, parliamentary, 
political and administrative controls over administrative 
actions that calls for the need to formulate up-to-date 
procedures which will afford justice to ordinary citizens in a 
more realistic way: that is, procedures which would be non­
technical, informal and easily usable by the ordinary people 
without being unnecessarily inhibited by financial or literary 
or other factors. Moreover, there is a need to provide redress 
in circumstances where the exercise of administrative 
discretion has been tainted with bad faith or improper motive
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or where unreasonableness of an administrative decision can
clearly be established. The institution of Ombudsman, properly
tailored to suit the local requirements of the adopting
country, would, it is hoped, provide such a machinery,
In a newly-born developing country like Zambia,
administrative abuse of power, administrative arbitrariness, or
maladministration in general, is admittedly bound to be practised
on a larger scale than in a developed country with an established
tradition of political and administrative behaviour. To start
with, most of the administrative personnel are ill-trained (if
they are trained at all), inexperienced, and in most cases
"bound by traditional or local loyalties inimical to the national 
69interest". This is also true of politicians themselves. But
C -rl h 'c jc , \
the situation of trained manpower was most in Zambia, even
by African standards. At independence in 1964 there were only 
one hundred Zambian university graduates, and less than 2,000 
holders of the General Certificate of Education.^ The 
establishment of the University of Zambia in 1966, and the opening 
of a number of colleges to train Zambians in all fields of 
professional skills, has of course, eased the problem of man­
power, but only to a limited extent. Yet soon after 
independence the government had already embarked on a 
comprehensive Zambianization programme designed to replace the 
expatriate staff from the Civil Service and the parastatal 
sector with the local people. Thus the Zambian public service 
has just emerged within the last decade or so. Yet this is the 
very administration which has provided the personnel in whom
vast powers have been lodged under a mass of social 
legislation that has filled the statute book in Zambia since 
independence. It is thus not out of the question to suggest that 
instances of misinterpretations, and therefore misapplications, 
of the powers under this legislation would be fairly frequent, 
with disastrous consequences for the rights of individuals.
It therefore seems imprudent to leave ordinary citizens at the 
mercy of such administrators, since cases of incompetence, 
ignorance of the administrative procedures and rules applicable, 
or indeed unawareness of the limits of the administrator’s 
own legitimate powers in the execution of administrative 
functions, would be commonplace. The function of' the Ombudsman 
in such situations would not only be confined to correcting the 
inevitable administrative errors, omissions, and mistakes, but 
he would also conveniently assume an educationalist role in 
acting as an educator to the administrators concerned by pointing 
out these errors to them, and indicating the proper way of 
dealing with those cases in the future by, say, drawing their 
attention to established procedures or rules.
It follows from this that one of the immediate tasks that 
would fall upon an Ombudsman operating in a new nation, would be 
to ensure that the administrators perform their functions in 
accordance with the established rules and procedure: for this
reason in cases of offending administrators, reliance cannot be 
put merely on prosecutions for violations, especially when 
dealing with a relatively inexperienced administration. The 
administration should be taken as being in a state of acquiring
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the necessary experience, and therefore methods of persuasion, 
warning, suspension, conciliation, etc., would need to be 
applied in appropriate cases.
There is, however, a further dimension to the question of 
our earlier assertion that administrative abuse of power or 
authority would be practised on a comparatively large scale in 
an African state. The African nation which has just come into 
existence with the attainment of political independence, is made 
up of a conglomeration of tribal or ethnic groupings, and we 
have shown how deeply people express their loyalties to their 
respective tribes and towards their own tribesmen. During the 
colonial era the question of tribalism or bias based on tribal 
allegiance was non-existent among colonial administrators since 
they had no stake in the local politics of the country. Even 
among the local administrators of this period little, if any, 
tribalism has been heard to have been attributed to them. This 
is understandable since, in any case, their conduct in the 
course of their official duties was under the watchful eye of 
their white bosses. After independence all positions held by 
the departing colonial administrators were filled by the local 
people who naturally possessed personal interests (and those of 
their families, clan or tribe or region) to protect and promote 
within the emergent social order. Thus tribal loyalties or bias 
have been made a living reality not only by the day-to-day 
practices of the ordinary people, but also more overtly by 
politicians themselves, who have played a major role in 
promoting inward feelings of "tribal identity" among their 
respective tribal groups. Indeed, the element of tribalism has
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has been undoubtedly the most ugly aspect of African political 
life. It is this practice of tribalism and its associated
, i
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derivatives of nepotism, / and corruption that has
been carried into public administration in many of the African 
countries. The impact on the rights and interests of 
individuals of an administration with those leanings and 
inclinations is quite obvious. The Zambian leadership was aware 
of this problem and so the National Commission on the 
Establishment of a One-Party Participatory Democracy recommended, 
and government accepted, that the Commission of Investigation to 
be established should have power to investigate:
"...any matter of individual injustice, or 
administrative abuse of power or authority 
involving corruption, tribalism, nepotism, ^
intimidation and all forms of discrimination...”
The point must be stressed here, that it is abuses of power
involving tribalism, nepotism, or favouritism in the appointment
to jobs, promotion to or wrongful dismissals from jobs,
discrimination in the issuance of trading or other licences,
grant of loans, etc., that constitute the most immediate
grievances of individuals against the administration. Looking
at the nature of cases received and dealt with by the Commission
for Investigation in Zambia during the years 1974 and 1975, the
bulk of the complaints against the various public officials and
institutions pertained to allegations of tribalism, nepotism,
or irregularities in the appointments to jobs; complaints about
promotions in jobs and dismissals from jobs; complaints about
the fixing of salaries or failure to award employment benefits
in the nature of allowances, terminal benefits, etc.:
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irregularities in the allocation of accommodation; political
victimization; detention on false charges of treason, and
72being tortured by the police while in detention.
In many of these cases it was clear that the complaints 
in question arose out of sheer ignorance on the part of the 
complainants regarding the true position of the procedure or 
rules applicable. In these circumstances, the Commission can 
also function# to legitimize the actions of the administration, 
and thereby protect it from unfair and unjustified public 
criticisms against it. Conversely, in cases where a complaint 
is found to be justified, and the error in question is detected 
and corrected, the Commission has often directed that the 
authorities concerned should work out a comprehensive scheme 
for dealing with similar cases in future. It is thus this
the area of public administration which is found to reduce 
the incidence of unfair administrative acts against individual 
citizens.
Some observations can now be made on the question whether 
protection of individual liberties through the technique of the 
institution of Ombudsman, such as exist under the Tanzanian and 
Zambian constitutional systems, secures protection of individual 
liberties in a really tangible way, as does a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights. Under a bill of rights, such as are 
found under Commonwealth African constitutions, all the known 
traditional civil liberties are enumerated and guaranteed and 
can be enforced by superior courts at the instance of any 
individual alleging violations of any of them in relation to him.
corrective and supervisory role which the Ombusdman fulfils in
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On the other hand, the institution of Ombudsman, except in 
the case of Tanzania, was not specifically instituted to 
function as the guardian of personal liberties in the sense in 
which the role of courts in that respect has been formally 
understood. The primary task of the Ombudsman is to correct 
instances of administrative abuse of power, or arbitrariness 
by the administration, and its role in the realm of the 
protection of individual rights arises only in so far as an 
administrative act complained of also infringes upon a 
recognized right of an individual. In other words, the 
Ombudsman’s role in securing protection of individual rights is 
only "peripheral" or "incidental" to its supervisory function as 
guardian of individuals’ interests in the face of the 
administration’s possible abuse of power or authority. An 
individual, for example, cannot go to the Ombudsman to seek 
remedy with the complaint that his freedom, either of expression, 
of assembly and association, of conscience, of movement, 
protection for home and property, etc., has been infringed. It 
is, of course, true to say that depending on the nature of the 
alleged violation, the Ombudsman can render redresses in cases 
where any of these rights and freedoms have been infringed - 
for example, in cases of discrimination on the grounds of race, 
tribe, political opinions, etc.; or where an individual has 
been wrongfully detained by the police; or where his property 
has been seized by an unauthorized official; etc. However, 
redressal of some of these violations may not, and frequently 
will not, be within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, since 
they involve declaring null and void some legislative or 
executive act, or some declared government policy measure.
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We have seen that it is outside the Commission's 
competence to entertain ‘ complaints
against presidential or legislative acts on any ground 
whatsoever, including those of their alleged repugnancy to some 
recognized individual rights. In Zambia, for example, all 
detention or restriction orders are made by the President, and 
it cannot be doubted that these measures constitute a formidable
i -
threat to personal liberties - yet they cannot be reviewed by the 
Ombudsman. However, the procedure under the bill of rights 
provides means of affording relief against presidential acts of 
this nature. In Tanzania no such problem would occur, because
| detention orders there are effected by the Minister responsible
| for internal affairs, and even by some senior regional
[ • . •
administrative officers. All these officials fall within the
! investigatory jurisdiction of the PCE.
I Further, a large area in which intervention by the Ombudsman
would be required in controversies involving personal liberties 
is outside the jurisdiction of the Zambian Commission for 
investigation. The Commission for Investigation Act, for example, 
provides that the Commission shall not conduct any investigation 
in respect of:
"(a) any matter in respect of which the person 
aggrieved has or had a right of appeal, 
reference or review to or before a 
tribunal constituted by or under any law;
(b) any matter in respect of which the person 
aggrieved has or had a remeby by way of 
proceedings in any court of law".^ 3
Provided that the Commission ' ~ iay
conduct an investigation notwithstanding that the 
person aggrieved has or had such a right of remedy 
if satisfied that in the particular circumstances it 
is not reasonable to expect him to resort or have 
resorted to it".
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These provisions undoubtedly confer on the Commission a 
discretion to entertain or not to entertain complaints in which 
the allegation is that a governmental authority has transgressed 
upon a right or freedom available to an individual, in spite of 
the fact that conflicts of this nature are usually adjudicated 
upon by the ordinary courts. Naturally, in deserving cases in 
which an individual may be inhibited to have recourse to court 
justice due to financial or other handicaps, the Commission would 
most likely take up the complaint. The point, however, is that 
this still does not remove the difficulty founded upon the fact 
that the Commission has no power to take up and investigate 
complaints where the administrative act under attack takes 
the form of a legislative or presidential act, or the form 
of a party/government policy, or anything done under the 
authority thereof. In Zambia, but not in Tanzania, the only 
consoling factor is that the Commission for Investigation 
operates side by side with a constitutional bill of rights, with 
the result that an individual aggrieved of the type of acts 
stipulated above, or anything done under their authority, can 
still turn to his right under the constitution by instituting 
proceedings in the Hihg Court (with a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court) for the enforcement of his right or rights. On 
the other hand, in Tanzania, where there is no bill of rights, it 
is quite obvious that grievances founded upon injury inflicted 
by a presidential or a legislative act, which clearly would fall 
outside the investigatory ambit of the PCE might go unremedied. 
So, to the extent that this is the case, the Zambian "doubly-
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locked" system of judicial/Ombudsman approach to the 
protection of individual rights, would seem to rest on a more 
sounder foundation inadquately fulfilling that task, than the 
system in Tanzania.
From our discussion above regarding the role which an 
Ombudsman can play in securing protection of individual 
liberties, it is fair to conclude that, on its own, the system 
would yield very little practical results. It contribution in 
that respect would be more meaningfully appreciated if the 
institution is made to function side by side with some other 
supporting protective devices, such as a bill of rights as is 
the case in Zambia; and/or if the institution functions in a 
politically congenial atmosphere, such as is facilitated by the 
existence of a responsive political leadership to the requirement 
of the rule of law and of democracy.
This then bring us to a consideration of the role which we 
envisage the party and the political leadership (especially the 
President) can usefully play in the protection of human rights, 
given the constitutional character of African Presidential systems 
of government.
iii) Role which the Party and the Political Leadership can Usefully 
Play in the Enforcement of Individual Rights
It will have become clear by now that one of the most distinctive
features which African political and constitutional systems display is
the dominating role which the President occupies within the entire
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government machinery. This is certainly true especially in a 
one-party state, in which the position of the President is 
unquestionably more dominating and where his influence over all 
political activities in the country is, for all practical purposes, 
self-evident. Parliamentary and judicial activities, and those of 
the press are all tightly controlled by the executive through the 
agency of the party. Hence all the traditional avenues of criticisms 
against the activities and conduct of the government are skilfully 
blocked. Further, there are no longer independent bodies in the 
country whose operations are not brought under the umbrella and control 
of the party - or the President, to be more precise. Appointments, 
dismissals, and disciplinary measures in the civil service, the 
parastatal bodies, police and prisons, defence, institutions of 
higher education, is exercised by the president through the various 
service commissions established under the Constitution, but whose 
activities and functions are made subject to the "general direction" 
of the President, and whose orders (the President’s) "shall" be 
complied with by the commission or person concerned.^
But above all, an African President has the muscle to make his 
country follow a certain pattern of political course of his own personal 
liking. In fact, most of the major constitutional reforms that have 
taken place since independence in these countries, including the
tVi <=*4-4 ® •'v
introduction of one-party states, have been at the * * i, or
acquiescence, of the President concerned. Indeed, an African 
Presidents1 personal commitment to ensuring the success of any 
institution or the implementation of any government policy, is 
indispensable. An avowedly determined leadership in the observance 
and maintenance of the rule of law and of human rights is therefore
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essential. And if there can be one valid proposition about human
rights in Africa, it is that their protection would not only depend
on the mere institutional infrastructure created for that purpose,
however perfect these may be, but more critically on what the
political leadership think and do about it. The example of Tanzania
is very much in point here. We have seen the role which President
Julius Nyerere had personally played in ensuring that the one-party
constitution which Tanzania was to establish (and which it
established in 1965) fundamental principles of democracy such as the
rule of law, civil liberties, and the independence of the judiciary
"lie at the basis of the Tanganyika Nation, and the whole political,
economic and social organization of the State must be directed
towards their rapid impeementation"Though the resultant
constitutional structure did not incorporate a bill of rights as we
have seen, the creation of the PCE and the reference in the preamble
calling upon the government to foster the principles that underlie
the concept of human rights, reflects more on Nyerere1s personal
commitment in ensuring that the entire political leadership should
submit itself to the requirements of democratic principles in the running of
affairs of government. The successful operation of the one-party state
institutions in Tanzania is at least a result of, or attributable to,
the good statesmanship of the President. The same comments can be
made in respect of Zambia, where President Kaunda has consistently
maintained the position that "the supremacy of the rule of law and
the independence of the judiciary....and the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual..." are "cardinal inviolable and built-in
76safeguards" that will always exist under the Zambian Constitution.
Both Nyerere and Kaunda have shown characteristic firmness in dealing 
with corrupt government officials and those who ignore to execute 
their official duties in accordance with the established procedures.
They have also supported the activities of their respective 
Ombudsmen. The position in Zambia and Tanzania can be compared to 
that in Malawi under President Kamuzu Banda, who, to start with, is 
a life president of his country. Having rejected inclusion of a 
bill of rights in the Malawian Republican/One-Party State constitution 
of 1966, there is absolutely no other institution specifically 
devised to safeguard the rights and freedoms of individuals in a 
more formal way, as is the case in Zambia and Tanzania. This, coupled 
with the fact that there is virtually no active personal response 
or initiative from the President to popularize the idea of a 
government based on some firm constitutionalist principles, Malawi, 
like Nkrumah’s Ghana (1960-66) is undergoing a crisis in the nature 
of executive perversion of democratic procedures, which comes 
dangerously close to dictatorship.
Assuming that there is present a genuine willingness on the 
part of the President to secure implementation of the principles of 
democracy, the next important factor is the degree of involvement 
which the party leadership in general is willing to render in the 
enforcement of the principles underlying the rule of law. Like the 
African President, it is because of the dominant position which the 
party accupies in the political and constitutional systems of many 
African states (especially those which have adopted one-party states) 
that-makes its role in implementing any vital national objective is essential, 
if not indispensable. The party in a one-party state like Zambia or 
Tanzania, is elevated above all institutions in the land. In Zambia,
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but not in Tanzania, there is an effective separation both in 
terms of personnel and functions between the cabinet and the central 
committee of the party. Members of the central committee take 
precedence over those of the cabinet. The party makes policy and 
merely instructs the government functionary concerned to implement it. 
Therefore, the party, in effect, directs the political destiny of the
■ v  -  •
country. It thus follows from this that the commitment of party leadership to 
any principles which should guide the government in the execution of 
its day-to-day tasks is essential. Party leadership which is avowedly 
committed to the maintenance of the rule of law and to the upholding 
of human rights may indeed play the vital role in inculcating in the 
minds of government officials, and the public at large, an awareness 
that the nation-state is founded upon certain ethical principles which 
should operate to inform the actions of public officials in their 
discharge of the many legal powers conferred on them under the 
statutes. One of the most formidable problems that operate adversely 
in the effective protection of human rights in Africa, is the fact 
that the ordinary people themselves are ignorant of their rights under 
the law, let alone how to go about asserting them when transgressed. 
Further, the politicians and the public officials too, are not 
themselves aware of their limits of power, and have behind them no 
ethic of how to go about handling public affairs bona fide. Thus, 
the problem would appear to be one of finding a well-organized 
institution or agency which could be used for the purpose of mobilizing 
the inert masses by providing them with some basic political 
education about a variety of important political subjects - of which 
their civil liberties and how to defend them would obviously be 
one such subject. The party is particularly well suited to undertake
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this task. Its experience in the mobilization of the people 
during the nationalist struggle for independence; it legitimacy;
the support it has among the entire political leadership; its
1
available resources>in the form of personnel, money, transport 
facilities, the media, accessibility to all government officials 
from the top (i.e., the President) to the messenger or tea boy, 
and to the chiefs and the ordinary people, both in rural and urban 
areas. It is thus upon the party that the formidable task of waging 
a campaign which has behind it the objective of instilling in the 
minds of the people a sense of ethical commitment about how the 
process of government should be carried on.falls. Political practice in 
communist countries like Russia and Mao’s China shows just how 
possible mobilization through party machinery can prove effective in 
achieving or implementing state policies.
Finally, the point must be stressed here that African states 
have just emerged into nationhood within the last 15 years or so, 
and as such much of the needed infrastructural conditions needed to 
bring about stable political and constitutional conditions have yet 
to be found and consolidated. The present, rather fragile state of 
affairs in African polities could be looked upon as a transient phase 
which, with the passage of time, will fade away, to be replaced by 
more stable conditions. The question, however, is whether Africa is 
on the right path in the search for these more stable political 
conditions or solutions to its massive problems of democracy. Does 
the political practice in Africa and the existing systems of 
government - such as one-party states, no-party states or military 
regimes - permit of a prediction of optimism that the "rule of law" 
will eventually prevail over the propensity to personalize power by
624
one man or a group of individuals? Perhaps as a matter of 
formality, one should state that such an era must come, but not 
least with the qualification that it is bound to take a long time. 
Ghana was the first African country to attain independence in 1957.
In 1960 it became the first African country to adopt a presidential 
form of government. In 1964 Ghana also gave the lead by adopting 
a one-party state. Between 1960-66 Ghana under President Nkrumah 
and the Convention Peoples* Party (the CPP) experienced perhaps the 
worst form of "tyranny and oppression" in independent Africa.
Nkrumah with his CPP government was overthrown by the army. Reverting 
to civilian rule 3 years later in 1969, the people of Ghana vowed 
that:
"...with the experience of tyranny and oppression 
so fresh in the minds of the people of Ghana,
Ghanaians were determined to ensure that never again 
would the political sovereignty of our country be 
allowed to reside so precariously in one man".77
The constitution that resulted from this displayed just that
preoccupation, namely, what an observer has called an excessive
"...indulgence in legal over-kill, with its fail-safe entrenchment
78provisions and double-locked guarantees..." In particular, a bill 
of rights and the office of an Ombudsman was provided for. Yet this 
constitution lasted only 3 years - being overthrown by the army in 
1972. The people of Ghana at the time of writing are fighting a 
second battle to return to civilian rule.
And the question cannot be ruled out of possible .further 
military takeovers, or other forms of constitutional breakdown.
These problems threaten not only Ghana, but many if not all, African 
states. Consequently, it would be futile to engage in any exercise
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of predicting when stable political and constitutional conditions 
would prevail in the continent of Africa.
For the reasons that we have given in this investigation, it 
is difficult to view with any optimism the immediate future or 
prospects for human rights in many parts of Africa.
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APPENDIX I
i) Bill of Rights in Zambia 1964
Chapter III of the Constitution entitled "Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual"
Funda­
mental 
rights 
and 
free­
doms of 
the
indivi­
dual
Protec­
tion
of
right 
to life
13. Whereas every person in Zambia is entitled to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, 
that is to say the right, whatever his race, place 
of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, 
but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others and for the public interest to each and 
all of the following, namely -
a) life, liberty, security of the person and the 
protection of the law;
b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of 
assembly and association; and
c) protection for the privacy of his home and 
other prooerty and from deprivation of property 
without compensation;
the provisions of this Chapter shall have the effect 
for the purpose of affording protection to those rights 
and freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection 
as are contained in those provisions, being limitations 
designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights 
and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the 
rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
14. 1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of 
a criminal offence under the law in force in Zambia of 
which he has been convicted.
2) Without prejudice to any liability for a contravention 
of any other law with respect to the use of force in such 
cases as are hereinafter mentioned, a person shall not be 
regarded as having been deprived of his life in contraven­
tion of this section if he dies as the result of the use 
of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable in 
the circumstances of the case -
a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the 
defence of property;
b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the 
escape of a person lawfully detained;
c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection 
or mutiny; or
d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of 
a criminal offence;
or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war.
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Protec- 15. 1) No person shall be deprived of his personal
tion of liberty save as may be authorised by law in any of
right the following cases, that is to say -
to per- a) in execution of the sentence or order of a court,
sonal whether established for Zambia or some other
liberty country, in respect of a criminal offence of
which he has been convicted;
b) in execution of the order of a court of record 
punishing him for contempt of that court or of 
a court inferior to it;
c) in execution of the order of a court made to
secure the fulfilment of any obligation imposed 
on him by law;
d) for the purpose of bringing him before a court 
in execution of the order of a court;
e) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, 
or being about to commit, a criminal offence 
under the law in force in Zambia;
f) under the order of a court or with the consent of 
his parent or guardian, for his education or 
welfare during any period ending not later than the 
date when he attains the age of eighteen years;
g) for the purpose of preventing the spread of an 
infectious or contagious disease;
h) in the case of a person who is, or is reasonably 
suspected to be, of unsound mind, addicted to drugs 
or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose of his 
care or treatment or the protection of the community;
i) for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of 
that person into Zambia, or for the purpose of 
effecting the expulsion, extradition or other lawful 
removal of that person Zambia or for the purpose of 
restricting that person while he is being conveyed 
through Zambia in the course of his extradition or 
removal as a convicted prisoner from one country to 
another; or
j) to such extent as may be necessary in the execution 
of a lawful order requiring that person to remain 
within a specified area within Zambia or prohibiting 
him from being within such an area, or to such 
extent as may be reasonably justifiable for the 
taking of proceedings against that person relating to 
the making of any such order, or to such extent as 
may be reasonably justifiable for restraining that 
person during any visit that he is permitted to make 
to any part of Zambia in which, in onsequence of any 
such order, his presence would otherwise be unlawful.
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15. (continued)
2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be 
informed as soon as resaonably practicable, in a 
language that he understands, of the reasons for his 
arrest or detention.
3) Any person who is arrested or detained -
a) for the purpose of bringing him before a court 
in execution of the order of a court; or
b) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, 
or being about to commit, a criminal offence under 
the law in force in Zambia;
and who is not released, shall be brought without undue 
delay before a court; and if any person arrested or 
detained as mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection 
is not tried within a reasonable time, then, without 
prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought 
against him, he shall be released either unconditionally 
or upon reasonable conditions, including in particular 
such conditions as are reasonably necessary to ensure 
that he appears at a later date for trial or for 
proceedings preliminary to trial.
4) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by 
any other person shall be entitled to compensation there­
for from that other person.
Protec- 16. 
tion 
from 
slavery 
and
forced 
labour
or order of a court;
b) labour required of any person while he is lawfully 
detained that, though not required in consequence 
of the sentence or order of a court, is reasonably 
necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the 
maintenance of the place at which he is detained;
c) any labour required of a member of a disciplined 
force in pursuance of his duties as such or, in the 
case of a person who has conscientious objections 
to service as a member of a naval, military or air 
force, any labour that that person is required by 
law to perform in place of such service;
1) No person shall be held m  slavery or servitude.
2) No person shall be required to perform forced labour,
3) For the purposes of this section, the expression
"forced labour" does not include -
a) any labour required in consequence of the sentence
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Protec- 17. 
tion 
from 
inhuman 
treat­
ment
Protec- 18. 
tion 
from 
depri­
vation 
of
property
(continued)
d) any labour required during any period when the 
Republic is at war or a declaration under section 29 
of this Constitution is in force or in the event of 
any other emergency or calamity that threatens the 
life and well-being of the community, to the extent
that the requiring of such labour is reasonably
justifiable in the circumstances of any situation 
arising or existing during that period or as a 
result of that other emergency or calamity, for the 
purpose of dealing with that situation; or
e) any labour reasonably required as part of reasonable 
and normal communal or other civic obligations.
1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.
2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of 
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section to the extent that the 
law in question authorises the infliction of any
description of punishment that was lawful in the former
Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia immediately before 
the coming into operation of this Constitution.
1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily 
taken possession of, and no interest in or right over 
property of any description shall be compulsorily 
acquired, except where the following conditions are 
satisfied, that is to say -
a) the taking of possession or acquisition is 
necessary or expedient -
i) in the interests of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality, public health, 
town and country planning or land settlement; 
or
ii) in order to secure the development or 
utilisation of that, or other, property for 
a purpose beneficial to the community;
and
b) provision is made by a law applicable to that 
taking of possession or acquisition -
i) for the prompt payment of adequate 
compens ation; and
ii) securing to any person having an interest in 
or right over the property a right of access 
to a court or other authority for the 
determination of his interest or right, the 
legality of the taking of possession or 
acquisition of the property, interest or 
right, and the amount of any compensation to 
which he is entitled, and for the purpose of 
obtaining prompt payment of that compensation.
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18. (continued)
2) No person who is entitled to compensation under 
this section shall be prevented from remitting within 
a reasonable time after he has received any amount of 
that compensation, the whole of that amount (free from
any deduction, charge or tax made or levied in respect
of its remission) to any country of his choice outside 
Zambia.
3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of subsection (2) of this section to the 
extent that the law in question authorises -
a) the attachment, by order of a court, of any amount
of compensation to which a person is entitled in
satisfaction of the judgment of a court or pending 
the determination of civil proceedings to which he 
is a party; or
b) the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the 
manner in which any amount of compensation is to 
be remitted.
4) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of subsection (1) of this section -
a) to the extent that the law in question makes
provision for the taking of possession or
acquisition of any property -
i) in satisfaction of any tax, rate or due;
ii) by way of penalty for breach of the law, 
whether under civil process or after 
conviction of a criminal offence under the 
law in force in Zambia;
iii) as an incident of a lease, tenancy, mortgate, 
charge, bill of sale, pledge or contract;
iv) in the execution of judgments or orders of
a court in proceedings for the determination 
of civil rights or obligations;
v) in circumstances where it is reasonably 
necessary so to do because the property is 
in a dangerous state or injurious to the 
health of human beings, animals or plants;
vi) in consequence of any law with respect to 
the limitation of actions; or
vii) for so long only as may be necessary for the 
purposes of any examination, investigation, 
trial or inquiry or, in the case of land, for 
the purposes of the carrying out thereon of 
work of soil conservation or the conservation 
of other natural resources or work relating 
to agricultural development or improvement 
(being work relating to such development or 
improvement that the owner or occupier of the 
land has been required, and has without 
reasonable excuse refused or failed, to carry out);
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b) to the extent that the law in question makes 
provision for the taking of possession or 
acquisition of -
i) enemy property;
ii) property of a deceased person, a person of
unsound mind or a person who has not attained
the age of eighteen years, for the purpose of 
its administration for the benefit of the 
persons entitled to the beneficial interest 
therein;
iii) property of a person adjudged bankrupt or 
a body corporate in liquidation, for the 
purpose of its administration for the benefit 
of the creditors of the bankrupt or body 
corporate and, subject thereto, for the 
benefit of other persons entitled to the 
beneficial interest in the property; or
iv) property subject to a trust, for the
purpose of vesting the property in persons 
appointed as trustees under the instrument 
creating the trust or by a court or, by order 
of a court, for the prupose of giving effect 
to the trust.
5) Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
affecting the making or operation of any law for the 
compulsory taking of possession in the public interest 
of any property, or the compulsory acquisition in the 
public interest of any interest in or right over 
property, where that property, interest or right is held 
by a body corporate established by law for public 
purposes in which no moneys have been invested other 
than moneys provided by Parliament.
1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be 
subjected to the search of his person or his property 
or the entry by others on his premises.
2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of 
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section to the extent that the law 
in question makes provision -
a) that is reasonably required in the interests of 
defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality, public health, town and country planning, 
the development and utilisation of mineral 
resources, or in order to secure the development 
or utilisation of any property for a purpose 
beneficial to the community;
b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of
protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons;
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19. (continued)
c) that authorises an officer or agent of the 
Government, a local government authority or
a body corporate established by law for a public 
purpose to enter on the premises of any person in 
order to inspect those premises or anything 
thereon for the purpose of any tax, rate or due 
or in order to carry out work connected with any 
property that is lawfully on those premises and 
that belongs to that Government, authority or 
body corporate, as the case may be; or
d) that authorises, for the purpose of enforcing the 
judgment or order of a court in any civil 
proceedings, the search of any person or property 
by order of a court or entry upon any premises by 
such order;
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may 
be, anything done under the authority thereof is shown 
not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
20. 1) If any person is charged with a criminal offence,
then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be 
afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial court established by law.
2) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence-
a) shall be presumed to be innocent until he is 
proved or has pleaded guilty;
b) shall be informed as soon as reasonably 
practicable, in a language that he understands
and in detail, of the nature of the offence
charged;
c) shall be given adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of his defence;
d) shall be permitted to defend himself before the 
court in person or, at his own expense, by a legal 
representative of his own choice;
e) shall be afforded facilities to examine in person 
or by his legal representative the witnesses 
called by the prosecution before the court, and 
to obtain the attendance and carry out the 
examination of witnesses to testify on his behalf 
before the court on the same conditions as those 
applying to witnesses called by the prosecution; 
and
f) shall be permitted to have without payment the 
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand the language used at the trial of 
the charge;
633
20. (continued)
and except with his own consent the trial shall not 
take place in his absence unless he so conducts himself 
as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his 
presence impracticable and the court has ordered him to 
be removed and the trial to proceed in his absence.
3) When a person is tried for any criminal offence, the 
accused person or any person authorised by him in that 
behalf shall, if he so requires and subject to payment 
of such reasonable fee as may be prescribed by law, be 
given within a reasonable time after judgment a copy 
for the use of the accused person of any record of the 
proceedings made by or on behalf of the court.
4) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission that did not, 
at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, 
and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence 
that is severer in degree or description than the 
maximum penalty that might have been imposed for that 
offence at the time when it was committed.
5) No person who shows that he has been tried by a 
competent court for a criminal offence and either 
convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that 
offence or for any other criminal offence of which he 
could have been convicted at the trial for that offence, 
save upon the order of a superior court in the court of 
appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction 
or acquittal.
6) No person shall be tired for a criminal offence if 
he shows that he has been pardoned for that offence.
7) No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall 
be compelled to give evidence at the trial.
8) No person shall be convicted of a criminal offence 
unless that offence is defined and the penalty therefor 
is prescribed in a written law:
Provided that nothing in his subsection shall 
prevent a court of record from punishing any person for 
contempt of itself notwithstanding that the act or 
omission constituting the contempt is not defined in a 
written law and the penalty therefor is not so prescribed.
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10) Except with the agreement of all the parties 
thereto, all proceedings of every court and proceedings 
for the determination of the existence or extent of any 
civil right or obligation before any other adjudicating 
authority, including the announcement of the decision 
of the court or other authority, shall be held in 
public.
11) Nothing in the last foregoing subsection shall 
prevent the court or other adjudicating authority from 
excluding from the proceedings persons other than the 
parties thereto and their legal representatives to such 
extent as the court or other authority -
a) may consider necessary or expedient in circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice or in interlocutory proceedings; or
b) may be empowered by law to do so in the interests of 
defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality, the welfare of persons under the age of 
eighteen years or the protection of the private lives 
of persons concerned in the proceedings.
12) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of 
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of -
a) subsection (2)(a) of this section to the extent that
the law in question imposes upon any person charged
with a criminal offence the burden of proving 
particular facts;
b) subsection (2)(d) of this section to the extent that 
the law in question prohibits legal representation 
before a subordinate court in proceedings for an 
offence under African customary law (being proceedings 
against any person who, under that law, is subject
to that law);
c) subsection (2)(e) of this section to the extent that
the law in question imposes reasonable conditions
that must be satisfied if witnesses called to testify 
on behalf of an accused person are to be paid their 
expenses out of public funds;
d) subsection (2) of this section to the extent that the 
law provides that -
i) where the trial of any person for any offence
prescribed by or under the law has been adjourned 
and the accused, having pleaded to the charge, 
fails to appear3at the time fixed by the court 
for the resumption of his trial after the 
adjournment, the proceedings may continue not- 
withstanding the absence of the accused if the 
court, being satisfied that, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case, it is 
reasonable so to do, so orders; and
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ii) the court shall set aside any conviction or 
sentence pronounced in the absence of the 
accused in respect of that offence if the 
accused satisfies the court without undue 
delay that the cause of his absence was 
reasonable and that he had a valid defence 
to the charge;
e) subsection (2) of this section to the extent that 
the law provides that the trial of a body corporate 
may take place in the absence of any representative 
of the body corporate upon a charge in respect of 
which a plea of not guilty has been entered by the 
court;
f) subsection (5) of this section to the extent that the
law in question authorises a court to try a member of
a disciplined force for a criminal offence notwith­
standing any trial and conviction or acquittal of 
that member under the disciplinary law of that force, 
so, however, that any court so trying such a member 
and convicting him shall in sentencing him to any 
punishment take into account any punishment awarded 
him under that disciplinary law.
13) In the case of any person who is held in lawful
detention, the provisions of subsection (1), subsection 
(2)(d) and (e) and subsection (3) of this section shall 
not apply in relation to his trial for a criminal 
offence under the law regulating the discipline of 
persons held in such detention.
14) In its application to a body corporate subsection (2) 
of this section shall have effect as if the words "in 
person or" were omitted from paragraphs (d) and (e).
15) In this section "criminal offence" means a criminal 
offence under the law in force in Zambia.
1) Except with his consent, no person shall be hindered 
in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and for 
the purposes of this section the said freedom includes 
freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others, and both in public and private, to 
manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.
2) Except with his own consent (or, if he is a minor, the 
consent of his guardian) no person attending any place of 
education shall be required to receive religious instruction 
or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or 
observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance 
relates to a religion other than his own.
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3) No religious community or denomination shall be 
prevented from providing religious instruction for 
persons of that community or denomination in the course 
of any education provided by that community or 
denomination.
4) No person shall be compelled to take any oath 
which is contrary to his religion or belief or to 
take any oath in a manner which is contrary to his 
religion or belief.
5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or 
in contravention of this section to the extent that 
the law in question makes provision which is reasonably 
required -
a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality or public health; or
b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of other persons, including the right to 
observe and practise any religion without the 
unsolicited intervention of members of any other 
religion;
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, 
the thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to 
be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be 
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, 
that is to say, freedom to hold opinions without inter­
ference, freedom to receive ideas and information without 
interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information 
without interference (whether the communication be to the 
public generally or to any person or class of persons) and 
freedom from interference with his correspondence.
2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of 
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section to the extent that the law 
in que stion makes provision -
a) that is reasonably required in the interests of 
defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health; or
b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of 
protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of 
other persons or the private lives of persons concerned 
in legal proceedings, preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, maintaining the 
authority and independence of the court, regulating 
educational institutions in the interests of persons 
receiving instruction therein, or regulating the 
technical administration or the technical operation of 
telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless, broadcasting
or television; or
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22. (continued)
c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers;
and except so far as that provision or, as the case 
may be, the thing done under the authority thereof is 
shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society.
23. 1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be 
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly 
and association, that is to say, his right to assemble 
freely and associate with other persons and in particular 
to form or belong to trade unions or other associations 
for the protection of his interests.
2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of 
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section to the extent that the law 
in question makes provision -
a) that is reasonably required in the interests of 
defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health;
b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of 
protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons;
c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers; or
d) for the registration of trade unions in a register
established by or under a law and for imposing
reasonable conditions relating to the procedure
for entry on such a register (including conditions 
as to the minimum number of persons necessary to 
constitute a trade union qualified for registration);
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may 
be, the thing done under the authority the reof is shown 
not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
24. 1) No person shall be deprived of his freedom of movement,
and for the purposes of this section the said freedom 
means the right to move freely throughout Zambia, the right 
to reside in any part of Zambia, the right to enter Zambia 
and immunity from expulsion from Zambia.
2) Any restriction on a person’s freedom of movement that
is involved in his lawful detention shall not be held to
be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section.
3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section to the extent that the law 
in question makes provision -
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a) for the imposition of restrictions that are reasonably 
required in the interests of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality, or public health or 
the imposition of restrictions on the acquisition or 
use by any person of land or other property in 
Zambia, and except so far as that provision or, as
the case may be, the thing done under the authority 
thereof, is shown not to be reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society;
b) for the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of 
movement of any person who is not a citizen of 
Zambia;
c) for the imposition of restrictions upon the movement 
or residence within Zambia of public officers; or
d) for the removal of a person from Zambia to be tried 
outside Zambia for a criminal offence or to undergo 
imprisonment in some other country in execution of 
the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal 
offence under the law in force in Zambia of which 
he has been convicted.
4) If any person whose freedom of movement has been 
restricted by virtue of such a provision as is referred 
to in subsection (3)(a) of this section so requests at 
any time during the period of that restriction not 
earlier than six months after the order was made or six 
months after he last made such request, as the case may 
be, his case shall be reviewed by an independent and 
impartial tribunal presided over by a person, qualified to 
be enrolled as an advocate in Zambia, appointed by the 
Chief Justice:
Provided that a person whose freedom of movement has 
been restricted by virtue of a restriction which is 
applicable to persons generally or to general classes of 
persons shall not make a request under this subsection 
unless he has first obtained the consent of the High 
Court.
5) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this 
section of the case of a person whose freedom of movement 
has been restricted, the tribunal may make recommendations, 
concerning the necessity or expediency of continuing the 
restriction to the authority by which it was ordered but, 
unless it is otherwise provided by law, that authority 
shall not be obliged to act in accordance with any such 
recommendations.
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1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) 
and (7) of this section, no law shall make any provision 
that is discriminatory either of itself or in its 
effect.
2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) 
and (7) of this section, no law shall make any provision 
that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
3) In this section, the expression "discriminatory11 
means affording different treatment to different persons 
attributable wholly or mainly to their respective 
descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, political 
opinions, colour or creed whereby persons of one such 
description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions 
to which persons of another such description are not made 
subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which 
are not accorded to persons of another such description.
4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any 
law so far as that law makes provision -
a) for the appropriation of the general revenues of
the Republic;
b) with respect to persons who are not citizens of 
Zambia;
c) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, 
devolution of property on death or other matters of 
personal law;
d) for the application in the case of members of a 
particular race or tribe of customary law with
respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law
with respect to that matter which is applicable 
in the case of other persons; or
e) whereby persons of any such description as is 
mentioned in subsection (3) of this section may be 
subjected to any disability or restriction or may
be accorded any privilege or advantage which, having 
regard to its nature and to special circumstances 
pertaining to those persons or to persons of any 
other such description, is reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society.
5) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be
inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1)
of this section to the extent that it makes reasonable
provision with respect to qualifications for service as
public officer or as a member of a disciplined force
or for the service of a local government authority or
a body corporate established directly by any law.
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6) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to 
anything which is expressly or by necessary implication 
authorised to be done by any such provision of law as 
is referred to in subsection (4) or (5) of this 
section.
7) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of 
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section to the extent that the 
law in question makes provision whereby persons of any 
such description as is mentioned in subsection (3) of 
this section may be subjected to any restriction on 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 19, 21,
22, 23 and 24 of this Constitution, being such a 
restriction as is authorised by section 19(2), 21(5), 
22(2), 23(2) or 24(3), as the case may be.
8) Nothing in subsection (2) of this section shall 
affect any discretion relating to the institution, 
conduct or discontinuance of civil or criminal proceedings 
in any court that is vested in any person by or under 
this Constitution or any other law.
9) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of
any law shall be held to be inconsistent with the
provisions of this section -
a) if that law was in force immediately before the 
coming into operation of this Constitution and 
has continued in force at all times since the 
coming into operation of this Constitution; or
b) to the extent that the law repeals and re-enacts
any provision which has been contained in any
enactment at all times since immediately before 
the coming into operation of this Constitution.
Dero- 26. 1) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of
gation an Act of Parliament shall be held to be inconsistent
from with or in contravention of section 15 or 25 of this
funda- Constitution to the extent that the Act authorises the
mental taking, during any period when the Republic is at war
rights or any period when a declaration under section 29 of
and this Constitution is in force, of measures that are
freedoms reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with
the situation that exists during that period.
2) Where a person is detained by virtue of such an 
authorisation as is referred to in subsection (1) of 
this section the following provisions shall apply:
a) he shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in
any case not more than five days after the commencement 
of his detention, be furnished with a statement in 
writing in a language that he understands specifying 
in detail the grounds upon which he is detained;
26. (continued)
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b) not more than fourteen days after the commencement
of his detention, a notification shall be published 
in the Gazette stating that he has been detained and 
giving particulars of the provision of law under 
which his detention is authorised;
c) not more than one month after the commencement of 
his detention and thereafter during his detention 
at intervals of not more than six months, his case 
s^hall be reviewed by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law and presided over by
a person appointed by the Chief Justice;
d) he shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult
a legal representative of his own choice who shall be 
permitted to make representations to the tribunal 
appointed for the review of the case of the detained 
person;
e) at the hearing of his case by the tribunal appointed 
for the review of his case he shall be permitted to 
appear in person or by a legal representative of his 
own choice.
3) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this 
section of the case of a detained person, the tribunal 
may make recommendations, concerning the necessity or 
expediency of continuing his detention, to the authority 
by which it was ordered but, unless it is otherwise 
provided by law, that authority shall not be obliged to 
act in accordance with any such recommendations.
4) Nothing contained in subsection (2)(d) or (2)(e) of 
this section shall be construed as entitling a person to 
legal representation at the public expense.
1) Whenever -
a) a request is made in accordance with subsection (2) 
of this section for a report on a bill or a statutory 
instrument; or
b) the Chief Justice considers it necessary for the 
purpose of determining claims for legal aid in 
respect of proceedings under section 28 of this 
Constitution;
the Chief Justice shall appoint a tribunal which shall 
consist of two persons selected by him from amongst 
persons who hold or have held the office of a judge of 
the High Court.
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2) A request for a report on a bill or a statutory 
instrument may be made by no less than seven members 
of the National Assembly by notice in writing 
delivered -
a) in the case of a bill, to the Speaker within 
three days after the final reading of the bill 
in the Assembly;
b) in the case of a statutory instrument, to the 
authority having power to make the instrument 
within fourteen days of the publication of the 
instrument in the Gazette.
3) Where a tribunal is appointed under this section 
for the purposes of reporting on a bill or a statutory 
instrument, the tribunal shall, within the prescribed 
period, submit a report to the President and to the 
Speaker of the National Assembly stating -
a) in the case of a bill, whether or not in the 
opinion of the tribunal any, and if so which, 
provisions of the bill would, if enacted, be 
inconsistent with this Chapter of this 
Constitution;
b) in the case of a statutory instrument, whether 
or not in the opinion of the tribunal any, and 
if so which, provisions of the instrument are 
inconsistent with this Chapter of this 
Constitution;
and, if the tribunal reports that any provision-would 
be or is inconsistent with this Chapter of this 
Constitution, the grounds upon which the tribunal has 
reached that conclusion:
Provided that if the tribunal considers that the 
request for a report on a bill or statutory instrument 
is merely frivolous or vexatious, it may so report to 
the President without entering further upon the question 
whether the bill or statutory instrument would be or is 
inconsistent with this Chapter of this Constitution.
4) Where a tribunal is appointed under this section for 
the purpose of determining claims for legal aid, the 
tribunal may grant to any person who satisfied them 
that -
a) he intends to bring or is an applicant in proceedings 
under section 28(1) or 28(4) of this Constitution;
b) he has reasonable grounds for bringing the 
application; and
c) he cannot afford to pay for the cost of the 
application;
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a certificate that the application is a proper case 
to be determined at the public expense:
Provided that paragraph (c) of this subsection 
shall not apply in any case where the application 
relates to the va,idity of a provision of law in 
respect of which a tribunal has reported that it 
would be or is inconsistent with this Chapter of 
this Constitution or where it appears to the tribunal 
that issues are or will be raised in the application 
which are of general public importance.
5) Where a certificate is granted to any person by 
a tribunal in pursuance of subsection (4) of this 
section there shall be paid to that person out of the 
general revenues of the Republic such amount as the 
court by which the application is heard may assess as 
the costs reasonably incurred by that person in 
connexion with the application; and the sums required 
for making such payment shall be a charge on the 
general revenues of the Republic.
6) For the purposes of sebsection (5) of this section -
a) the costs incurred in an application shall include 
the cost of obtaining the advice of a legal 
representative and, if necessary, the cost of 
representation by a legal representative in any
< court in steps preliminary or incidental to the
application;
b) in assessing the costs reasonably incurred by a 
person in an application regard shall be had to 
costs awarded against that person or recovered 
by him in those proceedings.
7) In this section "prescribed period" means -
a) in relation to a bill the period commencing from 
the appointment of the tribunal to report upon 
the bill and ending thirty days thereafter or if 
the Speaker, on the application of the tribunal, 
considers that owing to the length or complexity 
of the bill thirty days is insufficient for 
consideration of the bill, ending on such later 
day as the Speaker may determine;
b) in relation to a statutory instrument the period of 
forty days commencing from the publication of the 
instrument in the Gazette.
27. (continued)
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8) Nothing in subsection (1), (2) or (3) of this 
section shall apply to a bill for the appropriation 
of the general revenues of the Republic or a bill 
containing only proposals for expressly altering this 
Constitution or the Order to which this Constitution 
is scheduled.
9) References in this section to a statutory instrument 
are references to a statutory instrument made after the 
coming into operation of this Constitution under the 
authority of any Act of Parliament or any law enacted by 
any legislature established for the former Protectorate 
of Northern Rhodesia, or under the authority of any Act 
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or any Order of 
Her Majesty in Council having effect as part of the
law of Zambia.
28. 1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (6) of this
section, if any person alleges that any of the provisions 
of sections 13 to 26 (inclusive) of this Constitution 
has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in 
relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other 
action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully 
available, that person may apply to the High Court for 
redress.
2) The High Court shall have original jurisdiction -
a) to hear and determine any application made by any 
person in pursuance of subsection (1) of this 
section;
b) to determine any question arising in the case of 
any person which is referred to it in pursuance 
of subsection (3) of this section;
and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such 
directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose 
of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the 
provisions of sections 13 to 26 (inclusive) of this 
Constitution.
3) If in any proceedings in any subordinate court any 
question arises as to the contravention of any of the 
provisions of sections 13 to 25 (inclusive) of this 
Constitution, the person presiding in that court may, and 
shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, 
refer the question ot the High Court unless, in his 
opinion, the raising of the question is merely frivolous 
or vexatious.
28. (continued)
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4) Any person aggrieved by any determination of the 
High Court under this section may appeal therefrom 
to the Court of Appeal:
Provided that no appeal shall lie from a 
determination of the High Court under this section 
dismissing an application on the ground that it is 
frivolous or vexatious.
5) No application shall be brought under subsection (1) 
of this section on the grounds that the provisions of 
sections 13 to 26 (inclusive) of this Constitution are 
likely to be contravened by reason of proposals contained 
in any bill which, at the date of the application, has 
not become a law.
6) Parliament may confer upon the Court of Appeal or the 
High Court such powers in addition to those conferred by 
this section as may appear to be necessary or desirable 
for the purpose of enabling that court more effectively 
to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this 
section.
7) Rules of court making provision with respect to the 
practice and procedure of the High Court for the purpose 
of this section may be made by the person or authority 
for the time being having power to make rules of court 
with respect to the practice and procedure of that court 
generally.
1) The President may, at any time, by Proclamation 
published in the Gazette, declare that -
a) a state of public emergency exists; or
b) a situation exists which, if it is allowed to 
continue, may lead to a state of public emergency.
2) A declaration under subsection (1) of this section, 
if not sooner revoked, shall cease to have effect -
a) in the case of a declaration made when Parliament 
is sitting or has been summoned to meet within 
five days, at the expiration of a period of five 
days beginning with the date of publication of 
the declaration;
b) in any other case, at the expiration of a period 
of twenty-one days beginning with the date of 
publication of the declaration;
unless, before the expiration of that period, it is 
approved by a resolution passed by the National Assembly.
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29. (continued)
3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this 
section, a declaration approved by resolution of the 
National Assembly under subsection (2) of this section 
shall continue in force until the expiration of a period 
of six months beginning with the date of its being so 
approved or until such earlier date as may be specified 
in the resolution:
Provided that the National Assembly may, by 
resolution extend its approval of the declaration for 
periods of not more than six months at a time.
4) The National Assembly may, by resolution at any 
time revoke a declaration approved■by the> Assembly 
under this section.
APPENDIX II
Some Relevant Amendments Enacted to the Bill of Rights, 1964-1973
a) Constitution (Amendment) (No.5) of 1969
b) Constitution (Amendment) (No.5) of 1972.
c) Societies (Amendment) No.9 of 1974
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APPENDIX II
a) An Act to amend the Zambia Independence Order, 1964, and the 
Constitution. (23rd October, 1969.)
Enact­
ment
ENACTED by the Parliament of Zambia
Short
title
Amend­
ment
of
section 
20 of the 
Zambia 
Indepen­
dence 
Order, 
1964
Repeal ' 
of
section 10 
of the 
Consti­
tution
This Act may be cited as the Constitution (Amendment) 
(No.5) Act, 1969.
Section twenty of the Zambia Independence Order, 1964, 
is amended by the insertion after subsection (2) 
thereof of the following new subsection:
(3) This section shall not apply to the Barotseland 
Agreement, 1964 (that is to say, the agreement dated 
18th May, 1964, between the Government of Northern 
Rhodesia and the Litunga of Barotseland which provides 
that it may be cited by that title) , which agreement 
shall, on and after the commencement of the Constitution 
(Amendment) (No.5) Act, 1969, cease to have effect, and 
all rights (whether vested or otherwise), liabilities 
and obligations thereunder shall thereupon lapse.
Section ten of the Constitution is repealed.
Repeal 
and rep­
lacement 
of
section 18 
of the 
Consti­
tution
4. Section eighteen of the Constitution is repealed and 
and the following section substituted therefor:
(18) (1) Save as hereinafter provided, no property of 
any description shall be compulsorily taken possession 
of, and no interest in or right over property of any 
description shall be compulsorily acquired, except under 
the authority of an Act of Parliament which provides for 
payment of compensation for the property or interest or 
right to be taken possession of or acquired.
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of subsection (1) of this section to the 
extent that such law provides for the taking possession 
or acquisition of any property or interest therein or 
right thereover -
(a)
(b)
(c)
in satisfaction of any tax, rate or due; 
by way of penalty for breach of any law, 
whether under civil process or after 
conviction of an offence;
in execution of judgments or orders of courts;
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(d) upon the attempted removal of the property in 
question out of or into Zambia in contravention 
of any law;
(e) as an incident of a contract (including a lease, 
tenancy, mortgage, charge, pledge or bill of 
sale) or of a title deed to land;
(f) for the purpose of its administration, care or 
custody on behalf of and for the benefit of 
the person entitled to the beneficial interest 
therein;
(g) by way of the vesting of enemy property or for 
the purpose of the administration of such 
property;
(h) for the purpose of -
(i) the administration of the property of a 
deceased person,' a person -bf unsound 
mind or a person who has not attained the 
age of eighteen years, for the benefit of 
the persons entitled to the beneficial 
interest therein;
(ii) the administration of the property of a 
person adjudged bankrupt or a body corporate 
in liquidation, for the benefit of the 
creditors of such bankrupt or body corporate 
and, subject thereto, for the benefit of 
other persons entitled to the beneficial 
interest in the property;
(iii) the administration of the property of a 
person who has entered into a deed of 
arrangement for the benefit of his 
creditors; or
(iv) vesting any property subject to a trust in 
persons appointed as trustees under the 
instrument creating the trust or by a court 
or, by order of a court, for the purpose of 
giving effect to the trust;
(i) in consequence of any law relating to the limitation 
of actions;
(j) in terms of any law relating to abandoned,
unoccupied, unutilised or undeveloped land, as 
defined in such law;
(k) in terms of any law relating to absent or non­
resident owners, as defined in such law, of any 
property;
(1) in terms of any law relating to trusts or 
settlements;
(m) by reason of the property in question being in a 
dangerous state or prejudicial to the health or 
safety of human beings, animals or plants;
(n) as a condition in connection with the granting of 
permission for the utilisation of that or other 
property in any particular manner;
(o) for the purpose of or in connection with the 
prospecting for or exploitation of minerals 
belonging to the Republic on terms which provide 
for the respective interests of the persons
affected;
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(p) in pursuance of provision for the marketing
of property of that description in the common 
interests of the various persons otherwise 
entitled to dispose of that property;
(q) by way of the taking of a sample for the 
purposes of any law;
(r) by way of the acquisition of the shares, or a 
class of shares, in a body corporate on terms 
agreed to by the holders of not less than nine- 
tenths in value of those shares or that class 
thereof;
(s) where the property consists of an animal, upon 
its being found trespassing or straying;
(t) for so long as may be necessary for the purpose 
of any examination, investigation, trial or 
inquiry or, in the case of land, the carrying 
out thereon -
(i) of work for the purpose of the 
conservation of natural resources of 
any description; or
(ii) of agricultural development or improvement 
which the owner or occupier of the land 
has been required, and has without 
reasonable and lawful excuse refused or 
failed, to carry out;
(u) where the property consists of any licence or 
permit;
(v) where the property consists of wild animals 
existing in their natural habitat or the 
carcasses or trophies of wild animals;
(w) where the property is held by a body corporate 
established by law for public purposes and in 
which no moneys have been invested other than 
moneys provided by Parliament;
(x) where the property is any mineral, mineral oil or 
natural gases or of any rights accruing by virtue 
of any title or licence for the purpose of searching 
for or mining any mineral, mineral oil or natural 
gases -
(i) upon failure to comply with any provision
of such law relating to the title or licence 
or to the exercise of the rights accruing or
to the development or exploitation of any
mineral, mineral oil or natural gases; or
(ii) in terms of any saw vesting any such
property or rights in the President.
(3) An Act of Parliament such as is referred to in
subsection (1) of thas section shall, inter alia -
(i) provide that compensation shall be paid 
in money
(ii) specify the principles on which the 
compensation is to be determined; and
(iii) provide that the amount of the compensation 
shall in default of agreement be determined 
by resolution of the National Assembly.
(4) No compensation determined by the National 
Assembly in terms of any such law as is referred to 
in subsections (1) and (3) of this section shall be 
called in question in any court on the grounds that 
such compensation is not adequate.
(5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of subsection (1) of this section to the 
extent that such law makes provision for the termination 
of the Barotseland Agreement, 1964 (that is to say, the 
agreement dated 18th May, 1964, between the Government 
of Northern Rhodesia and the Litunga of Barotseland 
which provides that it may be cited by that title)
and the lapse of rights (whether vested or otherwise), 
liabilities and obligations thereunder.
Amend- _ 
ment of 
section 24 
of the 
Consti­
tution
5. Section twenty-four of the Constitution is amended by the 
deletion of subsections (4) and (5)
Repeal
and
replace­
ment
of
section 26 
of the 
Consti­
tution
6. Section twenty-six of the Constitution is repealed and 
the following section substituted therefor;
Deroga- 26. Nothing contained in or done under the authority
tion from of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with
funda- or in contravention of section 15, 18, 19, 21, 22,
mental 23, 24 or 25 of this Constitution to the extent that
rights the law in question authorises the taking, during
and any period when the Republic is at war or when a
free- declaration under section 29 of this Constitution is
doms in force, of measures for the prupose of dealing
with any situation existing or arising during that 
period; and nothing done by any person under the 
authority of any such law shall be held to be in 
contravention of any of the said provisions unless 
it is shown that the measures taken exceeded any­
thing which, having due regard to the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, could reasonably have been 
thought to be required for the purpose of dealing 
with the situation in question.
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Inser- 7. 
tion of 
new
section
after
section 26 
of the 
Consti­
tution
Provi­
sions
relating
to
restric­
tion and 
detention
The Constitution is amended by the insertion after 
section twenty-six of the following new section:
26A. (1) Where a person's freedom of movement is 
restricted, or he is detained, under the 
authority of any such law as is referred to 
in section 24 or 26 of this Constitution as 
the case may be the following provisions 
shall apply:
(a) he shall, as soon as is reasonably 
practicable and in any case not more 
than fourteen days after the commencement 
of his detention or restriction, be 
furnished with a statement in writing in 
a language that he understands specifying 
in detail the grounds upon which he is 
restricted or detained;
(b) not more than one month from the commence­
ment of his restriction or detention a 
notification shall be published in the 
Gazette stating that he has been restricted 
or detained and giving particulars of the 
provision of law under which his restric­
tion or detention is authorised;
(c) if he so requests at any time during the 
period of such restriction or detention not 
earlier than one year after the commencement 
thereof or after he last made such a request 
during that period, as the case may be, his 
case shall be reviewed by an independent 
impartial tribunal established by law and 
presided over by a person, appointed by the 
Chief Justice, who is or is qualified to be 
a judge of the High Court;
(d) he shall be afforded reasonable facilities 
to consult a legal representative of his own 
choice who shall be permitted to make 
representations to the authority by which 
the restriction or detention was ordered or 
to any tribunal established for the review 
of his case;
(e) at the hearing of his case by such tribunal 
he shall be permitted to appear in person 
or by a legal representative of his own 
choice.
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Repeal
and
replace­
ment
of
section 29 
of the 
Consti­
tution
8.
(2) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this 
section of the case of a restricted or detained person, 
the tribunal may make recommendations to the authority 
by which it was ordered concerning the necessity or 
expediency of continuing his restriction or detention but, 
unless it is otherwise provided by law, that authority 
shall not be obliged to act in accordance with any such 
recommendations.
(3) Nothing contained in subsection (1)(d) or (l)(e) of 
this section shall be construed as entitling a person to 
legal representation at the public expense.
(4) Parliament may make or provide for the making of 
rules to regulate the proceedings of any such tribunal 
including, but without dGroiatTng from the generality of 
the foregoing, rules as to evidence and the admissibility 
thereof, the receipt of evidence (including written 
reports) in the absence of the restricted or detained person 
and his legal representative, and the exclusion of the 
public from the whole or any portion of the proceedings.
(5) Subsections (10) and (11) of section 20 of this 
Constitution shall be read and construed subject to the 
provisions of this section.
(1) Section twenty-nine of the Constitution is repealed 
and the following section substituted therefor:
Decla­
rations 
relating 
to emer­
gencies 
or threa­
tened 
emergen­
cies
29. (1) The President may at any time by Proclamation
published in the Gazette declare that -
(a) a state of public emergency exists; or
(b) a situation exists which, if it is allowed to 
continue, may lead to a state of public 
emergency.
(2) (i) A declaration made under this section shall
cease to have effect on the expiration of a 
period of twenty-eight days commencing with 
the day on which the declaration is made 
unless before the expiration of such period 
it has been approved by a resolution of the 
National Assembly.
(ii) In reckoning any period of twenty-eight days 
for the purposes of this subsection no 
account shall be taken of any time during 
which Parliament is dissolved.
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Amend­
ment of 
section 62 
of the 
Consti­
tution
Amend­
ment of 
section 65 
of the 
Consti­
tution
(3) A declaration made under this section may at 
any time before it has been approved by a resolution 
of the National Assembly be revoked by the President 
by a Proclamation published in the Gazette.
(4) A declaration made under this section and approved 
by a resolution of the National Assembly in terms of 
subsection (2) of this section may at any time be 
revoked by a resolution of such Assembly supported by
a majority of all the members thereof.
(5) Whenever an election to the office of President 
results in a change in the holder of that office any 
declaration made under this section and in force 
immediately before the day on which the President 
assumes office shall cease to have effect on the 
expiration of seven days commencing with this day.
(6) The expiry or revocation of any declaration made 
under this section shall not affect the validity of 
anything previously done under such declaration
(2) Any declaration under section twenty-nine of the 
Constitution in force immediately before the commencement 
of this Act shall continue in force and shall be deemed 
to be a declaration, approved by a resolution of the 
National Assembly in terms of subsection (2) thereof, under 
the section hereby substituted.
10. Section sixty-two of the Constitution is amended in 
subsection (1) -
(i) at the end of paragraph (c), by the deletion of "or”;
(ii) at the end of paragraph (d), by the deletion of the
full-stop and the substitution therefor of or1';
(iii) by the addition of paragraph (d) of the following new 
paragraph:
(e) whose freedom of movement is restricted, or who is 
detained, under the authority of any such law as is 
referred to in section 24 or section 26 of this 
Constitution as the case may be.
11. Section sixty-five of the Constitution is amended in 
subsection (2) -
(i) at the end of paragraph (d), by the deletion of "or";
(ii) at the end of paragraph (e), by the deletion of the
full-stop and the substitution therefor of or";
(iii) by the addition after paragraph (e) of the following 
new paragraph:
(f) if under the authority of any such law as is 
referred to in section 24 or section 26 of this 
Constitution -
(i) his freedom of movement has been restricted 
or he has been detained for a continuous 
period exceeding six months; or
(ii) his freedom of movement has been restricted 
and he has immediately thereafter been 
detained for periods totalling more than 
six months; or
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(iii) he has been detained and immediately
thereafter his freedom of movement has 
been restricted for period totalling 
more than six months.
Amend- 12. 
ment of 
section 99 
of the 
Consti­
tution
(8) (a) Where the Judicial Service Commission is 
satisfied that by reason of special cir­
cumstances a person who holds one of the 
specified qualifications is worthy, capable 
and suitable to be appointed as a Justice of 
Appeal or a judge of the High Court notwith­
standing that he has not held some one or 
other of those qualifications for a total 
period of not less than five years, the 
President, acting in accordance with the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission, 
may dispense with the requirement that such 
person shall have held some one or other 
of the specified qualifications for a total 
period of not less than five years and may 
appoint him a Justice of Appeal or a judge 
of the High Court.
(b) For the purposes of this section "a person 
qualified for appointment" as a Justice of 
Appeal or a judge of the High Court as the 
case may be includes such a person as is 
referred to in paragraph (a) of this sub­
section.
Section ninety-nine of the Constitution is amended -
(i) by the deletion of subsection (3) and the 
substitution therefor of the following subsection:
(3) (a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (8)
of this section, a person shall not be
qualified for appointment as a Justice of 
Appeal or a judge of the High Court unless -
(i) he holds or has held high judicial 
office; or
(ii) he holds one of the specified quali­
fications and has held one or other 
of those qualifications for a total 
period of not less than five years.
(b) In this section "the specified
qualifications" means the professional 
qualifications specified in the Legal 
Practitioners Ordinance or in any law 
amending or replacing that Ordinance, 
one of which must be held by any person 
before he may apply under that Ordinance 
or under any such law to be admitted as 
a barrister and solicitor in the Republic.
(ii) by the addition after subsection (7) of the following 
new subsection:
APPENDIX II
b) An Act to amend the Constitution (15th December, 1972)
Enact- ENACTED by the Parliament of Zambia
ment
Short 1. This Act may be cited as the Constitution (Amendment)
title (No.5) Act, 1972, and shall be read as one with the
App.l Constitution.
Inser- 2. The Constitution is amended by the insertion after
tion Chapter II of the following new Chapter:
of new
chapter CHAPTER IIA
IIA in CHAPTER IIA
the
Consti­
tution ONE POLITICAL PARTY
One 12A. (1) There shall be one and only one political
polit- party in Zambia, namely, the United National
ical Independence Party (in this Constitution
party referred to as "the Party").
(2) Every citizen who complies with the requirements 
laid down, from time to time, by the constitution 
of the Party shall be entitled to become a 
member of the Party.
(3) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be 
so construed as to entitle any person to 
lawfully form or attempt to form any political 
party or organisation other than the Party or 
to belong to or assemble, associate, express 
opinion or do any other thing in sympathy with 
such political party or organisation
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APPENDIX II
c) An Act to amend the Societies Act (1st April 1974)
Enact­
ment
Short 
title 
Cap•105
Inser­
tion 
of new 
section 2
Politi­
cal
parties 
and organ­
isations 
to be un­
lawful 
societies
ENACTED by the Parliament of Zambia.
1. This Act may be cited as the Societies (Amendment) Act, 
1974, and shall be read as one with the Societies Act, 
hereinafter referred to as the principal Act.
3. Part IV of the principal Act is amended by the insertion 
under the heading "UNLAWFUL SOCIETIES" of the following 
new section:
22A. Every society (other than the United National 
Independence Party) which is a political party 
or has for its objects or purposes political activity 
of any kind or assembling, associating, expressing 
opinion or doing any thing in sympathy with any 
political party or organisation other than the United 
National Independence Party shall be an unlawful 
society.
